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 Preface 
 
 
 
 Marriage is an institution that plays a central role in most societies. As it 
affects decisions regarding labor supply, consumption, reproduction, and other 
important decisions, marriage receives considerable attention in academic 
circles. Much research has been done about marriage, principally by 
sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists.  
 While recognizing its importance, most economists have let marriage play a 
small role in their research. Economic theory ignores marriage almost 
completely. In their empirical studies, economists pay little attention to 
marriage, even where the evidence indicates that marital status is strongly 
related to the topic of research. If they include any reference to marriage, 
economists usually reduce marital status to the role of an exogenous control 
variable. So far, the economics of marriage, defined as the application of 
economic analysis to the study of marriage, has generated very limited interest. 
One of the reasons for this limited interest may lie in the lack of available 
books focusing on the economics of marriage. 
 As of the time of this writing, only three books on the economics of 
marriage have been published. Gary Becker's (1981) Treatise on the Family, 
published in the United States, stands out in the rigor of its mathematical 
presentation. Ivy Papps' (1980) On Love and Money, published in England, 
focusses on a limited number of applications of the economic analysis of 
marriage. The most comprehensive and readable book published on this topic 
in the past is Bertrand Lemennicier's (1988) Le Marche du Mariage et de la 
Famille. If it has not generated much interest in the economics of marriage in 
the United States or the United Kingdom, it is probably because it has not been 
translated into English. My major goals in the present book are to show that 
economics can be useful and relevant to the study of many aspects of marriage, 
and to fill some of the vacuum existing in this area. 
 Central to the book is the general theory of marriage presented in Part Two. 
The idea for that theory occurred to me during the beginning stages of my 
doctoral thesis in 1974-75. It was then that I first developed a market for 
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spousal labor and called it a "market for wife-services" (Grossbard 1976). At 
that time I also started writing on the interrelation between labor markets and 
spousal labor markets, but I did not have the opportunity to develop that idea 
until 1980, when I spent a year as a fellow at Stanford's Center for Advanced 
Study in the Behavioral Sciences. 
 In an attempt to create better communication between the disciplines 
engaged in research on marriage and thereby facilitate cross-fertilization, this 
book emphasizes materials that are most likely to interest social scientists. The 
book deals mostly with issues and data of contemporary relevance to two 
industrialized countries, namely the United States and Israel. Of the two 
chapters reporting data analysis from developing countries, the chapter 
analyzing cohabitation is very relevant to contemporary social policy in 
industrialized countries today, given the rapid increase in the incidence of 
cohabitation in the West.  
 Furthermore, this book emphasizes themes that are of interest to 
mainstream economists and sociologists. One of the central ideas of the book--
the impact of sex ratios on many aspects of behavior including labor supply--is 
an idea I started writing about in 1978 and which has become very popular in 
recent years. Another theme emphasized in the book, compensating 
differentials in marriage, will hopefully appeal to researchers in both labor 
studies and family studies. 
 Some of the themes covered in the book reflect my own research  
opportunities. I have researched polygamy in great part because Theodore W. 
Schultz and Gary Becker encouraged me to do so while I was a student at the 
University of Chicago. A summer job at Rand in 1976 offered the opportunity 
to work with William Butz studying Guatemalan data. As Guatemala is 
characterized by very high rates of cohabitation, I started to do research on 
cohabitation. An invitation to spend a year at Stanford in 1980 led to 
cooperation with Michael Keeley, who was concluding his analysis of the 
effects of Negative Income Tax experiments on divorce and labor supply. 
 Much about this book is new. Five of the fifteen chapters have never been 
published in English. Eleven chapters (Chapters 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 
15) are based on articles that have previously appeared in Hebrew, in an 
anthropology journal, in books and in economics journals of varying 
accessibility. Most of these chapters have been substantially expanded, 
rewritten, or translated. 
 Most chapters can be read without a strong background in economics or 
mathematics. Those chapters that contain some mathematical or economic 
analysis (Chapters 3, 7, 10, and 13) are preceded by introductions aiming at 
making the economics of marriage more accessible and appealing to readers 
without previous knowledge in economics. Even so, some readers may want to 
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skip Chapter 3, or at least the portions of that chapter that are formulated in 
mathematical terms. The introductions to each part and to each chapter also 
facilitate the integration of the various chapters into one book, and often also 
create bridges to existing literature. 
 This book presents a long list of hypotheses. Some chapters are mostly 
theoretical (in particular, Chapters 3, 4, 12, and 13), and the other chapters are 
mostly empirical. Even though more pages are devoted to testing hypotheses 
than to developing them, most hypotheses presented here remain either 
untested or inadequately tested. I have attempted to execute many of these tests 
on my own or in conjunction with colleagues, but providing adequate scientific 
tests for all these hypotheses has not been possible. Many of my results should 
be considered tentative, and I am sure they will be improved through the use of 
better data and methodologies. If a better understanding of marriage follows 
and as a result of such better understanding the economics of marriage can help 
us design better social policies or perhaps help us make wiser personal 
decisions regarding marriage, I will be very pleased. 
 
 
 Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman 
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 Introduction 
 This book deals with marriage from various perspectives. From the 
perspective of the different disciplines, this book deals with the economics of 
marriage to the extent that most hypotheses developed and tested are based on 
economic theory. It can also be classified as economics in the sense that it 
touches on many topics traditionally analyzed by economists, such as labor 
supply, labor productivity and earnings. This book can be classified as 
sociology, demography, or anthropology to the extent that it deals with topics 
such as marriage rates, consensual unions, polygamy, and the distribution of 
power in marriage, which have traditionally been considered part of the domain 
of these disciplines. 
 While this book contains a lot of facts and empirical findings, and touches 
on policy issues, the book's main contribution to the existing literature lies in 
the theoretical perspective it offers. The central part of the book is Part Two, 
which presents a general equilibrium theory of marriage. Years of experience 
have taught me that most people lack the motivation to read this kind of 
theoretical material on marriage. Common reasons why people shy away from 
such theory are the notions that (1) economics does not have much to add to the 
existing literature on marriage, and (2) an economic analysis of marriage leads 
to undesirable practical implications, such as denial of love and glorification of 
selfishness. Since such notions are so widespread, Part One of this book 
attempts to dispel them. 
  Addressing the first notion, the materials in Part One aim at showing that 
other disciplines do not offer close substitutes to an economic analysis of 
marriage. Chapter 1 compares the economics of marriage with some of the 
related literature found in anthropology and sociology. These disciplines 
provide a wealth of studies about marriage, including some theoretical material. 
However, sociological and anthropological theories of marriage have some 
drawbacks in comparison to economic theories of marriage.  
 Part One also addresses the second notion that discourages many people 
from reading an economic analysis of marriage, namely, the notion that an 
economic approach to the analysis of marriage leads to the denial of emotions 
and social or spiritual concerns. Most people, including most social scientists, 
think about marriage either in romantic terms, or in ethical-religious terms. To 
some extent, romanticism contradicts the economic approach. Romantics 
typically rely on feelings in making decisions, not on rational comparisons of 
costs and benefits. The romantic mentality stresses individual uniqueness, and 
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stands in sharp contrast to the economic approach in which markets play a 
central role. Chapter 2 attempts to dispel the notion that by applying economics 
to the study of marriage one suppresses basic human tendencies for love and 
intimacy. 
 Some readers may want to start directly with Part Two, which presents the 
general equilibrium theory of labor and marriage that served as inspiration to 
most of the other papers in this volume. Previous analyses of marriage, whether 
they were written by sociologists or by economists, have not integrated 
marriage markets with labor markets. This theory uses a general equilibrium 
framework to integrate labor and marriage markets. Predictions are derived 
regarding the effects of particular factors, such as individual resources and 
market size, on individual and market labor supply and marital choices. The 
two chapters in Part Two complement each other. Chapter 3 emphasizes theory 
and applications to labor supply, whereas Chapter 4 emphasizes implications 
for the study of marriage and divorce. Readers who lack a background in 
economic analysis may want to skip the first part of Chapter 3. 
 Parts Three and Four deal with implications of the theory: sex ratio effects 
and compensating differentials in marriage. A major implication of this general 
equilibrium theory integrating marriage markets with labor markets, is that the 
sex ratio of marriageable men to marriageable women may influence labor 
supply as well as marriage. Part Three consists of two chapters dealing with sex 
ratio effects. 
 The first chapter on sex ratio effects, Chapter 5, was written for a mixed 
audience of sociologists and economists, and avoids the technical jargon and 
statistical techniques familiar to economists. Chapter 6 is addressed to readers 
trained in economics or statistics and includes regression results. The two 
chapters also vary in the generality of their subject matter. Whereas Chapter 6 
focuses on only one effect of sex ratio variations, namely, its effect on the 
participation of married women in the labor force, Chapter 5 looks at the effect 
of sex ratio variations on a number of social and economic aspects of life.  
 The two papers included in Part Four both deal with compensating 
differentials in marriage. Chapter 7 is a study of married women's labor supply 
and shows how differences between husband's and wife's characteristics, 
associated with compensating differentials in marriage, add to our degree of 
understanding of women's labor force participation. The paper was written for 
an audience of economists. 
 Chapter 8 attempts to explain an aspect of similarity between husband's and 
wife's characteristics, what sociologists call homogamy. The degree of 
homogamy in one dimension, such as religion, is related to the similarity of 
husband's and wife's characteristics in other areas, such as education, age, and 
divorced status. It is assumed that compensating differentials in marriage exist. 
Hypotheses regarding the likelihood of intermarriage between members of 
different groups are derived and estimated, using the example of Jewish men in 
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the United States. 
 The general equilibrium theory of marriage and labor can be applied in 
many different ways to the study of marriage, as suggested in Chapter 4. Part 
Five presents further applications of the theory to selected aspects of marriage. 
Chapter 9 deals with marriage formality and cohabitation, Chapter 10 with 
divorce and labor supply, and Chapter 11 with polygamy. These chapters test a 
number of hypotheses regarding the effect of aggregate characteristics--such as 
sex ratios--and individual characteristics--such as education and income--on 
these aspects of marriage.  
 The theory of marriage presented in Part Two views individuals as suppliers 
of spousal labor, and defines spousal labor as any service benefiting a spouse. 
Such spousal labor is not simply about washing dishes and taking care of the 
garden, but also about investing in a spouse's human capital. People invest in 
their spouse's human capital to the extent that household labor boosts the 
spouse's earning capacity or other aspects of the spouse's  productive capacity 
(including the capacity to produce at home). The papers in Part Six of the 
volume all deal with aspects of spousal help that increase a person's human 
capital.  
 Chapters 12 to 14 deal with spousal help aimed at increasing a worker's 
earning capacity, whereas Chapter 15 focuses on the contribution of a spouse to 
an individual's religious practice, which can be considered as a particular 
aspect of home production. The last two chapters are of an empirical nature. 
They both analyze Israeli data and were written with Shoshana Neuman. Dafna 
Izraeli also collaborated on Chapter 14.  
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 PART ONE 
                                                                                  
   The Economics of Marriagee 
 in Perspective 
 Most people--including most social scientists--tend to have misconceptions 
about the economic analysis of marriage. The first two chapters address some of 
these misconceptions. The first misconception, addressed in Chapter 1, is that 
the study of marriage does not belong in economics. Chapter 1 compares the 
contribution of economics to the study of marriage with some of the research on 
marriage produced by other disciplines, principally sociology and anthropology. 
A second misconception is that an economic approach to marriage precludes 
emotions and morality. In addressing this misconception, Chapter 2 compares 
the economic perspective to other perspectives commonly used by people 
making decisions about marriage: a romantic perspective and an ethical-
religious perspective. Readers who find it natural to apply economic theory to 
marriage may want to read this part later, or skip it, and move on to Part Two. 
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 1 
                                                         The 
Economics of Marriage and 
 Other Social Sciences 
 The public at large often views economics as belonging to the domain of 
business and government policy directly related to the functioning of "the 
economy." Economics, however, can in reality be applied to any decision 
making process. Economists interpret the term "economics" as a conceptual 
framework that can be helpful any time a choice is made, be it the choice of a 
good, a service, an action, or a resource. The application of neo-classical 
economics to home-related subjects such as marriage, fertility, and 
consumption is referred to as New Home Economics. The New Home 
Economics approach was developed by Mincer (1962), Becker (1965), and 
Lancaster (1966), when they all taught at Columbia University. Their models 
were the first to incorporate household characteristics into formal models of 
labor force participation, consumption, or transportation. Because of Becker's 
central contribution and his move to the University of Chicago in the early 
seventies, the New Home Economics is part of what some people call the 
Columbia-Chicago School of Economics.      
 In its more than twenty-five years of existence, the New Home Economics 
has had a substantial impact on research dealing with areas such as the study of 
consumption and transportation. In addition, the New Home Economics has 
had a limited impact on fields previously considered outside of economics. For 
instance, it has become widely accepted that economics can be applied to the 
study of fertility. This acceptance explains why economists now present 
approximately twenty-five percent of all the papers included in the annual 
meetings of the  Population Association of America, and fill key positions in 
this professional organization. With the exception of the application of game 
theory (Manser and Brown 1980 and McElroy and Horney 1981) to the study of 
marriage, there have not been many other economic theories related to the 
study of marriage since Becker (1973, 1974a) published his first two articles on 
the economics of marriage. Of the few economists who have written on the 
economics of marriage, most have moved to other areas of research or have 
dropped out of academics altogether. The purpose of this book is to encourage 
8 Economics and Other Social Sciences 
 
 
 
and promote the application of economics to the study of marriage. 
 The rest of this chapter focuses on previous applications of neo-classical 
economics to marriage, and on how economics and some of the other 
disciplines converge and diverge with respect to the study of marriage.  
 Neo-Classical Economic Analysis of Marriage 
 Whenever a decision regarding the optimal use of time, energy, or money 
needs to be made, cost-benefit analysis, one of the basic tools of economics, can 
be helpful. This applies not only to the firm determining its level of operation, 
but also to the individual or the family making decisions regarding 
childbearing, consumption levels, or extent of participation in the labor force. 
Economics in the sense of a conceptual framework dealing with optimal 
allocation of resources is in fact applied mathematics.  
 The neo-classical economic approach assumes rationality. This rational 
approach to decision-making can be contrasted with other approaches 
commonly found among intellectuals, such as the Marxist approach which 
emphasizes material determinism, and the Freudian approach which 
emphasizes the power of instincts over man's behavior. 
 The two major tools used in general applications of neo-classical economics 
are cost-benefit analysis and market analysis: 
 l. Cost-Benefit Analysis divides the elements related to a particular decision 
into two groups: benefits and costs. The optimum point is reached when 
marginal benefit equals marginal cost. For instance, a person will spend 
money on margarine up to the amount at which the benefit derived from  
a pack of margarine equals its price. In this case the price is the marginal 
cost. If a good is not sold in the market, but is produced in the home, the 
marginal benefit needs to equal the marginal cost, which is also 
determined in the home, e.g., as a function of the value of alternative 
uses of time and money. 
 2. Market Analysis. If a good or service is not destined solely to one 
"consumer," or is not produced solely by one producer, a market exists, 
whether or not it is physically observable. There are markets for goods, 
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services, and different types of work, such as engineering, teaching, etc. 
 These two tools, cost-benefit analysis and market analysis, can be applied to 
the study of marriage. According to this economic approach, people marry 
when a (conscious or unconscious) comparison of costs and benefits makes 
marriage look profitable. Benefits can be material, social or spiritual. Costs are 
not simply financial or material.  They  depend on  the  value  a  person 
 
attaches to alternative uses of time, and can include, for instance, the value of 
the hours a person is unable to devote to studying the Bible because of 
marriage. 
 The other tool borrowed from economics is market analysis. Becker and 
before him sociologists and demographers have used the term "marriage 
market."  According to the version of the economics of marriage presented in 
this book, marriage markets consist of markets for spousal labor supplied by 
wives and husbands. Individuals participating in these markets act according to 
cost-benefit analysis and try to maximize their own utility, which can also 
include social and spiritual aspirations. Individuals make decisions about their 
willingness to (1) supply services that can be of use to a spouse, (2) supply labor 
services in the regular meaning of the term, and (3) acquire goods and services, 
including services from spouses. More on this theory is found in Part Two. 
  The nonmonetary essence of marriage makes measurement difficult and leads 
the economist to focus on less central but measurable aspects of marriage. The 
first empirical studies of marriage by economists focused on the contemporary 
United States, looking at the causes for differences in percentage of married 
women per state, individual age at marriage, and probability of divorce. 
Examples of early findings are  
 (1)  the inverse relation between the percentage of women married and 
percent Catholic across U.S. states (Freiden 1974). Freiden's 
explanation relies on the expected costs of divorce: Catholic marriages 
are less profitable because of higher expected costs of divorce.  
 (2)  positive income effect on marriage in the sense that ceteris paribus 
higher income was found to be associated with earlier marriage 
(Keeley 1979).  
 (3)  Becker, Landes, and Michael's (1977) finding of a positive income 
effect on marriage in the sense that Americans with higher income 
were found to be less likely to divorce. However, the same study also 
10 Economics and Other Social Sciences 
 
 
 
found that if wealth exceeded the level expected at time of marriage 
the chances of dissolution were higher than if wealth was as high as 
expected. This finding was explained in terms of a theory where 
divorce depends on risk and uncertainty. 
  Other topics related to marriage which economists have analyzed more 
recently, besides the topics covered in this book, include studies of the 
allocation of time in household activities (e.g., Carlin 1985), of newspaper ads 
related to marriage (e.g., Lemmenicier 1988), and child support payments (e.g., 
Beller and Graham 1986). 
 
 Economics and Sociology 
 The rich sociological literature on marriage does not appear to offer a 
comprehensive theory of marriage, if we accept Homans' definition of theory: 
"Not until one has properties, and propositions stating the relations between 
them, and the propositions form a deductive system--not until one has all three 
does one have a theory" (Homans 1964). 
 Following this definition of theory, only a small fraction of the sociological 
literature on the family that claims to be theoretical actually qualifies for that 
term. While very useful as inspiration and direction for empirical testing, the 
various propositional inventories (e.g. Goode 1959,  Hill, Katz, and Simpson 
1957,  or Nye and Berardo 1966), cannot be called theories. As to Parsons' 
(1942) grand "theory" of society, even within sociology it is considered as a 
conceptual framework rather than a theory (Hill and Hansen 1960). 
 Homans' (1961) theory and other versions of social exchange theory have 
been applied to marriage. Social exchange theory can be viewed as an 
application of price theory, as it is also based on rational choice and market 
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analysis. Two major pioneers of social exchange theory, Homans and Blau 
(1964), explicitly acknowledge their debt to economics. 
 Sociologists and social psychologists have applied social exchange theory to 
the study of separate aspects of marriage, such as intrafamilial distribution of 
power, marital stability, and dating, thereby preceding economists in the 
application of price theory to marriage. One of the earliest sociological studies 
of marriage based on the concept of bargaining is Waller (1937). Some other 
early applications include Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Blau (1964), and theories 
of intrafamilial power by Blood and Wolf (1960) and Heer (1963). Heer's 
theory is a significant improvement over Blood and Wolf's (1960) theory on 
that subject, in the sense that Blood and Wolf relied on the concepts of choice 
and maximization, but did not recognize how market principles affect the 
relative power of husband and wife. In contrast, Heer recognizes the 
importance of market factors. Another topic that has been analyzed in terms of 
social exchange theory is divorce, e.g., in Levinger's (1965) theory of marital 
stability.  
 Sociologists have also preceded economists in the application of market 
analysis to the study of marriage. Sociologists, as well as demographers, have 
focused their attention on sex ratios, a particular aspect of marriage markets 
presented here, before economists dealt with the topic.1 Demographers have 
been mostly interested in studying the effects of sex ratios on marriage. For 
instance, Glick, Beresford, and Heer 1963, Henry 1975, Goldman 1977, Smith 
1980, Schoen 1983, and Goldman, Westoff and Hammerslough 1984 have 
studied the effects of sex ratio on marriage rates. There have also been 
numerous sociological and demographic studies of sex ratio effects on 
intermarriage between various racial, religious or ethnic groups including Heer 
1962, Rosenthal 1970, Della Pergola 1976, and Fisher 1980. Less common are 
sociological studies relating sex ratios to divorce and mating patterns other 
than intermarriage (e.g. Spanier and Glick 1980, Guttentag and Secord 1983), 
suicide (Guttentag and Secord 1983, South and Trent 1989), and crime 
(Guttentag and Secord 1983, Trent and South 1988). 
 In addition, sociologists have also developed theories of marriage pertaining 
to timing and selection patterns (e.g., Rockwell 1976, Oppenheimer 1982, 
Marini 1984, DiMaggio and Mohr 1985, Wilson 1987, Oppenheimer 1988, 
Bennett, Bloom and Craig 1989, Mare 1991, Kalmijn 1991, and Blackwell 
1992). 
 Most of the sociological literature on marriage applies to separate aspects of 
marriage or typically considers one causal factor. Where sociologists of 
marriage are comprehensive they do not really deal with theory. Where they 
take a theoretical perspective, they do not typically take a comprehensive view. 
Even in the more comprehensive applications of social exchange theory to 
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marriage, such as Guttentag and Secord's (1983) Too Many Women - The Sex 
Ratio Question--which studies a wide range of socio-economic consequences of 
sex ratios--the theory is narrow in that it ignores aspects of marriage markets 
other than sex ratios.2 In contrast, economic theories tend to be more general in 
the sense that they encompass a range of applications and a range of causal 
factors. Another difference is that the sociological theories of marriage which 
incorporate the operation of marriage markets do not analyze marriage markets 
in a general equilibrium framework, as is done in Part Two of this book.   
 The type of empirical research sociologists and economists perform often 
differs as well. Until recently most economists analyzing marriage empirically 
have used more sophisticated statistical techniques than sociologists. Many of 
the sociological theories of intermarriage, intrafamily distribution of power, or 
divorce were tested using simple techniques such as two-by-two tables. When 
regression techniques were used, they were generally less sophisticated than the 
techniques used by economists testing the economics of marriage.  
 However, economics and sociology are converging from the perspective of 
applied research on marriage. Many recent studies of marriage by sociologists 
have applied statistical tools as sophisticated as those found in similar studies 
by economists (e.g., Lichter et al. 1991, South 1988). One finds more and more 
economists and sociologists cooperating on joint empirical research. Some 
sociologists have taken a lead in applying new statistical techniques to the study 
of marriage.  As in other areas of empirical research, academic affiliation is 
becoming increasingly irrelevant. This book will hopefully also contribute to a 
convergence of economics and sociology at the level of marriage theories. 
 Economics and Anthropology  
 Economics has traditionally explored the more quantifiable sectors of 
society with increasingly sophisticated theoretical and empirical tools.3 If we 
conceive social reality as a series of fields, economists generally worked on the 
scientifically most reachable ones at the intensive margin. Anthropologists, on 
the other hand, worked at the extensive margin of social science. Attempting to 
study entire cultures and venturing into the most remote communities, they 
have accumulated comprehensive insights. Given the scarcity of academic 
resources, researchers have had to make trade-offs  
between an intensive and an extensive emphasis.  While economists gave up 
breadth of knowledge, anthropologists have typically collected their 
information without much scientific methodology.  
 Recently, both economics and anthropology are extending their traditional 
boundaries: anthropology has become more concerned with the quantitative 
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intensive margin, while economists have become more interested in the 
qualitative extensive margin of inquiry. Since ethnographies have been 
collected from most existing cultures, anthropologists have become more 
involved in cultural comparisons and theoretical generalizations. 
Anthropologist Cohen (1973), who introduced a major methodological 
handbook by remarking that "the discipline as a whole does not have a 
systematic and cumulative tradition of methodological endeavor," expressed a 
"desire to see anthropology become a progressively more rigorous and scientific 
branch of the social sciences," "our primary goal...being theory-construction". 
In the same volume he also proposed a "restructuring of the social sciences 
[which] calls for methodological openness and a lack of concern for 
disciplinary boundaries." Along these lines, anthropologist Douglas (1973) 
specifically proposed that "economic analysis...be established at the center of 
anthropology itself." She saw "the need for a cost-benefit analysis that would 
apply across the board to both monetary and non-monetary transactions." 
 While more and more anthropologists concentrate less upon field work and 
more on theory and methods of analysis, economic investigation has expanded 
into the traditional specialities of other social sciences. For example, economic 
research has penetrated into the domain of the family (see, for instance, 
Theodore W. Schultz 1974) and social interactions (see Becker 1974b) and is 
creating a link with sociobiology (see Hirshleifer 1978,  Becker 1976). 
 While penetrating into new fields of study, most economists have 
maintained their allegiance to the traditional tools of analysis they have used in 
their more conventional work: cost-benefit analysis and market analysis. In 
making implicit or explicit cost-benefit analyses of marriage and divorce, 
economists realize that individuals are guided by preferences which in turn 
depend on both culture and nature. They circumvent the questions about these 
preferences by studying differences among people who live in the same culture 
and who are assumed to have adopted similar values, i.e. they are viewed as 
having the same utility functions. However, a social science of marriage needs 
to know more about the meaning of marital behavior, that is, it needs to explore 
the content of utility functions. It is not sufficient to recognize that cultural 
factors such as religion or education have an impact on percentage married or 
marital dissolution. It is especially important to study cultural factors when 
making cross-cultural generalizations, and even more so when comparing 
cultures which are far apart. Such studies of the deeper reasons for marriage 
have been a major preoccupation of anthropologists. 
 In addition to gathering huge numbers of facts about marriage around the 
world, anthropologists have analyzed marriage theoretically. Two major 
schools of anthropologists have analyzed reasons for marriage: the 
functionalists and the structuralists. Rather like sociobiologists, functionalists 
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view marriage as a means to satisfy functions like reproduction, socialization, 
and transmission. Some functionalists stress the function of marriage in 
meeting the needs of other parts of the social system while others emphasize 
physical needs like sexual gratification. This predominantly British approach, 
which leads to institutional determinism and encourages ethnocentrism, 
reached a peak in popularity before England lost its colonial empire. 
Structuralists disagree with the emphasis on nature and society as determinants 
of marriage; they think that cultural factors like relative reliance on the 
capacity to reason generate variations in the meaning (utility) individuals 
attribute to identical activities. Their analysis draws increasingly on linguistics, 
since language can be considered as a major expression of collective meaning 
(see Boon and Schneider 1974). Structuralism shares at least one assumption 
with economics: the binary oppositions, which according to Levi-Strauss (1969) 
are built in the structure of the human mind and create universal components of 
culture, appear consistent with the economist's concept of cost vs. benefit. 
 Besides these two major schools, there are evolutionary theories, ecological 
analyses illustrating the importance of the physical environment on the 
structure of marriage and descent, and Marxist analyses stressing the important 
effect of means of production. While the theoretical focus of functionalists and 
structuralists centers on meaning and utility, ecological and Marxist theories 
emphasize the importance of constraints in the real world affecting individual 
and community choice and are compatible with economic theory.  
 Furthermore, some of the concepts found in the economic analysis of 
marriage have been used in earlier studies by anthropologists. For instance, the 
concept of marriage market can be found in the work of e.g., anthropologists 
Schneider (1964) and Goldschmidt (1974). 
 Towards a General Theory 
 Historically, there have been clear lines of demarcation between economics 
and anthropology. Douglas (1973) asserts that centripetal forces attract 
resources towards the center of a discipline and discourage turbulence at the 
boundaries of a subject out of fear of losing autonomy. If she is correct, then the 
present division of the social sciences may not be more than a historical 
accident, another instance of institutional self-perpetuation. 
 These centripetal forces did not discourage Douglas. She communicated her 
interest in economic analysis of marriage and other human behavior to 
University of Chicago economist T.W. Schultz, and subsequently to 
participants in an applied economics seminar at the University of Chicago.4 
These centripetal forces also work very potently within the economics 
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profession.5  
 This book was in part inspired by Douglas' declaration of intellectual 
turbulence. Building on existing trends to stretch disciplinary boundaries, it 
proposes that economics and anthropology, together with sociology, work 
jointly towards a general study of marriage. 
 Economics can provide an umbrella theory compatible with the 
anthropology or sociology of marriage. An important message from economics 
is that the content of utility functions often does not matter in comparisons of 
culturally homogeneous units. This could help integrate fascinating 
ethnographic material in cases where there are differences of opinion between 
anthropologists interpreting the same findings according to diverging insights 
into entire societies. Pragmatically, one could accept parts of an 
anthropologist's empirical findings and generalizations, while disagreeing 
about other parts of the analysis. 
 An important contribution by anthropologists and sociologists is their expert 
knowledge of into the cultural, legal, and political constraints that bind 
individual choices. For instance, they can point out the extent to which a 
marriage market model is possibly applicable in a particular case.6 Jointly, 
anthropologists and economists could  
 (1)  focus their talents on the most difficult questions (understanding the 
meaning of utility, for instance), by taking advantage of their 
respective skills, 
 (2)  give new significance to previous ethnographic findings, and  
 (3)  collect better data. Cooperation between economists and 
anthropologists can lead to new conclusions regarding the type of data 
which should be gathered. For instance, in my attempt to explain the 
number of wives present in Maiduguri households, I found that 
traditional Muslim education--i.e., Koranic education--had an impact 
on the number of wives in a household. More precisely, male Koranic 
education tended to increase the number of wives, while the same 
Koranic education obtained by females reduced the number of co-
wives in a household. This statistical finding, based on data collected 
in the Nigerian city of Maiduguri, is consistent with an economic 
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theory of polygyny (see Chapter 11). When this finding was shown to 
anthropologist Cohen, who had spent many years doing field work in 
Maiduguri, it led him to regret not having included religious schooling 
in his own questionnaire.7 
 The present state of the general theory of marriage is definitely 
unsatisfactory. Most economists who promote it have been limited to the 
American experience. Economists have not sufficiently questioned the rationale 
behind institutional constraints. Economists can learn from anthropologists 
when studying factors which lead to the existence of institutions like polygamy, 
the levirate, patrilineality, and dowry. They also have much to learn from 
sociologists who have addressed many comparable questions such as the roles 
of men and women within the legal, social and political contexts of modern 
societies. 
 Marriage can serve as a good illustration of what social science stands to 
gain if the various disciplines join forces. All disciplines can be viewed as 
potential partners in a marriage market, a market for marriage among the 
disciplines. If it is true that a combination of extensive and intensive 
perspectives enriches social science, disciplines with the largest variation in 
intensive vs. extensive productivity have the most to gain from an 
interdisciplinary marriage. Since anthropology and economics lie respectively 
at the extensive and intensive ends of the spectrum, their gains from such 
marriage are particularly high. 
 The creation of a common language and method between disciplines is 
necessary to extend the intensive and intensify the extensive, thus building a 
science that combines the robustness of theories and empirical work with broad 
cultural perspectives.  
 This unified view on marriage represents only one possible direction of such 
an interdisciplinary marriage. It is a good starting point, not only for its 
symbolism, but also because cooperation between economics and anthropology 
has long been hindered by the lack of applicability of economics to small scale 
traditional societies or the perception of this lack of applicability. Economics is 
now changing by involving itself with marriage and other more human and less 
monetary transactions. This book is an illustration of what a general approach 
to marriage, based on economic analysis can accomplish. 
 Notes 
 1.  Part of my inspiration for writing a general theory of marriage came from my 
exposure to sociological studies of the impact of sex ratios while working at the 
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Population Research Laboratory at USC in 1978-1980. In particular, a seminar 
presented by the late William Hodge led me to delve more deeply into the study of sex 
ratio effects. 
 2.  When writing the early versions of my theory of marriage I was completely 
unaware of the work by Guttentag and Secord. It was first called to my attention by 
Noreen Goldman in Stanford in 1981. 
 3.  Adapted from Grossbard (1978a). 
 4.  T.W. Schultz, for whom I worked as a research assistant at that time (1973-
1974) encouraged me to attend Douglas' seminar, even though I was only in my second 
year of studies and did not regularly attend seminars at that time. Douglas was a 
tremendous source of inspiration. 
 5.  The cost of engaging in interdisciplinary research is very high in economics, 
based on my own experience and that of other economists who have dared to enter an 
area of study not typically considered as part of economics. While I was still in graduate 
school some of my professors warned me of the price I will have to pay in terms of 
foregone job opportunities. 
 6.  For instance, the assumption of substitutability may be untenable in a society 
with prescribed marriages. 
 7.  Related in a personal communication. 
  
 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 
 2 
                                                         The 
Economics of Marriage  
 and Belief Systems 
 An economic approach to marriage often turns people off. They perceive the 
economic approach as contradicting the lofty ideals of love in which they 
believe. In our society two belief systems which promote the ideal of love in 
marriage are romanticism and religion. These approaches are now contrasted 
with an economic approach to marriage. It is shown that these three approaches 
do not necessarily contradict each other.  
 Economics and Romanticism 
 To some extent, romanticism contradicts the economic approach. Romantics 
typically rely on feelings in making decisions, not on the rational comparison of 
costs and benefits. The romantic mentality stresses individual uniqueness and 
stands in contrast to the economic approach in which markets play a central 
role. The existence of a market is based on the assumption of limits to 
individual uniqueness. 
 An economic approach does not deny individual differences. Each person, 
each situation, can be unique in a certain sense. An economic approach takes 
account of the limits to such uniqueness and recognizes the existence of 
substitutes. In that sense, a market perspective is justified even in a sensitive 
area such as marriage.  
 The romantic belief in the existence of a unique life companion is 
commonly found among both secularized Westerners and people adhering to 
religious belief systems. The belief that marriages are made in heaven, and  
                                       
 
 Adapted from Dinei Israel, An Annual of Jewish Law: Past and Present, Vol. 12, 
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pp. 93-102, 1984-85 (in Hebrew). 
that people are destined to meet their very special soul mate, does not preclude 
an economic approach to marriage. We live in a world of uncertainty. Even 
those people who wait for signs from heaven indicating that they have met their 
Romeo or Juliet may have a hard time interpreting such signs. Meanwhile, they 
may want to do their best with the limited means at their disposal, and engage 
in an efficient search for the ideal partner in life. It is this kind of reasoning 
that lies behind the continued reliance on marriage brokers or newspaper ads in 
many parts of the world, including in some communities integrated within 
Western society, such as strictly observant Jewish communities or immigrants 
from India to the U.S. The following section shows a number of ways in which 
the economic analysis of marriage is compatible with a religious perspective, 
using the example of some Jewish laws and practices concerning marriage. 
  Economics and Judaism 
 The subject of marriage takes on great importance in traditional religions, 
including Judaism. In contrast, most scholars and intellectuals--who tend to be 
loose about observing religious precepts in their own life--consider the study of 
marriage of marginal importance. This lack of prominence of marriage as a 
topic of scientific research stands out in comparison to other research topics 
such as politics and finance. Perhaps indicative of general lack of academic 
interest in marriage, interest in the economics of marriage has been very 
limited. Far from contradicting a religious perspective to marriage, this novel 
research perspective is linked in a number of ways to the perspective of Jewish 
law. 
 According to an economic perspective on marriage, individuals, and 
perhaps their parents or other guardians, participate in marriage markets. The 
economic model views people as willing to provide a particular form of labor to 
a spouse and as having a demand for such labor from a spouse (to be presented 
in Part Two). These views are compatible with traditional Jewish law regarding 
marriage and divorce, which is based on obligations spouses have towards each 
other. What is called labor in such economic models include a wide variety of 
activities benefitting a spouse, such as contributions to household work and 
children's education. Such spousal tasks often coincide with what Jewish law 
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views as obligations of husband and wife, obligations (mitzvot) which deal with 
much more than ritual observances. Jewish law views it as an obligation of both 
husband and wife to be nice to each other. Husbands are obliged to provide for 
their wife's sustenance and material well-being, and wives are obliged to be 
primary care-takers of the home (Meiselman 1978). Many commandments deal 
with sexual life, including the commandment of ona, which commands a 
husband to satisfy his wife's sexual desire (it can be viewed as a service 
demanded by the wife and supplied by the husband).1   
 In every human society laws influence the equilibrium conditions in 
marriage markets. Many of these laws define potential justifications for divorce. 
Religious laws, such as laws prohibiting polygamy or marriages outside the 
faith, also influence marriage markets.2 A large number of rules which Jewish 
law has established concerning the obligations of husband and wife, such as the 
commandment of ona, can be viewed as expressions of wives' working 
conditions in the marriage and as means to regulate spousal labor (work within 
the marriage) and/or the compensation for such labor. 
 The usefulness of an economic approach to marriage is now illustrated with 
a number of examples related to the Jewish religion. 
Dowries Among Jews 
 When marriage markets are encouraged to function it is likely that 
payments will be made at the time of marriage. As explained in more detail in 
Chapter 3, marriage markets are viewed here as markets for spousal labor. For 
simplicity, consider a market for women's spousal labor, in which women are 
willing to work in marriage-related tasks, and husbands are willing to 
compensate their wives for their labor. Dowries are likely to be established 
when (1) equilibrium conditions in the market for women's spousal labor are 
such that--had market conditions prevailed--women would be paid low 
compensations for spousal labor, i.e. work in marriage, and (2) a society sets a 
minimum level of compensation for women's spousal labor after marriage.3  
These two conditions imply that women are being compensated above their 
equilibrium compensation levels, which is expected to cause an excess supply 
of women wanting to marry. Dowries help eliminate such excess supply. The 
minimum level of compensation for wives may be set by laws, such as Jewish 
laws specifying how a wife needs to be treated. 
 Dowries are often paid at the time tradition-oriented Jews get married. 
Dowry payments prior to marriage are most likely to be found where market 
conditions for brides are particularly bad. This is the case for brides wanting to 
marry grooms who are especially talented scholars of Jewish law. Most 
religious Jewish communities only have a small number of such outstanding 
Economics and Belief Systems 21 
 
 
 
scholars. However, the number of women and their families wanting to marry 
these grooms is large, for in accordance with traditional Jewish values, a 
woman's ultimate goal is to send her husband and children to study Jewish law. 
As a result, the supply of spousal labor by women wanting to marry these 
scholars is large in comparison to the demand for spousal labor by this limited 
number of scholars, which leads to an excess supply of women's spousal labor if 
compensation levels for such labor are not permitted to go down. Dowries then 
spring up as a means of dealing with such excess supply. Accordingly, in 
today's wealthy religious Jewish communities such dowries are often paid. In 
some cases, they can reach more than half a million dollars.  Restating this in 
terms of the theory presented in Chapter 4, the presence of dowries in certain 
religious jewish communities reflects a marriage squeeze for women in the 
market for marriage to Talmudic scholars. 
 Another possible reflection of the unfavorable market conditions faced by 
women who want to marry a scholar in Jewish law is the need for such women 
to work. Women in strictly observant Jewish communities often work to acquire 
the privilege of being married to a scholar, even though they usually have large 
families and would otherwise prefer to stay out of the labor force. Participation 
of married women in the labor force is more common in traditional Jewish 
communities with a low standard of living because it is hard to accumulate 
large dowries. It is often the case in Israel, where the high price of housing 
increases the need for earnings (even where a dowry was paid), and scholars 
are often supported by their wife's earnings from outside labor. It was also 
common in Eastern European Jewish communities for a wife or a father-in-law 
to support a scholar after marriage.  If the supply of scholarly grooms 
rises in relation to the supply of brides due, for instance, to selective migration 
of unmarried scholars without a similar increase in the number of brides, there 
will be an improvement in the marriage conditions of local (for instance, 
Israeli) brides, i.e. a marriage squeeze for women will be less acute. This may 
not be reflected much in the level of compensation women get for their spousal 
labor after marriage (which in turn affects the quality of the marital 
relationship and is fixed by religious law). Instead, it may be reflected in a 
lower need for the bride to bring a dowry or to support the family. If there 
exists such selective migration of scholars to Israel, this would imply that 
scholars would receive lower dowries in Israel than in their country of origin. 
Indeed, it appears that the families of Belgian scholars of Jewish law are 
expected to contribute substantially larger amounts of money towards their 
son's marriage if he marries an Israeli bride than if he marries a European or 
American bride.4  
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Marriage Brokers 
 It follows from an economic perspective on marriage that reliance on 
brokers should not be avoided. Brokers can facilitate transactions in many 
areas, including family formation. That marriage brokers are less popular in the 
West, including that part of Jewish Israeli society influenced more by modern 
Western values than by Jewish tradition, reflects the common emphasis on 
"marriage out of love." Contemporary Western society understates the 
importance of rational and business-like considerations when dealing with 
marriage. Both the traditional Jewish approach to marriage and the economic 
approach to marriage object to the excessive importance of feelings as criteria 
for basic decision-making regarding marriage. 
 It is interesting to notice that Jews observant of Jewish law are not the only 
modern people who rely on marriage brokers. In the Far East modern nations 
also look down at Western romanticism as a criterion for decision-making in 
the area of marriage. In this respect Japan which learned so much from the 
West, is an interesting example. After World War II Americans tried to weaken 
the strongholds of traditional power in Japan by passing a new constitution 
reducing the influence of extended family units. Accordingly, it was stated that 
a couple should not marry because of family considerations, but out of "love." 
Most Japanese still do not take this part of the constitution seriously. Parents 
often help in the search for an appropriate bride or groom (Hendry 1985). 
Marriage brokers are widely used. Employers also often help in the search 
process. Many large companies have their own computerized matchmaking 
service intended to help single employees. (See Chapters 12 and 13). 
Marriage Contracts 
 Another area where Jewish law and the economics of marriage are 
compatible is the area of marriage contracts. In view of the facts that women 
perform most services in a marriage and that marriage markets are typically 
competitive, women may want to obtain legal guarantees from their husbands.5 
  According to Jewish law, husbands are obligated to give their wives a 
marriage contract at the time of marriage.6 Such a marriage contract also serves 
as a sort of insurance policy benefitting the wife (Liebermann l983). If we 
consider the use of marriage contracts as an indicator of a rational rather than 
emotional approach, it seems that the rational approach has recently been 
gaining momentum in the United States. In part as the result of the high 
divorce rate, more and more couples who are getting married are writing 
marriage contracts or prenuptial agreements (Weitzman l983). 
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 Conclusions 
 This chapter addressed two common misconceptions regarding the 
application of economics to the study of marriage. Accepting the validity of an 
economic approach does not imply a view of people as robots solely concerned 
with the calculation of personal benefits. Marriage market analysis is relevant 
to the extent that people are not totally unique and there is a degree to which 
they can be substituted for each other. Nor does an economic approach 
necessarily deny the relevance of religious beliefs to marriage. In fact, it was 
shown that an economic approach to marriage overlaps with Jewish laws 
regarding marriage on a number of issues. It is clearly the case that the gap 
between these two approaches is smaller than that between the values presently 
popular in the West and traditional Jewish values. 
 It is apparent from this chapter that an economic analysis of marriage is 
also very relevant to laws regarding marriage and divorce in any judicial 
system. Some American law scholars interested in marriage and divorce are 
now benefitting from this type of economic analysis (see, for instance, Ellman 
1989). Likewise, religious organizations dealing with marriage and divorce law 
may learn something from the economic approach to marriage.  
 There does not seem to be anything intrinsic about the subject of marriage 
that precludes the application of economic analysis. A critical look at the belief 
systems influencing our perceptions about marriage lead to the conclusion that 
economics is as relevant to the study of marriage as it is to other areas 
commonly recognized as legitimate applications of economics.    Notes 
 1.  Jewish law does not impose a parallel commandment on wives (Meiselman 
1978). 
 2.  Polygamy was prohibited in Christianity ever since Christianity was born. 
Most Jews accepted such prohibition following Rabbi Gershon's edict in the 11th 
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Century. For Jews from Arab countries, the prohibition only dates from their recent 
forced migration to Israel and other countries prohibiting polygamy.   
 3.  See Becker (1981) and Chapter 4 in this volume. 
 4.  According to information I obtained informally. 
 5.  A theoretical analysis on this subject can be found Becker (1981). The subject 
of marriage contracts is also addressed in Chapters 4 and 9. 
 6.  In Hebrew such contract is called a "Ketuba." 
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 PART TWO 
                                                                                  
   A General Theory of Marriage  
 The general theory of marriage presented in the following two chapters 
serves as basis for the other chapters in this volume. It is a general theory in 
that it covers many causal factors and is applicable to many aspects of 
marriage, including interactions between marriage and labor supply decisions. 
Chapter 3 emphasizes the interaction between marriage and labor supply and 
derives predictions regarding labor supply based on the interaction between 
labor and marriage markets. The theory presented in Chapter 3 is also a general 
 theory of labor and marriage to the extent that it analyzes labor and marriage 
in a general equilibrium framework. While Chapter 3 focuses on labor supply 
and marriage, the chapters in Part Six examine how marriage affects labor 
productivity, a major aspect of the demand for labor. Chapter 4 presents 
applications to marriage, divorce, cohabitation, conjugal power, polygamy, 
bridewealth and dowry.  
 As Chapter 3 uses mathematical and graphical tools, some readers may 
want to skip it and move to Chapter 4. 
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 3 
                                                       
 A Theory of Allocation of Time in 
  Markets for Labor and Marriage 
 
This chapter was adapted from "A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets 
for Labor and Marriage," Economic Journal, Vol. 94, pp. 863-882, December 
1984 (hence Grossbard 1984). Grossbard (1984) was mostly written while I was 
a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at 
Stanford, in 1980-81. The bargaining theories of marriage of Manser and 
Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) appeared after this article was 
mostly written and I had not read them before this article went to press. Since 
then many more bargaining models of marriage have been published and 
consensual household models such as Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and 
Reed (1997) have appeared too (see Chapter x). Collective models of marriage 
first appeared in Chiappori (1992). While Grossbard (1984) covers much of the 
same ground as some of these later models, it is unique in its general 
equilibrium analysis of markets for labor and marriage. 
 
Economists have long recognized that the nature of the household plays a 
role in determining the supply of factors of production and the demand for 
goods and services. However, it was not until the "New Home Economics" 
(NHE) developed by Mincer (1962), Becker (1965), and Lancaster (1966), that 
household structure was given a significant role in economic theory (for more 
on the NHE see Chapter x). In the early 1980s, when this article was written, 
labor economists regularly wrote about the value of married women's time,1 and 
marital status entered economic analyses of consumption.2 However, in most 
economic models of labor supply or consumption available at that time couple 
formation was not part of the model--single persons did not marry and married 
couples did not divorce—and the markets affecting a couple or an individual 
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were markets for goods, factors or assets, not marriage markets. Marriage 
markets continued to be omitted and the assumption of a predetermined marital 
status continued to be accepted despite the existence of an abundant 
sociological on marriage markets (see Chapter 1) and the introduction of the 
economics of marriage by Becker (1973). Grossbard (1984) was the first model 
offering a theory analyzing the interdependence between labor and marriage 
markets and setting the ground for simultaneous estimations of labor supply 
and marriage. 
In this chapter it is argued that marriage market conditions influence the 
value of time in the home. For instance, the value of the time of a married 
woman varies according to the number of single men and women surrounding 
the household. Ceteris paribus, she is better off in a town with numerous single 
men than in a city disproportionately inhabited by single women. Generally, 
marriage-related market mechanisms create a mutual dependence between men 
and women who want to work, buy, or reproduce.  
This chapter has three sections: a theoretical exposition, implications for 
labor supply, and other implications. The theoretical part follows traditional 
micro-economic analysis in that it first analyzes individual decision-making 
assuming that a market equilibrium exists. This leads to the derivation of (1) an 
individual supply of homemaking work, generally a positive function of the 
compensation that can be obtained for such labor and a negative function of 
wages in regular labor markets and income from sources other than work 
(which may include welfare payments);1 (2) an individual supply of (regular) 
labor likely to decrease if the wage for homemaking work increases; and (3)  
 
an individual demand for the spouse’s homemaking work likely to be a 
negative function of the price of such labor (the quasi-wage w*). Some readers 
may want to skip the calculus and move directly to equations 3.7 through 3.9 
and Figure 3.1.  
 The theory then leads to the derivation of equilibrium wages in labor 
markets and equilibrium compensations in markets for homemaking. In a 
general equilibrium, labor markets and spousal labor markets are 
interdependent: conditions in one type of market influence conditions in all 
other markets.  
 This general theory of labor and marriage can be useful even though (1) 
quasi-wages for spousal labor cannot be measured directly, and (2) some of the 
assumptions behind a competitive market equilibrium do not always hold. All 
the usual caveats associated with neo-classical economics are applicable here. 
In addition, marriage markets function under the additional constraint of 
                                               
1
 In Grossbard (1984) ‘homemaking work’ was called ‘’spousal 
labor’; in Grossbard (1999) it was called xx.  
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monogamy. It is also recognized here that individual marriages may reflect 
some degree of bilateral monopoly. This would leave room for bargaining 
between spouses, each trying to bring the quasi-wage for spousal labor closer to 
their best interest. However, as long as divorce and remarriage are possible, the 
degree of monopoly power spouses have over each other is limited, and the 
market theory presented here is applicable.  
 The next two parts of this chapter discuss implications of this theory, 
principally to labor supply. The two principal applications are marriage squeeze 
effects on labor supply, the subject of Part Three, and compensating 
differentials, the subject of Part Four. 
 This section also sheds some new light on the meaning of differences in 
labor supply across various groups, such as ethnic or racial groups. It is 
hypothesized that if a group has low correlations between the wage of women 
in the labor market and their quasi-wage in the marriage market, these 
women's labor supply may be more elastic than that of women belonging to a 
group with high correlations between wage and quasi-wage for spousal labor. 
This idea could explain differences in the elasticity of substitution between 
black and white working wives in the United States, as well as differences in 
the elasticity of labor supply between Israeli Jewish women of European-
American descent and those of Asian-African descent. 
 A general equilibrium theory of labor and marriage markets can further our 
understanding of income and wage effects on the labor supply of married 
workers in other ways as well. The theory predicts, for instance, that income 
changes influence wives' labor supply more than they do husbands', and that 
women's labor supply is more backward bending than men's. Also, income or 
wage changes may lead spouses to adjust their labor supply in ways differing 
from adjustments by single workers, as they may take the implications of their 
behavior on expected marital stability into account. This leads to a 
simultaneous theoretical analysis of labor supply and divorce, a subject pursued 
further in Chapter 10. 
 The last section briefly mentions implications of this theory for subjects 
other than labor supply. Here the reader can find a critique of Willis's (1974) 
influential conclusions regarding the effect of male income on the fertility of 
families with working and non-working wives. Other subjects briefly discussed 
in this section are consumption, divorce settlements, and some of the subjects 
covered more in depth in Chapter 4. 
 Theory 
 To stress the mutual dependence between labor and marriage, marriage is 
analyzed within the theoretical framework of neo-classical labor economics. 
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 ), x ,h ,s ,h ,l( U = U ijiiiii  (3.1) 
Marriages are viewed as exchanges of spousal labor,3 i.e., labor which benefits 
one's (actual or potential) spouse. Examples of spousal labor are cooking, child 
care, counselling, or gardening. What transforms a household task into spousal 
labor, is that the task is performed for a longer time than one would spend on 
such a task if living alone.4 Women demand male spousal labor, and supply 
female spousal labor as well as labor in the ordinary sense of the word 
(henceforth simply labor), and similarly for men. In all, transactions take place 
in four interrelated labor markets, markets for male and female spousal labor, 
and markets for male and female labor. First, individual supply and demand 
schedules are derived. It is initially assumed that equilibrium prices have been 
established in product and factor markets. Subsequently, individual demands 
and supplies are aggregated and market equilibria are established. 
Individual Supplies and Demands 
 It is assumed that each individual makes a separate decision according to 
the same general principles of optimization. Decisions are made ex ante for 
different equilibrium market prices. The planning horizon consists of one 
period. 
 Individuals devote their time to three kinds of activity: labor, spousal labor, 
and leisure (self-oriented time).  While benefitting others, both categories of 
labor can also benefit the worker. If so, labor and spousal labor contribute 
positively to individual utility. Alternatively, labor and spousal labor may 
reduce an individual's utility, if they do not enjoy working. In sum, all three 
categories of time-use enter an individual utility function. Furthermore 
individuals derive utility from goods and services they purchase: services they 
obtain from a spouse (spousal labor supplied by j) and all other goods and 
services. Individuals accordingly have utility functions: 
 
 
 
where i,j = f, m (m = male, f = female, i  j),  l  denotes time allocated to labor, 
 h  is spousal labor,  s is self-oriented time,5 and  x  denotes commercial goods. 
  Assuming monogamy is legally imposed, labor can be obtained only from one 
spouse and hence only a single hj appears in the utility function. The marginal 
utility of the two kinds of labor can be positive or negative. Although labor is 
often unpleasant, people may derive satisfaction from contributing to others' 
well-being. It is assumed that both labor and spousal labor generally have a 
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negative marginal utility, especially after a person is already engaged in a 
certain amount of labor. For instance, if labor is measured in hours per day, a 
person's marginal utility of labor could become negative after one hour of labor 
per day. Both forms of labor create non-pecuniary rewards, and these rewards 
may vary across forms of labor, amount of time devoted to an activity, and 
individual preferences. People often enjoy working for a spouse more than for 
an employer. For instance, in the case of the same individual mentioned above, 
the marginal utility of spousal labor could become negative after two hours.6 
 As in other similar models of allocation of time and labor supply, it is 
assumed that an individual is constrained by limited time and limited income. 
What is different about this model, is that it includes spousal labor both in the 
time constraint and in the budget constraint. Individual i can earn an income 
from supplying spousal labor, that income depending on the quasi-wage paid 
per hour of spousal labor worked. That income is paid by spouse j. At the same 
time, individual i can spend part of his or her income on spousal labor supplied 
by spouse j. 
 More formally, the individual maximizes the utility given by 3.1 subject to  
 
 
a time constraint 
and a monetary budget constraint 
 where T is the maximum time available (e.g., 24 hours per day),  w  is 
market wage for labor,  w*  is quasi-wage for spousal labor,  V  is non-wage 
income, and  p  is a price vector for commercial goods and services. 
 
 The left-hand side of the budget constraint indicates that sources of 
individual income consist of labor, spousal labor, and income sources unrelated 
to work. The right-hand side consists of the individual's expenditures on 
commercial goods and services and labor supplied by the spouse. This 
individual depends on the equilibrium conditions in the markets for male and 
female spousal labor to the extent that (1) income from such labor depends on 
w*i, the quasi-wage for spousal labor which depends on the market-determined 
compensation for individual i's spousal labor, and (2) expenditures are a 
function of quasi-wage w*j, which depends on the equilibrium compensation for 
spouse's work. All individuals interested in either supplying or demanding 
  ,s + h + l = T iii  (3.2) 
  ,h * w+ x p = V + h * w+ l w jjiiiiiii          (3.3) 
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spousal labor affect the market wages for such labor (as shown in the next 
subsection). This includes married people who can possibly divorce and 
remarry.7 
 The compensation for spousal labor is not as readily observable as that for 
labor. In the case of a housewife married to a working husband, the husband 
transfers part of his income to the wife as a compensation for her spousal labor. 
She thus earns quasi-earnings from spousal labor and uses these earnings to 
purchase goods and services she enjoys, including food, lodging, or clothing. (It 
does not matter if this describes the transaction accurately. The exchange of 
work for income in the labor market can also take different forms, but nobody 
denies that there is work for pay). If both husband and wife supply labor to each 
other, barter will occur. The net income transfers may then possibly cancel out. 
 Maximizing the utility function 3.1 subject to constraints 3.2 and 3.3 yields 
supplies of labor and own spousal labor, as well as derived demands for self-
oriented time, other's spousal labor, and commercial goods. From the first-order 
conditions, and assuming p = 1, we have: 
  
which indicates that in equilibrium the real wage per hour of work is equal to 
the sum of the monetary equivalent of the value of that hour in self-oriented 
activities and of the absolute (monetary) value of the disutility of work, and 
which has the same meaning as equation 3.4, but relates spousal labor to time 
for self. Combining 3.4 and 3.5 yields equation 3.6, which expresses the trade-
off conditions between the two types of work. Expression 3.6 indicates that time 
is allocated between two occupations so that the wage in one occupation equals 
the wage in the other occupation, plus the monetary equivalent of the difference 
in marginal utility produced by these occupations.8 
  We are now ready to derive an individual supply of spousal labor (equation 
3.7) and labor (equation 3.8), as well as a demand for other's spousal labor 
  (3.4) 
  (3.5) 
  (3.6) 
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(equation 3.9). In reduced form, these variables are solely dependent on 
exogenously determined parameters, including the quasi-wages w*'s, which are 
based on quasi-wages established in marriage markets, as is shown in the next 
subsection. 
 A graphical representation of these supply functions is found in Figure 3.1. 
Panels a and b in Figure 3.1 describe examples of individual supplies of both 
kinds of labor. Panel a describes a relationship between spousal labor and its 
compensation, w*, whereas panel b presents a relationship between work and 
its compensation w. It is assumed that initial hours of work produce positive 
utility, thereby causing the supply curves to start at negative  
wage levels. The individual whose labor supplies are depicted in Figure 3.1 
enjoys the first hours of spousal labor more than the first hours of labor. 
 Both supply functions are assumed to have the characteristics giving rise to 
the standard backward-bending form, i.e., the substitution effect caused by an 
increase in the real wage (w*i in panel a and wi in panel b) initially dominates 
the income effect, but eventually the income effect comes to dominate the 
substitution effect. The equivalent of non-leisure in conventional models is here 
the sum of labor and spousal labor. Although this latter sum is predicted to 
decrease when income rises, this does not  
necessarily mean that both labor and spousal labor decrease with higher 
income.  
 Given that labor and spousal labor are alternative occupations, it follows 
that wi is inversely related to the supply of spousal labor h, and that w*i is 
inversely related to the supply of labor l. A substitution effect is likely to be 
reinforced by an income effect. Non-wage income V is expected to discourage 
both kinds of labor supply. After the derivation of market equilibria the reader 
will find a comparison between this model and traditional labor theory in terms 
of their implications for labor supply and the imputation of value of time in the 
home.  
 The demand for hj is expected to be a downward sloping function of real 
wage w*j for the usual reasons determining the slope of derived demands.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ) V ,*w ,*w ,w( h = h ijiiii  
                                   (3.7) 
)  ,* ,* ,( ll ijiii  (3.8) 
 ) V ,*w ,*w ,w( h = h ijiijj  ( .9) 
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 Fig. 3.1. Individual supplies of household labor (a) and labor (b). 
 Each productive individual in a society can be viewed as having such 
supplies of li and hi, and such demand for hj. Individual women demand male 
labor whereas individual men demand female labor. All men and women acting 
as if wages had been established in competition, in association with employers 
demanding labor,  determine those equilibrium wages. 
Market Equilibria 
  Equilibrium wages are established in the respective markets once all 
individual demands and supplies are aggregated. Our previous analysis leads to 
the derivation of individual demands and supplies in the markets for male and 
female spousal labor. It is assumed initially that there are no costs of divorce 
and remarriage and that there is one kind of woman and one kind of man. 
 Aggregate demand and supply functions for women are presented in 
equations 3.10 to 3.12, and for men in equations 3.13 to 3.15. Superscripts d 
and s denote whether a function is a supply or a demand. Capital letters are 
used to denote aggregate hours of work. 
 ), N , ,V ,p ,*w ,*w ,w(H = H ffffmff
s
f
s
f   (3.10) 
 ), N , ,V ,p ,*w ,w ,*(wL = L ffffmff
s
f
s
f    (3.11) 
 ), N , ,V ,p ,*w ,w ,*(wH = H ffffffm
d
m
d
m     (3.12) 
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 where  ß  is a factor describing tastes or productivity, and  Nf  is the number 
of women married or eligible for marriage. 
 The equations for men are analogous, subscripts  f  now being replaced by  
m, and vice-versa: 
 It was assumed that each person participates in three separate labor markets, 
as supplier of own labor and spousal labor, and as employer of spousal labor. In 
a sex-differentiated society this implies the existence of four interrelated 
markets: two markets for male and female spousal labor and two markets for 
male and female labor. A general equilibrium is obtained when all four markets 
clear. The general equilibrium model is composed of the six equations 3.10 to 
3.15 to which we need to add two equations of labor demand by employers, who 
make their decisions independently of the individuals supplying labor. It is 
assumed that from the employers' perspective workers of different gender serve 
as poor substitutes for one another, and therefore employers have separate 
demands for male and female workers. Figure 3.2 presents the four markets 
that are thus obtained. 
 The system of eight equations determines equilibrium wages and 
employment levels in each of the four markets for labor and spousal labor. 
Given demands D and supplies S, the equilibrium wages for women and men 
are respectively 1f and w 2m (panels c and d in Figure 3.2), and the equilibrium 
quasi-wages for spousal labor for women and men are respectively w 3*f and 
w 4*m (panels a and b.) The equilibrium conditions in all these markets are 
interdependent. Wages in labor markets affect marital behavior and conditions 
in the markets for spousal labor influence labor supply. Before we see how this 
general equilibrium analysis can help us gain new insights into labor supply 
(the topic of the next section) or marriage (the topic of the following section 
and of Chapter 4), let us look at some of the results obtained so far and compare 
them to other economic theories.  As in the theory of the competitive firm, 
this analysis has taken two steps: (1) individual maximization assuming 
competitive equilibrium prices have been were established, and (2) aggregation 
of individual schedules and juxtaposition of aggregate demand and supply 
leading to the derivation of these equilibrium prices. 
 Markets for spousal labor--or marriage markets--are similar to traditional 
 ), N , ,V ,p ,*w ,w ,*(wH = H mmmmfmm
s
m
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m   (3.13) 
 ), N , ,V ,p ,*w ,*w ,w(L = L mmmmfmm
s
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labor markets. In all labor markets, market forces are relatively difficult to 
identify  because of the absence of physically visible institutions, rigidities in 
compensation levels and hours of work, limitations on the relative proportion of 
pecuniary to non-pecuniary compensation, etc. Such restrictions may be 
particularly relevant in the case of spousal labor markets. Participants in 
markets for spousal labor face an additional restriction that prohibits polygamy, 
thereby forcing one-to-one matches. 9 However, in other labor markets there 
exist similar restrictions on the demand side, as we tend to get matches between 
one employer and a few employees. 
 This market model of marriage is based on the assumption that choices are 
available, which means that actual or potential spouses are substitutable. This is 
especially likely to be the case in densely populated areas. It is assumed that 
people have some freedom in deciding whether to become, or remain,  married, 
 and  in  establishing--often  implicit--reciprocal  spousal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 Markets for Labor and Marriage 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3.2. Markets for (a) Female spousal labor; (b) Male spousal labor;  
 (c) Female labor; and (d) Male labor. 
 
employment contracts. It is assumed that single persons interested in marriage 
(or their representatives) respond to market forces and decide accordingly 
whether to marry and how much spousal labor to contribute and employ. 
Married people are also viewed as responsive to markets for spousal labor, their 
response being a function of the degree of substitutability between one's current 
spouse and alternative spouses. In turn, this depends on whether recontracting 
into new marriages is costly or not. 
 In a monogamous society marriage tends to occur when at the equilibrium 
w 5*f and w 6*m a man demands the amount of spousal labor a woman wants to 
supply and that woman demands the amount of labor supplied by the man. A 
married couple in equilibrium experiences no excess demand for, or supply of, 
spousal labor at the relevant w*'s. Exchanges of such labor are egalitarian if the 
market value of her services w*f hf is identical to w*m hm, the market value of his 
services. To the extent that w*f hf exceeds w*m hm, the husband transfers goods 
(or means to purchase goods) to the wife. Net transfers from the wife to the 
husband are also possible. 
 This view of marriage may sound strange. As a description of attitudes it is 
probably not much more controversial than what economists write about 
decision making by firms. However, our goal is not to describe, but rather to 
derive testable hypotheses. Feelings are not necessarily absent from this theory. 
Personal liking can formally be incorporated in the form of a higher demand 
curve for the spousal labor of a particular person (or a shift to the right in the 
supply of such labor to that person). 
 This view of marital relations differs from previous economic analyses of 
marriage in its emphasis on the time spouses devote to each other's service. 
Changing outside factors can lead not only to changes in income redistribution 
between the spouses or to marital break-up (as in Becker 1973, 1981), but also 
to new marital labor relations. Thus a married woman's sudden realization that 
attractive labor market opportunities are open to her could possibly lead to a 
new spousal employment contract, the wife reducing her burden of spousal 
labor and using some of her additional wage income to obtain substitutes for 
her spousal labor, including perhaps her husband's spousal labor. 
 So far it has been assumed that men and women are respectively 
homogeneous. In the real world, populations are heterogeneous. People of 
certain classes, races, or religions may be forbidden to intermarry. In such 
cases, separate markets could be considered, one for each group of substitutable 
potential spouses.10 In that sense, again, spousal labor markets are not 
intrinsically different from other labor markets.  
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 The competitive market model may not always be applicable. Monopolistic 
elements enter into an existing marital relationship to the extent that divorce 
and marriage are costly (e.g., due to search costs). In that case one could find 
divergence between the market w* and the particular w* prevailing in a 
particular couple. Bilateral monopoly could often operate. Partners 
experiencing higher divorce and remarriage costs are likely to absorb more 
consequences of monopolistic exploitation (see Chapter 10). 
 The remainder of this paper deals primarily with this theory's implications 
for labor supply. It is shown that labor economics can be enriched by taking 
account of conditions in spousal labor markets, even though w*f or w*m cannot 
be directly measured. New insights are offered regarding (1) new variables that 
may affect labor supply and are not typically incorporated into labor theory, and 
(2) reinterpretations of the effect of variables included in traditional labor 
theory. 
 Implications for Labor Supply 
 The model presented here--a general theory of labor and marriage or GTM--
differs in a number of ways from traditional models of labor supply. Some of 
these differences are summarized in Table 3.1. In both models the decision to 
enter the labor force is based on a comparison of the attractiveness of work, 
measured as the wage (possibly minus the monetary equivalent of the disutility 
of work) and the attractiveness of staying at home, which is typically denoted as 
the reservation wage w*. Traditional theory of labor supply and the theory 
presented here differ first and foremost in the way they derive w*, the value of 
time in the home.  
 
 Value of Time, w*. Traditionally, w* is derived assuming a predetermined 
marital status. Households are either single persons or husband-wife teams with 
no options to marry or divorce. The assumptions common to the traditional 
literature translate into an individual supply of time for home production in the 
form of a transposed L, horizontal at the wage level the individual would 
receive if working in the market sector and vertical as soon as the time 
constraint is reached. As it is difficult to measure value of time, previous 
researchers have included variables which influence such value of time in their 
estimations of labor supply. For instance, it has been found that indicators of 
women's value of time in the home, such as number and age of children and 
husband's income, are inversely related to married women's labor supply (for an 
early example, see Mincer 1962).  
 In the traditional model, the value of a person's time depends only on 
38 Markets for Labor and Marriage 
 
 
 
household characteristics. There exists no market for spousal labor. Households 
are interdependent only to the extent that they supply work to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the same markets or that they buy goods from the same sellers. By using 
households as their decision-making units and by assuming that men and 
women are permanently bound into families, economists have lost sight of 
some important determinants of labor supply, especially the labor supply of 
married women. The realization that the supply of labor can shift following 
changes in a market-determined wage for spousal labor or quasi-wage w*, 
opens new directions for research in labor economics and in particular, for 
studies of female labor supply.  
 Whereas according to traditional theory w* is entirely established in the 
household, according to GTM, value of time in the home is partially established 
in a market for marriage. Both traditional theory and GTM recognize that the 
value of time contains a non-pecuniary or psychic component based on how 
much one values activities other than work-for-pay, including activities 
performed in the framework of marriage. Where the theories diverge is in that 
GTM recognizes that value of time w*--in particular, married women's value of 
time--may have a pecuniary (but not necessarily monetary) component as well. 
In most societies, including our own, most husbands offer their wives some 
form of material or pecuniary compensation for work married women perform 
in the framework of marriage, usually in the home. According to GTM this 
pecuniary component of the value of time varies positively with value in one's 
marriage market (the market for one's spousal labor). In particular, the better 
women's marriage market, the higher the pecuniary compensation they can get 
as wives and the higher their value of time. A number of reasons why a 
woman's value in the marriage market may vary are discussed in the remainder 
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of this chapter and in the next chapter. 
 Individual w*'s may diverge from the equilibrium w* established in one's 
marriage market to the extent that there are costs of divorce and remarriage (in 
short, costs of divorce.) 
 The more it is costly to divorce and remarry, the more the actual w* of a 
married person is likely to diverge from the w* established in the corresponding 
marriage market. For instance, a married woman to whom divorce and 
remarriage would be costly will be willing to accept a w* below the market-
determined value of time. This is analyzed in more detail in Chapter 10.  
 Furthermore, an individual w* may diverge from the market-determined w* 
due to the presence of non-pecuniary benefits from work and spousal labor. 
Even if divorce costs are zero, an individual asking w* based on equation 3.5 
may diverge from the equilibrium w* established in the market for spousal 
labor. Some people may collect an economic rent from supplying spousal labor 
to the extent that their individual asking w* is lower than the w* in the market. 
Further individual variations in w* could also be attributed to individual 
differences in spousal labor productivity.  
 According to traditional theory, the value of time in the home always 
depends on the individual's work status. If the individual works, the value of 
time w* is equal to the wage, and if she does not work, w* exceeds the wage. 
According to GTM the value of time depends on work status to the extent that 
indivisibilities in hours of work play a role. For both working and non-working 
married individuals, value of time is equal to a w* based on a market-
determined pecuniary component, divorce costs, and a non-pecuniary 
component. Assume that an individual's market w* is the one found on the left-
hand side of equation 3.6. That w* is then equal to the right-hand side of 
equation 3.6, i.e. the wage plus the difference in utility between the two 
occupations. If divorce and remarriage are costless and hours of work outside 
the home and in the household are easily divisible, the value of time equals the 
same w* established in the marriage market whether the individual works or 
not. If hours of work are not so easily divisible, the individual may have to 
spend either too much or too little time at work, in comparison to a situation of 
perfect divisibility. For instance, if there are fixed costs of going to work, a 
solution of spending 7 hours in h and 1 hour in l is not feasible. Instead the 
individual may not work outside at all, i.e. h will be 8 and l will be zero. This 
implies that the value of time w* will be higher than the left-hand side of 
equation 3.6, the market-determined w*. If the individual spends "too much" 
time at work in comparison to an optimal allocation of time, then the actual w* 
will be lower than the market-determined one. 
 The Decision to Work. Following these basic differences in the way the two 
theories define value of time at home w* the two theories also lead to different 
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hypotheses regarding labor supply. According to both theories the decision to 
work is based on a comparison of w and w*. Traditional theory estimates w* 
based on the utility of leisure. Such estimates are based on the characteristics of 
the individual or the household. The decision to work can also take account of 
the (dis)utility of labor, as is assumed in the last column of Table 3.1.  
 According to GTM, the decision to work is also based on a comparison 
between w and w*. However, GTM views w* as depending on more factors than 
those taken into consideration by traditional theory. According to GTM, w* is 
composed of a pecuniary and a non-pecuniary component. In turn, the 
pecuniary component depends on 
 (1)  the equilibrium value of the quasi-wage for spousal labor, established 
in a market for such spousal labor, and 
 (2)  costs of divorce and remarriage. 
The non-pecuniary component of w* depends on the difference in the value of 
marginal utilities of work and spousal labor h. 
 The higher the value of time--both pecuniary and non-pecuniary--the less a 
person is likely to participate in the labor force. If women prefer to perform 
household tasks at home instead of working for pay outside the home, the wage 
needs to exceed the pecuniary compensation for work in the home. 
 The introduction of a component of w* established in a market for spousal 
labor (or marriage market) leads to a number of theoretical implications which 
are derived next. New variables are introduced into the analysis of labor supply: 
namely sex ratios and group differences in marriage opportunities. I also 
discuss new interpretations of income and wage effects, and of the backward-
bending supply of labor. 
 The sexual differentiation assumed in the rest of this discussion follows 
observed patterns of division of labor, women being generally responsible for 
most household production. It is also assumed that both men and women differ 
in productivity, tastes, and income.  
Marriage Squeeze Effects 
 Demographers have defined sex ratios as the number of males divided by 
the number of females. A marriage squeeze for men occurs when the sex ratio 
exceeds 1, and a marriage suqeeze for women when the sex ratio is less than 1. 
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Sex ratios and female labor force participation are connected to the extent that 
marriage squeezes and sex ratios influence the market-determined value of time 
w*, and in turn that value of time is related to the decision to participate in the 
labor force.  
 It follows from the general equilibrium equations (3.10 to 3.15 plus two 
labor demand equations) that the number of women Nf and the number of men 
Nm are parameters which can potentially influence the equilibrium value of all 
wages w and w*. Given that the sex ratio is the ratio Nm/Nf , it follows that the 
sex ratio is also a determinant of wages and quasi-wages w*. In particular, 
given the importance of spousal labor as an alternative form of employment for 
married women, married women's value of time w* may be a function of sex 
ratio.  
 In order to derive hypotheses regarding the effect of marriage squeeze and 
sex ratio on the value of time w* and the labor supply of married women, we 
start by decomposing the sex ratio into its two components. Consider the simple 
case of an increase in Nm, the number of males, for instance due to a wave of 
all-male immigration. Such increase in Nm affects the system of equations 3.13-
3.15: men's aggregate supplies of labor and demand for wife labor all shift to 
the right. In order to predict the net effect of such increase in the number of 
men on female labor supply we divide the analysis into three stages: (1) initial 
effects on w*f (2) secondary effects on w*f and (3) effect of w*f on the amount of 
labor supplied by women.11 
 1.  Initial Effects. According to function 3.15, an increase in Nm causes an 
increase in the aggregate demand for female spousal labor. In 
graphical terms, this implies a shift to the right from D to D' in panel 
a of Figure 3.2, thereby leading to an increase in the market-
established w 7*f. Also, decreases in male equilibrium wages w 8*m 
and w 9m originate from shifts in supply in panels b and d (downward 
rigidity in wages may impede adjustment in both labor markets). 
 2.  Secondary Effects. These wage changes in turn cause more changes. 
Lower male income due to reductions in both male wages tends to 
push the aggregate demand for female spousal labor, Hf , back down.
12 
Moreover, a lower male household wage wm also tends to lead to a 
reduction in demand for Hf due to a substitution effect in home 
production and consumption (assuming male and female spousal labor 
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are substitutes). This factor will be minor if men don't engage much in 
spousal labor, as is the case in many societies. If it is assumed that 
such leftward shift in the demand for Hf from D' to D" is smaller than 
the original rightward shift from D to D', the equilibrium wage w*f 
ends up increasing in comparison to its pre-immigration level, for 
instance to post-immigration wage for wife labor w 10*f'' in Figure 3.2 
(panel a). 
 3.  Labor Supply. In turn, the rise in wage in one occupation, spousal labor, 
causes a decrease in the supply curve to the other occupation. This 
follows from equation 3.8, according to which the supply of labor is 
inversely related to w*f due to a substitution and income effect. 
Accordingly, women's supply of labor is expected to shift leftwards to 
S' in panel c.13 In addition, lower wages for male workers induce 
employers to substitute male workers for female workers, leading to a 
downward shift in D, the demand for female workers, in panel c. 
 This combination of a reduction in demand and in supply of female labor 
unambiguously leads to a reduction in total female employment. We have thus 
seen that an increase in the number of men--which brings a marriage squeeze 
for men--is predicted to cause an increase in women's value of time w* and 
therefore a decrease in total female employment. In general, 
 Hypothesis 1 
 A marriage squeeze for men is expected to be associated with less female 
labor supply than a marriage squeeze for women. 
 The aggregate employment levels in Figure 3.2 do not determine the 
division between total number of workers and hours of work per worker. The 
effect of a marriage squeeze for men is likely to act on both these dimensions: it 
will (1) reduce the proportion of women who participate in the labor force, and 
(2) decrease the number of hours individual women work outside the home.  
 While the predictions regarding the effect of a marriage squeeze for men on 
employment levels are unambiguous, the prediction regarding its effect on 
wages is ambiguous. Female wages could go up or down, depending on whether 
demand or supply shifts more in the market for women's work.14  
 Hypothesis 1 holds for all women participating in marriage markets affected 
by an increase in the number of men. If we distinguish between married women 
and single women, and both groups participate in marriage markets, we expect 
the hypothesis to hold separately for married women and for single women. 
Given that single women do not face divorce costs, their w* is likely to vary 
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more with market conditions than the w* of married women. However, it is 
expected that Hypothesis 1 is more applicable to married women than to single 
women given that an occupational choice between work and spousal labor is 
likely to be less relevant to single women than to married women. Although it 
may have been more common in the past, few single women today reduce their 
participation in the labor force in order to prepare for marriage. A correlate of 
Hypothesis 1 is therefore that 
 Hypothesis 1' 
 A marriage squeeze for men is expected to be associated with less labor 
force participation by married women than a marriage squeeze for women. 
 Related hypotheses are developed in Chapter 6, which also reports tests for 
some of the hypotheses linking marriage squeezes and labor supply. Recent 
trends in the sex ratio of those eligible for marriage and in female labor force 
participation tend to support Hypothesis 1, which states that marriage squeezes 
are related to female labor supply. As pointed out in Glick et al. (1963), 
marriage squeezes and sex ratios vary over time because (1) on average, women 
marry men who are generally somewhat older, and (2) the number of births 
fluctuates from year to year. In the early 1950s there were more men than 
women in most western countries as a result of declining numbers of births 
during the late 1920s and early 1930s. Conversely, in the mid-sixties, when the 
baby-boom generation started to reach marriageable age, women in the United 
States and other countries with similar demographic trends, began to 
experience a shortage of men. Heer (1978) and Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman 
(1981) show that this was true in the United States by 1964.15 Since the U.S. 
birth rate started a renewed downward trend from 1961, young men have been 
finding relatively few marriageable women in the 1980s. 
 Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 1' is the dramatic upsurge in the 
employment of U.S. women--married women in particular--that occurred in the 
late sixties and during the seventies, a period of marriage squeeze for women. 
This increase persisted "despite a significant slowing of the growth in real 
wages and dramatic acceleration of the rate of inflation. In fact, between 1973 
and 1975, real wages fell in two successive years, yet women's labor force 
participation continued to grow" (Niemi and Lloyd 1980). Increased 
participation despite stagnant wages supports Hypothesis 1, whereby a 
reduction in sex ratio pushes the supply of labor rightwards, whereas wages 
may go down to the extent that an increase in women's supply of labor 
dominates an increase in employers' demand for female labor following a 
decrease in male manpower. A popular alternative explanation for the growth 
in female labor supply, namely an increase in the demand for female workers, 
implies an unambiguous increase in wages.
16
 Since 1990, for the first time in 
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almost thirty years, there has been a decrease in women's labor force 
participation. This could be related to the marriage squeeze for men of the 
baby-bust generation that followed the baby-boom (see Chapter 5). 
 Additional evidence for the theory is provided by comparisons between 
blacks and whites in the United States. Black women have generally been found 
to have higher rates of participation in the labor force than white women (for 
instance, in a study of labor force attachment soon after pregnancy by Mott and 
Shapiro 1978), even after statistical control for income, education, marital 
status, and other important variables.  This can be explained by the marriage 
squeeze hypothesis stated here, for among U.S. blacks the sex ratio of those 
eligible for marriage is significantly lower than among whites, due to lower sex 
ratio at birth, higher mortality, and higher rates of imprisonment. Moreover, 
black males show a much higher tendency to intermarry with whites than do 
black females, which adds to the shortage of men experienced by black women 
(see Spanier and Glick 1980). 
Effects of Individual or Group Differences in Marriage Opportunities 
 As can be seen from equation 3.6 variation in labor force participation can 
be a consequence of variation either in wages or in the value of time in the 
home. In their empirical studies economists have looked solely at household 
characteristics (such as number and age of children or number of adults) as 
determinants of the value of women's time and those of labor supply. (See, for 
instance, Gronau 1973, Heckman 1974).17 It follows from this theory that 
individual or group differences in marriage opportunities are also related to the 
value of time in the home, and therefore labor supply. 
 The following hypothesis can possibly be tested using a variety of factors 
influencing value of time w*. 
 
 
 Hypothesis 2 
 The higher a woman's value in the marriage market, the higher her value of 
time and the lower her labor supply. 
 Value in the marriage market is not always easy to establish. As mentioned 
Markets for Labor and Marriage 45 
 
 
 
above, education and income of family of origin could possibly influence value 
in the marriage market. A woman's ability to marry into a wealthier family 
(judging from a comparison of wealth or income in the bride's and the groom's 
family), or her relative number of previous marriages, might also serve as 
indicators of her w* (holding other characteristics constant).18 
 Furthermore, the pecuniary component of a particular woman's value of 
time depends not only on her own characteristics and overall value in the 
marriage market. In the case of married women, the pecuniary component of 
w* also depends on the husband's characteristics. Compensating differentials 
may exist, whereby husbands who offer relatively low non-pecuniary benefits to 
their wife make up for such shortcoming by providing their wife with more 
generous pecuniary benefits than do husbands offering relatively high non-
pecuniary benefits. In other words, husbands can make up for an undesirable 
trait, such as old age or poor health, by sharing a higher proportion of their 
wealth with their wife. Given that the supply of labor depends on alternative 
ways of obtaining pecuniary benefits, it follows that  
 Hypothesis 3 
 Compensating differentials leading to pecuniary compensations by 
husbands to wives have a discouraging effect on wives' labor supply. 
 This hypothesis holds for a given income level of husbands, as it is assumed 
that husbands do not automatically share a fixed proportion of income with 
their wife. Hypothesis 3 will be tested in Chapter 7.  
 More hypotheses relating marriage-market factors to labor supply could be 
elaborated, but I prefer to limit this theoretical discussion to hypotheses that 
build towards the more empirical chapters found later in this book. 
Furthermore, GTM, the theory presented here, can also shed new light on 
traditional topics in labor supply theory, such as wage and income effects.  
Marriage and Wage 
 Racial or ethnic origin can not only shift the constant term in labor supply 
regressions, but it can also influence the slope of a labor supply. Wage effects 
often differ by characteristics such as racial or ethnic origin.  
Such differences in slope have been explained in the past in terms of cultural 
differences or discrimination. Traditional labor supply theory does not 
recognize that marriage market conditions can influence the elasticity of labor 
supply. It is hypothesized here that differences in marriage market conditions 
can also account for some racial or ethnic differences in wage effects.  
 In order to see how marriage market conditions can have an effect on the 
46 Markets for Labor and Marriage 
 
 
 
elasticity of labor supply consider the example of two ethnic or racial groups. 
Figure 3.3 represents the supply of two women, one from each group, with 
identical opportunities w0 and w*0 in the two relevant labor markets. 
Originally, their supply coincides at supply S. We then compare these two 
women with women who are offered a higher wage, w1. The observed elasticity 
of labor supply, based on a cross-section of each group, could differ across 
groups due to varying correlations between w and w*. If there is no link 
between w and w*, the observed elasticity is also the true elasticity However, if 
w and w* are positively correlated, for instance, because the same unmeasured 
characteristics--such as ability--raise opportunities in both the labor market and 
the spousal labor (or marriage) market, an increase in wages from w0 to w1 
leads simultaneously to both a movement along the supply curve and a leftward 
shift of the supply curve (due to a substitution effect and an income effect away 
from work). The observed elasticity then differs from the true elasticity. More 
specifically,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3.3.  Labor supply elasticity for two groups of women. 
 
 Hypothesis 4 
 The more positively w* and w are correlated in a cross-section of women, 
the lower the observed elasticity of labor supply. 
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 A case in point is the finding by Gronau (1981) that in Israel the labor force 
participation of women of Asian-African origin is more sensitive to changes in 
wage (actual or potential) than that of European-American women. Gronau's 
explanation for the higher observed elasticity of labor supply among Asian-
African women is that the former women react more to pecuniary rewards. The 
present theory leads to an alternative explanation based on ethnic differences in 
the prevalence of marriage. Marriage seems to be more prevalent among Asian-
African Jews than among European-American Jews, as indicated for instance 
by the lower percent of the population at marriageable age who is unmarried 
among Asian-African Jews. This is probably related to stricter adherence to 
traditional spouse roles among Asian-African Jews (documented for instance by 
Yogev and Ayalon 1982). As a result of these differences in marriage patterns, 
it is more likely that talented Asian-African women will specialize in spousal 
labor and not work at all outside the home, which implies a lower correlation 
between w and w* than for women of European-American origin. In turn, a 
lower observed correlation between w and w* among Asian-African women 
than among European-American women implies that the observed elasticity 
and the true elasticity are more likely to coincide in the case of Asian-African 
women than for European women. In the case of European-American women 
the supply schedule is more likely to shift leftwards to Se, implying a lower 
observed elasticity of labor supply for European-American women than for 
Asian-African women. 
 Available evidence suggests that whereas all Israeli women succeeding more 
in marriage are less likely to work, this is more so among women of Asian-
African origin. For instance, Matras and Selby (1981) found that all women 
who married men whose father had a higher occupation than their own father 
(an indicator of higher w*f) were less likely to participate in the labor force, but 
that a high w*f had a much more discouraging effect on the labor-force 
participation of Asian-African women. This could indicate that wf and w*f are 
correlated less positively in that group than among European-American Jews. 
This alternative explanation of group differences in the elasticity of labor 
supply thus seems to be applicable to Israel.19  
 Hypothesis 4 could also be applied to Black-White differences in the 
elasticity of labor supply in the United States. Hall (1973) found a positive 
elasticity of substitution for U.S. women as a whole, while he found a negative 
elasticity of substitution for a sample of U.S. black wives. Hall's finding can be 
explained in terms of black-white differences in marriage and family patterns. 
For whatever reasons (possibly a more imbalanced sex ratio among blacks), 
marriage and specialization in spousal labor are found less frequently among 
blacks than among whites. Some talented white women, who could possibly 
obtain both a high w and a high w* may end up having either a high w or a 
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high w*, as many of them have the option of specializing in spousal labor. That 
option being very rare for talented black women, one expects more of a positive 
correlation between the w and w* of various women among blacks than among 
whites. In turn, a higher correlation between w and w* among black women 
than among white women implies less of a negative elasticity of substitution in 
black women's labor supply among black women than among white women, 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. It is hoped that this interpretation of 
Hall's finding will be tested more directly, as it has important policy 
implications.  
 A general theory of labor and marriage can also be used to derive predictions 
regarding male and female differences in elasticity of labor supply. Individual 
supply of labor outside the home can be substituted for both spousal labor and 
self-oriented time. The (compensated) supply of (outside) labor by married 
women will be more elastic than that of married men in view of the larger 
possibilities of substitution between the two types of work available to women 
in comparison to men. This conclusion can also be found in traditional labor 
theory. When we analyze uncompensated wage effects which also include 
income effects, the analysis according to GTM becomes more complicated. 
Before considering such uncompensated wage effects, we look at income 
effects. 
Marriage, Divorce and Income  
 The present theory also leads to new insights regarding income effects on 
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labor supply and divorce.  Income effects on labor supply are examined here, 
and income effects on divorce are analyzed briefly in Chapter 4, and in more 
detail in Chapter 10. It follows from this theory that income effects on labor 
supply are likely to be different for men and women. Furthermore, income 
effects on the labor supply of married workers are closely related to income 
effects on divorce. We start by considering changes in income originating from 
sources other than own labor, i.e. non-wage income. It is assumed that these 
changes were not expected at the time of marriage. 
 Consider independent increases in the non-wage income of a couple initially 
in equilibrium at the market wages for spousal labor w 11*f  and w 12*m (see 
Figure 3.4). Assuming that spouse's labor is positively related to own income in 
utility function 3.1, higher incomes lead to rightward shifts in each spouse's 
demand for the other's labor (both husband and wife have a demand for spousal 
labor such as function 3.9 where the partial effect of non-wage income, V, is 
positive). If the shifts are proportional to the existing amount of spousal labor 
supplied, in most cases the shift in husband's demand for the wife's labor will 
be larger than the corresponding shift in wife's demand for the husband's labor. 
 At the same time, the willingness to supply one's own labor is most likely to 
decrease as a result of higher income V. This follows from negative partial 
effects of V on h and l according to equations 3.7 and 3.8. Graphically, this 
implies that S shifts leftwards in both panels of Figure 3.4, and probably by a 
larger absolute amount in the case of female spousal labor than in that of male 
spousal labor.  
 Assuming market wages for spousal labor have not changed (e.g., because 
few people are facing a similar increase in income), this couple now 
experiences excess demands for spousal labor. Given wives' specialization in 
spousal labor, excess demand for the wife's labor is expected to be larger than 
excess demand for the husband's labor.  
 The effects of such excess demands for spousal labor depend on whether 
divorce and remarriage are costly. With zero divorce costs, the couple who was 
previously in equilibrium in Figure 3.4 will opt for a divorce and remarriage to 
new partners with whom they do not experience excess demand for spousal 
labor. 
 If divorce is costly and the couple chooses to remain married, they can do 
two possible things: (1) let the material component of w* they give each other 
increase beyond the market level w 13*f and w 14*m, or (2) find ways to reduce 
excess demands for spousal labor.  One way to reduce such excess demand is by 
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an increase in the supply of spousal labor at the expense of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3.4.  Income effects on spousal labor. 
 
labor outside the home. To the extent that there existed an initial division 
of labor associated with larger amounts of the wife's spousal labor, this  
adjustment will require a larger reduction in the wife's labor supply than in her 
husband's. To the extent that internal adjustments in w* are limited, it follows 
that  
 Hypothesis 5 
 If a husband and wife who are married to each other experience 
independent equal increases in income, the wife's labor supply is likely to 
decrease more than the husband's. 
 This rejoins Mincer's (1962) conclusion that changes in household income 
are likely to reduce the wife's labor supply more than the husband's. What the 
present analysis adds is that it points out to some of the correlates of this 
asymmetric effect of income on husband's and wife's labor supply. It will be 
shown in Chapter 10 that the effect of income on husband's and wife's labor 
supply is likely to be more asymmetric the higher the divorce costs, the higher 
the divorce costs of the wife relatively to those of the husband, the more the 
wife's income is affected relatively to the husband's income, the fewer the 
substitutes for spousal labor, and the more women are willing to substitute 
between labor and spousal labor. 
 Part of this discussion of marriage, divorce and income effects is also 
applicable to the study of wage effects. An uncompensated wage (w) increase 
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includes (1) a positive income effect leading people to work less in general, and 
most likely also less outside the home, and (2) a positive compensated wage 
effect leading to substitution of outside labor for spousal labor and time for self. 
It follows from the theory that both these effects will have a stronger 
discouraging influence on the labor supply of wives than of husbands, if 
couples stay married. Wives will increase their spousal labor in order to bridge 
the gap between demanded and supplied spousal labor that originates from a 
wage increase experienced by both wife and husband. 
 Hypothesis 5 was tested using results from a Negative Income Tax (NIT) 
program, which transferred income as a function of earnings, and therefore 
included both a positive income effect and a negative compensated wage effect. 
These results, presented in Chapter 10, support Hypothesis 5.  
 The analysis leading to Hypothesis 5 also implies that unexpected changes 
in income will cause divorce. This is discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 
10. 
The Backward-Bending Supply of Labor 
  The traditional explanation for a backward-bending supply of labor is that 
the supply has a negative slope when a negative income effect dominates a 
positive substitution effect. The reasoning behind ethnic or racial differences in 
the elasticity of labor supply can also provide an additional rationale for a 
backward-bending supply curves. The backward-bending supply of labor could 
result from a positive correlation between w and w*, a situation relevant to 
women more than to men. Higher wage levels could cause leftward shifts in the 
supply of labor if w* and w are positively correlated (e.g., due to lack of control 
for ability). If the ensuing shift in supply is large enough, the observed supply 
schedule could have a negative slope. In order to see that, one can visualize a 
supply of labor such as the one presented in Figure 3.3, which lies to the left of 
Se, sufficiently so in order for the observed amount of labor supplied by women 
obtaining a wage w1 to be less than the amount supplied by women obtaining a 
wage w0. 
 It follows from this explanation that a backward-bending supply curve is 
more likely to be observed among women than among men. It should not come 
as a surprise, therefore, that one of the few cross-sectional studies finding a 
backward-bending supply of labor used a sample of nurses (Link and Settle 
1981).20 
 Other Implications 
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 This section briefly mentions some additional implications of this theory of 
allocation of time in markets for labor and marriage regarding consumption, 
fertility and marriage. Many of the implications for marriage are developed in 
more detail in Chapter 4. 
 Consumption. As has been mentioned by Becker (1973,1981), the relative 
position of husbands and wives in their respective marriage markets is 
predicted to influence their consumption patterns. In terms used here, the 
higher w*f relatively to w*m, the higher the wife's well-being compared to the 
husband's. One of the means by which this could be expressed is through a 
large share of household expenditures benefitting the wife rather than the 
husband. Variation in relative compensations for spousal labor could also 
explain related trends in gender differences in health, longevity, or time spent 
on recreational activities. 
 Fertility. The study of fertility is another area that could benefit from this 
theory. It follows from the theory presented above that there will be no strong 
contrast between male income effects on the fertility of married women who are 
not employed outside the home and those effects on married women working 
outside the home. In contrast, according to Willis (1974) and others following 
his approach, an increase in husband's income will not affect the time cost of 
children of a married woman employed in the labor force, unless she is induced 
to stop working outside the home, whereas such increase in husband's income 
is expected to lead to an increase in the value of time of a housewife. From 
Willis' point of view, so long as a woman is working outside the home, the 
value of her time equals her wage and is unaffected by changes in male income. 
But if male income rises and the wife is not working outside, the demand for 
spousal labor shifts upwards, her value of time in the home and cost of children 
rise, which attenuates the impact of an income effect. This leads Willis to 
predict that the absolute value of a male income effect on fertility will be larger 
if the wife works outside the home than if she does not.  
 In contrast, it follows from this model that a woman's value of time in the 
home is determined in a market for spousal labor. A rise in the demand for 
women's spousal labor resulting from an increase in male income may be 
associated with an increase in the value of time in the home (w*), even for 
women working outside the home. For instance, in the case of time series, 
increases in aggregate male incomes are expected to cause a rightward shift in 
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demand for women's spousal labor, and therefore an increase in w*, the value 
of women's time. However, it remains true that a shift in demand at a point 
where the supply is closer to vertical will cause a larger increase in w* than an 
upward shift in demand at a point where the supply curve is more elastic, and 
that supply is less likely to be elastic when women do not work outside the 
home. Also, as pointed out earlier, income effects on value of time depend on 
divorce costs. But according to the present approach, it does not necessary 
follow that the male income effect on fertility will be stronger if labor force 
participation by married women is more widespread, an implication stated in 
Willis (1974). It is therefore not surprising that Ermisch's (1979) analysis of 
British time series of fertility and Butz and Ward's (1979) analysis of such 
series for the United States did not show that male income had a stronger 
positive effect if women participated in the labor force. Whatever one's source 
of interest it is important to appreciate that, according to equation 3.6, the value 
of someone's time in the home does not need to be equal to their wage in the 
labor market (assuming they work). People who are much more productive in 
the labor market than in the marriage market, which would be reflected in a w* 
much lower than w, will probably devote small amounts of time to spousal 
labor. For example, the successful executive with an average market w* may 
spend few but very enjoyable hours working in spousal labor (including time 
devoted to children beyond the amount of time that the executive would 
contribute as a single parent). 
 Alimony. The implications of this theory for value of time in the home are 
also relevant for the determination of alimony or life insurance benefits. One 
can use some of the ideas presented here in determining optimal methods for 
property and income distribution at divorce. The emphasis on household 
employment and market-established values of spousal labor  implies (1) less 
emphasis on the number of hours a person works outside the home than is 
presently the case: wives (or husbands) who work outside the home should not 
necessarily be deprived of a compensation at the time of divorce, nor should 
full-time housewives necessarily receive a large compensation; (2) less 
emphasis on income unrelated to spousal labor; (3) a return to the more 
individualized divorce settlements which many jurisdictions have recently 
replaced by simplified procedures. Marriages involve a great variety of (often 
implicit) reciprocal employment contracts, and at dissolution each case needs to 
be studied separately. 
 Finally this theory has many insights to offer regarding our understanding 
of variations in marriage and divorce rates, preference for cohabitation versus 
formal marriage, acceptance of polygamy, intermarriage, or age at marriage. 
These are pursued further in the rest of this book. 
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 Summary and Conclusions 
 This chapter has presented a theory of interrelated labor and marriage 
markets. Demand and supply schedules for labor and spousal labor were 
derived based on a theory of allocation of time and on the assumption that 
individuals can enter and discontinue marriage contracts. Particular emphasis 
was given to the theory's implications for the study of labor supply. Among the 
major insights derived from the model are the hypotheses that labor force 
participation of married women varies with the extent of marriage squeezes, 
that income changes influence wives' labor supply more than husbands', that 
group differences in patterns of division of spousal labor influence the elasticity 
of female labor supply, and that a positive correlation between achievement in 
markets for labor and spousal labor can provide an additional explanation for 
the backward-bending supply of labor. The theory also offers interesting 
insights regarding consumption, fertility, and marriage. 
 Further research ought to refine the theoretical apparatus presented here, 
test it against further empirical evidence, and explore its implications for public 
policy. Numerous laws and government programs affect women's labor force 
participation, marriage, fertility, and divorce, as well as the relative welfare of 
men and women, whether married or not. This theory will hopefully add to our 
understanding of the consequences of public policy for production, 
reproduction, and the distribution of wealth. 
 
 
 Notes 
 1.  The derivation of value of time in the home, also called the shadow wage, 
follows the economic theory of allocation of time.  
 2.  Marital status obviously counts in economic analyses of fertility (see Becker 
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1960, for instance). 
 3.  For the purpose of this discussion, no distinction is made between formalized 
marriage and living together arrangements. It is assumed that spouses are heterosexual.  
 4.  A similar distinction between work at home and leisure is made in Gronau 
(1977).  
 5.  The same activity could be either work or self-oriented time, depending on the 
circumstances or the person. Because no distinction is made between consumption and 
production, the time single persons devote to activities such as cooking or cleaning 
generates positive utility.  
 6.  A person supplying either kind of labor in the range of negative or zero wages, 
is performing volunteer work. 
 7.  If costs of such recontracting are positive, this could make divorce 
prohibitively costly and lead to a discrepancy between a married person's actual w* and 
the w*i that person could receive on the market. Likewise, "on-the-job" training 
occurring during marriage could cause such discrepancy. 
 8.  The original Economic Journal article also contained an adaptation of 
Becker's (1965) concept of full income incorporating market-determined w*'s.  
 9.  Even in societies allowing polygamy, specific rules limit the kinds and 
numbers of marriages. For an economic analysis of polygamy see Becker (1973) and 
Chapter 11 here. 
 10. Such separation is done in the analysis of intermarriage found in Chapter 8. 
 11. It is assumed that the influx of men does not affect the aggregate demand for 
total labor and the level of non-wage income. The following hypotheses 1 and 1' are 
about the effect of the number of men, allowing the total population to change. If one 
were to analyze the effect of sex ratios keeping the size of the total population constant, 
it would follow that an increase in sex ratio would be accompanied by both an increase 
in the number of men and a decrease in the number of women. In that case an additional 
initial effect would be a leftward shift in women's supply of labor, which would cause 
the wages of female workers to increase, a factor encouraging women's labor force 
participation. This effect will be stronger if male and female workers are poor 
substitutes in the labor market.  
 12. This will be true as long as the goods and services produced with the help of 
women's spousal labor have a positive income elasticity. Note that part of the reduction 
in demand comes from men who were already married. 
 13. Women with higher income will generally choose to work less, implying in 
most cases a smaller propensity to supply spousal labor (see the next section on income 
effects). The supply of female labor is also expected to shift to the left if the number of 
women decreases as the number of men increases, leaving the total population size 
unchanged. Consequently, a given woman might not necessarily be less likely to work 
when the sex ratio increases. She will be more willing to work to the extent that her 
wage increases, and less willing to work to the extent that her quasi-wage for spousal 
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labor increases. 
 14. In addition, there could also be shifts in women's demand for male spousal 
labor and supply of own spousal labor as a result of changes in income and in w*m, 
leading to further ripple effects. These and other presumably small ripple effects are 
ignored. 
 15. Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman (1981) compared the number of unmarried 
males aged 20-29 to unmarried females aged 18-29. The dividing line between the two 
kinds of marriage squeeze was set at 1.00 (see Chapter 5). 
 16. An additional explanation for a possible rightward shift in the supply of 
female labor has been attributed to changes in female ideology following the surge of 
the feminist movement. Such explanation is hard to differentiate from the marriage 
squeeze explanation given the data available. However, Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman 
(1981) view the feminist movement in part as another consequence of the female 
marriage squeeze. 
 17. Household characteristics such as household size and labor force participation 
have been analyzed as jointly determined, for instance, by Cain and Dooley (1976) and 
Carliner et al. (1981). 
 18. As argued in Chapter 9, in certain societies formalization of marriage can also 
indicate a woman's higher w*. In ladino villages in Guatemala, women with more 
schooling and coming from better homes were found more likely to be married formally 
rather than to be living consensually. This can be connected with DaVanzo's (1972) 
finding that in Chile, women cohabiting without a formal marriage are more likely to 
participate in the labor force than women married formally. Since DaVanzo analyzed 
labor supply, marriage type and wages simultaneously, an alternative explanation--that 
working women prefer cohabitation--is not so likely. 
 19. Another explanation views women from the two ethnic groups on the same 
supply schedule, but at different points corresponding to different wage levels. 
 20. Relying on data from time series, some have viewed secular declines in hours 
of work as evidence for a backward-bending supply curve (e.g., Cain and Watts 1973). 
However, these studies did not isolate factors other than wages and incomes such as 
technological change. 
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 4 
                                                       
 Theoretical Implications  
 for Marriage 
 The general theory of marriage based on price theory that was presented in 
Chapter 3 can be applied to the study of a variety of aspects of marriage. This 
chapter develops some hypotheses regarding incidence of marriage and divorce, 
consensual unions, distribution of power in the household, and incidence of 
dowry and bridewealth. It also summarizes other hypotheses regarding divorce, 
intermarriage and polygamy that are developed elsewhere in the book.  
 This chapter starts by summarizing the theoretical framework found in the 
previous chapter. The theory is then extended in ways amenable to the study of 
various aspects of marriage. The compensation for spousal labor, the quasi-
wage w*, is decomposed into components capturing various aspects of 
marriage. In the discussion found at the end of this chapter one can find a 
partial comparison between this theory of marriage and two alternative theories 
widely used by social scientists who engage in the study of marriage: resource 
theory and sociobiological theory. 
 This market theory of marriage is an expansion of labor economics. It views 
wives and husbands as performing a variety of labor-services for each other in 
the framework of marriage or sexual cohabitation (we temporarily 
ignore formal and ceremonial distinctions). The term spousal labor is used to 
include any task people perform for the benefit of a  spouse  or  partner 
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and beyond their own needs. Examples of such tasks include child-bearing, 
child-rearing, household chores, or spouse counseling. 
 The exact composition of spousal labor varies from marriage to marriage 
and from culture to culture. Parenting services are an important component, but 
they are by no means essential to marriage.1 People with no intention to bear 
children marry in many societies. Some spousal labor is performed exclusively 
by women (childbearing, for example), and in most societies many other 
services are performed principally by women.   
 Most people are ready to perform spousal labor. The amount of time they 
are willing to devote to such activity depends on the hourly compensation 
involved. The relationship between readiness to work as a spouse and 
compensation level for such work can be depicted as a supply of spousal labor. 
A supply of spousal labor depicted in panel a of Figure 3.4 indicates how 
individual i is willing to supply more hours of spousal labor at a higher 
compensation level w*. 
 Most people are interested in obtaining spousal labor. For instance, a man's 
demand curve indicates how much female spousal labor he wants to obtain at 
different levels of compensation. Most women are also interested in obtaining 
spousal labor from men. A woman's demand curve indicates how much male 
spousal labor she wants to obtain at different levels of compensation. Generally, 
the cheaper a service, the more its users will rely on it, and therefore demands 
for spousal labor are downward-sloping. 
 Men and women involved or interested in marriage are interrelated via 
markets for spousal labor. Markets for spousal labor (or marriage markets) are 
obtained when aggregate demand for spousal labor and supply of spousal labor 
are juxtaposed. In the marriage market for women, the demand for spousal 
labor is by men and the supply of spousal labor by women, while in the 
marriage market for men the demand for spousal labor is by women and the 
supply of spousal labor is by men. 
 A market equilibrium is obtained at the intersection of demand and supply. 
In the markets for men's and women's spousal labor depicted in panels a and b 
of Figure 3.4, the equilibrium w*m and w*f stand respectively for the average 
compensation that men are willing to offer women and that women are willing 
to offer men in order to have a spouse work for them.2 Marriage tends to occur 
between individual men and women who satisfy each other's demand for 
spousal labor at the equilibrium w* levels. A net transfer occurs if the value of 
one spouse's labor, as valued in the relevant marriage market, exceeds the value 
of the other spouse's labor. As women typically engage in more spousal labor 
than men, such net transfer is typically "paid" by the husband to the wife. This 
transfer is termed the compensation for women's spousal labor or women's 
spousal income.3 
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 The word "paid" has to be interpreted in a general way, for unlike 
compensations for other types of labor, the compensation for women's spousal 
labor is mainly non-monetary. In most societies, this compensation can be 
decomposed into the following elements: a material component consisting of 
goods and services consumed by the wife (including food and shelter), and a 
non-material component consisting e.g. of household services performed by the 
husband for the wife's benefit, expected stability of the relationship, or relative 
power of the wife in the home.  
 Market forces establish an equilibrium value of quasi-wage w*, but do not 
specify the form compensations for spousal labor may take. Cultures vary 
widely in the rules, guidelines, and customs by which they regulate total 
compensation for spousal labor and its components. In societies where marriage 
is basically the only honorable way by which women can make a living, the 
material compensation for spousal labor takes on more relative importance than 
in societies where women have other ways to support themselves materially. 
Laws can affect the size and composition of compensations for spousal labor, 
e.g., by determining how a husband's property passes to his wife, by requiring 
that certain powers be given or be taken away from women, or by punishing 
husbands who abuse their wives.4 
 Certain forms of compensation for spousal labor are found only within a 
particular cultural context, while other forms are found in many cultures. 
Trade-offs tend to occur between the different components. The following 
aspects of marriage may be components of the compensation for spousal labor. 
 Marriage Formality.  Most cultures make distinctions between formal 
unions called marriage and informal unions or cohabitation. Even though one 
notices many moves to equalize the rights of common-law and legal wives 
(Bruch 1981), it still remains true that under most circumstances legal wives 
are entitled to more protection in case of separation or husband's death. As a 
result, formal marriages tend to be more stable than cohabitating unions. The 
higher expected stability associated with marriage formality can be viewed as a 
component of the compensation for spousal labor, to the extent that people 
prefer a commitment from their mate.  
 It may be assumed that women have a higher desire for commitment than 
men due to the higher costs they may anticipate from an unexpected marital 
disruption, especially if children are involved. Consequently, given that net 
transfers of compensations for spousal labor tend to go from husband to wife 
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rather than vice-versa, women may obtain part of their net compensation for 
spousal labor in the form of a promise of increased stability.  
 Power.  To the extent that people generally prefer to be more in control of 
their lives, they prefer to make decisions related to their relationship with their 
spouse and the spousal labor they perform. Power is used in the sense of 
orchestration power and is defined following Safilios-Rothschild (1976) as "the 
power to make not only the important and frequent decisions that do not 
infringe upon their time but that determine the family life style and the major 
characteristics and features of their family." The higher her total compensation 
for spousal labor, the more a married woman is likely to have power in 
household decision-making.5 Factors associated with high compensations for 
women's spousal labor are therefore likely to increase these women's power. A 
few such factors are analyzed in this chapter, leading to a number of 
hypotheses.  
 Dowry and Bridewealth.  Another aspect of marriage also relates to w*, but 
is of a different nature. In certain cultural contexts, bridewealth or dowry 
payments are negotiated prior to marriage. Bridewealth and dowry are very 
different from each other. Bridewealth is usually paid to the wife's relatives 
prior to marriage, with the wife rarely benefiting from that payment. Dowry is 
usually paid by the wife's relatives to the couple getting married.  
 Such transfer payments at marriage originate from rigid rules regarding 
compensation levels for spousal labor after marriage. If elements of women's 
compensations for spousal labor are fixed by law or tradition, individual 
variations in spousal compensations after marriage will be limited. 
Consequently, one may find transfers negotiated prior to marriage which 
capture some of the positive or negative differences between the net 
compensation for women's spousal labor set by law and the value of such 
compensation, had market-clearing w* been allowed to operate.6 For instance, 
if women's equilibrium w* is very low, and the w* set by law exceeds the 
equilibrium w* (which is especially likely when a substantial portion of the 
compensation for women's spousal labor consists of in-kind and indivisible 
goods such as housing), one may find a compensatory dowry payment made 
prior to marriage. Such payment is a transfer from the wife's family to the 
groom (or his family). In contrast, if the equilibrium w* in the market for 
women's spousal labor is substantial relative to a society's standard of living, 
but laws and customs prevent women from receiving compensations for spousal 
labor corresponding to their market value after marriage, then one tends to find 
transfer payments called bridewealth, which are paid by the groom and his 
family to the relatives of the bride who control her marriage decision.  
 Polygamy.  Within a different cultural context, that of a polygynous society, 
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the number of co-wives in a household can be viewed as a component of the 
value of spousal labor.7  One expects that in a polygynous household at least 
one category of spousal labor that husbands supply to wives will on average be 
inferior to what it would be in a monogamous situation, namely spousal labor 
necessitating the husband's physical availability and readiness.8 In a 
polygynous society, women with low w* are less likely to obtain monogamous 
privileges than women with high w*.9 Hypotheses regarding polygamy are 
derived in Chapter 11. 
 Overview of Hypotheses 
 This book offers hypotheses covering a wide range of dependent variables 
related to marriage: incidence and timing of marriage, cohabitation and 
marriage formality, conjugal power, bridewealth and dowry, intermarriage, 
divorce and polygamy. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 4.1, which 
lists dependent variables in columns 1 to 8, and explanatory variables in rows 1 
to 12.10 The numbers in the boxes indicate the hypothesis number used 
throughout this book. The hypotheses are numbered sequentially according to 
their order of appearance in Parts Two to Four. (Another set of hypotheses 
regarding productivity at work and earnings is found in Part Six). Footnotes at 
the end of the table refer readers to the chapter in which the hypothesis is 
presented. Where no chapter is mentioned, the hypothesis is presented later in 
this chapter. 
 Given gender asymmetry in marriage, hypotheses are specified by gender. 
For simplicity, each aspect of marriage will be studied mostly from the 
perspective of one gender, generally women's.  
 In explaining these various aspects of marriage, we use explanatory 
variables at both the micro-individual level and the macro-aggregate level. 
Macro level explanatory variables include characteristics of nations, cultures, 
and marriage markets. They influence individual marital behavior by 
influencing things such as the importance of children, the existence and costs 
of substitutes for spousal labor, the relative number of men and women in a 
marriage market, the size of a marriage market, inequality among men, 
inequality among women, and the prohibition of polygamy. The micro 
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explanatory variables included here are female wage, female income, female 
spousal productivity, male income, male spousal productivity, and previous 
divorce. Examples of indicators of spousal productivity, i.e. productivity in 
spousal labor, are education (assuming other effects of education have been 
controlled for) and age. Variables such as physical appearance and basic 
personality characteristics are also very important in influencing marital 
behavior. However, relative to the variables covered here, they are relatively 
more difficult to measure and are not as likely to produce macro-level changes 
or differentials in marriage. 
 The hypotheses all deal with partial effects, i.e. when looking at the effect of 
a particular variable, it is assumed that all other variables are held constant. 
These hypotheses deal with comparative statics in the sense that 
we compare two situations differing in terms of one element, and the dynamic 
process of change is overlooked.  
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  In this chapter little evidence is reported regarding the validity of these 
hypotheses. Some of the hypotheses are tested in later chapters. The hypotheses 
can be tested using (1) cross-cultural comparisons. For instance, does a 
particular society have certain laws or customs, such as dowry or bridewealth, 
polygamy, or consensual union, (2) individual variations in such aspects of 
marriage within a given society, or (3) time series. 
 The rest of this chapter explains many of the hypotheses. The following 
discussion is organized by dependent variable, i.e. by column in Table 4.1. At 
the end of the chapter, there is a brief discussion by row--i.e. by explanatory 
factor--as well. Table 4.1 starts by summarizing the five hypotheses dealing 
with women's labor supply that were derived in the previous chapter. Column 
1, labelled "woman in the labor force," also includes additional hypotheses that 
will be presented in later chapters. The next column contains hypotheses 
regarding incidence of marriage, to which we turn now. 
 Incidence of Marriage and Divorce  
 Incidence of marriage can be measured in many different ways, such as 
percentage of the population married by a certain age, likelihood that a 
particular individual or group is married, or average age at marriage. High 
incidence of marriage also tends to be associated with low divorce rates. Any 
factor causing an increase in the supply or demand of spousal labor is expected 
to increase the incidence of marriage.11 A systematic inquiry into factors that 
can possibly explain increases in demand and supply of spousal labor leads to a 
series of hypotheses. Many of these hypotheses regarding the incidence of 
marriage are similar to hypotheses that have previously been developed in the 
sociological and economic literature. The discussion starts with three macro 
level factors: demand for children, cost of substitutes for spousal labor, and 
numbers of men and women (sex ratio). 
Macro Level 
 Demand for Children. The demand for spousal labor is a positive function 
of the demand for children. The individual demands for spousal labor by both 
men and women depend on the value of children. In all societies, given the 
scarcity of substitutes for a wife's childbearing capacity, the value to men of 
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motherhood services is an important component of the value they place on a 
unit of spousal labor.12  Men to whom children are very important may also be 
willing to supply more spousal labor to their wives than men who do not care 
much about children. 
 Women's demand for men's spousal labor and their supply of spousal labor 
also depends on the demand for children. Women placing importance on 
having children within wedlock and wanting more such children have a higher 
demand for spousal labor by men than women who do not. The importance of 
legitimate children to women can also be seen as a factor leading to a large 
supply of spousal labor by women.13   
 The higher the demand for women's spousal labor, and the higher the 
supply of women's spousal labor, the higher the incidence of marriage. 
Likewise, the higher the demand for men's spousal labor, and the higher the 
supply of men's spousal labor, the higher the incidence of marriage. At this 
stage marriage stands for any monogamous relationship between men and 
women, and variations in marriage formality are ignored. Given that an 
increase in the demand for children causes an increase in all demands and 
supplies of spousal labor, it follows that 
 Hypothesis 6 
 The more important children--in particular, legitimate children--are in a 
society, the higher the incidence of marriage and the lower the incidence of 
divorce.  
 This implies that where children are more important, and where it is more 
important to have children within wedlock, one expects to find a higher 
percentage of the population who will have married at least one time before 
they reach the end of their reproductive career. One also expects to find an 
inverse relationship between number of children per marriage (typically a 
function of importance of children) and divorce, as the same reasons who lead 
people to marry will lead them to stay married. 
 There is plenty of empirical evidence showing that marriage is related to the 
demand for children, and particularly legitimate children. For instance, the 
incidence of marriage is considerably higher in countries where fertility rates 
are high than in countries where fertility rates are low. It has also been found 
that children often act as a deterrent to divorce. 
 Cost of Household Help. The demand for spousal labor is a positive 
function of the cost of other services that could substitute for spousal labor. 
Both the individual demands for spousal labor by men and by women depend 
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on the cost of these alternatives. For instance, if men do not like to cook, or are 
not allowed to cook as is the case in some cultures, they are more likely to 
desire spousal labor. Also, the harder it is for women to find substitutes for 
husband's spousal labor and the more costly such substitutes, the higher 
women's demand for spousal labor. Where women have restricted property 
rights, for instance, wealthy women have a high demand for husbands as 
managers of their property. 
 At the same time, if it assumed that spousal labor complements activities 
people perform for their own satisfaction, the higher the costs of substitutes to 
spousal labor, the more individual men and women will be willing to supply 
such labor.14  
 Given that an increase in the cost of substitutes to spousal labor is expected 
to cause increases in all demands and supplies of spousal labor, it follows that 
 Hypothesis 7 
 The more costly substitutes to spousal labor, the higher the incidence of 
marriage and the lower the incidence of divorce. 
  An example of evidence supporting Hypothesis 7 can be found in the effect 
of the AIDS epidemic on monogamous relationships. Casual sexual 
relationships are a substitute for monogamous sexual relationships, one aspect 
of the exchange of spousal labor. Even though we are not witnessing significant 
increases in the incidence of marriage since the epidemic became a serious 
problem (many other factors affect changes in incidence of marriage over time), 
monogamous relationships--often taking the form of cohabitation--may be on 
the rise (Cooper 1992). Another example can be found among the Kanuri, a 
people living in Eastern Nigeria. Kanuri custom prohibits men from cooking 
and grown sons often do not have the option of eating at their mother's home.  
This increases their demand for spousal labor and helps explain why the 
percent of women who are married is very high among the Kanuri (Cohen 
1971). 
 Marriage Squeezes. Marriage squeezes for men tend to occur when the sex 
ratio--the number of men divided by the number of women--exceeds 1, and the 
opposite is true of marriage squeezes for women.  As was shown in Chapter 3, 
the larger the number of men (or the smaller the number of women) in a 
Theoretical Implications for Marriage 67 
 
 
 
society, the higher the aggregate demand for women's spousal labor, and the 
larger the total amount of spousal labor performed by women (assuming the 
number of women is constant.) Furthermore, increasing numbers of men in the 
market results in a higher aggregate supply of spousal labor by men, which 
does not mean a higher incidence of marriage among men.15 Such increase in 
the relative number of men can cause a marriage squeeze for men. In 
interpreting the following hypotheses it is important to remember that, so far, 
marriage has been defined as a monogamous union, whether formalized or not. 
 Hypothesis 8.1 
 Marriage squeezes for men in a society are expected to be associated with a 
higher incidence of marriage among women than marriage squeezes for 
women. 
 
 If the number of women increases, and monogamy is legally imposed as the 
only legal form of sexual union,16 a symmetric argument implies that  
 Hypothesis 8.2 
 Marriage squeezes for women in a society are expected to be associated 
with a higher incidence of marriage among men than marriage squeezes for 
women. 
 
 A higher incidence of marriage tends to be associated with a lower 
incidence of divorce. Therefore, Hypothesis 8.1 is related to Hypothesis 8.3: 
  Hypothesis 8.3 
 Marriage squeezes for men in a society are expected to be associated with a 
lower incidence of divorce among women than marriage squeezes for 
women. 
 Likewise, the number of men, the number of women, sex ratios and 
marriage squeezes are also expected to be associated with variations in divorce 
among men. Let us now turn to the effect of some individual (micro) 
differences within a population--the effect of income, education and age--on the 
incidence of marriage.  
Micro Level 
 Here it is worth noticing that these variables are likely to have a different 
impact on various measures of the incidence of marriage. In particular a 
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distinction needs to be made between effects on likelihood of marriage and 
likelihood of divorce. A distinction also needs to be made between variations 
over time experienced by particular individuals, and variability across 
individuals. 
 Income. Consider overall increases in income over time, or a comparison 
between low-income and high-income societies. Consider income which 
originates from sources other than labor and assume wages are constant. 
Income changes can affect marriage due to shifts in both demand for spousal 
labor and supply of spousal labor. Let us look at the demand side first. The 
higher their income, the more people tend to desire most goods and services, 
including spousal labor. Goods whose demand increases with income are called 
normal goods in economics. It is assumed that goods produced by spouses are 
normal from the perspective of both men's and women's demand for the spousal 
labor needed to produce such goods. For instance, as people's income increases, 
they may demand more spousal labor in the form of feedback through 
communication, intimacy, gourmet meal preparation, entertainment, etc. It 
implies that (everything else being constant) demand for spousal labor is likely 
to increase as income increases. We now turn to the supply side. 
 Men and women are generally less willing to work as their income 
increases, and this includes reduced willingness to supply spousal labor. This is 
where the so-called independence effect comes in. If they can afford it, many 
individuals prefer to work less in general, which includes less work in spousal 
labor. Consequently, one expects lower supplies of spousal labor as income 
increases. Increases in income are thus expected to be associated with lower 
supply and higher demand for spousal labor by both men and women. In other 
words, within a market for women's spousal labor for instance, an increase in 
income causes shifts in demand and supply going in opposite directions. As 
pointed out in Chapter 3, in equilibrium a market for spousal labor establishes a 
quantity--the amount of spousal labor supplied, which corresponds to certain 
levels of incidence and timing of marriage--and a quasi-wage w* for spousal 
labor. Figure 3.4 shows such shifts in demand and supply due to income 
increases. 
 The net effect of these four shifts caused by an increase in income--two left-
ward shifts in supply and two right-ward shifts in demand in two different 
markets--is ambiguous in terms of their impact on quantity of spousal labor 
supplied. Within each market--spousal labor by men and women--it is not clear 
whether shifts in demand will dominate shifts in supply or vice-versa.17 If a 
right-ward shift (increase) in demand exceeds a leftward shift (decrease) in 
supply we expect an increase in quantity of spousal labor supplied, 
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corresponding to an increase in incidence of marriage. However, if a left-ward 
shift in supply exceeds a right-ward shift in demand, we expect a decrease in 
the incidence of marriage. People will marry more and divorce less if the 
income effect on demand for spousal labor dominates the income effect on 
supply of spousal labor.  
 It follows that when all individuals in a marriage market experience 
changes in income,  
 Hypothesis 9 
 There is no clear prediction regarding the effect of income on incidence of 
marriage. An income effect on marriage will be positive if the effect of 
income on demand for spousal labor dominates its effect on the supply of 
spousal labor. 
 Previous studies analyzing income effects on marriage and divorce have 
often overlooked one or the other of these two sides. For instance, in analyzing 
such income effects Becker (1973) has basically ignored the supply of spousal 
labor. He assumed income affects gain from marriage, and his concept of gain 
from marriage corresponds to the sum of the consumer surpluses under the 
demand for spousal labor by men and women. Consequently, his theory leads to 
the prediction of positive effects of permanent expected income (see below) on 
the likelihood of marriage. Other studies have overlooked the demand side, 
focussing on the independence effect related to supply. 
 The effect of income on marriage and divorce depends also on whether an 
income change is expected to be permanent or transitory. A transitory increase 
in income is expected to last over a short period and is likely to have a limited 
effect on behavior. In contrast, increases in permanent income--expected to last 
over a long future period--are likely to have a substantial impact on demand 
and supply of spousal labor. The effect of income on marriage and divorce is 
also a function of how many people experience similar changes in income. If 
expected changes in income are limited to selected individuals in a marriage 
market, this may induce such individuals to prefer a strategy of sequential 
marriage and divorce, the partner chosen to suit individual needs at a particular 
stage in the life-cycle. If a significant proportion of the individual men or 
women in a marriage market experience similar changes in income, income 
changes are not expected to have much of an impact on marriage and divorce 
(see Chapter 10).  
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 A further determinant of income effects on marriage and divorce is the 
extent to which income changes are expected or unexpected at the time of 
marriage. Unexpected changes can lead to changes in demand and supply of 
spousal labor. To the extent that conditions in marriage markets and quasi-
wages for spousal labor based on market conditions do not change, such 
unexpected changes can cause excess demand or excess supply of spousal labor, 
and therefore may cause divorce. 
 Hypothesis 9' 
 Unexpected changes in income lead to divorce. 
 Expected changes may not affect the demand or supply of spousal labor as 
much as unexpected changes, and therefore are less likely to cause divorce. 
 Empirically, whether we compare countries or individuals within a given 
society, there does not seem to be a clear association between income and 
incidence of marriage. More on income effects on divorce, including an 
empirical analysis, is found in Chapter 10. 
 Wages. When analyzing the effects of changes in wages that can be 
obtained in the labor market, we need to make a distinction between own wage 
effects--i.e. the effect of changes in a person's own wage--and spouse's wage 
effects. Let us start with own wage effects. People who can earn higher wages 
in the labor market are likely to experience a decrease in their supply of spousal 
labor. This follows from the choice people often have between earning income 
by working in a regular job or by working as a spouse in the context of 
marriage, a choice available to women more than men. So on the supply side, 
increases in wage clearly cause left-ward shifts in supply, what could be called 
independence effects. More precisely, this follows from both an income effect 
and a substitution effect (substitution between two kinds of labor). Again, 
demand and supply of spousal labor are expected to be affected in opposite 
directions. Even if an increase in wage is compensated by a corresponding 
reduction in income, i.e. we have a compensated wage effect, such increase in 
wage is likely to cause an increase in the demand for spousal labor. This 
follows from the possible substitution between own time and spouse's time in 
the household. The higher the wage, the more an individual will seek to replace 
his or her own time in the household for others' time, including labor by a 
spouse.18 
 When spouse's wages increase, people are expected to demand less spousal 
labor. They substitute other services and commercial goods for spousal labor. 
They may also replace spousal labor with their own labor, which implies that 
they supply more spousal labor themselves. When all wages change, we thus 
have a complex case of demand- and supply-driven shifts in markets for male 
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and female spousal labor. Consider a specific example, the case of an increase 
in female wages, which can be interpreted as an own wage effect for women, 
and as a spouse's wage effect for men. 
 When female wages increase, both the demand for female spousal labor by 
men and the supply of female spousal labor by women decrease, which clearly 
implies less marriage among women. However, the demand for male spousal 
labor by women and the supply of male spousal labor by men is expected to 
increase, which implies more marriage among men. To the extent that the 
effects of an increase in female wages on female spousal labor dominate the 
effects of an increase in female wages on male spousal labor, it is predicted that 
 Hypothesis 10 
 Higher female wages are expected to be associated with a lower incidence 
of marriage, especially so, the more women's spousal labor is important in 
comparison to men's spousal labor.  
 This implies that women earning higher wages are less likely to be married 
and more likely to divorce. Empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis is 
mixed (see Oppenheimer 1992). The absence of conclusive evidence in support 
of Hypothesis 10 and the apparent association between a time trend towards 
higher female wages and lower participation of men in the labor force suggests 
that we can not ignore male spousal labor when analyzing the effect of female 
wages on the incidence of marriage. 
 When male wages increase we expect both the supply of spousal labor by 
men and women's demand for men's spousal labor to decrease. At the same 
time, the supply of women's spousal labor and men's demand for women's 
spousal labor are expected to increase. To the extent that changes in the market 
for women's spousal labor dominate changes in the market for men's spousal 
labor, it is predicted that 
 Hypothesis 11 
 Higher male wages are expected to be associated with a higher incidence of 
marriage, especially so, the more women's spousal labor is important in 
comparison to men's spousal labor. 
 This explains why many studies have found male income and proportions of 
men employed to be positively associated with incidence of marriage, whereas 
male unemployment is negatively associated with incidence of marriage (e.g., 
Oppenheimer 1992; Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart and Landry 1992). 
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 When all wages rise, the total predicted effect on marriage is not clear. 
Assuming male spousal labor does not matter and combining hypotheses 10 
and 11 leads to a prediction found in Becker (1973), namely that the lower the 
relative wage of women in comparison to that of men, the higher the incidence 
of marriage. Many researchers, including Becker (1973) and Cigno (1991), 
have explained drops in the incidence of marriage over time as a function of a 
historical increase in the relative wages of women. Other studies indicate no 
clear effect of relative female wage on marriage timing, (Oppenheimer 1992) 
which is consistent with this analysis, assuming men's spousal labor matter, i.e. 
men's work in marriage varies and is an important aspect of any analysis of 
incidence of marriage or marriage timing. 
 Education and Productivity in Household Labor. The analysis of the effect 
of education on the incidence of marriage is somewhat more complex. 
Education can affect the markets for marriage in at least four ways. It can affect 
(1) income, (2) preferences, (3) wages in the labor market, and (4) productivity 
in spousal labor. (Even if we control for income and wage, education can affect 
future incomes and wages).  
 (1)  We saw that the predicted effect of changes in income on the incidence 
of marriage is ambiguous.  
 (2)  Education is very likely to affect peoples' expectations of marriage in 
terms of what marriage means to them (the concept of preferences), 
but it is not clear a priori in what direction.  
 (3)  To the extent that more education implies higher wages in the labor 
market, we expect that increased levels of female education will be 
associated with a lower incidence of marriage, primarily for women, 
whereas higher levels of male education are expected to increase the 
incidence of marriage. 
 (4)  However, to the extent that more educated women are more productive 
workers in the household, it follows that higher education is expected 
to raise the incidence of marriage.19  
 In general, if we consider productivity in spousal labor, whether it originates 
from better or more education or from other sources,  
 Hypothesis 12 
 A higher incidence of marriage is expected among people with higher 
productivity in spousal labor. 
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 To the extent that education is an indicator of productivity in spousal labor, 
more educated people are more likely to be married. 
 This hypothesis is relevant for women more than men, to the extent that 
they engage more in spousal labor. Whether education contributes to  
productivity in the household is an empirical question that will be partially 
addressed in Chapters 9 and 11 and in Part Six. Another possible variable 
influencing productivity in spousal labor is age. The more an individual is close 
to what is considered an optimal age for marriage in a given society, the more 
this person is likely to be married. Empirical findings confirming this 
prediction are also found in Chapters 9 and 11. 
 The next column in Table 4.1 presents hypotheses dealing with the 
probability of divorce. In general, a prediction of increased incidence of 
marriage corresponds to a prediction of reduced probability of divorce. Some 
more specific hypotheses about divorce, which will be developed in Chapter 10, 
are also summarized in this table. 
 Next we turn to hypotheses relating the same factors to another aspect of 
marriage, namely marriage formality. 
 Marriage Formality and Cohabitation  
 As mentioned above, one of the aspects of marriage that can possibly be 
interpreted as a compensation for spousal labor is marriage formality. It was 
assumed that women value the commitment inherent in a formal marriage 
more than men do, and that they will therefore opt to translate part of their 
compensation for spousal labor into marriage formality. In this section a 
number of hypotheses are formulated regarding the effect of the same factors 
discussed in the previous section, this time in terms of their effect on marriage 
formality. The theory of marriage formality presented here takes three steps: (1) 
effect of a factor on shifts in demand and supply of male and female spousal 
labor, (2) effect of such shifts on market w*'s and on amount of spousal labor 
supplied, and (3) implications for female spousal income, of which expected 
stability in the form of marriage formality is one component (as explained 
earlier in this chapter.) The explanatory variables are in the same order as they 
appeared above in the discussion of incidence and timing of marriage. Macro-
level factors are followed by micro level factors. 
Macro Level 
 Demand for children. The demand for children is the willingness to incur 
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the cost of children and depends on both the value of children and the cost of 
children. Here it is critical to distinguish between demand for children in 
general, and demand for legitimate children. Let us consider the value of 
children irrespectively of their legal status. The demand for spousal labor by 
both men and women is a positive function of the demand for children. Women 
and men who demand more children--perhaps because children are more 
important to them--are also willing to supply more spousal labor than people 
who have less demand for children. 
 The higher the aggregate demand for spousal labor, and the larger the 
aggregate supply of spousal labor, the larger the total amount of time people 
spend working as spouses. As we saw earlier, this implies a higher incidence of 
marriage. Likewise, it may also mean that married individuals are spending 
more time working in marriage as suppliers of spousal labor. 
 Given that a higher importance placed on children causes both demand and 
supply to shift to the right in the markets for male and female spousal labor, it 
is not clear what that will do to the equilibrium (hourly) quasi-wages w*'s 
established in these markets. Even if we assume that these quasi-wages do not 
change as a result of the increased demand for children, the net result of 
increased time spent working as a spouse (h) and unchanged w* is an increase 
in women's spousal income, which implies that 20  
 Hypothesis 13 
 The more importance attached to children, the higher the incidence of 
marriage formality and the lower the incidence of cohabitation. 
 
 Evidence for this hypothesis can possibly be found in time trends, cross-
country comparisons, and cross-sectional data within a given society. Time 
trends indicate that recent increases in the popularity of cohabitation in the 
West coincide with a decrease in the demand for children. As for individual 
comparisons within one culture, people who are formally married typically 
have more children than people who cohabit. 
 Instead of looking at the importance of children in general, we may want to 
consider the importance of legitimate children. Given that such children are 
typically born and raised by formally married parents, it is obvious that when 
legitimate children are more important, marriage formality is more likely to be 
found. 
 Cost of Household Help. The analysis regarding demand for children can 
also be applied to the effect of the cost of household help (by others than a 
spouse.) The higher the cost of household help, the larger the demands for 
spousal labor and the supplies of spousal labor. This tends to cause an increase 
in women's net income from spousal labor, and therefore in the expected 
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stability component of that income. Therefore, 
 Hypothesis 14 
 The more costly are substitutes to spousal labor, the higher the percentage 
of the adult population that is formally married and the lower the incidence 
of cohabitation. 
 Marriage Squeezes.  The more men in a marriage market, the higher the 
aggregate demand for female spousal labor, the higher the supply of male 
spousal labor, which may cause a marriage squeeze for men. In such 
circumstances the value of female spousal labor may be high, and therefore  
 Hypothesis 15 
 A marriage squeeze for men is expected to be associated with a higher 
incidence of marriage formality and a lower incidence of cohabitation 
among women, than a marriage squeeze for women. 
 
 This is true if we limit ourselves to a sample of women who either cohabit 
or are formally married (i.e. single status is ruled out). Chapter 5 explores this 
in further detail. If the number of women increases relatively to that of men, 
causing a marriage squeeze for women, and men only have a choice between 
marriage and cohabitation it follows that a marriage squeeze for women is 
expected to be associated with a lower incidence of marriage formality and a 
higher incidence of cohabitation among men than a marriage for women. 
 Given these gender differences in preference for cohabitation, it follows that 
if a distinction is introduced between marriage and cohabitation, marriage 
squeezes will not have the exact opposite effect on incidence of marriage 
among women (Hypothesis 8.1) and on incidence of marriage among men 
(Hypothesis 8.2). This follows from a stronger preference for cohabitation 
among men than among women. When cohabitation is a third alternative, 
marriage squeezes have a larger impact on incidence of marriage among 
women than on incidence of marriage among men. For instance, a marriage 
squeeze for men implies that more women enter relationships, be they marriage 
or cohabitation. At the same time, a marriage squeeze for men implies a higher 
ratio of marriage to cohabitation. Therefore, women marry more in a situation 
of marriage squeeze for men for two reasons: they enter more relationships and 
they are more likely to convince men that these relationships should be 
marriages. In contrast, when there is a marriage squeeze for men, men are less 
likely to enter relationships, but these relationships are more likely to be 
marriages than other unions. Thus, for women two forces work in the same 
direction, whereas for men these same two forces work in opposite directions.  
This can be stated as 
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 Hypothesis 8.4 
 Variations in marriage squeeze are expected to be associated with more 
variation in the proportion of married women than in the proportion of 
married men. 
 Let us now turn to the effect of individual differences within a population--
for instance, the effect of income, education and age--on the formality of 
marriage and the incidence of cohabitation.  
Micro level 
Given that the hypotheses depend on the assumption of women's relative 
preference for expected stability, we need to analyze the effects of male and 
female characteristics separately. As this theory is developed in more detail in 
Chapter 9, the following hypotheses are stated briefly here. 
 Female Income. Women who have access to income which does not 
originate from working either as a spouse or on a job, are likely to have a 
higher demand for spousal labor than women unable to rely on such non-work 
income (see above). The demand for their spousal labor on the part of men is 
likely to be high, for men hope to benefit from some of that income.21 Rich 
women are likely to supply less spousal labor 22, so that it is not clear what will 
be the effect of female income on the amount of spousal labor actually supplied 
by women. However, it is clear that income is likely to raise a woman's w*. The 
net spousal income of rich women is likely to exceed that of poor women, 
implying more marriage formality if the proportion of spousal income going to 
expected stability and material benefits remain constant. Furthermore, it is 
possible that rich women value material benefits received from a husband less 
than poor women do, and rich women may get a higher proportion of their 
spousal income in the form of expected stability. It follows that 
 Hypothesis 16 
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 Women with higher incomes are more likely to be formally married and less 
likely to cohabit than women with lower incomes. 
 Evidence for this hypothesis is presented in Chapter 9. 
 Female Wage. Women who can earn higher wages in the labor market are 
likely to experience a decrease in their supply of spousal labor, as explained 
earlier. An increase in female wages is also likely to cause an increase in 
women's demand for spousal labor and a decrease in men's demand for spousal 
labor (due to substitution between alternative factors of production within the 
household)n This implies that the total amount of time women with high wages 
spend in spousal labor is likely to be less than the time women with low wages 
spend, and there is no clear prediction regarding the market w*f. In addition, 
the demand for male spousal labor by women and the supply of male spousal 
labor is expected to increase, which implies more w*mhm. This implies that the 
net spousal income of women is likely to decrease when their wages increase. 
From that perspective, we expect less expected stability and more cohabitation. 
However, if women have incomes from sources other than spousal labor, they 
are likely to prefer a mix of spousal income including fewer material benefits 
and more expected stability, so the total effect of female wage on marriage 
formality is ambiguous. 
 Female Education. Assuming that education reflects productivity in spousal 
labor, it follows that  
 Hypothesis 17 
 To the extent that education is an indicator of productivity in spousal labor, 
more educated women are more likely to be formally married and less likely 
to cohabit. 
 This is tested in Chapter 9. Any other correlate of women's productivity in 
spousal labor is likely to be negatively associated with cohabitation. Another 
measurable aspect of productivity is age. The closer women are to an optimal 
age for marriage, the less they are likely to cohabit. 
 Male Income. As explained in Chapter 9, higher male income is likely to 
imply a higher material component in women's spousal income. Given that a 
trade-off is expected between the two components of female spousal income, 
material benefits and expected stability of the relationship, men with higher 
incomes are more likely to cohabit than men with lower incomes. On the other 
hand, men with higher incomes are expected to have a higher demand for 
spousal labor. This implies higher expected stability in the relationship and 
lower likelihood of cohabitation. It follows that  
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 Hypothesis 18 
 Men with higher incomes may be less likely to be formally married and 
more likely to cohabit than men with lower incomes, especially if men's 
demand for spousal labor is not income elastic. 
 This hypothesis is tested in Chapter 9. To the extent that men do not engage 
in much spousal labor, the analysis of the effect of higher male wages is similar 
to the analysis of the effect of higher male income. Likewise, if male education 
is viewed principally in terms of its income-enhancing role, the same analysis 
applies. 
 One could also add a hypothesis about other compensating differentials in 
marriage and marriage formality. Following the analysis of compensating 
differentials presented in Chapter 3 (see also Part Four) it is expected that men 
with less desirable characteristics--desirable as defined in marriage markets--
are likely to transfer a higher total compensation for spousal labor to their wife 
(excluding the value of men's spousal labor). If the material component of that 
compensation is kept constant, it is predicted that men with less desirable 
characteristics are more likely to marry formally and less likely to cohabitate 
than men with more desirable characteristics. However, it could be--as in the 
case of income--that some of these desirable characteristics are also associated 
with higher demand for spousal labor, and therefore a higher likelihood of 
formal marriage. Assuming demand for spousal labor is constant, 
 Hypothesis 18' 
 Men with less desirable characteristics are more likely to be formally 
married than men with more desirable characteristics. 
 As was mentioned earlier, spousal income can take many forms, including 
material benefits, expected stability in the form of marriage formality, and 
power in decision-making, as defined above. The same reasoning which was 
used to derive hypotheses regarding marriage formality can also be used to 
explain the distribution of power in the household. 
 Power in the Household  
 Husbands would prefer more power to themselves while giving less power to 
their wives, whereas the opposite is true of wives. The higher a woman's (net) 
spousal income, the more influential she is expected to be in household 
decision-making relatively to her spouse. The hypotheses related to marital 
power are very similar to Hypotheses 13-18' dealing with cohabitation, and are 
summarized in column 4 of Table 4.1. The discussion here is brief, and follows 
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the same reasoning as that of the previous section. 
 19. The more value attached to children, the more power women are likely 
to have in the household.  
 This is true from the perspective of women's total value as suppliers of 
spousal labor. However, as mentioned above, a society may determine rules, 
laws and customs, which take away women's power and set women's value 
below the market equilibrium w*. 
 20. The more costly substitutes to spousal labor, the more power women are 
expected to have power in the home. 
 21. Marriage squeezes for men are expected to be associated with more 
power of women in the home than marriage squeezes for women. 
 Hypotheses 19 and 20 are parallel to Hypotheses 13 and 14. Hypotheses 
regarding the relative power of women need to be tested within a given culture. 
The maximum and minimum amount of power available to women tends to be 
prescribed culturally. In certain cultures, such as traditional Muslim societies, 
women's power tends to be very restricted. It could still be true that within such 
society women with characteristics that are highly valued in the marriage 
market may get higher total compensation and therefore have relatively more 
power in comparison to women without such characteristics. 
 A separate question of great interest--why certain societies grant more 
power to women than others--may not lend itself well to the economic analysis 
presented here. Cross-cultural variations in women's relative power may need 
to be explained in terms of political economy, as argued by Guttentag and 
Secord (1983). According to such analysis, men have more of an incentive to 
forcefully take power away from women when women are more valuable in 
marriage. This implies that the higher the value of the net compensation for 
spousal labor which men have to pay women according to market-determined 
w*'s, the more it is likely that they will use political means to force women's 
quasi-wage w* at a level below the market-clearing w*.  
 The following two hypotheses look at the effect of women's characteristics 
on power in the marriage and are the equivalent of Hypotheses 16 and 17. 
 22. Women with higher incomes are likely to have more power in the home, 
relative to women with lower incomes. 
 23. To the extent that education is an indicator of productivity of spousal 
labor, more educated women are likely to have more power in the home. 
relative to less educated women. 
 Evidence has been reported for Hypothesis 23. Various empirical studies 
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suggest a direct relationship between a wife's education and her relative power 
in the marriage. Controlling for husband's education, Blood and Wolfe (1960) 
found this to be true for an American sample and Michel (1967) for a French 
sample. Although no empirical analysis has plotted a quadratic function of age 
in an equation predicting the relative power of wives, it has been reported that 
wives have less power when they are either very young or relatively old (Blood 
and Wolfe 1960).  
 The following hypothesis is the equivalent of Hypothesis 18:  
 24. Men with higher incomes may be likely to have more power in the home 
than men with lower incomes, especially if their demand for spousal labor 
is not income elastic. 
 The prediction here is not clear, as men's income sometimes automatically 
increases the material component of women's income from spousal labor, 
thereby causing compensatory decreases in other possible components of 
women's spousal income, such as power in marriage. But if the demand for 
spousal labor is income elastic, one expects women married to men with higher 
incomes to have more power than women married to men with lower incomes. 
This may explain the contradictory findings of numerous studies of conjugal 
power regarding the effect of male income on conjugal power (for a summary, 
see Scanzoni 1979). 
 I now present hypotheses relating the same factors to the level or the 
incidence of dowry or bridewealth, the subject of column 6.  
 Dowry and Bridewealth 
 Dowry and bridewealth are two types of transfer payments at marriage. 
They originate from rigid rules regarding the compensation for spousal labor 
after marriage. As argued above, dowry is likely to be associated with a w* for 
women set by custom or law at a level above its market equilibrium level. This 
is likely to occur when the equilibrium w* is low in the first place. If laws and 
customs set w* at an artificially low level which prevents women from 
receiving spousal income corresponding to their market value, one tends to find 
transfer payments called bridewealth paid by the groom and his family to the 
relatives of the bride controlling her marriage decision. 
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 We now return to the same factors considered in previous hypotheses. Any 
factor likely to raise women's net spousal income, based on the market w*, is 
likely to increase the likelihood of a bridewealth system, reduce the likelihood 
of a dowry system, increase the amount of bridewealth or decrease the amount 
of dowry. The hypotheses are formulated in terms of levels of dowry or 
bridewealth, rather than in terms of one transfer payment or another. 
 25. The more value attached to children, the lower the expected dowry and 
the higher the expected bridewealth. 
 
 26. The more costly substitutes to spousal labor, the lower the expected 
dowry and the higher the expected bridewealth. 
 
 27. Marriage squeezes for men (relative to women) are expected to result in 
lower dowries or higher bridewealth payments than marriage squeezes for 
women. 
 
 28. To the extent that education is an indicator of the productivity in 
spousal labor, more educated women are likely to pay a lower dowry or to 
receive more bridewealth. 
 
 29. Men with higher incomes are likely to receive a higher dowry or to pay 
a lower bridewealth (especially if men's demand for spousal labor is not 
income elastic and all other characteristics are held constant.) 
 
 Evidence for Hypothesis 27 has been reported by Goldschmidt (1974), who 
found that at times of better overall economic performance in their region, the 
Seibei of sub-Saharan Africa experienced higher bridewealth payments. 
 This hypothesis can also be used to explain why men with scarce and 
desirable characteristics receive higher dowries or pay lower bridewealth 
payments. This follows from their desirable position in spousal labor (or 
marriage markets). When women with given characteristics are relatively 
scarce, the dowries paid are likely to be low or bridewealth payments are likely 
to be high. Circumstantial evidence for such views was mentioned in Chapter 
2. If it is true that religious Jewish brides from Israel bring lower dowry 
payments to marriage than comparable brides from other countries, it could 
partially be explained by the existence of a marriage squeeze for men among 
religious Jews in Israel and a marriage squeeze for women outside of Israel 
(alternatively, lower dowries could be the result of lower incomes of Israelis in 
comparison to American or Western European Jews). 
 Marriage squeezes in particular marriage markets depend on the rules for 
intermarriage between men and women with certain characteristics. Interpreted 
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in this context, such rules explain why women from higher classes in 
traditional societies (such as India today or France in the 17th Century) 
generally bring high dowries to a marriage. These societies often prohibit 
higher class women from marrying men from lower classes, while higher class 
men are allowed to marry women from lower classes. Such gender asymmetry 
created a marriage squeeze for higher class women. The relatively high demand 
for low class women and the relatively low demand for high class women could 
explain the coexistence of bridewealth (among the poor) and dowry (among the 
rich) in India. This puzzling fact had been noticed by Bronfenbrenner (1971), 
who explained it in terms of variations in women's willingness to supply hard 
physical labor.  
 Dowries and bridewealth are thus one result of gender asymmetric rules 
regarding class intermarriage. A possible response to the problems created by 
marriage squeezes for women in the higher classes of hierarchical societies 
(such as India) consists of allowing consanguinity. By permitting marriage 
among blood relatives (usually cousins or uncle-niece marriages), a group 
increases the number of men and women available for marriage by an equal 
number, which increases the balance in sex ratio and reduces the occurrence of 
marriage squeezes. Consequently, it would not be surprising that--controlling 
for caste and religion--in areas of India where consanguinity is permitted one 
finds reduced levels of dowry or bridewealth payable in comparison to areas 
where consanguinity is prohibited (Bittles et al. 1992). 
 Marriage squeezes for men are also likely to be associated with a 
bridewealth system rather than with a dowry system. In contrast, one expects a 
dowry system where there is a marriage squeeze for women. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, the countries of Europe which still have a widespread dowry 
system--Greece and Ireland--also have relatively low sex ratios. Some of these 
marriage squeeze effects are tested in Part Three of this book. 
 Evidence can also be found in support of a variation of Hypothesis 28. 
Given that spousal labor includes a variety of activities benefiting a spouse, 
aristocratic descent can be viewed as an alternative indicator of woman's 
productivity. Kuper (1981) reports that women of aristocratic descent receive 
higher bridewealth payments among the Swazi and the Zulu of Southern 
Africa.  
 The next aspect of marriage covered in Table 4.1 is intermarriage (col. 7). 
 Intermarriage 
 The subject of intermarriage is addressed in Chapter 8, where Hypotheses 
30 to 32 are generated and tested using the example of a particular type of 
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religious intermarriage. That chapter also presents additional hypotheses 
regarding religious intermarriage.  
 The question of who marries whom is a much broader one. One can study 
individual behavior regarding choice of a partner who is like us (homogamy), 
which includes marriage with a member of one's group, as opposed to marriage 
with somebody who is different (heterogamy), possibly because he or she 
belongs to a different group (intermarriage). Furthermore, if homogamy relates 
to marriage with one's relatives, it is called consanguinity. 
 One can also study why societies differ in the kinds of laws, rules, and 
traditions they enforce regarding such forms of homogamy or heterogamy. It is 
left to the reader to fill the empty boxes in Table 4.1 under the column 
"intermarriage." The last aspect of marriage covered in this book is polygamy. 
 
 Polygamy 
 Polygamy, more specifically polygyny, is analyzed in Chapter 11. There it is 
hypothesized that the number of wives in a household also varies with the same 
factors used to explain the aspects of marriage discussed above. Hypotheses 34 
to 46 (col. 8 in Table 4.1) are some of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 11. 
 What Explains Marriage? 
 So far, hypotheses have been presented according to the aspect of marriage 
serving as dependent variable. In terms of Table 4.1, the hypotheses have been 
discussed by column. We can also read the table by row, and examine which 
explanatory variables matter. In fact, causality can often run in both directions. 
In most cases, I focus only on one direction of causality. In a few cases, a 
variable appears as both dependent and independent variable, i.e. as a row and 
as a column. The first three rows deal with macro-level explanatory variables, 
and so do the last four rows. Rows 4 through 9 deal with the effect of variables 
that are mostly interpreted here at the micro-level (although they can also 
possibly apply at the macro-level). 
 The first two rows deal with the demand for children by men and the cost of 
other services that could substitute for women's spousal labor, two factors 
expected to cause increases in the demand for spousal labor. As hypothesized 
earlier, the higher the demand for spousal labor, the more women are likely to 
be married and the higher w*. Everything else constant (including the legal and 
political system), this implies lower participation of women in the labor force, 
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higher marriage formality, more power to women, and higher bridewealth. 
Predictions regarding a wife's probability of living in a polygynous household 
are ambiguous. As pointed out in Chapter 11, in societies with a higher demand 
for wives, polygyny is more likely to be permitted or encouraged. At the same 
time, however, if women do not wish to share their husband, their good 
position in the marriage market may help them avoid polygynous situations. 
 Row 3 summarizes hypotheses about effects of marriage squeezes on various 
aspects of marriage. It is hypothesized that when there are a relatively large 
number of men, casuing a marriage squeeze for men, women (and married 
women in particular) are less likely to work (col. 1) and women are more likely 
to be married (col. 2) and less likely to divorce (col. 3) than if there is a 
marriage squeeze for women. Within the context of a choice between formal 
and consensual unions, the higher equilibrium w* may allow more women to 
obtain formal reinforcements toward marriage stability (col. 4). It is also 
hypothesized that when w* is higher, that other aspect of w*--the wife's 
orchestrative power in the household--is expected to be higher (col.5). Also the 
presence of more men relative to women may lead to higher bridewealth 
payments, if bridewealth is the norm (col. 6), and is likely to affect the 
probability of intermarriage (col. 7). Within the context of a polygynous 
society, a higher w* is expected to be translated in terms of fewer women 
sharing a husband (col. 8).  
 Rows 4 to 6 contain hypotheses linking factors characterizing women--
female wage, income, and productivity in spousal labor--to the various aspects 
of marriage reported in the columns. None of the signs of these effects on 
marriage are unambiguously positive or negative, for reasons discussed above. 
In the case of the hypotheses regarding the effects of higher female productivity 
in spousal labor (row 6), where productivity is interpreted in terms of a more 
desirable age or education, it is predicted that these women are more likely to 
be married and to spend time outside the labor force after marriage. (We are 
ignoring the effects of age and education on labor market opportunities).  
 If higher compensation for women's spousal labor can be translated into a 
higher probability of obtaining a formal union, one expects formal marriages to 
be more common among more educated women and women at the most 
desirable ages. It is also hypothesized that more productive women are expected 
to have more power in the marriage. Furthermore, higher bridewealth payments 
are expected to be paid for women of higher quality, and such women may be 
less likely to have co-wives if their society is polygynous, a prediction that 
appeared to be true in Maiduguri, Nigeria (see Chapter 11).  
 In assessing the effect of a woman's quality, it is important to control for her 
potential wage in other kinds of labor. Clearly, education may raise the 
potential wage, which would have very different effects on women's spousal 
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income. 
 No clear-cut predictions can be inferred when male characteristics are used 
as explanatory variables. In the case of male income effects, this is due to the 
existence of two effects of men's real income. First, there is a straightforward 
income effect that may lead higher-income men to demand more women's 
spousal labor, meaning better conditions in the market for women's spousal 
labor as a whole. Therefore in cross-cultural comparisons and historical studies, 
one expects to find increases in male income (or indicators of their real income) 
associated with more women getting married, less female labor force 
participation (outside the household), more marriage formality, higher 
bridewealth, and more conjugal power to the wife. This factor may also be 
partially at work in cross-sectional studies. Second, one also expects a trade-off 
between different components of women's spousal income, especially in cross-
sectional studies. If material benefits are a fixed proportion of husband's 
earnings because of some institutional rigidity, then that portion of women's 
compensation for spousal labor will rise with husband's earning power 
irrespective of the wife's characteristics and performance. Compensatory 
reductions in other components benefitting the wife may therefore occur. For 
instance, marriage formality may be hard to obtain, more co-wives may be 
present (or mistresses in some cultures), or the wife may have to surrender 
some of her power. 
 The net predicted effect of male income (or education, one commonly used 
indicator of permanent income) is expected to be ambiguous. Some evidence in 
that direction was mentioned above and is discussed in later chapters. 
 The row indicating "divorced status" only reports hypotheses related to 
female labor force participation developed in Chapters 3 and 10. Chapter 8 also 
includes a (unnumbered) hypothesis relating divorced status to intermarriage. 
One could easily fill the rest of the columns, assuming divorced status is an 
undesirable characteristic in the marriage markets. 
 The table concludes with four rows relating more macro-level variables to 
selected aspects of marriage. The size of the market is an important variable 
likely to influence all aspects of marriage discussed here. In this book I only 
discuss its effect on labor force participation, divorce, and intermarriage.  
 Another interesting direction to go, is to study further implications of the 
degree of inequality between men and women on patterns of marriage. This 
idea is pursued in this book only with respect to the impact of inequality among 
men and inequality among women on polygamy. Similar reasoning would show 
that an unequal distribution of resources among men and women also 
influences other aspects of marriage. 
 The final row offers an example of a hypothesis relating a type of law to 
various aspects of marriage. A prohibition on polygamy in a society is likely to 
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affect the incidence of marriage and divorce. It may also affect the other aspects 
of marriage discussed here. Furthermore, other laws, regulations, and customs 
are expected to affect marriage. For instance, the existence of a legal minimum 
age at marriage will affect the aspects of marriage under discussion.  
 Conclusion: Gains from a Market Model of Marriage 
 This discussion has been limited to selected aspects of marriage and to a 
partial range of explanatory factors. It was also limited in its theoretical depth. 
Any theory has to be evaluated in light of its ability to lead to testable 
implications and to provide acceptable interpretations of existing findings. At 
this point, it is somewhat premature to assess the value of this theory in 
comparison to that of alternative models and theories. The reader could 
compare the theory presented here, based on economic analysis, with resource 
theory and sociobiological theory. 
  Resource theory is a spin-off of social exchange theory, which in turn was 
influenced by price theory (see Chapter 1). Although social exchange theory 
has had a major influence on sociological theory, its applications to the study of 
marriage have sometimes contradicted market principles. Resource theory is 
somewhat similar to price theory, but the analytical tools developed by 
economists for other purposes can help clarify issues that have not been 
emphasized by resource theory. This book hopefully offers a few examples of 
the contribution of economic theory to the study of marriage. 
 Sociobiological theory, another theory that has recently become popular 
with some social scientists, is based on the assumption that men and women 
engage in mating and reproduction in accordance with a calculus of fitness. 
 With respect to a comparison with the sociobiological model, the market 
theory's advantage for our purposes lies in the relative generality of its 
assumptions. The two approaches are related in that they are both based on 
calculus. But whereas sociobiologists and their followers in anthropology and 
sociology (for instance, Hiatt 1980; and van den Berge 1979) limit the objective 
of that calculus to reproductive fitness, economists do not generally impose a 
specific content on the objective of the calculus. This makes it possible for their 
analysis to be more sensitive to the cultural context of a given society or group 
of societies that can be assumed to share similar objectives. The generality of 
the economists' market approach carries a distinct advantage over the 
restrictive biological focus of this alternative. 
 An advantage of the economic theory of marriage presented here, relatively 
to alternatives, lies in its generality. A wide variety of hypotheses has been 
derived, and more could be derived. This theoretical framework is general in 
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that it can be adapted to any given cultural setting. How useful these hypotheses 
really are depends on whether they can be verified empirically.  
 This chapter has reported a few findings confirming some of the hypotheses. 
Many hypotheses mentioned in this chapter are tested in later chapters. We will 
return to an overall assessment of the theory after reporting tests of some of the 
hypotheses regarding labor supply (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), divorce (Chapters 5 
and 10), intermarriage (Chapter 8), consensual unions (Chapters 5 and 9), and 
polygamy (Chapter 11).  
 This market theory focusses our attention on many of the factors that should 
be considered simultaneously when studying a particular aspect of marriage. No 
two variables can be viewed in isolation, which rules out simple correlations or 
cross-tabulations. It is not even enough to control for supply factors when 
studying the effect of a demand factor. Ideally, other determinants of demand 
should also be taken into account, and when the dependent variable relates to a 
particular component of spousal income, some of the other relevant and 
measurable components in a particular society should be covered as well. 
 Controlling for other factors may be very difficult, especially when 
performing cross-cultural comparisons. For instance, it may be difficult to 
control for variations in type of women's spousal labor and composition of 
spousal income. There can be problems in cross-sectional studies within a given 
society as well. For instance, in an empirical study of the effect of male income 
on the formality of a union, it is crucial to control for wife quality. This is 
especially so in view of the tendency for assortative mating. Higher-status 
males tend to marry higher-status females, and the latter are more likely to 
marry formally. If controls are not introduced, a positive relationship between 
male income and marriage formality may reflect the effect of female, rather 
than male, status. In regression analysis of the probability of formal marriage it 
was indeed found that when female quality was uncontrolled for, the 
relationship between male income and formality was not different from zero. 
But after the introduction of female education, age, and wealth in the 
regression, male income appeared to be negatively associated with formality 
(see Chapter 9). 
 The same points hold for a study of polygyny or the wife's relative conjugal 
power. As Scanzoni (1979) recognized in the case of conjugal power, there has 
been--at least until recently-- a lack of multivariate analyses of conjugal power. 
Consider the example of the relative love of one spouse for the other, a variable 
developed by Safilios-Rothschild (1976). Unless one controls for all measurable 
aspects of quality of husband and wife simultaneously (which was not done in 
her own empirical study of a Greek sample), the theory is not tested adequately. 
 Not only do the tools of demand and supply point to the need for using 
correct methods of estimation after a survey has been completed, but they can 
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also point to the need for including certain variables in a survey. For instance, 
it would be useful to collect information pertaining to productivity in spousal 
labor. A further assessment of the theory of marriage found in this book is 
found in the concluding comments at the end of the book. 
 Notes 
 1.  The danger of an unwanted pregnancy leads most unmarried women to engage 
in sexual relationships more reluctantly than men. The fact that outside of marriage (or 
cohabitation) men pay women for the privilege of sexual intercourse much more often 
than women pay men supports the view of sex as a net flow of women's spousal labor 
(see Heer 1978). 
 2.  Chapter 3 discusses some of the limitations of such market analysis. These 
limitations do not appear more of a problem in the case at hand than in the case of other 
labor markets. 
 3.  The net transfer of spousal compensation from the husband to the wife can be 
called the wife's compensation or wife's spousal income and amounts to w*fhf - w*mhm. 
 4.  Examples of laws affecting the aggregate demand for women's spousal labor 
are laws prohibiting polygyny, which reduce the aggregate demand for women's spousal 
labor, or laws requiring a minimum age at marriage, which can shift both demand and 
supply. Any factor which shifts demand for women's spousal labor more than their 
supply leads to higher w*, and is likely to lead to higher compensations for women's 
spousal labor. 
 5.  It is assumed that both wives and husbands would prefer to have more power, 
although it may be argued by some that this assumption does not capture situations in 
which women prefer to abdicate all responsibility for their own actions. My own 
interpretation of such abdications would be that they result from resigned acceptance of 
unfavorable conditions and not from intrinsic preferences. 
 6.  This idea is adapted from Becker's (1981) theory of marriage. According to 
Becker, a rigid division of household income explains marriage transfers. If the portion 
of household output going to the wife is fixed by law or tradition, a transfer at marriage 
in the form of dowry will help the total gains from marriage to wife and husband (the 
wife's income and husband's profit) reach their market equilibrium level. 
 7.  Polygyny is the accurate name for marriage between one husband and more 
than one wife. Polygamy refers to all varieties of plural spouses. 
 8.  The cost of having a co-wife varies across polygynous cultures. For instance, 
that cost will be higher if a woman cannot easily meet with lovers, and it will be lower 
if food technology is such that a senior wife may want additional wives to work for her 
(see Chapter 11.) 
 9.  The lower w*fhf is likely to be spent on smaller amounts of this particular 
component of w*mhm. 
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 10. The original paper from which this chapter is adapted focussed around such 
summary table. 
 11. This can be seen graphically in Figure 3.4 by looking at the effect of an 
increase in demand or supply on the amount of spousal labor. 
 12. This is especially true in patrilineal societies, i.e. societies where inheritance 
rights pass from father to son. 
 13. In terms of the model presented in Chapter 3, higher value of children implies 
higher betas and therefore increases in supplies 3.10 and 3.13, as well as in demands 
3.12 and 3.15. 
 14. For instance, assume I like a clean house, whether I am married or not. In 
terms of the model presented in the previous chapter, cleaning for my own sake is a 
self-oriented activity which is complementary to cleaning as a job for a spouse's benefit 
(cleaning house is a job to the extent that I clean more than I would for my own sake.) 
The more cleaning help is expensive, the more I will be willing to clean for my own 
sake and therefore the more I will supply cleaning time to a spouse. Substitution effects 
in the household lead to increases in supplies 3.10 and 3.13, as well as in demands 3.12 
and 3.15. Higher prices also imply that real income will decrease, causing both supplies 
to increase and both demand to decrease. This last decrease in demand is not likely to 
turn the entire effects around. 
 15. Total Hm has to be divided over more men. Also, the larger supply of men 
implies lower wages wm and w*m. If men's income decreases, their demand for women's 
spousal labor will decrease. It is assumed that such decrease does not cancel the primary 
effect of an increase in number of men (see Chapter 3.) 
 16. This is not necessarily the case. This assumption is relaxed in the discussion 
on polygamy found in Chapter 11. 
 17. In terms of the model presented in Chapter 3, higher income V implies an 
increase in supplies 3.10 and 3.13, as well as in demands 3.12 and 3.15. 
 18. In terms of the model presented in Chapter 3, higher own wage wi implies a 
decrease in supplies 3.10 and 3.13, and an increase in demands 3.12 and 3.15. Higher 
spouses' wages wj are expected to cause substitution effects (decrease in demands and 
increase in supplies) and income effects in the same directions. 
 19. Same analysis as in footnote 13. 
 20. When spousal compensations w*f hf and w*mhm both increase, the difference 
between the two, the wife's compensation or wife's spousal income w*f hf - w*mhm, is 
most likely to increase. For simplicity, let us assume that this spousal income is 
composed of two types of benefits, material benefits and expected stability. If the 
increased spousal labor associated with a higher value of children affects both male and 
female spousal labor in the same proportion, women's net income from spousal labor is 
likely to increase. If both components of spousal income--material benefits and expected 
stability--increase in the same proportion, this implies what is stated in Hypothesis 13. 
This conclusion is more likely to hold if higher value of children affects female spousal 
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labor more than male spousal labor, a likely assumption given women's comparative 
advantage in this area. 
 21. This is especially likely to be the case if property laws benefit husbands. 
 22. Women's income may not have such a discouraging effect on the supply of 
spousal labor if there are substantial amounts of joint production between husband and 
wife. 
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 PART THREE 
                                                                                  
   Marriage Squeeze Effects  
 The term marriage squeeze has been coined by Paul Glick to describe a 
situation where members of one sex are faced with a relatively small pool of 
marriage eligibles (Glick, Beresford, and Heer 1963). It was stated in Part Two 
that marriage squeezes for men or women--based on the relative number of 
men and women interacting in a marriage market or sex ratio--can have an 
impact on labor supply (Hypothesis 1), and on various aspects of marriage 
(Hypotheses 8, 15, 21, 27, 32 and 40). In this part, some of these hypotheses are 
restated, expanded, and tested.  
 The two chapters on marriage squeeze effects vary in their level of 
technicality. The first chapter, Chapter 5, was written for a mixed audience of 
sociologists and economists, and avoids technical jargon and statistical 
techniques familiar to economists. Chapter 6 contains a few equations and a 
statistical analysis. The chapters also vary in the generality of their subject 
matter: whereas Chapter 5 looks at the effect of marriage squeezes on a number 
of social and economic aspects of life, Chapter 6 focuses on a single effect of 
sex ratio variations, namely, its effect on the participation of married women in 
the labor force. Finally, the chapters vary in the type of data they use. Chapter 5 
studies variations over time, while Chapter 6 tests for the effects of marriage 
squeezes on the participation of married women in the labor force using data 
for U.S. cities in 1930 and 1980. 
 Other chapters in this volume also touch on the subject of marriage squeeze 
effects: Chapter 2 mentioned marriage squeeze effects on dowry levels, Chapter 
8 develops a hypothesis on the effect of marriage squeezes on the probability of 
religious intermarriage, and Chapter 11 explains the hypothesis dealing with 
the effect of marriage squeezes on the likelihood that a society outlaws 
polygamy.  
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 5 
                                                        Marriage 
Squeezes and Marriage, 
 Cohabitation, Labor Supply, 
 and Divorce: Time Trends 
 This chapter first adds some hypotheses to the marriage squeeze effects 
predicted in Part Two. Measures of marriage squeeze based on sex ratios--the 
relative number of men to women--are used to explain marriage rates divorce, 
and sorting patterns, cohabitation, married women's labor force participation, 
divorce rates and feminism. Additional evidence is also discussed. In particular, 
the chapter offers a reinterpretation of black-white differences in marriage, 
divorce, and women's participation in the labor force. 
 Hypotheses and Literature Review 
 Part Two presented a number of hypotheses relating the number of men and 
women participating in marriage markets to labor supply and various aspects of 
marriage. It was hypothesized that marriage squeezes for men are associated 
with lower female labor force participation than marriage squeezes for women 
(Hypothesis 1 or H1), with a higher likelihood that women are in any kind of 
marriage or union (H8), and with a higher likelihood that a  
 
                                         
 
 This chapter was revised in June, 1993 in preparation for the third printing of this 
book. Adapted from "Marriage Squeezes and the Marriage Market," in Kingsley Davis 
in association with A. Grossbard-Shechtman, eds. Contemporary Marriage: 
Comparative Perspectives on a Changing Institution. New York: Russell Sage 
Publications, 1985. I would like to thank Muriel Bell, Deborah Blackwell, Nancy 
Chodorow, Kingsley Davis, David Heer, Adam Kuper, Yohanan Peres, Alan Stone, and 
Myra Stroeber for helpful comments.  
woman is formally married (H15) than marriage squeezes for women. These 
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hypotheses can also be stated in terms of the relative number of men and 
women. Following the convention accepted amongst most demographers, sex 
ratios are defined as the number of men divided by the number of women. High 
sex ratios (above 1.00) imply a marriage squeeze for men, whereas low sex 
ratios (below 1.00) imply a marriage squeeze for women.  
 Hypothesis 1 stated that marriage squeezes for men are less likely to be 
associated with participation of women in the labor force than marriage 
squeezes for women. Some of these hypotheses have corollaries that will also be 
evaluated empirically. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a corollary of Hypothesis 1 
is that a marriage squeeze for men is expected to be associated with lower 
participation of married women in the labor force than a marriage squeeze for 
women(Hypothesis 1' or H1').  
 Hypothesis 8.1 stated that a marriage squeeze for men is expected to be 
associated with a higher incidence of marriage among women than a marriage 
squeeze for women. The effect of variations in marriage squeeze on men's 
likelihood to marry, divorce or cohabit is not the mirror image of these effects 
on women. Gender asymmetry is caused--at least in part--by differential 
tendencies for men and women to select marriage versus its alternatives, 
cohabitation and singlehood.1 It was hypothesized in Chapter 4 that women are 
more likely than men to prefer a formal marriage over cohabitation. As a result, 
as stated in Hypothesis 15, marriage squeezes for men are likely to be 
associated with a higher proportion of unions taking the form of formalized 
marriage than marriage squeezes for women. It was therefore hypothesized in 
Chapter 4 that marriage squeeze variations are expected to have larger effects 
on the proportion of married women than on the proportion of married men 
(Hypothesis 8.4). 
 If a marriage squeeze for men occurs--for instance because the number of 
marriageable men increases--women are affected as follows: (1) more women 
get married and cohabit while fewer women stay single, and (2) of those who 
enter a steady relationship, more marry and fewer cohabit. This leads to an 
unambiguous prediction regarding a higher likelihood of marriage and lower 
likelihood of being single. However, the net effect on the proportion of all 
women who cohabit is not clear. Defining the proportion unmarried as the 
proportion either never-married or cohabiting, it follows that a marriage 
squeeze for men is expected to cause a decrease in the proportion of unmarried 
women. 
 At the same time, an increase in the number of marriageable men causes (1) 
a decrease in the proportion of men who get married or cohabit and an increase 
in the proportion single, and (2) among men who enter a steady relationship, 
an increase in the proportion who marry and a decrease in the proportion who 
cohabit. This leads to an unambiguous prediction regarding a lower likelihood 
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of cohabitation and higher likelihood of being single. However, the net effect 
on the proportion of married men, or the proportion of unmarried men defined 
as the sum of men who never marry or who cohabit, is not clear. A marriage 
squeeze for men is likely to reduce the percentage of all unmarried individuals, 
male or female. However, the percentage of unmarried women is expected to 
decrease faster than the percentage of unmarried men. 
 A marriage squeeze for women leads to increased proportions of unmarried 
women for two reasons. First, fewer women are likely to be involved in any 
type of heterosexual relationship. Second, women's lower bargaining power 
encourages an increase in the ratio of cohabiting to married couples. The 
percentage of unmarried men is expected to rise less than the percentage of 
unmarried women as a result of a marriage squeeze for women. On the one 
hand, more cohabitation occurs at the expense of legal marriages (which leads 
to an increase in the proportion of men who are unmarried), but on the other 
hand, some men who want to marry find a wife more easily (which leads to a 
decrease in the proportion of unmarried men). Likewise, one can look at the 
percentage of men and women who marry, keeping in mind that there are three 
choices: married, cohabitating, and unmarried.  
 This chapter also provides evidence for Hypothesis 8.3, which stated that: 
 Marriage squeezes for men in a society are expected to be associated with a 
lower incidence of divorce among women than marriage squeezes for 
women. 
 Chapter 4 considered a number of aspects of marriage related to the 
compensation for women's spousal labor w* and women's net spousal income, 
including the aspects mentioned in Hypotheses 1 and 15. Aspects of marriage 
related to such compensation that were not discussed in Chapter 4 include 
desirable qualities of husbands, the ratio of family expenditures benefiting the 
wife in relation to the husband, the value of alimony payments, and the 
willingness of women to have more children than they would, had they 
followed their own inclination.2 It also follows from the market theory of 
marriage presented in Part Two that marriage squeezes for men will be 
associated with more desirable qualities found in the average husband in 
comparison to marriage squeezes for women.  
 In a marriage squeeze for men women of given quality are able to be more 
selective in their mating choices and will marry men with more desirable 
qualities than the men they would have married under less favorable market 
conditions. It is therefore hypothesized that 
 Relative to a marriage squeeze for women, in a situation of marriage 
squeeze for men one will find fewer matches between women who are young 
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and single and men who are substantially older, divorced, unattractive, 
poor, or of a background that women prefer to avoid for some reason.3  
 More generally, one expects age differences in marriage to adjust to 
marriage squeezes. It also follows from the theory that in comparison to low sex 
ratios, high sex ratios are expected to be associated with relatively more 
expenditures benefitting the wife, higher alimony payments, and marital 
fertility closer to the wife's preference (if that preference diverges from the 
husband's).4 
 Feminism may also be related to sex ratios and marriage squeezes. A 
marriage squeeze for women causes a worsening of market conditions for 
women in both marriage markets and labor markets. According to both a union 
(or economic) theory of feminism and a frustration (or psychological) theory of 
feminism, a worsening of women's market conditions is likely to encourage 
feminism. A union theory of feminism suggests that the feminist movement is a 
type of labor union protecting women who participate in markets for labor and 
marriage. According to this view, women can bargain collectively for better 
working conditions. Worsened conditions propel women to organize and to 
attempt to raise their compensations above the market level. As in other types 
of labor unions, the mechanism that makes bargaining for higher wages 
possible involves restrictions on entry into that market. Many feminists have 
committed themselves to singlehood, which could reflect their willingness to 
trade higher wages (quasi-wages w*) for higher employment levels in markets 
for female spousal labor. 
 Alternatively, we can use a frustration (or psychological)  theory of 
feminism, which views movements as outlets for personal frustration. People 
whose position has worsened relative to that of others often coalesce and form a 
group for protest, especially if group awareness develops easily.5 According to 
both theories, a women's movement or feminist revolution is more likely to 
occur when there is a worsening in women's position in the market for spousal 
labor, for instance as the result of a marriage squeeze for women. 
 The hypotheses mentioned so far in this chapter are now compared to 
similar hypotheses found in the literature. Demographers have long been 
concerned with sex ratios, the number of available men relative to the number 
of women of marriageable age. Demographic theories regarding the effects of 
sex ratios tend to be limited to effects on the incidence of marriage or marriage 
rates. Many studies have shown that women faced with low sex ratios were less 
likely to be married than women faced with high sex ratios (e.g., Glick, 
Beresford & Heer 1963, Henry 1975, Smith 1980, Schoen 1983, Goldman 
1977, Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman 1981, Lichter et al. 1991). 
 A more general theoretical perspective on sex ratio effects can be found in 
Guttentag and Secord's (1983) Too Many Women--The Sex Ratio Question, 
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which was developed independently from the theory presented in Chapters 3 
and 4 based on Grossbard-Shechtman (1981, 1984). Guttentag and Secord also 
derived hypotheses regarding the potential impact of sex ratios on divorce, 
cohabitation, sorting patterns, and labor supply (see Chapter 1). 
 For instance, an equivalent to Hypothesis 1 can be found in Guttentag and 
Secord (1983), who hypothesized that women (both married and unmarried) 
are more likely to work when sex ratios are low. However, Guttentag and 
Secord never formulated an equivalent to Hypothesis 1', which relates solely to 
married women. It is more interesting to test for sex ratio effects on labor force 
participation separately for married and unmarried women than to consider all 
women together, regardless of marital status. If lower rates of participation for 
married and unmarried women combined, are associated with a higher sex 
ratio, this could simply follow from the fact that (a) higher sex ratios imply 
higher marriage rates for women, and (b) married women typically work less 
than unmarried women. 
 Guttentag and Secord (1983) brought evidence in support of their 
hypotheses regarding marriage, divorce, sexual ideology, etc. based on data 
from classical Greece, medieval Europe, Russian Jews in the nineteenth 
Century, frontier America, and the contemporary United States. Trent and 
South (1989) tested the hypothesis of an inverse relationship between sex ratios 
and divorce using a cross-societal comparison. Guttentag and Secord's 
equivalent of Hypothesis 1 was validated with cross-country data by Ward and 
Pampel (1985), Ferber and Berg (1991), and South (1988), who all looked at 
overall female labor force participation (combining married and unmarried 
women). 
 The marriage squeeze effects hypothesized in this book are first tested using 
data on recent time trends in the United States. 
 Testing the Effects of Marriage Squeezes over Time 
 In estimating the effects of changes in marriage squeezes over time one 
faces conceptual problems deriving from the life-cycle nature of marriage 
decisions. It is not simply the existence of marriage squeezes that affects 
decisions, but also the subjective awareness that such marriage squeezes exist 
or will occur in the future. Marriage squeezes vary substantially over the life 
cycle (Davis and Van den Oever 1982). If people were to take expected 
variations in marriage squeeze into account before making a decision, they 
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would assess conditions in the market for spousal labor both in the present and 
in the future. For instance, the worse the marriage squeeze is expected to be at a 
later stage in life, the lower the bargaining position now. In rational decision-
making, while the present would demand more consideration than the future, 
both existing and expected marriage squeezes could play an important role. 
 Another conceptual problem has to do with separating the effects of a 
marriage squeeze from other effects. A good test of the theory would require 
control for other time-related variables influencing marriage patterns. These 
other factors may be categorized as financial (often termed "economic"), 
demographic (for instance, number of people born in a particular year), cultural 
(for instance, the emphasis on decision making without parental influence), or 
political (for instance, the onset of the Vietnam war). The findings reported in 
the next section do not attempt to control for such factors, and therefore must 
be interpreted very cautiously. 
 In the United States at various times each sex has experienced a marriage 
squeeze. Variations in marriage squeeze occur because, on the average, women 
marry men who are generally somewhat older and because the number of births 
fluctuates from year to year (Glick, Beresford, and Heer 1963). In the early 
1950s men faced a shortage of women. This marriage squeeze for men resulted 
from a decline in the absolute number of births each year during the late l920s 
and early 1930s. A man born in 1930 seeking a wife born in 1932, for example, 
would be at a disadvantage. In the mid-1960s, when the baby-boom generation 
started to reach marriageable age, the United States began to experience a 
marriage squeeze for women. A woman born in 1946, for example, would be 
most likely to marry a man born in 1944. During the post-World War II baby 
boom, many more children were born in 1946 than in 1944, so that women 
belonging to the 1946 cohort were facing a marriage squeeze. A marriage 
squeeze variable defined as the ratio of men between ages 20 and 29 to women 
between ages 18 and 29 and pictured in Figure 5.1 for the period 1951-1980 
reflects this transition from a marriage squeeze for men to a marriage squeeze 
for women around the mid-1960s. Since the early 1980s, we have reentered a 
marriage squeeze for men. The sex ratio rose above 1.00 in 1980, and has 
continued to rise in the 1980s. This follows from a decline in fertility which 
began in the early 1960s and from a continuous--although varying--difference 
between the average male and female age at marriage.  
 For simplicity, I will focus on simple measures of marriage squeeze: 
national averages for selected years and cohorts. In accordance with the 
theoretical discussion, data on marriage squeezes will be compared to measures 
of nuptiality and age at marriage, cohabitation, labor force participation of 
Sex Ratio: Time Trends 103 
 
 
 
married women, and divorce.   
 Variations in Marriage Squeeze over Time. As can be seen from Figure 5.1 
the generations entering adulthood in the 1950s experienced a marriage 
squeeze for men. During that period, the number of unmarried men aged 20-29 
exceeded the number of unmarried women aged 18 to 29. This marriage 
squeeze for men reached a peak in 1953, after which the sex ratio declined 
continuously until the late 1960s. The 1.00 benchmark was crossed in 1965. 
Based on this operational definition, it follows that a marriage squeeze for 
women started in 1965. In that year, 18 and 19 year old women belonged to the 
huge baby-boom generation, while no baby-boom men had reached age 20. 
Since 1978 the sex ratio facing young unmarried people has tended to climb, 
passing the 1.00 mark briefly in 1980. By 1980, the first generations born after 
the baby-boom (the cohorts born in 1961 and 1962) had entered this marriage 
market. If one looks at sex ratios defined as the ratio of the total number of men 
ages 20-29 divided by the total number of women ages 18-29, one sees the 
onset of a new marriage squeeze for men in the 1980s.6  
 These trends in sex ratio and marriage squeeze are now compared to trends 
in marriage, cohabitation, divorce, and labor supply. 
 Marriage. In the mid-1960s the sex ratio of young unmarried men to young 
unmarried women reached a level lower than 1.00, and a marriage squeeze for 
women occurred. Simultaneously, the downward trend in women's age at first 
marriage reversed and women's chances of being married decreased. Figure 5.2 
shows that the onset of a marriage squeeze for women roughly coincided with 
the onset of an increase in the percentage of women aged 25-29 who have never 
married. The period of marriage squeeze for women also corresponds to an 
increase in the median age at first marriage for women from about 20 to 22, as 
shown in Figure 5.3. This same period of marriage squeeze for women also 
witnessed a growth in the percentage of never-married men. However, as 
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predicted from the theory, this increase proceeded at a slower rate than the 
increase in the proportion of never-married women. For instance, between 1970 
and 1980 the percentage of never-married women aged 25-29 grew at an 
average yearly rate of 9.9 percent, whereas the percentage of never-married 
men in the same age group grew by only 7.6 percent per year on average (see 
sources for Figure 5.2). These facts support Hypotheses 8.1 and 8.2. 
 The transition from a marriage squeeze for women to a marriage squeeze 
for men has not led to a complete reversal of these trends in median age at 
marriage and percentage of women who are unmarried. By 1980 a slowdown 
had occurred in the increase in women's median age at first marriage and in the 
percent never-married, some of which is shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. First, 
we look at recent trends in percent-never married among white women.  In the 
1980s the average annual growth rate in the proportion of never-married 
women between the ages of 25 and 29 (5.5 percent in the period 1980-1988) 
was lower than the annual growth rate of 9.9 percent that characterized the 
1970s. This slowdown occurred as women aged 25-29 born during the baby-
boom and experiencing marriage squeezes for women were being replaced by 
women aged 25-29 born after the baby-boom, a period of marriage squeezes for 
men. 
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 The slowdown in the growth of the proportion of women who never married 
is even more dramatic for women between the ages of 20 and 24. In the 1970s, 
the proportion of never-married women in that age group grew at an annual 
rate of 3.6 percent a year. Between 1980 and 1988, this age group consisted 
mostly of post-baby-boomers, and the percent never-married grew only by 3 
percent a year. In contrast, the percent never-married among women age 30 to 
34 grew at a faster annual rate during the 1980s than during the 1970s (7.6 
percent versus 4.7 percent). By 1988 the youngest women in this age group 
were still baby-boomers. As for women age 35 to 39, who were pre-baby-
boomers in the 1970s and baby-boomers in the 1980s, the proportion never-
married amongst them grew from 1.3 percent a year to 5.5 percent a year 
(Saluter 1989). 
 Trends in percent never-married for blacks parallel those for whites during 
these periods. The rate of growth in proportion of never-married black women 
age 20 to 24 slowed down from 5.8 percent during the 1970s to 1.2 percent for 
1980-1988. A slowdown also occurred in this rate of growth for women age 25 
to 29 (from 9.8 percent to 4.2 percent). In contrast, among black women born 
during the baby-boom the proportion never-married grew from a yearly rate of 
7.6 percent in the 1970s to 11.8 percent in the 1980s (women age 30-34) and 
from a yearly rate of less than 1 percent in the 1970s to 7.8 percent in the 1980s 
(women 35-39). 
 Since 1985, a slowdown has also occurred in the rate of growth of the 
median age at first marriage. While women's median age at first marriage grew 
at a yearly rate of 5.9 percent in the years 1980 to 1985, it has grown at a 
significantly slower yearly rate of 1.3 percent in the period 1985-1988. (Saluter 
1989).  
 Juxtaposition with parallel time-series for men shows no trend reversal for 
most age-race groups. During the 1970s the percentage of never-married 
women age 25 to 29 rose faster than the percentage of never-married men the 
same age (9.9 percent a year for white women versus 7.6 percent a year for 
white men). This is consistent with Hypothesis 8.4. However, from 1980 to 
1988 the percentage of never-married women in that group also grew faster 
than that for men (5.5 percent versus 3.9 percent), even though sex ratios where 
higher than in the 1970s. Partial evidence supporting Hypothesis 8.4 can be 
found among blacks age 20 to 24. Here one finds that the growth in proportion 
never-married slowed down more for women (from 5.8 percent in the 1970s to 
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1.2 percent in the 1980s), than for men (from 4.1 percent to 1.2 percent over 
the same period).  
 Cohabitation. Figure 5.4 illustrates the number of unmarried couples living 
together in the United States.7 It appears that a dramatic increase in 
cohabitation took place in the l970s. From 1970 to 1980, the number of 
cohabiting couples grew at an annual rate of 20.4 percent (Saluter 1989). 
Unfortunately, no data are available for the late 1960s, so that it is impossible 
to determine the exact timing of the jump in the popularity of cohabitation. It 
could well be that the upward trend in cohabitation significantly changed in the 
mid-1960s and not in 19708, thus coinciding with the shrinking popularity of 
marriage, apparent in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, and with the onset of a marriage 
squeeze for women. This seems to confirm Hypothesis 15, which predicted that 
cohabitation is more likely when there is a small number of men in comparison 
to the number of women in a marriage market. 
 As predicted from Hypothesis 15, the onset of a marriage squeeze for men 
in the 1980s may have caused a substantial slowdown in this trend. The yearly 
rate of growth in cohabitation went down from 20.4 percent in the 1970s to 7.9 
percent in the period 1980-1988. Among couples without children under 15 
years, who are mostly young (in 1988 68 percent of all cohabiting couples were 
under 34 years old), the yearly rate of growth in cohabitation went down from 
25.4 percent in the 1970s to 6.8 percent in the 1980s.  
 So far, then, the data on young women during the 1960s and 1970s 
demonstrate a correspondence between three trends: the onset of a marriage 
squeeze for women, a decrease in the tendency for young women to get 
married, and (with a possible lag) a dramatic increase in the popularity of 
cohabitation. Furthermore, data for the late 1980s indicate that the onset of a 
marriage squeeze for men has caused a slowdown in the rise in age at first 
marriage, the percent of young people who never marry (both black and white), 
and particularly in the rise in cohabitation. 
 This correspondence does not prove that there was an impact of marriage 
squeezes. Other factors influencing marriage and cohabitation need to be 
controlled.9 Skeptics may point to the possible lag between the onset of a 
marriage squeeze for women and the rapid rise in cohabitation. Such 
skepticism can be dealt with by emphasizing the time it takes people to accept 
social norms about new lifestyles. Such lags in the adjustment of social norms 
can also account for the apparent divergence between the squeeze trend and 
that in marriage and cohabitation in the late 1970s. It appears from Figure 5.1 
that while the marriage squeeze for women aged 18-29 remained more or less 
constant after 1965, trends in marriage and cohabitation changed dramatically 
throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s. Such divergence could be the result of 
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lags in the spread of new social norms. (It could also be due to the insufficiency 
of the marriage squeeze measure used here. A more accurate empirical measure 
of the marriage squeeze variable would have to take account of variations over 
time for a given cohort.)  
 It would also be worthwhile to consider how the experience of adjacent 
cohorts affects a particular age group experiencing a marriage squeeze. In the 
early 1970s, the effect of a marriage squeeze for women aged 18-29 in a 
particular year became cumulative. Women entering the market for spousal 
labor in 1970 had to cope not only with a relative scarcity of men aged 20-29 in 
1965 but also with competition by unmarried women in their thirties. Thus, 28-
year-old women in 1970 faced a more unfavorable market of spousal labor in 
objective terms than their older sisters faced in 1965. Their perceptions and 
beliefs may also have been influenced by the unpleasant experience of cohorts 
immediately preceding them. 
 Employment. The marriage squeeze also relates to female employment, 
divorce and feminist ideology. From Figure 5.5 it is apparent that a dramatic 
upsurge in female employment started in 1963, about the time the sex ratio fell 
below 1.0.10 Again, it appears that female employment grew rapidly throughout 
the 1970s. In contrast, the marriage squeeze for men has been associated with a 
dramatic turn-around in women's labor force participation. By the late 1980s 
young women's participation in the labor force has grown at a slower pace than 
was the case in the 1970s (Grossbard-Shechtman 1992). 
 Divorce. The divorce rate shows a similar pattern: a takeoff in 1967 for 
women aged 25-29, and in 1969 for women aged 30-34 (Carlson 1979), and 
steady growth throughout the 1970s and early 1980s (Figure 5.6). By the late 
1980s a turnaround had occurred in divorce as well. The latest statistics 
available in 1992 indicate a significant decrease in divorce rates after 1985 
(Norton and Miller 1991). This is consistent with Hypothesis 8.3.  
 Feminism. Women's liberation, whose major protagonists had also been 
developing and presenting their ideas for more than a decade, became popular 
in the mid-1960s. The simultaneous occurrence of a market squeeze for women 
and this social response suggests a relationship between objective market 
factors and subjectively perceived ideologies such as the women's liberation 
movement. Alternatively, worsening market conditions could have propelled 
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women into organizing in a union-like manner. The tremendous rise in 
popularity of feminist ideas was in part a reflection of the growing frustration 
among women who were having a difficult time achieving the standard of 
living their mothers and older sisters had reached in the past, and in part a 
framework for collective action to improve market conditions. 
 It seems that the basic pattern of women's liberation followed closely that of 
the trends in marriage and cohabitation: a dramatic increase in the mid-1960s, 
when the concept of women's liberation reached the headlines, and a 
continuous growth throughout the l970s. For instance, the magazine MS. for 
career-oriented women first appeared in 1972 and experienced a rapid growth 
in its readership. The feminist influence on higher education provides another 
indicator of the impact of the feminist revolution, among young women in 
particular. Women's studies first appeared in the last half of the 1960s. In 1970 
the first integrated women's studies program was officially established at San 
Diego State University. "Between 1970 and 1975, 150 new women's studies 
programs were founded, a feat that was repeated between 1975 and 1980" 
(Boxer 1982). 
 The growth of the feminist movement not only coincided with the marriage 
squeeze and the movement away from marriage but probably also fueled a 
stronger reaction to the marriage squeeze. The feminist revolution may have 
shortened the lag between cause and actual behavior by making young women 
of the 1970s more aware of alternatives to traditional marriages, thereby 
encouraging a more widespread response to the unfavorable conditions in the 
market for spousal labor. 
 While a rise in feminism characterized the 1970s, the late 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s have witnessed the growth of social trends which could 
be expected in a period of marriage squeeze for men. By 1992, big weddings 
have become more popular and Bride Magazine is thicker than ever (Bratt 
1992). This is consistent with a transition from marriage squeeze for women to 
marriage squeeze for men. Also, the more recent period has witnessed the 
growth of men's movements, which is compatible with increasing levels of 
dissatisfaction among men, possibly the result of worsening marriage market 
conditions.11 
 Sex Ratio Effects Over Time - Summary. The evidence presented in this 
section suggests that marriage squeezes in the US affect marriage patterns in 
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the direction predicted by this theory. The evidence presented here is 
impressive in that many different dimensions move in the predicted direction. 
More sophisticated statistical analyses which control for other relevant factors 
such as income, wages, contraceptive technology, preference for various types 
of work, and discrimination, are desirable for establishing the importance of 
marriage squeezes on firmer grounds. Additional preliminary evidence 
regarding the effects of marriage squeezes is based on comparisons across 
different groups (as shown in the next section) or areas (as shown in the next 
chapter). 
 Variations Across States and by Race 
 State data. Using data for the various states of the Union, Freiden showed 
that in states with a lower sex ratio--that is, with more of a marriage squeeze 
for women--a lower percentage of women married (Freiden 1974). In the same 
vein, Keeley (1979) found that marriage squeezes delay women's expected age 
at first marriage. 
 Blacks vs. Whites.  An interesting question is how marriage squeeze 
variations explain racial differences. It appears from U.S. data that racial 
variations in marriage squeeze relate to a variety of indicators of women's 
status. For example, Spanier and Glick (1980) have noted that the sex ratio of 
marriage eligibles is considerably lower among blacks than whites, which 
causes more acute marriage squeezes for African American women than for 
women of European descent. This lower sex ratio is in part a function of 
differences in the sex ratio at birth (Willerman 1979) and in part a result of 
higher mortality rates for blacks than whites, and for men than women. In 
addition, for the years 1967-1970 more than three times as many marriages 
between black men and white women occurred as between white men and black 
women.12 All these factors depress the equilibrium conditions for black women 
in the market for spousal labor. The marriage squeeze theory probably provides 
one important reason why in 1970 the percentage of women aged 25-34 who 
ever married was 83.3 percent among blacks, as contrasted to 91.0 percent 
among whites (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973). 
 Black-white comparisons also lend support to the hypothesis that relates 
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marriage squeezes to sorting patterns. Spanier and Glick (1980) found that a 
large proportion of black women marry men who are significantly older than 
the typical age at marriage for the population as a whole. They also discovered 
that black women are significantly more likely than white women to marry 
either men at lower educational levels than themselves or men who had been 
married previously.  
 In addition, the theory of marriage presented here offers a new explanation 
for the fact that black married women have a greater tendency to participate in 
the labor force than white married women (Cain 1966). The adverse marriage 
conditions that stem from a more severe marriage squeeze for black women 
result in their weak bargaining position in gaining compensation for work in 
spousal labor. Consequently, many more black women, even those who are 
married, are employed outside the home relative to white women.  
 Furthermore, racial differences in sex ratios may also explain differences in 
cohabitation and divorce rates. The black-white differentials in cohabitation are 
substantial. In 1976 twice as many black adults as white adults maintained 
living quarters without being married (Glick and Norton 1979). A black-white 
comparison shows that black women are more likely to be divorced. In 1970, 
3.7 percent of all white women were divorced, whereas that proportion stood at 
5.1 percent for black women.13  
 Uneven sex ratios may also have an impact on the incidence of 
homosexuality. Evidence to such effect is the prevalence of homosexual 
behavior in prisons. It also seems to be the case that black women--who are 
faced with substantially worse marriage squeezes than white women--are more 
likely to be homosexual than white women. A survey of people who had voted 
in the 1992 Presidential election indicates that 13% of the gay women surveyed 
were black, in contrast to 9% of all women surveyed being black.  The same 
survey showed no overrepresentation of blacks among gay men (Cronin 1993). 
  Conclusion 
 Since the mid-1960s the United States has experienced a downward trend in 
the popularity of marriage, as reflected in later age at marriage, lower 
percentages of married men and women, and higher cohabitation and divorce 
rates. All these trends were interpreted here as resulting from the onset of a 
marriage squeeze for women, which started when baby-boomers reached 
adulthood around 1965. In addition, this marriage squeeze for women was 
related to the rapid growth in women's labor force participation and feminism 
which also occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s.  
 A marriage squeeze for men began when the post-baby-boom generation 
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entered marriage and labor markets in the 1980s. With varying lags, we 
observe all the changes we expect based on sex ratio hypotheses derived from 
this theory: a slowdown in the movement away from marriage, a slowdown in 
the movement towards cohabitation, a turnaround in divorce and female labor 
force participation. All these changes are particularly noticeable for the younger 
age groups who now are members of the baby-bust generations born after 1960. 
Thus, this chapter provides evidence for sex ratio hypotheses 1, 8.1, 8.3, 8.4 
and 15. 
 Marriage squeezes thus seem to affect marriage, cohabitation, divorce, 
female labor force participation, and social activities. The existence of such 
effects implies that marriage markets exist and have important social and 
psychological, as well as economic, ramifications. As unappealing as such 
unromantic notions may sound, markets affect even the most intimate aspects 
of our lives. 
 Most readers with a Western cultural background will probably experience 
difficulty in accepting these views. However, in countries such as Japan and 
India marriage market awareness is a fact of life. These countries use a variety 
of means to promote market clearance, such as go-betweens, newspaper 
advertising, and local marriage bureaus.14 Awareness of marriage squeezes, and 
of marriage market forces in general, may encourage Westerners to move 
further away from the sixties and seventies, in a direction toward more lasting 
marriages and a more practical approach to marriage, as is the case in the Far 
East.  
 Notes 
 1.  This recognizes that women are more interested in legal protection in case a 
separation occurs. Women's preference for tying their husbands to familial obligations, 
particularly after dissolution, and men's relative emphasis on avoiding limitations to 
their freedom (including the freedom from responsibility to their children) is strongly 
rooted in biological differences between the sexes. In Chapter 9, I discuss how women's 
stronger desire for legal protection in marriage can be derived from gender differences 
in productivity levels (reproductive productivity in particular) and in life-cycle 
variations in two major kinds of productivity (reproductive and earnings-generating). 
Other biologically rooted gender differences have been related to the asymmetric desire 
for legal protection at dissolution. This includes differences in morbidity, mortality, and 
sources of sexual satisfaction (see Davis and Van den 0ever 1982). It should also be 
kept in mind that women's relative preference for legal protection through marriage is 
not universal. For instance, women oriented toward a career outside the home and not 
toward childbearing may be less interested in stability and legal protection through 
marriage. 
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 2.  In Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman (1981) marriage squeezes are related to 
marital fertility, assuming wives are more willing to have children than husbands.  
 3.  0thers have hypothesized this relation between marriage squeeze and sorting 
patterns, among them Lebergott (1965) and Spanier and Glick (1980). 
 4.  Similar hypotheses regarding these additional aspects of marriage could be 
derived regarding the effects of other factors, such as those found in the first rows of 
Table 4.1. 
 5.  The first explanation was suggested by Yochanan Peres. The second is also 
found in Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman (1981). 
 6.  The 1980s witnessed a rapid rise in age at marriage. Consequently, the 
number of unmarried 18 and 19 year old women grew faster than the number of 
unmarried men in their twenties, even though the total number of women in the relevant 
age categories was not growing as fast as the total number of men in the relevant age 
categories.(The decreased popularity of marriage among young women in the 1980s 
indicates that there is more at stake than variations in sex ratio.) 
 7.  Before 1977, no data were published on the number of unmarried couples 
aged 25-34. Therefore I could not present a figure using age groups comparable to the 
measure of marriage squeeze.  
 8.  According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1981), the ratio of cohabitation 
in 1980 compared to that in 1970 was 9.46 for households where the householder was 
under 45 and 1.24 for households where the householder was 45 and over. That same 
ratio comparing 1980 to 1977 was 1.68 and 1.17 respectively. 
 9.  There are, however, serious statistical problems in testing a theory with 
annual data for such a short period. 
 10. For more empirical evidence on the relationship between marriage squeeze 
and female labor force participation, see Chapters 6 and 7. 
 11. I owe this point to Deborah Blackwell. 
 12. But total racial exogamy is limited in the United States. "In 1975, about 4.4 
percent of married black men and about 2.4 percent of married black women had 
partners of a different race, almost always white" (Spanier and Glick 1980, p. 724). 
This low exogamy justifies viewing markets for services by black and white wives as 
separate. 
 13. Guttentag and Secord (1983) similarly argue that lower sex ratios among 
American blacks than whites account for the former's higher divorce and cohabitation 
rates.  
 14. This happened, for example, on the Japanese island of Hokkaido, where men 
who had been experiencing a shortage of brides organized an agency to bring potential 
wives from the mainland (New York Times, January 3, 1978). 
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                                                         Marriage 
Squeezes and Married  
 Women's Labor Supply: 
 Cross-City Comparisons 
 Studies of women's labor force participation that are set in a family context 
have generally taken marital status as given. In contrast, it is assumed here that 
marriage markets and labor markets are interconnected. This chapter focuses 
on one particular application of such interrelationship between the two markets: 
the labor force participation effects of imbalances in marriage markets due to 
unequal numbers of men and women. A marriage squeeze for women occurs 
when a marriage market contains substantially more women than men. 
According to Hypothesis 1' derived in Chapter 3, a marriage squeeze for men is 
expected to be associated with lower participation of married women in the 
labor force than a marriage squeeze for women. This chapter also derives and 
tests correlaries of Hypothesis 1' regarding factors influencing the effects of 
marriage squeezes on women's labor supply. Analyses of data for U.S. cities in 
1930 and 1980 offer some evidence for Hypothesis 1' and its correlaries. It 
seems to be the                                          
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case that married women are less likely to participate in the labor force in cities 
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where there is a marriage squeeze for men, i.e. women are relatively scarce, 
than in cities where men are relatively scarce.This is especially likely to be the 
case for women with no more than a high school education.  
 Previous Literature 
  Demographers have long been concerned with marriage squeezes, which are 
often defined as a function of sex ratios. Sex ratios are defined as the number of 
available men relatively to the number of women of marriageable age. 
Demographers analyzing sex ratios have primarily been interested in the effects 
of sex ratios on marriage rates. General theories of sex ratio and marriage 
squeeze effects that were developed independently by Marcia Guttentag and 
Paul Secord (1983) and this writer (Grossbard-Shechtman 1981,1984) lead to 
the derivation of additional hypotheses regarding effects of sex ratios on 
divorce, cohabitation, sorting patterns, and on labor supply (see Chapters 3, 4 
and 5). This chapter focuses on the impact of marriage squeezes and sex ratios 
on the labor supply of married women. 
 Previous research which has related sex ratios to women's labor supply has 
not focussed solely on married women. For instance, Guttentag and Secord 
(1983) and Wilson (1987) hypothesized that women (both married and 
unmarried) are more likely to work when sex ratios are low. This hypothesis 
was tested with cross-country data by Ward and Pampel (1985), Ferber and 
Berg (1991), and South (1988), who all looked at overall female labor force 
participation. 
 Likewise, the tests reported in the previous chapter--based on time trends 
and black-white comparisons--related sex ratios to women's labor force 
participation, regardless of marital status. 
 The fact that the rate of labor force participation of both married and 
unmarried women was lower where the sex ratio was higher could simply 
follow from the fact that (1) higher sex ratios imply higher marriage rates for 
women, and (2) married women typically work less than unmarried women. In 
contrast, the analysis presented here tests how sex ratios and marriage squeezes 
influence the labor supply of married women. 
 Previous studies of sex ratio and marriage have pointed out to the need for 
analyzing various educational, ethnic, linguistic, racial, or religious groups 
separately. For instance, Goldman (1977) constructed separate availability 
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measures for women differing in educational level and race. Marriage patterns 
have also been analyzed separately for blacks and whites by Schoen and 
Kluegel (1988), and Lichter, LeClere and McLaughlin (1991), in part due to 
the tendency for marriage within a race (racial endogamy). People also prefer to 
marry a spouse of similar origin or speaking the same language (e.g., Schoen 
and Cohen 1980, Stevens and Schoen 1988.) Whenever possible, the analysis 
presented here also separates women by educational level and ethnicity.  
 Theory 
 The analysis in Chapter 3 lead to Hypothesis 1, the hypothesis on which the 
present chapter focuses: Hypothesis 1 stated that: 
 A marriage squeeze for men is expected to be associated with lower female 
labor force participation than a marriage squeeze for women. 
 A marriage squeeze of men occurs when there is a relative surplus of men in 
a marriage market, whereas a marriage squeeze for women occurs when there 
is a relative surplus of women. If sex ratios are defined as the number of 
marriageable men divided by the number of marriageable women, it follows 
that marriage squeezes for men tend to occur when sex ratios are larger than 1, 
and marriage squeezes for women when sex ratios are smaller than 1. One 
possible measure of marriage squeeze is the sex ratio in a marriage market. As 
argued in Chapter 3, higher sex ratios are associated with a higher aggregate 
demand for women's spousal labor (given the supply by women), and 
consequently with a higher marriage-market related component of women's 
value of time. The basic idea is that the scarcer women are, the more men may 
make women feel desirable, and the more attractive dating options for never-
married and divorced women become. This leads to a higher value of time for 
women, including married women. Given that value of time and labor force 
participation are inversely related, it follows that sex ratios and women's labor 
force participation will be inversely related, and that a marriage squeeze for 
men may discourage women from participating in the labor force. 
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 This hypothesis applies separately to unmarried and to married women, to 
the extent that some women's labor supply decisions are influenced by marriage 
market conditions both before and after marriage. To the extent that marriage 
market conditions affect married women more than unmarried women, it 
follows that: 
 A marriage squeeze for men is expected to be associated with lower female 
labor force participation than a marriage squeeze for women (Hypothesis 1'). 
 Two alternative explanations also lead to Hypothesis 1, the first based on 
migration theory and the second on the theory of discrimination in labor 
markets. First, an alternative interpretation for a negative association between 
sex ratios and women's labor force participation across geographical areas can 
be based on job-related migration. If people migrate in order to improve their 
employment conditions, high sex ratios could be caused by migration of men to 
areas where men have better job opportunities or by migration of women to 
areas where women have better job opportunities. In turn, job opportunities are 
positively related to labor force participation, and sex ratios are related to 
marriage squeezes. A second alternative interpretation for a negative 
association between sex ratio and female labor force participation is based on 
the existence of discrimination in the job market. This theory assumes that 
employers prefer to employ men rather than women. If men are in relatively 
short supply (for instance, due to a low sex ratio), employers reluctantly will 
hire more women. 
  It does not follow from a migration interpretation or a discrimination 
interpretation that marriage squeeze and sex ratio effects on labor supply are 
likely to be more relevant to married women than to unmarried women. 
Unmarried female workers are more likely to migrate and to be substituted for 
male workers than are married female workers. Therefore, according to these 
theories one expects marriage squeezes and sex ratios to be more related to 
labor supply among unmarried women than among married women. In 
contrast, given the fact that married women are more likely to switch between 
supplying labor and spousal labor, and given the fact that most unmarried 
women work regardless of marriage market conditions, it follows from a 
market theory of marriage that conditions in the market for spousal labor are 
more relevant to the decision to work of married women than to the decision to 
work of unmarried women. Consequently,  
 Hypothesis 1.1 
 Marriage squeeze effects on the labor supply of married women are 
expected to be stronger than marriage squeeze effects on the labor supply 
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of unmarried women. 
 As explained in Chapter 3, a major premise behind Hypothesis 1 is that for 
women work in the labor market and spousal labor are substitute sources of 
income. The presence and intensity of marriage squeeze effects is expected to 
vary with the importance of work as a source of income. 
 Marriage squeezes for men are expected to be associated with a higher 
pecuniary component of women's value of time in marriage than marriage 
squeezes for women. Women who work outside the home primarily for 
pecuniary reasons are more likely to use their increased compensation within 
marriage in order to avoid work than women who work to a large extent due to 
non-pecuniary rewards obtained on the job. Three variables which possibly 
reflect the relative importance of pecuniary rewards are education, full-time 
work status, and wage. This leads to Hypotheses 1.2 through 1.4. 
Marriage Squeeze and Education  
 Women with higher education tend to find work outside the home more 
rewarding than do women with low education. The lower their level of 
education, the more married women are likely to use their marriage market 
position as a means to avoid work outside the home.  It follows that 
 Hypothesis 1.2 
 The lower women's level of education, the more one is likely to find a 
negative association between marriage squeezes for men and women's rate 
of participation in the labor force. 
 Migration theory does not lead to Hypothesis 1.2. According to migration 
theory more educated women are expected to migrate more as a function of job 
opportunities, which leads to a stronger (negative) association between sex ratio 
and labor force participation for more educated women. In other words, high 
participation rates of women in the labor force and marriage squeezes for 
women are expected to be associated more positively among highly educated 
women than among women with low education. Likewise, as men tend to be 
more educated workers than women, according to discrimination theory one 
expects a stronger association between marriage squeezes and labor force 
participation among educated women than among uneducated women. 
Marriage Squeeze and Full-Time Work  
 In light of the marriage market analysis presented here, it follows that the 
decision to work full-time is more likely to be linked to marriage market 
conditions women face than is the decision to work part-time. Part-time 
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workers are more likely to enjoy work, and not as likely to translate increased 
pecuniary compensations in marriage due to marriage squeezes for men (or any 
other reason) into the luxury of avoiding work. It follows that 
 Hypothesis 1.3 
 Marriage squeeze effects on women's labor force participation are more 
likely to be found for full-time workers than for part-time workers. 
 Another variable related to the relative importance of pecuniary 
compensation at work is the wage. 
Marriage Squeeze and Wage 
 The wage a woman can earn in the labor market is going to be related to the 
way marriage squeezes affect women's labor force participation for at least two 
reasons. First, higher wages may indicate that a job is more satisfying (unless 
the wage is higher in order to compensate for unpleasant job characteristics). 
From this perspective, marriage squeeze effects are likely to be stronger for 
women with low wages who presumably do not enjoy work much than for 
women with high wages. Second, where marriage squeezes for men prevail and 
women are relatively scarce, that scarcity may affect not only marriage 
markets--as discussed so far--but also labor markets. If male and female 
workers are poor substitutes this implies that where female workers are scarce, 
demand for their work is higher, which may cause both higher wages and more 
participation in the labor force. Where marriage squeezes for men are not 
associated with higher wages for women, one may infer that there is not much 
of a labor market effect of marriage squeeze on female labor force participation 
and a negative association between marriage squeeze for men and female labor 
force participation is more likely to be observed. For both of these reasons we 
expect that 
 Hypothesis 1.4 
 The negative effect of a marriage squeeze for men on women's labor force 
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participation is more likely to be found where women's wages are low. 
 Given possible substitution between work and spousal labor as sources of 
income, the intensity of marriage squeeze effects is also expected to be a 
positive function of the importance of the market-determined component of the 
value of time. In turn, the impact of marriage markets on individual value of 
time is a negative function of duration of marriage. 
Marriage Squeeze and Duration of Marriage 
 Value of time is likely to vary more with marriage market conditions around 
time of marriage than either considerably before or after the wedding. The 
longer a couple is married, the more they may have made marriage-specific 
investments and the higher the costs of divorce. In turn, the higher the costs of 
divorce and remarriage, the less important the market-determined component 
of w* is expected to be, and the less marriage squeeze effects on the labor 
supply of married women are likely to be observed. It follows that 
 Hypothesis 1.5 
 The longer the duration of marriage, the less one is likely to find a negative 
association between marriage squeezes for men and the rate of 
participation of married women in the labor force. 
 In turn, duration of marriage may be approximated by age at marriage or 
age at interview. Therefore, a variation of Hypothesis 1.5 states that Hypothesis 
1 is more likely to hold the closer women are to the average age at marriage. 
Furthermore, marriage squeeze effects on women's labor supply are expected to 
vary with the proportion of women who are married. 
Percent Married  
 The effect of variations in marriage squeeze on female labor force 
participation depends on the size of the various curve shifts and on the 
elasticities of demand and supply in the relevant markets for spousal labor. To 
understand this, one needs to go back the technical analysis of Chapter 3. 
Consider a marriage squeeze for men caused by an increase in the number of 
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men, which was caused by a rightward shift in demand for women's spousal 
labor as depicted in Figure 3.2. The more elastic the supply of female spousal 
labor at the initial intersection between demand and supply, the smaller the 
impact of such rightward shift in demand on the equilibrium w*, and therefore 
the smaller the effect of a marriage squeeze for men on women's supply of labor 
outside the home. In contrast, the more inelastic the supply of female spousal 
labor at the initial intersection of demand and supply, the larger the predicted 
impact on the equilibrium w*, the larger the predicted impact on value of time, 
and the more women's labor supply will be affected. 
 In turn, the elasticity of supply of female spousal labor depends on the 
proportion of women who are married. The larger the proportion of women 
who are married, the less elastic the supply of spousal labor. When most 
women are married, further increases in w* will generate little entry of 
additional women interested in marriage or increases in the number of hours 
married women are willing to work in spousal labor. Under such circumstances 
a rightward shift in men's demand for women's spousal labor, caused e.g., by an 
increase in the number of men, is likely to cause a large rise in w*, and 
consequently a large decrease in labor supply.1 This implies that  
 Hypothesis 1.6 
 The higher the percent of women who are married, the more marriage 
squeezes for men are likely to be negatively associated with (married) 
women's labor force participation. 
 In other words, the higher the percent of women who are married, the more 
Hypothesis 1 (or Hypothesis 1') is applicable. 
 Accordingly, the elasticity of supply of women's spousal labor is expected to 
vary across various groups of women as a function of the percent of women 
who are married in that group. For instance, if a higher proportion of high-
class women are married than is the case for low-class women, it follows that a 
marriage squeeze for men will have more of a discouraging effect on the labor 
force participation of high-class women than on the labor force participation of 
low-class women. It also follows that if the percentage of blacks who are 
married is lower than that percentage among whites, it is expected that 
marriage squeeze effects on black women's labor force participation will be 
weaker than marriage squeeze effects on white women's labor force 
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participation. 
 Hypothesis 1.6 does not follow from migration theory. Where a higher 
proportion of women are married, female migration is expected to be less 
sensitive to differences in job opportunities for women. Likewise, Hypothesis 
1.6 does not follow from discrimination theory. 
 The percent of women who are married is expected to affect women's labor 
force participation not only via marriage squeezes, but also directly. Where a 
higher percentage of women are married this may capture favorable marriage 
market conditions for women (for reasons other than a high sex ratio). 
Accordingly, one expects percent married and participation of married women 
in the labor force to be negatively related. Causality is not so clear. Favorable 
marriage market conditions may simultaneously cause more marriage and less 
participation of married women in the labor force. 
 The degree to which marriage squeezes have an impact on women's labor 
force participation is also expected to depend on the elasticity of demand for 
spousal labor, female labor in particular. If a marriage squeeze for men is 
interpreted as a smaller supply of women's spousal labor, it follows that value 
of time will be affected more by marriage squeezes the less elastic the demand. 
In turn, such elasticity is a function of cost and availability of substitutes.  
 In interpreting empirical tests of these marriage squeeze effects based on a 
comparison of geographical areas one also needs to realize that migration could 
occur as a result of better marriage opportunities in another city, possibly the 
result of sex ratio variations across cities. Such migration could reduce 
variation in sex ratios and thereby weaken marriage squeeze effects on value of 
time, and consequently, on labor force participation of married women. If 
variations in sex ratio persist over time, it implies that migration motivated by 
marriage market factors is limited. 
 An empirical study of the labor supply of married women also needs to take 
account of other variables which belong in a theory of labor supply and are 
known to influence labor supply. 
Wage and Income Effects  
 Employment levels and wages can be related to labor supply in a number of 
ways. Wages enter both the demand and the supply of labor and are eventually 
established where demand and supply intersect. The supply of labor is expected 
to depend on wage opportunities (positively, to the extent that a substitution 
effect dominates, and negatively, to the extent that an income effect prevails). 
The demand for labor is a negative function of wages. While there exists 
widespread evidence of a positive relation between women's wages and labor 
force participation (see for instance, Mincer 1962, Rotella 1981 using earlier 
data, Goldin 1983, and Smith and Ward 1985) that evidence is mostly based on 
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microdata sets or inter-regional comparisons based on historical data. 
 Income from sources other than own wage is expected to raise a married 
woman's value of time, and consequently to discourage her labor force 
participation (Mincer 1962). Husband's income from work and income from 
other sources are all expected to have such negative effect on the participation 
of married women in the labor force. 
 There is a wealth of evidence which has accumulated regarding wage and 
income effects on labor supply (including the labor supply of married women), 
some of which has been summarized e.g., by Keeley (1981) and Killingsworth 
(1983). As the following empirical work is based on cross-city comparisons, it 
is worth reviewing some relevant findings based on similar comparisons 
performed in the past. For instance, Bowen and Finegan (1969) and Fields 
(1976) estimated models of labor force participation of married women using 
cross-city comparisons for 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970. They found women's 
own expected wage was positively related to married women's labor force 
participation rates, whereas family (nonemployment) income was negatively 
related to such rates. Bowen and Finegan also found that husbands' earnings 
were negatively related to the labor force participation of married women.  
Fertility and Education 
 Many studies of married women's labor force participation have controlled 
for number of children and found a negative relationship between fertility and 
such labor force participation. However, causality is hard to establish, as 
fertility and labor supply tend to be simultaneously selected. It is also well-
documented that education is positively related to labor supply. Again, causality 
is difficult to establish as women are likely to select their educational level and 
their level of participation in the labor force simultaneously. 
 Testing the Marriage Squeeze Hypotheses 
 The marriage squeeze hypotheses stated above were tested using data for 
American cities in 1930 and 1980.2 There are two major advantages of using 
data at two points in time: (1) it possibly increases the robustness of the results, 
and (2) it enables us to make comparisons over time. One expects stronger 
effects of marriage squeezes on women's labor force participation in 1930 than 
in 1980 for the following reasons: 
 1. In 1930, there were higher proportions of married women (e.g., because 
cohabitation without marriage was less of an option then than it is now), 
which implies higher potential effects on value of time based on marriage 
market conditions (Hypothesis 1.6).  
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 2.  In 1930, there were fewer substitutes for women's spousal labor, and 
therefore a less elastic demand by men for women's spousal labor, 
which implies stronger effects of sex ratios on quasi-wage w*, 
women's value of time and women's labor force participation.  
 3.  In 1930 there was more of a tendency for women to work at arduous jobs 
offering little intrinsic rewards. In 1930 women were mostly employed 
in manufacturing and domestic service, whereas today most women 
are employed in white-collar jobs. Consequently, in 1930 a higher 
proportion of women were likely to work for monetary rewards. This 
favors the sex ratio hypothesis, which compares monetary returns to 
work with the returns to homemaking and does not take non-monetary 
benefits from paid employment into account.  
 In testing the marriage squeeze hypotheses stated above, it is important to 
separate foreign-born from natives. Numerous studies have observed 
pronounced in-group tendencies for marriage with respect to race, religion, and 
national origin (see for instance Blau, Blum, and Schwartz 1982 for a partial 
survey of the literature). To the extent that people tend to marry according to 
ethnic or religious boundaries, it is preferable to run regressions of the labor 
supply of women of a particular origin using ethnic or religion-specific 
marriage squeeze estimator(s). People born in the same foreign country tend to 
belong to the same ethnic-religious groups and to marry each other. They also 
tend to concentrate in a relatively small number of cities when they migrate. It 
can be assumed that sex ratios for all foreign-born in a given city are positively 
correlated with each other. Marriage squeeze effects on the labor force 
participation of foreign-born women may be stronger than such marriage 
squeeze effects for native women to the extent that there is more variance in sex 
ratio among the foreign-born population or that the foreign-born population is 
characterized by some of the factors which are expected to reinforce marriage 
squeeze effects on female labor supply, such as high emphasis on work for 
pecuniary rewards and high marriage rates for women. 
 The inclusion of foreign-born gives a further advantage to the 1930 data. In 
1930 there was a larger number of cities with a substantial proportion of its 
population born abroad than in 19803. In 1980 only a small number of cities 
had a number of foreign-born large enough for the calculation of sex ratios and 
labor force participation rates for women in their twenties. 
 In view of the low rate of intermarriage between blacks and whites, and 
given the small numbers of blacks in many of the cities, the analysis was 
restricted to white women, most Hispanics defining themselves as white. 
 Empirical tests were limited to young women, for their value of time may be 
most related to marriage market opportunities (see Hypothesis 1.5). Marriage 
squeezes are expected to have a larger effect on recently married couples, who 
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are most likely to be aware of marriage market conditions, than on couples 
married for a longer time. The longer a couple has been married, the more it is 
likely that transactions within a marriage become influenced by factors 
unrelated to marriage market conditions, such as affection and the power of 
habit. Ideally, I would have liked a sample of recently married young women. 
Instead, as age at marriage was not available, I used data on women around the 
average age at marriage in the U.S. 
 It also follows from the theory (Hypotheses 1.2 and 1.3) that one would 
want to focus on full-time workers and on uneducated women. In the case of 
the 1980 data it was possible to extract data by education and full-time work 
status. The available 1930 data did not enable calculation of sex ratios or 
participation rates by education or full-time work status. 
 The model that was estimated included participation of married women in 
the labor force on the left-hand side and measures of marriage squeeze on the 
right-hand side. In addition, other variables that are possibly related to married 
women's labor force participation were included in the equation: proxies for the 
demand for women's and men's labor, female wage level, and regional 
dummies. 
 Given the simultaneous relationship between labor force participation and 
fertility, reduced forms of labor force participation were estimated. 
 I first report the analysis of the 1930 data, and then proceed with the 1980 
data. 
 
U.S. Cities, 1930  
 Hypotheses relating marriage squeezes to women's labor supply were first 
tested with data on 67 U.S. cities in 1930. The cities included in both samples 
were the largest cities for which information was available. 
 The sample was restricted to women between ages 25 to 34. This age group 
seemed an appropriate age group for our test: a majority of women aged 25 to 
34 (73 percent) were married, and given their age, they were relatively recently 
married. 
 The following independent variables were included: 
 Sex Ratio (SR). In this study, the indicator of marriage squeeze was the sex 
ratio defined as a continuous variable. Even though younger women tend to 
marry men older than themselves, in the computation of sex ratios I was not 
able to add men older than 34.4 It is possible to define sex ratios as the total 
number of men divided by the total number of women, or alternatively, as the 
number of unmarried men divided by the number of unmarried women 
(demographers have always put women in the denominator). As can be seen 
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from Table 6.1, which presents means and standard deviations for all the 
variables included in the model, I tried both definitions of sex ratio. 
 
  TABLE 6.1  Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses)-- 
 White Women Ages 25-34, U.S. Cities in 1930 (N=67) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The advantage of the measure including all men and women is that it gives a 
more accurate picture of the real marriage opportunities before marriages 
actually occur. But people may not become aware of such opportunities if they 
do not look at the statistics. They are more likely to become aware of the ratio 
of unmarried men to unmarried women, especially after the market has already 
been cleared of a lot of participants. In view of men's older age at first 
marriage, it appears from Table 6.1 that the overall sex ratios are considerably 
lower than the sex ratios among the unmarried, and that sex ratios among the 
foreign-born were substantially higher than sex ratios among natives. 
 Demand for Labor. The variable VALUE was included as an indicator for 
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the demand for labor typically performed by women. VALUE is the value added 
by the five industries that employ most women (food processing, clothing, 
paper, leather and tobacco). This variable, constructed by Rotella, was found to 
be a significant determinant of employment levels in Rotella (1980, 1981).  
 It can also be argued, as did Haines (1979), that women's employment 
opportunities are negatively related to men's employment opportunities in 
mining and heavy industry. Such a negative relationship could result from sex 
segregation in the occupational and industrial structure, so that there was little 
substitution between male and female workers, or could be caused by men's 
higher earnings inducing women to stay home. Haines found women's 
employment to be significantly lower in areas with high proportions of men 
employed in mining and heavy industry. Accordingly, I constructed a MINING 
variable as the percentage of men aged 25 to 34 employed in mining and heavy 
industry, and included it in the regressions of female labor force participation.5  
 Wages. (Wf) actually stands for women's earnings (wages and hours of work 
could not be easily separated). 
 Region. Regional dummies were also included as possible proxies for the 
demand for labor. Dummies were included for two regions of the United States: 
West and South.  
 Means and standard deviations can be found in Table 6.1. 
 Model. The first equation that was estimated is 
where MFLFP is the percentage of married women in the labor force.
6
 
Following Hypothesis 1', it is expected that ß1 is negative. It is also expected 
that ß2 and ß4 are positive, and that ß3 is negative.
7  
 Even though equation 6.1 contains a measure of employment opportunities 
for women (VALUE) and of employment opportunities for men (MINING), as 
well as a measure of women's earnings WAGEF, employment opportunities are 
far from being perfectly controlled for, so that it is possible that poor 
employment opportunities for women, reflected in a low participation of 
married women in the labor force (MFLFP), attracted few women through 
migration, thereby causing a low sex ratio. Moreover, high sex ratios may be 
caused by migration of men to areas where they have better opportunities and 
incomes relatively to that of women (Wrigley 1961; Haines 1979). It is also 
possible that discrimination in the labor market causes a negative relationship 
between sex ratios and female labor force participation. Equation 6.1 thus 
 
 SOUTH + W             
+ MINING  + VALUE  +  SR +  = MFLFP
5f4
3210


 (6.1) 
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cannot distinguish between such alternative explanations. 
 As an additional test for the sex ratio hypothesis, a second equation, which 
includes the labor force participation among unmarried women, UFLFP, was 
estimated: 
According to the sex ratio hypothesis, the sex ratio is expected to influence 
MFLFP more than UFLFP (Hypothesis 1.1) and, consequently, one predicts a 
negative coefficient of Sex Ratio (SR) when unmarried women's LFP (UFLFP) 
is included in the regression of married women's labor force participation 
(MFLFP). According to the alternative explanations based on migration and 
discrimination at work, once UFLFP is controlled for,  one does not expect that 
the coefficient of sex ratio will be statistically significant in a regression of 
MFLFP. If the coefficient of sex ratio is significantly negative after control for 
UFLFP one can consider this as evidence for the sex ratio hypothesis.8  
 Logarithmic transformations were made of all variables, excluding the 
regional dummies. All regressions were estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. 
Results, 1930  
 All regressions were estimated for three groups of white women: foreign-
born, native, and all white women. As mentioned above, given observed 
tendencies for group endogamy, marriage markets differ by national origin. 
 Table 6.2 reports regression results following the first model (equation 6.1) 
which does not include labor force participation rates among unmarried women 
(UFLFP). Table 6.3 presents results based on the second model (equation 6.2), 
which includes UFLFP as one of the variables explaining MFLFP.  
 Most regressions show that as predicted, the higher the sex ratio, the less 
married women participate in the labor force. The sex ratio takes a negative 
sign in most regressions. All regressions estimated on the basis of intercity 
variations in foreign born labor force participation and sex ratios indicate a 
significant sex ratio effect, whether sex ratios were computed for the total 
population age 25 to 34 (col. 2) or were limited to the ratio of unmarried men 
to unmarried women in that age range (col. 1), and whether or not UFLFP is 
included (Table 6.2 or Table 6.3). While sex ratio effects on the labor force 
participation of married women appeared strong for foreign-born women, sex 
ratios did not seem to have much effect on the labor force participation of 
native married women: regression 3 in Table 6.2 indicates a negative 
 
UFLFP  +  SOUTH + W  
+ MINING  + VALUE  +  SR +  = MFLFP
65f4
3210


 (6.2) 
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coefficient which is statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
 
 TABLE 6.2  Regressions of Labor Force Participation-- 
 Married Women Ages 25-34, U.S. Cities in 1930  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once UFLFP is controlled for, the labor force participation of native married 
women does not seem to be affected by sex ratio variations (Table 6.3).  
   When all white women are combined, Table 6.2 indicates a sex ratio effect 
that is statistically significant (at the 95 percent level) if sex ratios are 
computed for the unmarried population. This coefficient of sex ratio remains 
negative in Table 6.3, after control for UFLFP, but only at the 90 percent level.  
 It appears, therefore, that sex ratio effects on women's labor supply were 
stronger amongst the foreign-born than amongst the native white U.S. 
population. This may be related to the greater variance in sex ratio found 
among the foreign born, the higher percentage of foreign born who were 
married 9 (stronger effect on w* as postulated in Hypothesis 1.6), a higher 
demand for marriage by more tradition-bound foreign born men, a more 
inelastic supply of marriage by more tradition-bound women, or language or 
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cultural barriers affecting foreigners' job opportunities. Also, as mentioned 
above, Hypothesis 1' depends on the assumption that women work not for  
 
 TABLE 6.3  Regressions of Net Labor Force Participation-- 
 Married Women Ages 25-34, U.S. Cities in 1930  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pleasure, but out of financial necessity. Their culture of origin may discourage 
foreign-born women from wanting to leave the home, and they may be more 
likely to work out of financial necessity than native women. Interestingly, in 
unreported regressions, it was found that a sex ratio defined for natives had no 
effect on the participation of the foreign born, and vice versa. A comparison of 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 indicates that the inclusion of unmarried women's LFP had 
a small impact on the sex ratio coefficients in the regressions of foreign born 
married women's LFP, but that this is not so for native women. In Table 6.3, 
which controls for unmarried women's LFP, the size of the sex ratio coefficients 
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in columns 1 and 2 are almost identical to those found in Table 6.2, where 
unmarried women's LFP was not included amongst the explanatory variables. 
This suggests a sex ratio effect on foreign-born married women's labor force 
participation which is unrelated to job-motivated migration or discrimination 
against women. The same is not true for native women. In columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 6.3, sex ratio coefficients do not differ significantly from zero, whereas 
unmarried and married women's labor force participation are strongly related. 
 Also, the hypothesis that job-motivated migration simultaneously creates 
high sex ratios and low female labor force participation rates leads one to 
predict significantly negative sex ratio coefficients in regressions of unmarried 
women's LFP, possibly more so than in regressions of married women's LFP 
(unmarried women are more likely to migrate as a function of job opportunities 
than are married women). In separate regressions of the participation rate of 
unmarried women, UFLFP, it was found that the coefficient of sex ratio was 
not significantly different from zero, in contrast to the significantly negative 
coefficient of sex ratio in the LFP regressions for married women.10  
   Other noteworthy results include the strong positive effect of the demand for 
labor (VALUE) on married women's LFP and the negative coefficient of 
MINING.11 The latter result suggests that in cities with more job opportunities 
for men in mining and heavy industry, (1) there were possibly fewer job 
opportunities for women, or (2) men's higher income made it less necessary for 
women to go to work. These two variables indicating demand for labor are 
significant in both Tables 6.2 and 6.3. In contrast, the effect of female wage 
(Wf) is insignificant in all regressions, possibly because it is the result of both 
demand and supply differences across cities.12 Regional patterns appear to 
matter. In comparison to married women in the northeast, married women 
elsewhere in the country were more likely to participate in the labor force. This 
became even more so after inclusion of UFLFP in the regressions. 
U.S. Cities, 1980 
   Most data for this study were extracted from a 1 percent sample of the 1980 
Census for most large U.S. cities defined as Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (SMSAs).13  For the main variables used in this study, city averages were 
calculated from micro-level data. Given the considerations mentioned earlier, 
data were extracted for young women close to the average age at marriage. Sex 
ratios and labor force participation rates were calculated for married white 
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women between the ages of 25 and 28, and income data for men and women 
between the ages of 30 and 31. Separate data were extracted for married white 
women in this age group who did not complete more than a high school 
education. As stated in Hypothesis 1.2, the lower women's educational level the 
more one is likely to find a marriage squeeze effect on the participation of 
married women in the labor force.14 The dependent variable used in this study 
was full-time labor force participation of married women. 
 Full-time Labor Force Participation. In line with Hypothesis 1 it is more 
likely to find marriage squeeze effects on full-time labor force participation of 
married women than on part-time participation. Average full-time labor force 
participation rates were computed for married women age 25 to 28 in each city, 
the alternative being either no work at all or part-time work. 
 The independent variables were calculated as follows: 
 Marriage Squeeze. The construction of a marriage squeeze index was based 
on two steps: calculation of sex ratios and creation of an "Excess males" 
variable. First, sex ratios were calculated as the number of men between the 
ages of 27 to 30 divided by the number of women between the ages of 25 to 28. 
A two year difference in age at marriage was chosen, in line with the average 
age difference at first marriage in the United States in 1980.15 Sex ratios could 
also be defined as the number of unmarried men divided by the number of 
unmarried women in these age groups. The advantage of the measure including 
all men and women is that it gives a more accurate picture of marriage 
opportunities before marriages actually occur.   Second, a 
variable called "Excess males" was constructed. This variable was equal to the 
difference between the number of men and the number of women participating 
in the same marriage market, relatively to the number of women, provided that 
the sex ratio exceeded the mean sex ratio by 1 standard deviation or more (the 
operational definition of a marriage squeeze for men). 
 For each city I calculated marriage squeeze measures (based on sex ratios) 
and married women's labor force participation rates for all women and for 
women with low education. Low education was defined as a high school degree 
or less. In calculating sex ratios for women with high-school education or less, 
I used the number of men with three years of college or less, given the tendency 
for husbands' educational level to exceed that of their wives.  
 Table 6.4 shows the calculated rates of full-time labor force participation for 
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white married women between the ages of 25 and 28 in the two groups selected 
for this study: all women and women with low education. It can be seen that 
women with lower education tended to work less than women with more than a 
high school degree. 
 The second row in Table 6.4 shows average sex ratios for the selected 
groups of women. By design, sex ratios for women with a high school diploma 
are expected to exceed 1, as men with higher educational achievements are also 
included. The mean value of the marriage squeeze index, EXCESSM, is low, 
especially when calculated for people of all educational levels. For many cities--
cities without a marriage squeeze for males--this variable took the value 0, and 
for the cities with such marriage squeeze the amount of excess men was divided 
by the number of women. 
 
 TABLE 6.4  Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) 
 for Various Samples, U.S. Cities in 1980 
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 Income. Expected income was computed based on the income of full-time 
workers between the ages of 30 and 31: FINCM in the case of women, and 
MINCM for men.16 As expected, it can be seen from Table 6.4 that the mean 
income of individuals with low education is lower than the mean income of all 
individuals. 
  Wage. (WAGEM) For each city, I also obtained data on the average hourly 
wage paid to production workers in manufacturing, directly from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Given that most such blue-collar workers are men, this 
variable is a proxy for husband's wage, especially in the case of women with 
low education.  
 Regional dummies were also included.  
 Model. The equations that were estimated have the same format as equation 
6.1 mentioned above, the differences lying in the definitions of the variables. 
The model was estimated separately for women of all educational levels and for 
women of low education.  
 Following the theory presented above, it is hypothesized that ß1 is negative 
(Hypothesis 1'), and more so in the case of women with low education than in 
the case of more educated women (Hypothesis 1.2). To the extent that FINCM 
is a proxy for expected female wage, and the substitution effect dominates the 
income effect, ß2 is expected to be positive. According to Hypothesis 1.4 the 
negative effect of a marriage squeeze for men on the participation of married 
women in the labor force is likely to depend on the wage these women earn. 
Among women with higher wages we expect less of a negative effect of 
EXCESSM, i.e. the coefficient ß4 is expected to be positive. To the extent that 
MINCM and WAGEM are proxies for husbands' income, ß3 and ß5 are expected 
to be negative.  
 A model aimed at testing Hypothesis 1.6 was also estimated with the 1980 
data. Such model adds two variables to the model in equation 6.3: the percent 
of women who are married and an interaction term between percent married 
and excess male. Based on Hypothesis 1.6, it is expected that this interaction 
term will be negative.  
 The equations were estimated for the two education groups (high-school or 
 
 SOUTH + WAGEM  + NCMEXCESSM.FI             
+  MINCM + FINCM  + EXCESSM  +  = MFLFP
654
3210


(6.3) 
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less and all levels of education). In each regression, the marriage squeeze index 
and the income variables were adapted to the relevant group of women. Given 
that the data are city averages, the dependent variable varies continuously 
between 0 and 1, and the regressions were estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares.   
 
Results, 1980 
 Tables 6.5 and 6.6 summarize the results based on a cross-city comparison 
for 1980. Table 6.5 presents regression results for women of all educational 
levels. It can be seen that the coefficient of EXCESSM (excess males) is 
negative, as predicted, but that result is significant only at the 90% level. This 
result confirms Hypothesis 1'. Evidence is also found for Hypothesis 1.4, as the 
interaction of EXCESSM and FEMALE INCOME (FINCM) has a positive sign 
and is also significant at the 90% level. As expected own wages encourage 
women to be in the labor force and male wages discourage the participation of 
married women. 
 Table 6.6 presents regression results for women with low education. Here 
the excess males index is computed based on sex ratios defined for women with 
low education (see definition in Table 6.4). The difference between the two 
regressions in Table 6.6 is that equation 2 also includes the percent married 
and an interaction between excess males and percent married. 
 Hypothesis 1' was confirmed in both regressions of Table 6.6. The effect of a 
marriage squeeze for males (measured by EXCESSM) is significant in both 
regressions (at the 95% level in equation 1). In both regressions the interaction 
between EXCESSM and FINCM is positive, as predicted, and significant at the 
95% level. That the effect of a marriage squeeze for men is more significant in 
the case of women with low education (Table 6.6) than in the case of women at 
all educational levels (Table 6.5), is evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.2. In 
general, the results in Table 6.6 indicate that the model utilized fits women 
with lower education better than women at all educational levels (Table 6.5). 
This can be seen, for instance, from a comparison of the R-square coefficients.  
 Table 6.6 also indicates that the negative effect of a marriage squeeze for 
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men is stronger in the West than in other regions of the country (other than the 
South). Furthermore, it was found that in cities where a larger proportion of all 
women had a low educational level the rate of participation of married women 
in the labor force was lower, which can be interpreted as additional evidence of 
an own wage effect. The interaction between the proportion of women with a 
low education and EXCESSM was found to be positive, which implies that the 
effect of a marriage squeeze for males is weaker where there are fewer people 
with a college education.  The availability of fewer men with a college 
education seems to depress the marriage opportunities of women with low 
education, thereby encouraging them to work (other possible interpretations of 
such interaction term--which would possibly reinforce the negative effect of 
EXCESSM--seem to matter less).17 
 
 
 TABLE 6.5  Regression of Participation in the Labor Force-- 
 Married Women, Ages 25-28, U.S. Cities in 1980  
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 The coefficient of proportion married was found to be negative (regression 2 
in Table 6.6). This indicates that where women are more likely to be married 
they are also less likely to work while married, i.e. the amount of spousal labor 
and the value of spousal labor are positively related. However, no evidence was 
found for Hypothesis 1.6: the effect of EXCESSM did not depend on the percent 
of women who are married. 
 In both regressions in Table 6.6 the coefficients of women's earnings 
FINCM were not significant and the sign of MINCM was negative and 
significantly so. Wages of production workers in manufacturing, which was 
 
 TABLE 6.6  Regressions of Participation in the Labor Force-- 
 Married Women with Low Education, Ages 25-28, 
 U.S. Cities, 1980  
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predicted to be negatively related as well, was not found to have a significant 
effect in these regressions. So it appears that in each table at least one indicator 
of men's earning power has a significantly negative coefficient. Similarly, 
Bowen and Finegan's (1969) analysis of earlier Census data had found 
husband's income and family income to be negatively related to the 
participation of married women in the labor force. Fields' (1976) analysis of the 
1970 Census found a significantly negative effect of family income, but not of 
husbands' income.18 Southern residence does not have a significant impact on 
the labor force participation of married women of all origins. This may indicate 
that North-South differences in cultural tradition within the  
native (mostly culturally homogeneous) population are minimal.19  
 Table 6.6 also indicates that in larger cities, with more women in the age 
group and educational category studied here, married women are less likely to 
participate in the labor force. This could indicate more opportunities for women 
in the larger cities, possibly due in part to more (non-work) assets spent by 
husbands on their wives. 
 Conclusions 
 It was found that both in 1930 and in 1980 young white married women 
were less likely to participate in the labor force in cities with more 
advantageous marriage market conditions. In the 1930 study, better marriage 
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market conditions were measured in terms of higher sex ratios. In the 1980 
study, the indicator used was a measure of the relative excess number of men, 
given that there is a high sex ratio. In cities where marriage markets are more 
advantageous to women, married women are less likely to participate in the 
labor force. Significant sex ratio and marriage squeeze effects on labor force 
participation were found for white married women in their late twenties. The 
1930 study found such effects for both foreign-born women and men of all 
origins. the 1980 study found marriage squeeze effects for both women with 
less than a college education and women at all educational levels. The various 
tests using different data sets, definitions, and models, thus point to the possible 
validity of Hypothesis 1'. 
 Marriage squeezes and sex ratios are generally overlooked in studies of 
labor supply. No previous studies of labor force participation by married women 
had included sex ratios or indicators of marriage squeeze among their 
explanatory variables. Previous cross-city comparisons of married women's 
labor force participation by Bowen and Finegan (1969) and Fields (1976) did 
not include sex ratios, but included the number of women (the denominator of 
the sex ratio). Bowen and Finegan (1969) found that in cities with more women 
compared to men (ages 14 and over), fewer married women were working. In 
Field's (1976) analysis of the 1970 Census the number of women was found to 
be insignificant. In contrast, I found that in  1930, where there were more men 
compared to women, which is associated with a higher sex ratio, fewer married 
women were working.  In 1980, where there was more of a relative excess of 
males, fewer married women were working full-time. The discrepancy between 
previous studies based on data from 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970 and the 
present study based on data from 1930 and 1980 can be explained by the fact 
that previous analyses (1) pooled women of all ages together and (2) did not 
include sex ratios or an index of marriage squeeze.  In contrast, I concentrate 
on women between the ages of 25 and 34 (in the 1930 study) and between the 
ages of 25 and 28 (in the 1980 study) and look at the effect of either sex ratios 
or an index of marriage squeeze.  
 Some models attempted to separate between the explanation offered here 
and alternative explanations for a negative relationship between sex ratios and 
married women's labor force participation. The results for 1930 included labor 
force participation among unmarried women in regressions of married women's 
labor force participation. The fact that in some cases sex ratios still explain 
Sex Ratios:  Cross-City Comparisons 141 
 
 
 
variation in the labor force participation of married women after inclusion of 
unmarried women's labor force participation support the marriage market story 
told in this book. 
 Also supportive of the marriage market story are the findings based on 1980 
data that excess male effects on married women's labor force participation seem 
to be more likely to be found for women with low education (Hypothesis 1.2) 
than for women at all educational levels, and the finding that excess male 
effects on married women's labor force participation were stronger where 
women had lower wages (Hypothesis 1.4). 
 Also, as predicted from the theory, results seem to be stronger for 1930 than 
for 1980. This would not follow from a migration hypothesis, as one expects 
migration costs to be lower in 1980 than in 1930, and therefore more migration 
to occur as a function of job opportunities in 1980 than in 1930. The stronger 
findings for foreign-born than for natives (or total population) in 1930 are also 
consistent with the theory of marriage presented in this book. 
 These results make sense in light of a market theory of labor and marriage. 
Alternative explanations of a negative association between sex ratios and 
married women's labor force participation do not seem to explain all the 
findings reported here. The findings also indicate that in analyzing the effects 
of marriage squeezes, it is important to separate educational levels and to take 
account of cultural background. These results indicate that marriage squeeze 
and sex ratios matter not only when it comes to explain marriage rates, but also 
when explaining labor supply. It is hoped that further tests with better and more 
kinds of data and based on improved methods of estimation will shed more 
light on the validity of the hypotheses presented here.  
 Notes 
 1.  High sex ratios can also lead to higher rates of marriage among women. Here I 
focus on other underlying factors that could cause variations in percent married.  It may 
be desirable to use a simultaneous model to estimate percent married and labor supply.  
 2.  The choice of 1930 data was prompted by Elyce Rotella's generous offer to let 
me use the data she collected. At the time I started working with the 1980 data, these 
were the latest census data available. 
 3.  According to the sample of cities included here, the percent foreign-born was 
23 percent in 1930. There were more than 67 cities in which the foreign-born made up 
at least one percent of the white population. 
 4.  In fact, the age difference at marriage is itself to some extent a function of the 
sex ratio. 
 5.  Using the tables published by the U.S Bureau of Census (1930), Volume IV 
(Occupations by States), Table 12, the total number of men aged 25 to 34 employed in 
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extraction of minerals, machinists, and operatives and laborers in iron and steel, 
machinery, and vehicle industries was divided by the total number of employed men 
aged 25 to 34 for the same city.  
 6.  For the purpose of this discussion, a distinction is made between formalized 
marriage and living-together arrangements, and "married" means "formally married." 
 7.  Education was not included in the final regressions. A variable measuring the 
percent of women aged 16-17 enrolled in school was consistently insignificant. Such 
result can also be explained by selective migration of educated women to cities with 
better job opportunities for women. Earlier versions also included men's earnings; the 
latter variable was dropped due to its consistently insignificant effect. 
 8.  An alternative to running Regression 2 would be to run regressions of the 
same type as model (1) for unmarried women. According to the Migration Hypothesis 
SR should have a negative sign in such regression, and its coefficient should be at least 
as large as the coefficient of SR in a regression of MFLFP (for married women). 
According to the Sex Ratio Hypothesis sex ratios should have stronger effects on 
married women than on unmarried women. 
 9.  The proportion of women who were married was 73 percent. 
 10. The results of such regressions are available upon request.  
 11. The elasticity of VALUE in the regressions for all women is half or less of that 
in the regressions for foreign-born women. This is probably due to the fact that VALUE 
does not include white collar jobs. Probably 50 percent of the native women were 
employed in white collar jobs. 
 12. Men's wages consistently appeared insignificant in all regressions. This 
suggests that men's migration caused men's supply of labor to follow variations in the 
demand for men's labor. Men's migration may cause sex ratio variations more than 
women's migration.  
 13. My goal was to include all 100 largest SMSAs in 1980. Technical constraints 
brought the sample down to 85 cities. 
 14. I also extracted data for foreign-born. As none of the regressions for the 
foreign-born were significant, these results are not reported. In a previous version of this 
chapter I reported results for foreign-born women based on erroneous computations 
from the 1 percent sample of the 1980 Census. 
 15. In fact, difference in age at marriage is endogenously determined. Where sex 
ratios are higher, and men find it relatively harder to marry, larger or smaller age 
differences may occur, depending on which age groups are more represented in a 
particular city. Such adjustments are definitely occurring when sex ratios vary over 
time, but they may also be found where sex ratios vary across cities (Bergstrom and 
Lam 1989.) 
 16. The variable is a composite of both wage income and income from other 
sources. At this age most income is derived from work, and the income of full-time 
workers is a good proxy for wage. It should be noted, however, that even where income 
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from work is available, there exists a combination of an income and a substitution 
effect.  
 17. This alternative interpretations implying a negative sign for the interaction 
between EXCESSM and proportion with low education are (1) that where a higher 
proportion of women have low education, female wages are lower and the negative 
effect of EXCESSM is expected to be stronger, and (2) that where a higher proportion of 
women have low education there is less potential competition from college graduates in 
the marriage market for women with less education, and the negative effect of 
EXCESSM (as defined here) is expected to be stronger. 
 18. The results presented here may differ from previous cross-city comparisons 
based on Census data due to the difference in the age of the population studied (women 
age 25-28 here, in contrast to all women older than 14 in Bowen and Finegan and all 
women older than 16 in Fields), to the difference in definitions of income, or to actual 
changes in the effect of men's income on the supply of married women to the labor 
force.  
 19. Another recent study of women's labor force participation which indicates the 
absence of South vs. non-South difference is Ono (1991).  
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 PART FOUR 
                                                                                  
   Compensating Differentials 
 in Marriage 
 The two papers included in this part deal with compensating differentials  
in marriage. It follows from a general equilibrium theory of marriage that 
differences between husbands' and wives' characteristics, associated with 
compensating differentials in marriage, add to our degree of understanding of 
womens labor force participation and intermarriage. Concepts similar to 
compensating differentials in marriage have been found in the sociological 
literature for many decades. However, the concept has not been previously 
applied to the study of married women's labor supply, the subject of Chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 focuses on an aspect of marriage that has previously been connected 
to the concept of compensating differentials, namely the question of whether 
people marry husbands or wives with similar characteristics, what sociologists 
call homogamy. The example used here is that of homogamy amongst Jews in 
the United States. The theory is also applicable to our understanding of the 
determinants of any kind of homogamy or assortative mating, be it by religion, 
ethnicity, education, age, or income.  
 The economic analysis of intermarriage goes beyond the sociological 
concept of reciprocal compensatory exchange.  Examples are given of what the 
market model adds to the previous literature on homogamy. This aspect of the 
general equilibrium theory of marriage can also be applied to topics other than 
labor supply and assortative mating, such as financial settlements at divorce or 
consumption in marriage. For example, compensating differentials in marriage 
could explain why marriages differ in the degree women spend family income 
on the satisfaction of their individual needs, holding other relevant 
characteristics constant.  
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 7 
                                                        
 Compensating Differentials 
 in Marriage and  
 Married Women's Labor Supply 
 (with Shoshana Neuman) 
 Models of labor force participation have long recognized that the value of 
time in the home is one of the factors affecting individual labor supply. Most 
models concentrate on marital status and presence of children as factors 
influencing value of time and, therefore, labor force participation. According to 
a general equilibrium theory of marriage, the value of time in the home 
includes as one of its components a quasi-wage w*, the material compensation 
associated with being a spouse which is influenced by marriage market 
conditions. As w* is a variable proportion of the income of the other spouse (let 
us say the husband), the proportion of husband's income enjoyed by the wife 
depends on the individual traits of husband and wife, and on conditions in the 
marriage market. Individual traits influence value of time in the home in part 
through the mechanism of compensating differentials. 
   It is hypothesized that a husband with traits that are relatively undesirable 
in comparison with his wife's traits has to compensate her materially by letting 
her have a larger proportion of his income. When such compensating 
differentials in marriage occur, married women are less likely to need work 
as a source of income and, therefore, less likely to participate in the labor  
 
______________________________________ 
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force. It is also hypothesized that women with traits that are valuable in the 
marriage market are less likely to participate in the labor force.  
 Evidence for these hypotheses is found on the basis of regressions of labor 
force participation for a sample of Israeli married women. Women with traits 
valued in the marriage market are less likely to participate in the labor force, 
and marital sorting patterns that may capture compensating differentials in 
marriage are associated with lower participation of the wife in the labor force.  
Regressions of married women's labor force participation that include 
marriage-related variables have better explanatory power than the standard 
regressions estimated in this case. 
 Theoretical Background 
 The decision to participate in the labor force varies directly with wage 
opportunities expected in the labor market and inversely with the value of time 
in the home. In a general way the decision to enter the labor force can thus be 
modeled as a function g(w, w*), where w is the expected wage and w* is the 
value of time in the home. The value of time is usually considered a function of 
household characteristics such as marital status and presence of young children 
(see, e.g., Mincer 1962, Becker 1965, Heckman 1974). This chapter pursues an 
idea stated earlier in this book--in Chapter 3--namely that value of time can 
vary with circumstances specific to a marriage or a marriage market. As argued 
in Chapter 3, any trait of the wife or husband associated with a higher wife's 
share of household income also implies a higher value of time and therefore a 
lower likelihood that she participates in the labor force for material reasons. 
 Formally, w* is viewed as a function w* = k . I, where w* is the value of 
time of a spouse, I is a vector of household income sources other than that 
spouse's income from work, and k is the proportion of such income that spouse 
obtains for her own benefit. We are assuming that spouses' well-being depends 
on the extent to which they control the household's income. In turn, this implies 
that spouses purchase at least some private (as opposed to public) goods and 
that they do not get as much utility out of their spouse's consumption as they 
get out of their own. If husbands transfer part of their income to their wives, 
this also implies that wives provide more valuable services to husbands than 
vice-versa. In the terms used in Chapter 3, it is assumed that the value of 
women's spousal labor exceeds that of men's spousal labor. 
 Proportion k of the household's income obtained by one spouse is established 
as a result of marriage market forces and internal bargaining between husband 
and wife (see Chapter 3). This is represented as k = k(Vif, Vim), where V are 
vectors of traits, and subscript i stands for individual traits such as age or 
education, f for wife and m for husband. As stated here, function k is very 
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general. It could possibly include multiplicative terms such as the product of 
wife's and husband's age or ethnicity or differences between wife's and 
husband's age. In any case, it is hypothesized that the relative traits of a wife in 
comparison with those of her husband influence the strength of her bargaining 
power k. For example, if she is relatively well endowed in a trait lacked by her 
husband, the value of k would be raised and therefore the value of her time will 
go up. 
 Chapter 3 presented Hypothesis 3, which stated that compensating 
differentials leading to pecuniary compensations by husbands to wives have a 
discouraging effect on wives' labor supply. (hence called the "compensating 
differentials hypothesis"). In other words, a husband with traits that are 
relatively undesirable in comparison with his wife's traits has to compensate her 
materially by letting her have a larger proportion k of his income or of some 
joint income. When such compensating differentials in marriage occur, wives' 
material needs are more likely to be satisfied by marriage and married women 
are less likely to enter the labor force.  
 The extent to which a trait is likely to affect proportion k and, therefore, a 
woman's value of time depends not only on the tastes of this household but also 
on preferences in the marriage market in general. If a trait i is generally 
considered as attractive, the holder of such a trait is more likely to translate this 
into bargaining power k than if such a trait is specific to the marriage and 
therefore attractive only to the spouses. Duration of marriage may be a factor 
influencing k since it is positively related to marriage specificity and might 
reduce the (general) market value of a person's traits. 
 In our empirical tests we control for ethnicity: European-American 
(Western) versus Asian-African (non-Western) in the context of Israeli Jews. 
Being Western is presumably an asset in both the marriage market and the 
labor market, so the wife's ethnicity is expected to raise both w and w* and 
therefore has an ambiguous impact on labor force participation. We can expect 
compensating differentials on the part of non-Western husbands married to 
Western wives and therefore lower participation in the labor force on the part of 
intermarried Western wives (see Chapter 8 for more on intermarriage and 
compensating differentials). However, a trait such as ethnicity is problematic 
since it might mean different things to different people and, therefore, the k 
function may show discontinuities. For instance, Western Jews might 
discriminate against marriage to non-Western men and women, while 
simultaneously non-Western Jews might discriminate against Western Jews. 
Consequently, we do not have clear predictions regarding ethnicity but include 
the ethnic variables for control purposes. 
 In the following empirical section we report an empirical test of the 
compensating differentials hypothesis using a number of traits of husband and 
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wife. We test for a higher participation rate for women with lower k and, 
consequently, lower w*. Lower values of time could result from a woman's 
deprived social background or recent arrival to Israel. We also test for lower 
participation rates for women married to men considerably older than 
themselves. Such men are expected to give their wives compensating 
differentials and, consequently, k is expected to be high and labor force 
participation low. 
 The predictions derived from the compensating differentials hypothesis 
differ from those one could infer from an alternative theory based on the 
relationship between mismatches and divorce probabilities. According to such a 
theory the more a couple is mismatched, for example, because the husband is 
much older than the wife, the higher the probability of divorce and the more the 
wife is likely to enter the labor force. 
 Empirical Study 
 This theory of labor supply and marital choice was tested using data from 
the mobility survey conducted by Israel's Bureau of the Census in 1974, the 
only version of the annual labor force survey that includes information on the 
fathers of husbands and wives that were interviewed. The hypotheses stated 
above assume that the more income derived from marriage, the less married 
women choose to work. That would be true only if financial considerations play 
a major role in women's decision to work. Women who enjoy working outside 
the home on the basis of work's intrinsic rewards tend to be more educated and 
often do not work full-time. Therefore, to capture women driven primarily by 
work's financial rewards, our study was restricted to women who had not 
graduated from high school, and we defined our dependent variable as full-time 
participation in the labor force. As is apparent from Table 7.1, 12.8 percent of 
all married women in the sample worked full-time. The independent variables 
defined in Table 7.1 include variables that have been included in previous 
empirical estimations of labor supply--wife's age, earning potential, years of 
schooling, husband's schooling and income, number of children, and years of 
residence--and innovative independent variables such as father's occupation, 
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husband-wife ethnicity combinations, and husband-wife age combinations 
(husband older). 
 Models of full-time labor force participation were estimated using the logit 
method of estimation. The first model we estimated (regression 1 in Table 7.2) 
is one commonly found in the literature.1 It can be seen that once the effect of 
education on potential earnings is captured, years of schooling has no impact 
on full-time labor supply. This could reflect a nonlinear effect of schooling on 
individual success in the marriage market.2 It was found that women who have 
resided more years in Israel are less likely to work outside the home.3 In light of 
the present theory, years of residence could ben's marriage opportunities, 
thereby raising her w* and reducing her need for income  from outside work.  
This effect  does not  seem related  to earning  
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potential and discrimination by employers since residence was used as a 
determinant of potential wife's earnings. 
 Regression 2 in Table 7.2 includes variables that are not commonly included 
in studies of labor supply: a dummy capturing the wife's father's low 
occupational status and a variety of combinations of husband's and wife's 
characteristics. Such variables reflecting marital choices appear to improve the 
model's productive power.  A log likelihood test comparing regressions 1 and 2 
shows that the inclusion of these additional variables significantly improves the 
model's predictive power (chi-squared significant at the 0.5 percent level). 
Some of the signs of the coefficients in regression 2 also seem to confirm our 
hypotheses. The dummy reflecting the wife's relatively deprived background 
(her father was employed in an occupation of low-prestige and generally low 
income), which can be viewed as a nondesirable trait in the marriage market, is 
found to be significantly positive.4 
 It also appears from regression 2 that if a woman is married to a man at  
least 3 years older than she is, the older he is the less likely she is to work full-
time. This is consistent with the compensating differentials hypothesis. Older 
men are relatively penalized in the marriage market and have to "buy" 
themselves the services of a wife by offering high pecuniary w* and thus  
making it unnecessary for women to work full-time.5 
 Interestingly, this negative relation between older husband and labor supply 
varies with ethnicity.6 Asian-African Jewish women are less likely to receive 
compensating differentials from husbands much older than they are. By using 
the approximation rule bp(l - p), where b is the regression coefficient and p the 
probability of participation (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981), we found that for 
European-American women each additional year of the husband (beyond a 3-
year difference) reduces full-time labor force participation of the wife by 1 
percent; that is, for that group older husbands seem to "pay" compensating 
differentials. In contrast, the net effect of older husband among Asian-African 
women married within their own ethnic group is zero, which may reflect the 
fact that the average age difference at first marriage tends to be much higher 
than 3 years (the Israeli average) among Jews of Asian-African origin. Asian-
African Jewish women appear to be willing to marry older European-American 
men without asking for any pecuniary compensation at all. In fact, the net 
effect of older husband on the labor supply of Asian-African wives married to 
European-American husbands is to raise their participation rate 1 percent above 
that of European-American women married within their own group. 
 It is difficult to find alternative explanations for this older husband effect. It 
has been argued in a Belgian economic study of married women's labor supply 
that older husbands have higher incomes and can therefore afford a housewife 
(DeWachter 1982). But husband's schooling and income are included in the 
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regressions. Also, our income measure is current income (an  
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 TABLE 7.2  Regressions of Wife's Labor Force Participation, 
 Israeli Couples, 1974  (N=635) 
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imperfect measure of permanent income) which would strengthen our 
argument. If permanent income matters more than current income and men are 
generally in the upward-sloping part of their lifetime earnings profile, older 
men earning the same income as younger men would have a lower permanent 
income, and their wives would be more likely to work full-time! Also, it was 
not the age of the husband that was found to matter, but a particular function of 
the age difference between husband and wife. A culturally oriented alternative 
explanation is that older husbands want their wives to fit the stereotype of the 
traditional housewife, who stays home and does not work. Such cultural 
explanation would not account for the higher participation rates among Asian-
African wives of older European husbands relatively to European wives of older 
European husbands. One expects traditional stereotypes to be stronger in the 
case of older European husbands married to Asian-African wives than in the 
case of such husbands married to European wives. 
 Inclusion of variables reflecting marital choice also modifies the coefficients 
of regressors included in traditional models of female labor force participation. 
Some coefficients that were insignificant become significant after the inclusion 
of marital choice variables. For example, in regression 2, children are found to 
deter mother's labor force participation not only if the children are 4 or younger 
but also if they are between ages 5 and 13.7 
 Summary and Conclusions 
 Husband's characteristics valued in the marriage market are positively 
related to wife's labor supply through a mechanism of compensating 
differentials. Women with qualities valued in the marriage market are less 
likely to work outside the home. Biases in the effect of husband's or wife's 
characteristics on wife's labor supply may be caused by insufficient control for 
other characteristics and marital sorting patterns. This suggests that female 
labor supply studies should include determinants of success in marriage 
markets in addition to the variables that are usually included. 
 Notes 
 1.  Most previous studies, including Gronau's (1981) study using Israeli data, 
include number and age of children in regressions of married women's labor force 
participation. We followed most previous literature in ignoring the fact that fertility and 
labor force participation may be simultaneously determined. 
 2.  See Part Five for discussions of the effect of schooling on indicators of w*. 
 3.  Gronau (1981) also found lower participation rates for women having resided 
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longer in Israel, but he had no explanation for it. 
 4.  The positive sign of wife's father in low occupation can also be interpreted as 
a negative income effect, as we do not have a good measure of nonwage income. The 
father low occupation variable is based on a ranking by social status as well as income. 
It is likely that women whose fathers had been employed in low-status occupations 
might also have lower nonwage income at the time of the survey. 
 5.  Separate regressions in which "husband older" was measured as the ratio of 
the age difference between husband and wife to the wife's age showed that it is not the 
absolute difference in age that matters, but that difference in proportion to the wife's 
age. 
 6.  The statistical significance of the interaction terms with ethnicity can be 
questioned. Large samples are needed in order to assume asymptotic normality and 
consistency. We only had small numbers of couples in which one spouse is Western and 
the other is not, but we had large numbers of people married to spouses of their own 
ethnicity. 
 7.  We experimented more with variables related to fertility. The introduction of 
interactive terms between the presence of a young child and some traits of husbands and 
wives did not add predictive power. In other regressions not presented here, we found 
that when the number of children was excluded, most coefficients retained the same 
degree of significance they had when children were included. 
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 8 
                                                        
 Compensating Differentials 
 and Intermarriage 
 This chapter applies the theory of compensating differentials in marriage, to 
the case of marriage between members of two groups. The degree of 
homogamy--i.e. assortative mating--in one area, such as religion, is related to 
the similarity of husband's and wife's characteristics in other areas, such as 
education, age, and divorced status. Despite some similarities, this theory 
differs from the theory of compensatory reciprocal exchange developed by 
sociologists (see Part One). Analysis within a comprehensive economic theory 
of marriage leads to some insights that do not follow from the earlier 
sociological literature. This theory also differs from other economic theories of 
religious intermarriage, which have been based on the premise that religious 
homogamy is always a positive marital trait (Becker 1974, Becker et al. 1977, 
Chiswick and Lehrer 1992 and Lehrer and Chiswick 1992).    It has 
long been clear to scholars from a variety of disciplines that conditions in 
markets for husbands and wives influence observed marriage patterns. 
Sociologists, demographers, and economists have often related observed 
religious or ethnic homogamy to:  (1)  a group's size (e.g.,  Heer 
 
 
                                 
 
 Adapted from a paper presented (in absentia) at the Demographic Sessions held at 
the 8th World Congress of Jewish Studies in August 1981. The theoretical part was 
published as "A Market Approach to Intermarriage," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and 
S. DellaPergola (eds.)  Papers in Jewish Demography 1981, Jerusalem: Institute of 
Contemporary Jewry, 1983. I am thankful to the Center for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, for its support, Lynn Gale for her computorial assistance, 
to Fred Massarick and Ron Watts for providing me with the data, and to Evelyn Lehrer 
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1962, Rosenthal 1970, DellaPergola 1976, and Fisher 1980); (2) its sex ratio 
and geographic concentration (e.g., DellaPergola 1976 and Fisher 1980); and 
(3) personal characteristics of group members, such as age and previous marital 
status (e.g., Rosenthal 1970, DellaPergola 1976, Heer 1980, and Becker 1981).  
 The theory of compensating differentials, embedded in a general theory of 
marriage, could also lead to hypotheses predicting correlates of these 
compensations, given a certain pattern of inter-group marriage. An interesting 
application of this theory regards the use of alimony and child support 
payments at divorce. It follows that under the assumptions used for the 
derivation of Hypothesis 30, Jewish men marrying non-Jewish women are 
likely to pay their wives higher alimony and child support payments at time of 
divorce than similar non-Jewish men marrying similar non-Jewish women (this 
would include controls for income and education.) Similarly, one expects that 
black men marrying white women are likely to pay their white ex-wives higher 
alimony and child support payments than would white men of similar 
characteristics marrying similar white women.  They would also pay higher 
alimony and child support to a white ex-wife than to a black ex-wife. 
 The four hypotheses derived here all deal with the predicted effect of 
individual and group characteristics on the probability of intermarriage. The 
theory is then tested using a sample of American Jewish men. 
 Hypotheses  
 The following analysis of intermarriage will be presented in terms of groups 
A and B, which could for instance be interpreted as Jews and Christians. 
Following the analysis found in Chapter 3, marriage markets are presented as 
markets for spousal labor. For simplicity, I will focus on markets for female 
spousal labor. I introduce two markets, one for each group of women. It is 
assumed that men discriminate between two types of women and that women 
from groups A and B cannot be easily substituted for each other. Figure 8.1 
presents two markets for spousal labor: panel a is a market for women of type A 
and panel b is a market for women of type B. 
 Similarly to men, women also discriminate between men of types A and B. 
Consequently, in each market one has to draw separate supply curves to men A 
and to men B. The first case we analyze is a situation where A women 
generally prefer homogamy, i.e. A women would rather marry A men. This 
case is similar to the case found in Merton (1941) based on the theory of 
compensatory reciprocal exchange. The supply of spousal labor by A women to 
A men lies below their supply to B men. As a result, as can be seen from panel 
a in Figure 8.1, the market establishes a compensation for  
160 Compensating Differentials and Intermarriage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                      
 
 Fig. 8.1  Markets for spousal labor (hf) by women from groups A and B. 
 
women of type A who marry B men, wAB*, which exceeds the compensation A 
women get when they marry homogamously (wAA*). Were these same women 
heterogamous in their preference, their supply to A men would lie above their 
supply to B men, and wAB* would be lower than wAA*. 
 There are many ways by which market conditions, personal characteristics, 
and preferences regarding homogamy interact.1 To illustrate the fruitfulness of 
a market theory of intermarriage, two assumptions will be made regarding 
preferences for homogamy. To make the discussion more concrete, groups A 
and B are taken to be Jews and Christians with particular views on 
intermarriage.2 In both cases it is assumed that Christians prefer to marry other 
Christians, possibly due to discrimination against Jews. In Case 1, Jews prefer 
to marry Christians, whereas in Case 2, Jews prefer to marry homogamously. 
 Case 1. The Discriminating Christian and the Assimilationist Jew. It is 
assumed that the person belonging to one group prefers homogamy, whereas 
the potential spouse prefers heterogamy. Let us assume that Christian women A 
prefer homogamy, for instance because of antisemitism. According to this 
analysis, such woman A requires a higher compensation for her spousal labor if 
the husband is from Group B than if he is from Group A. Stated differently, if 
her husband is also from A part of her compensation consists of the satisfaction 
of fulfilling some cultural expectations that she has absorbed. In the context of 
Christian-Jewish marriage, the above mentioned assumptions imply that a 
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Jewish man who prefers to marry a Christian woman, possibly due to his desire 
to assimilate into mainstream America, needs to make up for his religious 
origin by compensating her with qualities exceeding those she can expect from 
a fellow Christian under given market conditions. The same would be true if 
marriages were arranged by parents. The guardians of a woman from Group A 
would attempt to extract an extra compensation if the groom belonged to Group 
B. 
 An example of what the explicit market theory presented here adds to the 
existing theory of compensatory reciprocal exchange is that even if a particular 
woman does not discriminate personally between the two types of men, but if 
she aims at getting the best possible deal for herself in the marriage market, she 
is likely to require a higher compensation when marrying a B man than when 
marrying homogamously. She would then take advantage of the fact that other 
Christian women tend to discriminate and require extra compensations when 
marrying Jews. 
 The following hypothesis is formulated using Jewish-Christian marriage 
from a male perspective as an example, but can be generalized to other groups 
and to a female perspective. Homogamy could be measured in terms of income, 
education, age or previous marriages. 
 Hypothesis 30    
 If Jews prefer assimilation and Christians prefer homogamy, Jewish men 
marrying Christian women are expected to have desirable characteristics 
relative to their wife's characteristics and to the characteristics of Jewish 
men marrying homogamously. 
 Characteristics of men considered desirable in the marriage market include 
income and determinants of spousal productivity such as health and vitality. 
Past a certain age, additional years of age is likely to be a liability in the 
marriage market, for instance.  
 How about Jewish women marrying either Jewish or Christian men when 
the same assumptions still hold? If they seek assimilation, their supply of 
spousal labor to men from their own group will lie to the left of their supply to 
men from the other group. Given a downward-sloping demand for that labor, 
the equilibrium compensation to men from Group A is lower than that 
compensation to men from their own group. In other words, such Jewish 
women will provide spousal labor to Christian men at a cheaper rate than to 
Jewish men, which implies expecting less productive talent from Christian men 
for a given amount of talent the women have. 
 Given the melting-pot mentality, it is realistic to assume that many Jews 
prefer to assimilate. However, there are also many cases of Jews who prefer 
homogamy. This brings us to Case 2. 
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 Case 2. Discriminating Jew and Christian. This is a case where both 
groups prefer homogamy. It can be shown that for there to be any incidence of 
people marrying outside their group when two groups prefer homogamy, it is 
necessary to assume either that (1) the equilibrium compensation for a wife 
from the same group exceeds the compensation determined in the market for 
spousal labor by women from the other group by an amount higher than the 
premium a man is willing to pay in order to marry homogamously, or that (2) 
search costs for finding a spouse from one's own group are higher than the cost 
of finding a spouse from outside the group. 
 A differential in the compensation for a wife from inside versus that for a 
wife from outside the group will occur if the demand and supply curves in each 
market are sufficiently different.  This could be the case for a number of 
reasons, such as imbalances in numbers, differential preferences for 
characteristics other than group identity, or differential attitudes towards 
marriage and work. Whatever the origin of the differential in equilibrium 
compensations, if such differential is the cause of observed heterogamy, the 
Jewish men who marry outside their faith will tend to be the ones who were 
unable to afford a Jewish wife. In turn, this inability to marry homogamously in 
the face of a preference for homogamy is likely to be due to possession of 
undesirable characteristics (such as low income, low general education, or 
previous marriages). 
 Therefore, assuming that search costs for spouses from inside the group are 
equal to or lower than search costs for spouses from outside the group, we 
obtain  
 Hypothesis 30' 
 If both Jews and Christians prefer homogamy, it is predicted that Jewish 
men marrying Jewish women will have desirable characteristics relatively 
to the characteristics of Jewish men marrying Christian women. 
 It is noteworthy that Hypotheses 30 and 30' lead to opposite predictions. If 
Jews prefer assimilation and heterogamy, the ones who marry Christians are 
likely to have more desirable characteristics than their counterparts marrying 
homogamously. The opposite is true if Jews prefer homogamy. Given the 
possible importance of search costs in Case 2, Hypothesis 30' may depend on 
variables affecting search costs. 
 Differences in search costs lead us back to the well-known theoretical 
insight stating that the smaller the size and density of the Jewish community, 
the higher the likelihood of heterogamy. No interaction terms between size of 
Jewish community and personal characteristics is expected if search costs are 
uniformly higher for finding Jewish spouses than for finding Christian spouses. 
However, search costs for finding a Jewish spouse could be considerably higher 
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than the costs of finding a Christian spouse if one also searches for relatively 
rare characteristics. If search costs are higher for Jewish spouses with given 
desirable characteristics than they are for Christian spouses with similar 
characteristics, Hypothesis 30' could possibly be blurred. 
 Moreover, one expects an interaction between effect of size of the Jewish 
community and personal characteristics for another important reason. The last 
hypothesis was derived on the assumption that search costs are not at the origin 
of observed intermarriage.  The larger the Jewish community in comparison to 
the population on a whole, the more it is likely that different search costs are 
not causing intermarriage. This leads to: 
 Hypothesis 31 
 Hypothesis 30' is more likely to hold where there is a dense Jewish 
population. 
 If it is relatively easy to find a Jewish mate, actual heterogamy in the face of 
preferences for homogamy is not as often associated with differential search 
costs as it is with factors related to imbalance in numbers and other factors 
causing different compensations for the two types of wives. 
 Given our assumption about Christian preferences for homogamy, 
characteristics of Jews marrying inside and outside their faith depend on Jewish 
preferences for homogamy. They also depend on market opportunities. Market 
opportunities faced by men and women vary not only as a function of the size of 
the pool of marriage eligibles in a given area, but also with changes in the sex 
ratio over time. As explained in Chapter 5, marriage squeezes (imbalanced sex 
ratios) change over time because (1) on average, women marry men generally 
somewhat older; and (2) the number of births fluctuates from year to year. As 
pointed out by DellaPergola (1976) the post World War II baby boom has 
caused a marriage squeeze for females. It follows that  
 Hypothesis 32 
 It will be more likely that a Jewish man will marry the wife of his first 
choice (homogamy or heterogamy) if the woman was born during the baby 
boom--and faces a marriage squeeze for women--than if the woman was 
born prior or after the baby boom. 
 These hypotheses were tested based on a subsample of married men. 
 Data and Methods 
 The theory was tested using a subsample of Jewish men interviewed for the 
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1970-71 National Jewish Population Survey sponsored and financed by the 
Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, the first attempt to conduct a 
nationwide survey of U.S. Jews.3 After selection of the men married at the time 
of the interview and born Jewish more than 2,200 cases were left.4 Next, the 
sample was subdivided according to presumed preference for homogamy or 
heterogamy, as measured by exposure to and intensity of Jewish education, 
given the well known link between Jewish education and adoption of a 
preference for homogamy. Two alternative indicators of Jewish education were 
used: knowledge of Hebrew and enrollment in relatively intensive programs of 
Jewish education (denoted as medium or high level of Jewish education).
5
  It is 
assumed that the men who learned more about Judaism have a preference for 
homogamy, while other  
men prefer heterogamy or have neutral preferences. 
 As can be seem from Table 8.1, 11.4 percent of the Jewish men who do not 
know Hebrew married a Christian-born wife, whereas only 5.6 percent of the 
men who know Hebrew did so. Of those who had little Jewish edu- 
 
 TABLE 8.1  Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations (by Subsample)a, 
 National Jewish Population Survey, 1972 
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cation, 10.7 percent intermarried, whereas 7 percent of those with a medium or 
high Jewish education did so. 
 Table 8.1 also defines the variables used to explain the likelihood that a 
particular man intermarried. Information on the wife's and husband's (general) 
education, age and marital status before their current marriage were included as 
characteristics reflecting relative desirability. More general education 
presumably increases desirability, e.g., by raising earning potential and 
expected children's intelligence.6 Age is likely to reflect attitudes towards 
homogamy and other cohort-related effects. Persons who had been divorced 
prior to their current marriage are likely to have less desirable characteristics 
(especially given that the average age of the respondents was approximately 44 
for men and 41 for women and that divorce carried more of a stigma earlier in 
the century). An important reason why previously married individuals tend to 
be less desirable marital partners is that they often have children from their 
previous unions. Such children have been found to have a significant 
destabilizing effect on the new marriage (Lehrer 1992). Also included is 
information on whether a person was born during the baby-boom following 
World War II.7 
 As a rough indication of the opportunities for Jewish homogamy, a 
distinction was made between five regions of the United States: New York City, 
the Northeast, the South, the West and the Midwest.8  It appears that among the 
men with more Jewish education, 30 percent lived in New York. 
 In order to test the hypotheses derived above it is necessary to 
simultaneously take account of wife and husband characteristics and to control 
for region of residence, a goal that can be achieved by means of regression 
analysis. Ordinary least squares regressions were estimated, the dependent 
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variable being marriage to a Christian (non-Jewish) woman.9  
 Findings 
 Separate repressions were estimated for men presumably preferring 
homogamy and for men presumably preferring heterogamy.  Table 8.2  
approximates preference for homogamy according to knowledge of Hebrew. 
 Table 8.2 presents regression results for the subsamples of 1,298 men who 
know Hebrew and the 911 who do not. For each subsample the table presents 
one regression with personal characteristics and location and the other identical 
to the first, but also including interaction terms differentiating between the 
effect of personal characteristics inside and outside of New York City. The 
discussion focuses on coefficients that were statistically significant. 
 As predicted in Hypothesis 30', it is found that controlling for wife's 
characteristics, among those who do not know Hebrew (and presumably  
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prefer heterogamy) the Jewish husband has relatively more desirable 
characteristics if there had been a mixed marriage than in the case of 
homogamy. It was found that a Jewish man who does not know Hebrew and 
marries heterogamously tends to have more years of (general) schooling than 
such Jewish man who marries homogamously. This indicates the presence of 
"compensating differentials" if there is a preference for heterogamy. In 
contrast, if the husband knows Hebrew and presumably prefers homogamy, 
years of schooling and likelihood of intermarriage are not related (significant 
positive coefficient of male education in regressions 1 and 2 in Table 8.2). 
 In support of Hypothesis 30, it was found that an indicator of negative 
husband characteristics, previous divorce, is positively associated with 
likelihood of intermarriage only if the husband knows Hebrew.10 If the husband 
does not know Hebrew, and presumably prefers intermarriage, intermarriage 
and male divorce are not related. This result was found only if a couple lives in 
the New York metropolitan area and also supports Hypothesis 31, which stated 
that where Jews are endogamously oriented and search costs for Jewish spouses 
are relatively low one is more likely to find undesirable characteristics to be 
associated with heterogamous marriage. In other words, among Jewish men 
who are assumed to prefer homogamy and have low costs of finding partners 
from their own group, those who marry heterogamously are more likely to have 
been divorced prior to the current marriage.  In other words, men who marry 
homogamously and prefer to do so (and presumably the Jewish women they 
marry have the same preferences), have to compensate their wives by showing 
good past behavior.  Being divorced is a drawback and lessens the likelihood of 
homogamy. 
 The results also show that the likelihood of exogamous marriage is highest 
among the youngest and the oldest respondents who do not know Hebrew. 
Based on this linear formulation, it would appear that among men who do not 
know Hebrew the probability of intermarriage decreases with age, until around 
age 68, when that probability increases. The negative relationship with age is 
probably due to the secular trend towards more intermarriage, while the 
surprising turn in the age-intermarriage function may be due to the small 
number of Jews living in the United States prior to 1900 (people who were 68 
years old in 1971 were born in 1903) and the high proportion of German Jews 
among early Jewish immigrants to the United States. Among men who know 
Hebrew this U-shaped curve of intermarriage as a function of age is expressed 
in the positive coefficient of age and the positive coefficient of baby-boom 
(regression 4 in Table 8.2). From column 4 it appears that throughout the 
country men born during the baby boom are more likely to marry 
heterogamously, but that this is not true in New York City. The coefficients of 
the variables "baby boom" and "age" are difficult to interpret without data on 
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marriage squeezes faced by American Jews. The fact that younger men born 
during the baby boom and living in New York are not more likely to intermarry 
than their older counterparts can be explained in two ways. First, Jewish men 
who are homogamously oriented and have opportunities to find Jewish women 
are more likely to be influenced by the relative over-supply of Jewish women 
than by the over-supply of non-Jewish women. Plenty of Jewish baby-boom 
women were available in New York for interested baby-boom men. Second, 
Jewish babyboomers in New York are more likely to be first or second 
generation Americans, many of them children of orthodox holocaust survivors; 
their counterparts in other parts of the country are more likely to be Americans 
for three or more generations, and therefore less interested in homogamy. 
 This suggests that in the earlier part of this century the upward trend in 
intermarriage was concentrated among Jews with no knowledge of Hebrew and 
presumably little preference for endogamy. Given the relatively small number 
of Jews who lived in the U.S. when these older respondents got married, age 
could also be correlated with high costs of finding a Jewish wife. It would be 
very worthwhile to check whether these results are sensitive to method of 
estimation. 
 Location, as defined here, does not appear to have a significant direct effect 
on likelihood of intermarriage. However, it has indirect effects via divorce and 
baby-boom. The indirect effect of location regarding endogamously oriented 
Jews that was formulated in Hypothesis 31 receives some confirmation in 
regression 4 that includes interaction between divorce and birth in New York 
City. The baby-boom effect found for New York can be viewed as possible 
evidence of Hypothesis 32. That the baby-boom effect for the rest of the country 
goes in the opposite direction does not necessarily contradict Hypothesis 32, for 
changes in the location and position of Jewish communities outside of New 
York after World War II could dampen any pure baby-boom effects. 
 Finally, it appears from Table 8.2 that irrespectively of whether the husband 
knows Hebrew or not, non-Jewish (mostly Christian) wives who marry Jews are 
more likely to have been previously divorced than Jewish wives. This supports 
the assumption that Christians prefer endogamy to marriage with Jews. It is 
also interesting that in the regressions for husbands who do not know Hebrew, 
the coefficients of divorced are larger in magnitude for women than for men, 
and only significant in the case of women. This is consistent with the 
interpretation of divorced status as an indication of the presence of children 
from a previous marriage. As women retain custody of children more often than 
men do, divorced status is more of a negative trait for women than for men.11 
 Additional tests of the theory were performed by dividing the sample 
according to level of Jewish education. It was assumed that people with a low 
level of Jewish education have a preference for marrying outside the faith, 
170 Compensating Differentials and Intermarriage 
 
 
 
while the opposite is true for people with high levels of Jewish education.12 
These regressions also showed that men's secular education is associated 
positively with heterogamous marriage among Jews with low exposure to 
Jewish education, but not among Jews who presumably prefer homogamy. An 
interesting finding that also confirms Hypothesis 30' is that where a preference 
for homogamy can be assumed the non-Jewish wives are likely to have a better 
education (controlling for husband's general education) than do the Jewish 
wives. Such finding was not found when husbands presumably prefer 
intermarriage to endogamy. The regressions using level of Jewish education as 
criterion for endogamous preference also showed evidence for a direct effect of 
location, in the expected direction. In New York City homogamously-oriented 
previously divorced men were more likely to marry heterogamously than were 
similar men who had not been married previously.  
  Summary and Suggestions for Further Research 
 The market approach to intermarriage presented here lead to the hypotheses 
that if non-Jews prefer homogamy, (1) Jews who do not prefer homogamy and 
marry a non-Jew have better qualities than their counterparts marrying Jews 
(Hypothesis 30), whereas (2) among Jews who prefer homogamy, those 
marrying a non-Jew have undesirable characteristics relatively to those of their 
counterparts marrying Jews (Hypothesis 30'). Moreover, (3) in locations where 
the market for Jewish spouses is large relatively to that for non-Jewish spouses, 
the findings of Hypothesis 30' will come out more strongly (Hypothesis 31). 
Finally, it was hypothesized that (4) the cohorts born during the post-World 
War II baby boom experience a marriage squeeze for females which will make 
it easier for Jewish men to marry the wife of their first choice (Hypothesis 32). 
 These hypotheses were tested by applying regression analysis to subsamples 
of Jewish men whose background varied in terms of the intensity of their 
exposure to Jewish culture, as measured by knowledge of Hebrew and years of 
Jewish education. It was assumed that preferences for homogamy develop as a 
result of intensive Jewish education. As predicted, it was found that in the 
subsamples likely to have low or no preference for homogamy, Jewish men who 
married heterogamously had more desirable characteristics (measured in terms 
of general education, and previous marriages) relatively to men who married 
homogamously. The opposite was true for Jewish men likely to have a strong 
preference for homogamy. 
 It was found that in New York--and not elsewhere--divorced men who know 
Hebrew were more likely to marry heterogamously. This confirms Hypothesis 
31, for a previous divorce is generally considered to be an undesirable 
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characteristic and New York offers a relatively large market for Jewish spouses. 
 The effects of marriage squeeze were difficult to estimate given that the 
variables age and baby-boom contain both period effects and cohort effects. 
 These results stress the usefulness of the market theory of intermarriage 
presented here.13 Further research could add to the value of this study in a 
number of ways. First, the empirical study of Jewish-non-Jewish marriage 
could be improved by using more appropriate methods of estimation (such as 
logit), better explanatory variables, more recent data, and an extension to 
heterogamy among Jewish women.14 Second, other empirical studies of 
homogamy--whether religious, ethnic, or class--could provide tests for the 
theory. Third, the theory of homogamy could benefit from more elaboration. 
 It is believed that the market theory at hand can not only help us understand 
intermarriage between Jews and Christians, but also other cases of 
intermarriage. Moreover, insights gained from studying assortative mating 
could also contribute to our understanding of the allocation of employees in the 
job market. 
 Postscript 
 Results from a recent study of intermarriage between U.S. Jews and 
Christians indicate the possible existence of compensating differentials of the 
kind that were discussed here. Medding, Tobin, Fishman, and Rimor (1992) 
distinguish between inmarrying and outmarrying Jews based on data collected 
from close to 7,000 households in eight Jewish communities between 1985 and 
1988. The tables they report don't include information on spouses, so that it is 
not possible to establish whether outmarrying Jews have more desirable 
characteristics in comparison to their spouse than do inmarrying Jews. What 
Medding et al. do report are comparisons between inmarrying and outmarrying 
Jews in terms of educational level, occupation, and income. The authors report 
significant differences between respondents older than 45 and younger than 45.  
 Among older respondents, outmarrying Jews tend to have a higher socio-
economic status than inmarrying Jews. The opposite is the case among  
younger respondents. For instance, 4% of Jews above age 55 with a high school 
degree married outside their religion (marriages involving a conversion are 
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categorized as inmarriages for the purpose of this discussion). In contrast, more 
than 9% of older Jews with a graduate degree married outside their religion. 
Whereas in the past more educated Jews had a higher likelihood to marry out 
than less educated Jews, the opposite is the case among Jews younger than 45. 
For instance, 41% of Jews age 18-34 with a high school degree married outside 
their religion, which is more than double the percentage of outmarriage for 
Jews in this age category with a graduate degree (19% of outmarriage). 
 Similarly, Jews age 18 to 34 in professional or technical occupations had an 
outmarriage rate of 20%, less than half the outmarriage rate for their 
counterparts working in blue collar occupations or in the service industry 
(45%). In contrast, among older Jews, there was no relationship between 
outmarriage and occupation. Also, income does not seem to be related to 
outmarriage among Jews above age 45. But among Jews under age 45 the 
percentage marrying out is 37% among respondents earning less than $30,000 
and only 21% among respondents earning more than $75,000 a year. 
 Medding et al. attribute this difference between older and younger Jews to 
the fact that most younger Jews and few older Jews are educated. Consequently, 
younger Jews who are not educated can not easily find a Jewish mate. Their 
explanation assumes a preference for inmarriage among Jews. Elsewhere, they 
report that 33% of the marriages that occurred between 1980 and 1989 (of 
which a high proportion presumably involved a respondent age 18-34) were 
outmarriages. This stands in contrast to 5% outmarriages among respondents 
who married prior to 1960, and 12% outmarriages among respondents who 
married between 1960 and 1969. The assumption of a preference for 
inmarriage among Jews is compatible with increased rates of outmarriage to the 
extent that the driving force behind such increased outmarriage is a reduction 
in the degree of antisemitism in the U.S.   
 Medding et al. also report a clear association between outmarriage and 
years of Jewish education and increasing levels of Jewish education over time. 
In light of the theory presented here, there is a connection between these 
associations between outmarriage and socio-economic status on the one hand, 
and outmarriage and Jewish education on the other hand. The theory presented 
here predicted that among Jews with low levels of Jewish education, and 
presumably a preference for outmarriage, outmarrying Jews would have more 
desirable characteristics than inmarrying Jews (which includes higher 
education or income). In contrast, among Jews with high levels of Jewish 
education, and presumably a preference for inmarriage, outmarrying Jews 
would have less desirable characteristics than inmarrying Jews. In theory, the 
generational differences in socio-economic characteristics of outmarrying and 
inmarrying Jews could possibly be the result of a switch from a population 
dominated by a preference for outmarriage to a population dominated by a 
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preference to inmarriage, a switch which may be related to increased levels of 
Jewish education. Such switch could have possibly occurred at the same time 
that the percent of outmarriages increased if substantial reductions in 
antisemitism occurred as well.  
 These changes over time thus suggest a substantial reduction in 
discrimination against Jews in U.S. marriage markets. If that is the case, the 
theory presented here implies that there must have been a substantial reduction 
in compensating differentials in marriage. One expects a reduction in the 
positive gap between the desirable traits of the Jewish spouse and the non-
Jewish spouse. It is hypothesized that the less antisemitism is prevalent, the less 
it is necessary for a Jewish spouse to compensate a non-Jewish spouse for being 
Jewish. 
 A multivariate analysis of the kind presented here could be performed with 
recent data, such as the data used by Medding et al. and the 1990 National 
Jewish Population Survey, thereby allowing tests of the hypotheses mentioned 
in this chapter, including the hypothesis mentioned in this postscript. 
 Notes 
 1.  Various theories from disciplines other than economics have dealt with the 
determinants of preferences for religious homogamy. Such theories have considered the 
following factors as influential: the relationship with one's parents along the lines of 
psychoanalytical theory (for references, see Berman 1968), the provision of social 
controls by parents and religious organizations (see for instance Heiss l960), and the 
tendency to avoid the frustration of being part of a minority (DellaPergola l976). Most 
relevant to the perspective presented here, Rosenthal (1963) has shown that an 
individual's religious education during childhood is a determinant of the propensity to 
intermarry. 
 2.  The entire discussion could also be read in terms of marriage between Blacks 
and Whites, for instance. 
 3.  For details about this sample and discussion of how representative it is of U.S. 
Jews, see Lazerwitz (l973, l974). When the original version of this chapter was written, 
this was the only national survey of Jews available.  
 4.  Jewish men, and not women, were selected because (l) there were relatively few 
intermarriages between Jewish women and non-Jewish men, and (2) so far the theory 
has been simplified by focusing on men's likelihood to intermarry. Information on 
whether a wife who was not born Jewish converted or not, was not used here. The 
sample was limited to men who were born Jewish and did not convert. Ideally, one 
would have preferred a sample including men who have been previously married. By 
restricting the sample to men who were married at the time of interview, one excludes 
marriages which ended in dissolution, possibly in part due to religious differences. 
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 5.  Low level Jewish education was defined as no education at all or attendance 
of Sunday school only. 
 6.  However, general education could also reflect different attitudes towards 
homogamy, or imbalances in particular categories of education. As Chiswick and Lehrer 
(1992) have pointed out, high levels of education also imply wider intellectual horizons, 
and additional dimensions of compatibility which may be more beneficial than the 
possible cost of religious differences (in cases where homogamy is preferred). 
 7.  The response rate on the question regarding monetary income was so low that 
this information was not used in the regressions. 
 8.  Region was defined according to place of birth.  It would have been preferable 
to include region of residence prior to marriage, but that information was not available.  
 9.  Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable--the likelihood that a 
Jewish man be married to a Christian--methods such as logit regressions would be 
appropriate.  However, given the often similar results obtained with linear regression 
models, the method of Ordinary Least Squares was utilized. 
 10. It is especially appropriate to assume that previous divorce is an undesirable 
characteristic in a subsample where the average husband's age at interview was 44 
years. 
 11. I owe this point to Evelyn Lehrer. 
 12. Some results are available upon request. 
 13. If Jewish education indeed makes as much difference in explaining 
heterogamy as is implied from this study, it would also be interesting to explore in 
detail what particular aspects of Jewish education have the most impact on heterogamy 
and correlates of heterogamy.  
 14. Unfortunately, I have not found the time or resources to do any of these things 
myself.  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 176 
 
 
 
 
 
 PART FIVE 
                                                                                  
   Cohabitation, Divorce, and  
 Polygamy 
 This part of the book addresses four aspects of marriage: cohabitation, labor 
supply, divorce, and polygamy. Based on the theory of labor and marriage 
presented in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 introduced a few hypotheses regarding 
cohabitation and divorce. More hypotheses are presented here-- in particular, 
hypotheses relating divorce and labor supply, and a theory of polygamy. All the 
chapters presented here also contain an empirical section testing a substantial 
fraction of the hypotheses regarding the topics covered in this part of the book. 
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 9 
                                                         A Theory 
of Cohabitation and  
 Marriage Formality  
 
 As mentioned in the theory of marriage presented earlier in this book 
(Chapter 4), marriage formality is viewed as an indication of commitment and 
loyalty. The fact that a particular man and woman are bound by a formal 
marriage, instead of living together informally, could indicate that the woman 
has a higher value on the marriage market. This chapter expands the 
hypotheses regarding cohabitation and marriage formality that were presented 
in Chapter 4. Most of the hypotheses are then tested with data from Guatemala 
(the 1974 Rand-INCAP survey). This chapter contributes to our understanding 
of formality and loyalty in marriage. It could possibly also be useful for studies 
of moral hazard and loyalty in the labor market.1 
 Introduction 
 During most of its history the Western world has overwhelmingly adhered 
to formal marriage. Recently there have been signs of a weakening of the 
traditional marital institutions,  e.g., in Scandinavia and the United States. 
 
                                        
 
 Adapted from "A Theory of Marriage Formality: The Case of Guatemala," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 30, pp. 813-830, July 1982, University of 
Chicago Press. This research was funded by a grant obtained from the Rockerfeller 
Foundation to the Labor and Population Studies Department of the Rand Corporation. I 
thank William Butz and Finis Welch for enabling me to do this research; Yoram Ben-
Porath, Deborah Blackwell, William Butz, Julie DaVanzo, Kingsley Davis, Arthur 
Goldberger, John Stein, Dan Sumner, Robert Willis, and an anonymous referee for 
helpful comments; Iva Maclennan for outstanding programming; and Gabriel Sidhom 
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for his assistance. 
 
For instance, it appears from census data that the number of cohabitating 
couples in the U.S. in 1970 was eight times higher than that number in 1960. 
This trend has continued throughout the seventies and the eighties, although at 
a decreasing pace. For instance, between 1974 and 1980 the ratio of cohabiting 
to married couples in the U.S. increased from about .023 to .032. (Glick  1975, 
Glick and Norton 1977, Saluter 1989). It is still the case that most couples in 
the U.S. are formally married. 
 In contrast, in most other North American countries the proportion of 
couples who are formally married has long been relatively small. As shown in 
Table 9.1, the percentage living informally relative to the number of those who 
are formally married has been particularly high in Spanish-speaking North and 
Central America. Likewise, most South American countries have very high 
informality ratios. The phenomenon of informal unions reaches its most 
spectacular proportions in Honduras and Guatemala, where people tend to 
cohabit rather than marry formally.  
 There are also wide cross-cultural variations in the degree to which formal 
marriages differ from informal unions and in the extent to which they convey 
loyalty or commitment. Among the countries where cohabitation resembles 
formal marriage more closely one can count Sweden and Guatemala. Legally, 
no or very small penalties are imposed on those united informally in 
Guatemala.2 The main apparent difference between the two types of union 
seems to be the ceremonial acts of celebration in front of people important to 
the spouses (relatives, neighbors, state employees, or church functionaries). 
Such public recognition reinforces a mutual commitment, thus lowering the 
chances of separation. The more elaborate 
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and public the ceremony, and the more that formal marriage raises divorce 
costs, the more marriage formality is expected to encourage stability. In 
Guatemala and other Latin American countries, village fiestas follow after a 
formal marriage, but not when cohabitation starts, probably as a way for the 
community to stress the commitment formal marriage involves. Guatemala was 
chosen as the testing ground for the theory of marriage formality developed in 
this book, in part because a study of marriage formality in Guatemala allows us 
to isolate the element of commitment involved in such formality from legal 
differences which are relatively minor in Guatemala. 
 Theory 
 This theory of cohabitation and marriage formality is based on the general 
theory of marriage presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 4 developed a 
number of hypotheses regarding marriage formality versus cohabitation. The 
theory and testable hypotheses are now briefly restated. Other hypotheses are 
expanded or added. 
 According to this theory people are viewed as suppliers of spousal labor. In 
most cultures such spousal labor includes parenthood services, food preparation 
and homemaking. Additional forms of spousal labor vary widely from one 
culture to the next. Spousal labor is supplied in return for a compensation, 
called quasi-wage or w*. Quasi-wages for spousal labor are partially determined 
by conditions in markets for spousal labor. In turn, the market-determined 
component of the quasi-wage for women's spousal labor is determined at the 
intersection of the aggregate demand and supply in the market for women's 
spousal labor. Likewise, men supply spousal labor and get compensated for it. 
A net income transfer is expected to occur from the husband to the wife to the 
extent that the value of her spousal labor exceeds the value of his spousal labor.  
 The form in which wives are compensated for their labor also differs cross-
culturally. In most cultures, it includes a material component, often taking the 
form of provision of shelter and basic goods by the husband for the wife's 
benefit. 
 This analysis is based on the assumption that marriage formality indicates 
higher expected mating stability than cohabitation. Marriage formality can be 
viewed as an expression of loyalty to the institution of marriage in general and 
to one's spouse in particular. A second assumption is that women value 
commitment and loyalty from a spouse more than men do. A partial 
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explanation for such gender differences is found in Appendix 9.A. 
Consequently, expected stability associated with marriage formality is viewed 
as a component of the compensation for women's spousal labor. 
Women's Resources 
 Women's Income. According to this analysis, women cohabit, in part, as a 
result of low spousal income, which in turn varies with quasi-wage levels. 
Various characteristics of women associated with low value in the market for 
women's spousal labor will therefore be positively associated with the 
likelihood that a woman will cohabit and not formally marry. Given their 
position in the marriage market, such women can not obtain a formal marriage. 
The following factors may be associated with low female spousal income. 
 Education. Education is a characteristic which we assume raises a woman's 
value in the market for spousal labor. Female schooling is often a measure of 
very basic skills. Knowing how to read and count can clearly add to 
productivity at many household tasks. Thus we obtain Hypothesis 16: To the 
extent that education is an indicator of productivity in spousal labor, more 
educated women are more likely to be married formally and less likely to 
cohabit. This hypothesis is clearly applicable within the context of a Less 
Developed Country (LDC) such as Guatemala where a year of schooling may 
add much to the productivity of spousal labor.3  
 Hypothesis 16 may not be as applicable in a more developed country, where 
it is not as clear than an additional year of schooling contributes to spousal 
productivity. For instance, if post-graduate years of schooling don't contribute 
to productivity in spousal labor, it is not predicted that women with post-
graduate education are less likely to cohabit than college graduates. 
 Family Background. Likewise, one can derive hypotheses associating the 
likelihood of cohabitation with other characteristics of women which relate to 
the market value of their spousal labor, such as family background or fecundity 
(the ability to procreate). It is expected that women will be more likely to 
formally marry and less likely to cohabit when they come from a family with 
above average income rather than from a lower-income family. Likewise, 
women at an age considered optimal for marriage in the society in which they 
live can use that resource to obtain a formal marriage. In contrast, if having 
children from a previous union is a liability in the marriage market, women 
who have children are less likely to formally marry and more likely to cohabit. 
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Men's Resources 
 The theoretical basis for a prediction regarding the effect of men's resources 
on the likelihood of cohabitation is more complex. We start with the effect of 
men's income. There are two ways men's income can influence marriage 
formality. First, there can be a trade-off between marriage formality and the 
material benefits a woman receives in return for providing spousal labor to a 
man, in a manner similar to the trade-off between monetary returns and job 
stability found in the labor market. Second, men with higher income may 
demand more spousal labor. We start with the first point: a trade-off between 
material benefits and expected stability. 
 In the job market, the risk of dissolution implies the risk of unemployment. 
It appears that workers are risk averse, for they require a monetary 
compensation to engage in occupations with a high risk of unemployment. 
Different combinations of risk and wages can coexist, reflecting preferences of 
workers and employers, as well as job characteristics.4 A similar trade-off 
between low risk and material compensation is expected in the case of 
male/female relationships. 
 As mentioned in earlier chapters, there may be some divisibility problems 
creating rigidity in the determination of a quasi-wage. For instance, the wife's 
income in marriage may be a constant proportion of the total income of both 
spouses 5, implying that she is getting a constant proportion of her husband's 
earnings. It follows that the wife's compensation for spousal labor depends not 
only on her productivity in marriage and on marriage market conditions, but 
also on her husband's income. Alternatively, the proportion of the husband's 
income which the wife gets in return for her spousal labor may vary, but it may 
not vary enough to reflect actual variations in compensation for spousal labor 
applying to men and women with different characteristics. This rigidity in the 
determination of the wife's income from  
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 Fig. 9.1  A woman's indifference curves 
spousal labor can cause variations in marriage formality.  
 A woman's preferences for higher material benefits and lower risk of 
dissolution imply indifference curves as drawn in Figure 9.1. She is better-off 
as she moves toward the southeast. As a result of her preference for risk 
aversion, a woman will value deterrents to dissolution, be they socially 
sanctioned ceremonies or legal stipulations, and will be willing to give up some 
material benefits from her union in order to obtain such deterrents. Also, she 
would require higher material benefits if she were to provide spousal labor 
without any formal marriage. A woman's actual choice depends not only on her 
preferences but also on her opportunities. 
 Her opportunities are determined by her own productivity as a wife and by 
her potential husband's preferences. Figure 9.2 depicts the marriage-
opportunity curve facing a woman of given productivity. She can either marry a 
man offering total loyalty (no expected dissolution) with low material benefits 
or enter a higher-risk union involving higher benefits. The choice is limited to 
these possibilities to the extent that a man values marriage risk positively: he 
would rather avoid entering a formal marriage restricting future options of 
dissolution. Consequently, he would be willing to pay higher quasi-wage 
payments in order to avoid marriage formality. At  
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 Fig. 9.2  Women's opportunities for income from    spousal labor. 
 
the extreme, a man would pay the highest material benefits to a woman if she 
agrees to provide him with the equivalent of spousal labor without becoming 
his wife (formal or informal), implying no obligations whatsoever on his part. 
 If we assume rigid determination of material benefits for wife's spousal 
labor out of the husband's income, men have little choice in moving along a 
marriage-opportunity curve. A given income leads to a given level of marriage 
benefits which can be illustrated by a vertical line (male income line in Figure 
9.2). Consequently a man of income-level 1 will only get involved with a 
woman f1 of productivity 1 in a union involving a level or risk r1. Such a union 
may never occur, if at that point the indifference curve of that particular woman 
is not tangent to the marriage-opportunity curve. Men of income-level 1 may 
end up living with a woman f2 of productivity 2 in a union of type r2, if at that 
point one of her indifference curves is tangent to the appropriate marriage 
opportunity curve (m.o.c.). Figure 9.3 illustrates such marriage patterns under 
the assumption that both women f1 and f2 have the same indifference curves. 
Similarly, there will be a point of tangency to the first woman's marriage-
opportunity curve that will be associated with a higher risk of dissolution and a 
lower-income husband offering lower marriage benefits.   As there is only one 
point of tangency between a mar-  
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 Fig. 9.3  Optimal match  
 
riage-opportunity curve and an indifference curve, some matches may not be 
feasible. 
 If the proportion of a husband's income going to payments for his wife's 
spousal labor is variable, but that variability is limited by rigidities, it is still 
likely that a husband with high income will offer a wife low expected stability, 
given that he is obliged to provide her with material benefits exceeding the 
level such benefits would reach if there were no rigidities and all quasi-wages 
were determined in markets for spousal labor.  
 If it is true that the benefits a husband provides to his wife are a function of 
his income (status), one expects higher-status males to enter unions with higher 
risk of dissolution. A woman of a given quality and wealth will be indifferent 
between living with a man of higher status who provides her with higher 
benefits and lower stability or a man of lower income providing her with lower 
benefits and higher stability. Consequently, if wife quality is constant, higher-
status men are less likely to formally marry. According to Figure 9.3, shifts of 
the male income line along a given marriage-opportunity curve imply higher 
risk of dissolution. 
 At the same time, higher-status men may demand more spousal labor, 
thereby raising the total spousal income their potential wives would get. This 
could lead to a higher likelihood of marriage formality. This effect is expected 
to be strong if the demand for spousal labor is income elastic. Combining these 
two effects of male income on the likelihood of cohabitation versus formal 
marriage, we obtained Hypothesis 17, which stated that men with higher 
income may be less likely to be formally married and more likely to cohabit 
than men with lower income, especially if men's demand for spousal labor is 
not income elastic. 
 In contrast to the theoretical analysis presented here, some researchers on 
Latin America have reached an opposite conclusion regarding the male-income 
(status) effect on marriage formality. While the marriage ceremony--civil or 
religious--is usually free, the fiesta accompanying it generates major 
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expenditures. Judging from Panamanian rural data from 1974, the groom is 
responsible for fiesta costs which amounted to around $150-$200 (Gudeman 
1976). Some researchers (Adams 1970, for instance) believe that the main 
reason that many, especially Indians, avoid formal marriage is that they can not 
afford to marry. In other words, they have a "poor Indian" theory of marriage 
formality. However, both Gudeman (1976) for Panama, and Kreiselman (1958) 
for Martinique estimated that most persons who can afford to live together also 
can afford a marriage celebration. The empirical part of this paper will test the 
effect of male income on marriage formality: A positive sign would confirm 
Adams' interpretation, while a negative sign may confirm my view of marriage 
formality as an indication of commitment to marriage. 
 One could also add hypotheses about other compensating differentials in 
marriage and marriage formality. Following the analysis of compensating 
differentials presented in Parts Two and Four it is expected that men with fewer 
desirable characteristics--desirable as defined in marriage markets--are likely to 
give their wives a higher total compensation for spousal labor in other forms. If 
the material component of that compensation is kept constant, it is predicted 
that men with less desirable characteristics are more likely to formally marry 
and less likely to cohabit than men with more desirable characteristics. This 
was stated as Hypothesis 17': men with less desirable characteristics are more 
likely to be formally married than men with more desirable characteristics. 
 However, it could be--as in the case of income--that some of these desirable 
characteristics are also associated with higher demand for women's spousal 
labor, and therefore a higher likelihood of formal marriage. For instance, high-
income men are more likely to marry women willing and able to make heavy 
human capital investments in the marriage's children. 
 Some evidence for this hypothesis was found in the Caribbean, where light 
coloring was considered a desirable characteristic in marriage. In the 1950s, 
many black families there would rather have their daughter live informally with 
a white or brown man than have her formally marry a black man (Henriques 
1953).  
 It follows from this view of marriage formality that lower expected 
dissolution is likely to be associated with a lower actual rate of dissolution. 
Furthermore, if a union is expected to be unstable, fewer investments specific to 
the marriage will be made. Considering that children are such investments, 
fertility should be lower among those living together informally than among 
those who are formally married (Becker, Landes and Michael 1977). 
 Empirical Results 
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Sample 
 As mentioned earlier, formal marriages are not the norm in Guatemala, but 
rather the exception. This situation holds in our sample drawn from six villages 
that had been studied by Rand and INCAP in 1974. As reported in Table 9.2, 
only 35 percent of women's first marriages involved a formal ceremony. 
Informal unions are common largely because of the small legal difference 
between the two types of union. Under Guatemalan law, formal marriages can 
end in divorce, and for children to be legitimate it suffices that parents 
recognize them.  The only legal differences  consist  in  the  easier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
inheritance procedures facilitated by formal marriage, and in the Catholic 
church's prohibition against divorce, in case a formal marriage was celebrated 
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in the church. 
 This small normative contrast between formal and informal unions dates 
back to the times of colonization. The insulari, the colonizers from Iberia, 
found it convenient to have a way of establishing legal cohabitation with 
indigenous women without compromising their chances of marrying (or staying 
married to) a fellow Iberian within the rites of the Catholic church.  This 
became a particularly attractive option as they were often sent to America 
without a family for extended periods of time. This historical view of the 
institution of marriage in Central and South America appears to agree with 
some of the theoretical discussion from the previous section.
6
 The two forms of 
marriage may have evolved side by side, in part, because many lower-class 
indigenous women were indifferent between "marrying" high-status insulari 
with the low expected stability typical of informal unions, and marrying men of 
their own class promising them a stable formal marriage. 
 The six communities studied in this survey by Rand and INCAP in 1974 
were Ladino, meaning that they are mainly composed of descendants from 
Indians acculturized to Spanish culture. Four are rural villages northeast of 
Guatemala City, the other two lie within a short commuting distance from the 
capital. Poverty is common: not all villages have electricity or drinking water, 
schooling among adults is very low (see Table 9.2), and housing quality is poor. 
Table 9.2 presents means and standard deviations for two selected subsamples 
of mothers whose first relationship with a man started as a formal or informal 
marriage: (1) women reporting on their first relationship whether their mate 
could be interviewed or not, (their mate could be a formal or informal husband, 
currently living with them or not) and (2) that section of subsample 1 whose 
husbands were also interviewed. Differences between these two subsamples are 
noticeable: subsample 2 is mainly restricted to the rural villages (because few 
husbands were interviewed in the modernizing villages) and has more stable 
marriages (if the first husband is available for interviewing it is less likely that 
the marriage ended in separation). 
Method 
 First, simple correlations were computed. Then, regression analysis was 
used. The dependent variable in the regression--formal marriage as opposed to 
informal union--is dichotomous and, therefore, linear ordinary least squares 
(OLS) may not be the appropriate regression method. Specially designed for 
such cases is the probit method. Some of the regressions (for instance, cols. 1 
and 2 in Table 9.4) were estimated by both OLS and probit. Given the 
similarity of the results in terms of both coefficients and asymptotic t-statistics 
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and given technical constraints, most regressions presented here are based 
solely on OLS.7 
Findings 
 In order to test income effects on marriage type, one can first infer some 
information from the simple correlations presented in Table 9.3. Subsample 1 
(cols. 1 and 2) only had information on husband's job. It appears that among 
those active in agriculture, independent farmers are more likely to be formally 
married than agricultural laborers. Farmers who own their land were excluded 
in order to separate ownership from expected income. A different table (not 
shown) shows that farmers owning their own land are les 
s likely to be formally married than farmers not owning their own land. The 
occupations in Table 9.3 are ranked in increasing order of income and pres- 
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tige. Table 9.3 indicates that well-paid employees (employees were the highest 
income category) are slightly more likely to be formally than informally 
married, but less so than in the case of farmers (nonowners). Since the latter 
are considered to be poorer than employees,8 this may be a first indication that 
the male income effect on marriage formality is negative. Similarly, both the 
husband's schooling--often considered an indicator of permanent income--and 
salaried income have a slightly negative impact on marriage formality. 
However, these negative bivariate correlation coefficients may differ from the 
true relationships, because some critical variables have not been kept constant. 
The table also shows that higher-income men marry women with additional 
schooling, and that there exists a positive correlation between female schooling 
and formal marriage, the latter result being consistent with the theory. 
 To estimate the effect of male income on formal marriage when female 
schooling is kept constant, one can turn to the regression analyses presented in 
Tables 9.4-9.6. These tables also give an indication of the female income effect, 
as measured by family ownership of the house where a woman lived prior to 
marriage (the bivariate correlation coefficient between this measure of her 
family's income and marriage formality is positive).9  
 Table 9.4 applies to subsample 1, based on female interviews only. Table 
9.5 applies to subsample 2, composed of matched female and male interviews, 
and Table 9.6 relates to first marriages where all males are salaried workers. 
 Hypothesis 16 was confirmed in regressions of marriage formality on 
selected female characteristics using both the probit method and OLS. As 
predicted, it can be seen from Table 9.4 that women with more human or 
material assets appear more likely to be married formally. Each year of 
schooling increases the likelihood that a woman is formally married.  
 Women whose family of origin owned a house are more likely to be 
formally married. Columns 1 and 2 confirm the prediction that higher-status 
women can obtain better marriage conditions in terms of either more stability 
or higher material benefits. Thus, if material benefits are held constant because 
husband's income is included in the regression, women of higher status are 
more likely to formally marry.10 Both indicators of wife quality--schooling and 
house-owning family--have a positive coefficient in Table 9.4, but only the 
former is significantly positive in Table 9.5. 
 The regressions in Tables 9.4-9.6 indicate that male income has a negative 
impact on marriage formality when female characteristics are kept constant. In 
light of Hypothesis 17, it appears that the trade-off between material benefits in 
marriage and stability is a more important factor in these Guatemalan 
marriages than a positive income effect. Regressions 3 and 4 in Table 9.4, and 
1 and 2 in Table 9.5, all including both male and female characteristics, 
indicate  a  negative male income  effect principally  due to 
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fewer formal marriages on the part of employees. This effect becomes 
insignificant when female characteristics are not held constant, principally 
because higher-income men marry women with more education and income, 
which in turn leads to more marriage formality (see the coefficient of years of 
schooling and family-owned house). Moreover, Table 9.6 indicates that for a 
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subsample of salaried males, men making more salaried income are less likely 
to be married formally (significant only at the 90 percent level). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction of a trade-off 
between marriage stability deriving from a formal ceremony, and the material 
benefits a woman gets out of marriage. They contradict the "poor Indian" 
theory of marriage formality, for the poorest men do not appear to formally 
marry less often in Guatemala. It is possible, however, that in a different 
cultural context, where legal differences between the two types of union are 
larger, a positive male income effect would overpower this negative male 
income effect.  
 Other male attributes did not appear statistically significant: male schooling 
mainly succeeded in taking away from the explanatory power of salaried 
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income (Table 9.5 col. 2). Amount of land planted, for a subsample of farmers, 
did not affect marriage formality; neither did male age. 
 Village residence appeared to be a major determinant of marriage formality. 
From the simple correlations in Table 9.3, it already appeared that the villages 
differed as to the percentage of residents formally married; given that 
occupation was controlled for, this may have reflected differences in religious 
activities. The two villages which consistently showed a lower likelihood of 
formal marriage (villages 2 and 3) happened to be the only two villages without 
a church. While the other villages all had at least one church, they varied in 
terms of Catholic and Protestant (evangelical) activism. One expects that the 
evangelicals, relatively new on the Guatemalan scene, precisely chose to focus 
on villages where religious commitment was low, implying little use of 
Catholic marriage rites. Not surprisingly, village 1, where formal marriages 
were more frequent, counted many active Catholics (including the priest) and 
no active Protestants. The two transitional villages (5 and 6) did not 
significantly differ from each other, for they were exposed to the same social 
control. Other reasons may have accounted for the observed village differences 
in the form of marriages, such as variations in work opportunities for men and 
women not captured by the available measures of such opportunities, and sex 
ratio variations. 
 A comparison of columns 3 and 4 in Table 9.4 shows the effect of 
controlling for village of residence. When no control is made for village, the 
effect of husband's employee status loses in significance and that of house 
ownership by the woman's family drops from .15 to .12. This probably reflects 
the fact that the villages with low marriage formality are less modernized 
compared with the village of reference and, therefore, have more instances of 
house ownership (few migrants coming in) and a relatively small proportion of 
employees. 
 Conclusions  
 This chapter presented evidence in support of two hypotheses regarding 
marriage formality, which were originally presented in Chapter 4. As predicted 
from the theory, women with more human and physical assets and men with 
fewer such assets are more likely to marry formally than to live together 
informally. The finding regarding male income effects on marriage formality 
appears to be culture-specific. In the Guatemalan context, marriage formality 
does not carry major legal differences. It would be very interesting to test 
whether these hypotheses would also hold for other countries. 
 This work has implications not only for the study of marriage, but also for 
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labor economics. It appears that an apparently purely symbolic act undertaken 
voluntarily by two people--a marriage ceremony--does have tangible 
consequences in terms of material benefits a woman can obtain through 
marriage and matching of potential spouses.  
 The symbolic act of formalizing a marriage may not transform the situation 
but instead contain information regarding individual motivations and 
expectations. If this is a correct interpretation of marriage formality, acts of 
symbolic value in other areas of behavior could also be used as valuable sources 
of information. Since the closest analogy to marriage is labor, those interested 
in job turnover, wage determination, and job-specific investments should 
include these kinds of symbolic cues in their explanatory models. They are 
important expressions of differences in taste. To generalize comparisons in job 
loyalty between the United States and Japan, for example, one could add cross-
sectional data measuring job loyalty in separate firms by using indicators 
reminiscent of the concept of marriage formality (for instance, extent of public 
recognition of a labor contract). 
 Marriage formality does make a difference, and so does probably any formal 
symbolic act that a society has bothered to design. Social research should pay 
more attention to such formalities. 
 Postscript 
 Since this paper was written in the late 1970s other studies have found that 
women with more resources are less likely to cohabit. For instance, Bumpass, 
Sweet and Cherlin (1991) found that the trend toward cohabitation in the U.S. 
has been led by the least educated segment of the population.11 In a similar 
vein, Parnell, Swicegood and Stevens (1989) found that U.S. women who had 
completed high school or had some post-secondary education were more likely 
to legitimate a first birth than high school dropouts. Studies of cohabitation in 
Canada (Rao 1989) and Brazil (Greene and Rao 1992) also indicate a negative 
relationship between women's education and the likelihood of cohabitation. 
 Appendix 9.A. Why women prefer stability and husbands tend to be older 
than their wives. 
 It is usually agreed that a woman's peak productivity as a mother, one of the main 
components of wife productivity, precedes a man's peak earning productivity. Biology 
seems to account for the quasi-universal observation that female fecundity peaks in the 
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early twenties. (Based on Chapter 11, peak fertility among Maiduguri, Nigeria, women 
seems to occur around age 22). But men rarely reach peak productivity in their 
occupation before age thirty. Generally, the more male productivity depends on physical 
power, the sooner the peak in earnings. Even among uneducated migrant workers in 
Liberia, the peak in starting salaries was found to occur at ages 40-42 (Lave and 
Mueller 1975). If it is true that, due to rigidity, the wife's compensation for spousal 
labor varies with the husband's income at least to some extent, it follows that the peak 
in wife compensation for spousal labor comes after the peak in wife productivity.  
 If the same basic profile occurs for most men and women, and wife's compensation's 
dependence on male earnings is universal, it follows that (1) an age differential between 
husband and wife would be optimal and (2) to the extent that the  
wife's peak productivity precedes that of the husband, he will have an incentive to take 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.4  Life-time productivity of wife and husband, and life-time profile in 
compensation for wife's spousal labor. 
 
advantage of his wife's productivity as she is producing more than he compensates her 
for, but after his compensation based on a fixed proportion of his income exceeds her 
productivity (time to in Figure 9.4) he will have an incentive to quit. 
 An additional reason why men would be more likely to desire dissolution is that 
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their search costs are lower. Men meet more women while they work and travel, 
especially if women do not participate in the labor force (which is generally the case 
after childbirth in Guatemala and in most other countries). 
 Notes 
 1.  The importance of job commitment and loyalty in determining wages, 
turnover, and productivity has been recognized, but few models including measures for 
such commitment have been developed and applied. Freeman's concept of the voice of 
unions and Kuratani's comparison of Japanese and American workers' loyalty closely 
relate to such an exogenous commitment factor. (Freeman 1977, Kuratani 1972). 
 2.  According to a personal communication from Charles Teller, INCAP, the only 
legal difference between the two types of marriage is that inheritance rights come more 
immediately to a formal widow than to an informal one. 
 3.  Another example of the important effect of schooling on marriage can be 
found in Chapter 11. 
 4.  See the literature on hedonic wage, for instance Lucas (1977). 
 5.  As argued in Becker (1981), Ch. 4. 
 6.  I owe this point to Kingsley Davis. 
 7.  In order to compare the coefficients obtained by both methods, the partial 
derivatives were calculated at the means of the probit function. For the three significant 
coefficients in column 1, these derivatives are .04 for schooling, .008 for age at 
marriage, and .12 for family-owned house. These values are very close to those obtained 
with OLS (col. 2). This empirical research was performed in 1976. I don't have the 
resources to reestimate the regressions. 
 8.  Following my own understanding of the male income data collected through 
the same INCAP project as well as that of John Stein as communicated to me, the 
occupational ranking in Table 9.3 approximates a rising income scale. As Dan Sumner 
pointed out to me, farmers often have off-farm jobs, which complicates the income 
equivalence of occupations. 
 9.  The fact that prior to marriage a woman lived in a house that her family--
probably her parents--owned, may not only reflect their and her income, but also the 
stability of their marriage, which may in turn influence their daughter in getting married 
formally. 
 10. The coefficients of female schooling and family-owned house remained almost 
identical when male-occupation dummies were excluded from the regressions. 
 11. They do not make a distinction between male and female education. 
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                                                         A Theory 
of Divorce 
  and Labor Supply 
 (with Michael C. Keeley) 
  
 Abstract 
 The theory of allocation of time in markets for labor and marriage presented in Part 
Two of this book also leads to a theoretical analysis of labor supply and divorce. The 
theory presented here focusses on income effects on labor supply and divorce. It gives 
some reasons why it is important to estimate income effects on labor supply and divorce 
simultaneously. Results are then reported for such joint estimation. This chapter also 
offers new interpretations of results from simultaneous empirical analyses of divorce 
and labor supply other than the ones presented here, and contributes to the 
methodological debate regarding the usefulness of experimental data. 
 Introduction 
 The existing literature analyzes income effects on divorce with one set of 
tools and its effect on labor supply with a different set of tools. The basic  
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 Adapted from "Labor Supply and Marriage: A New Model and Evidence from an 
Income Maintenance Experiment," working paper, Stanford, 1981. Michael Keeley is 
solely (and only) responsible for the empirical part of this chapter. We would like to 
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framework used by economists for analyzing income effects on labor supply is 
the income-leisure trade-off. This framework takes household structure as 
given, and has no room for incorporating marriage or divorce. Typically, this 
framework is of a static nature, and income changes are conceived of as 
unexpected changes in current income, which does not originate from work.  
  It has been postulated on theoretical grounds and shown empirically that 
income and labor supply are negatively related. Economic literature offers 
ample evidence that wives' labor supply is more income elastic than that of 
husbands. Following Mincer (1962) this has been explained in terms of 
women's larger involvement with household work and the existence of 
relatively good substitutes for women's time in the home. 
 The economic analysis of divorce is based on Becker's (1973,1981) theory 
of marriage (see also Becker, Landes and Michael 1977). Income effects are 
assumed to be unexpected at the time of marriage. Given a higher income, 
individuals can obtain a better match than with the spouse they are currently 
married to. The sociological literature has also considered the choices between 
marriage, singlehood, and remarriage in a cost-benefit framework, and has 
focussed on the possible independence from marriage that can be obtained with 
added income from outside the marriage (e.g., Hannan, Tuma and Groeneveld 
1977, Oppenheimer 1988). 
 These two separate bodies of theories lead to separate hypotheses of negative 
effects of income on labor supply, and positive effects of income on divorce. In 
other words, the existing literature does not provide a single explanation 
accounting simultaneously for income effects on divorce and on the labor 
supply of husbands and wives.  
 In contrast to the separate theories regarding the determinants of labor 
supply and divorce found in the literature, the analytical framework presented 
in Part Two allows us to integrate the analysis of labor supply and divorce. 
Specifically, in the case of income effects, the same analysis leads to the 
hypothesis of larger income effects on wives' labor supply than on husbands' 
(Hypothesis 5 in Chapter 3), and to the hypothesis that unexpected changes in 
income will be positively related to divorce (Hypothesis 9' in Chapter 4). This 
theory of labor supply and divorce can also be useful in offering new 
interpretations of results from more recent simultaneous empirical analyses of 
labor supply and divorce.1 
Divorce and Labor Supply 203 
 
 
 
 In this chapter, it is shown how income effects on labor supply and divorce 
depend on the same intervening factors, including divorce costs and 
substitutability in the supply of spousal labor. It is also shown how the 
magnitude of income effects on a particular couple depends on the number of 
other people in the environment experiencing similar income effects. If large 
numbers of people participating in the same marriage market obtain additional 
income, for instance, the conditions in the marriage market will vary in 
directions similar to the changes occurring to each individual eligible couple. 
As a result, divorce will be less likely and labor supply will change less than if 
few other people experience an income change. 
 The possible implications from such analysis are important for policy 
purposes. Through programs such as Aid for Families With Dependent 
Children (AFDC) the government is presently transferring income, thereby 
causing effects on labor supply, divorce and remarriage. In the past, the 
government has run Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments, which have 
created unique opportunities for researchers to study unexpected income effects 
on labor supply and divorce. It is important to assess correctly the extent to 
which any income transfers have an impact on labor supply and family 
structure. 
 Many studies have shown that income transfers such as AFDC and NIT 
discourage labor supply and marriage, while they tend to encourage female 
headship and divorce. With respect to the welfare system, Moffitt (1992) 
reports a number of econometric studies showing that labor supply is reduced 
by welfare programs such as AFDC and Food Stamps. Hoffman and Duncan 
(1988) have shown that women who were divorced or separated were less likely 
to remarry when they could benefit more from AFDC. As to Negative Income 
Tax, which at one point was seriously considered as an alternative to traditional 
welfare programs, two major reasons for its demise were the findings that NIT 
leads to (1) reductions in work time (Rees 1974; Robins and West 1980; and 
Robins, Tuma and Yaeger 1980) and (2) increases in divorce or separation 
among families receiving support (Hannan, Tuma, and Groeneveld 1977; and 
Groeneveld, Tuma, and Hannan 1980, Keeley 1987).2 
 A major drawback of most studies on the effect of income transfers in 
general--and of NIT programs in particular--is that they have not accounted 
simultaneously for the effect of income transfers on labor supply and divorce. 
Estimating these effects separately leads to biased estimations.  
 The advantages of a simultaneous estimation are (1) unbiased estimation of 
any effects (including income effects) on labor supply or divorce, and (2) given 
a simultaneous theoretical analysis of divorce and labor supply, a better 
understanding of how income and other factors influence behavior. In 
particular, this theory enables us to assess the direction of a possible bias due to 
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the experimental nature of the data. 
 This chapter first summarizes the theory regarding labor supply and divorce 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4, and then expands that theory. This is then 
followed by an empirical analysis based on Two-Stage Least Squares. The 
chapter's conclusion includes policy implications. 
 
 Theory 
 The general theory of labor and marriage presented in Part Two allows us to 
integrate the analysis of labor supply and divorce. The decisions to marry, stay 
married or divorce are viewed as closely interrelated with labor supply 
decisions in the following ways. 
 An individual's decision to supply labor is conceived of as a choice between 
leisure and two occupations, labor in the conventional sense and spousal labor, 
defined as any task performed for the benefit of one's spouse. Marriage is 
viewed as the institutional framework within which the exchange of spousal 
labor takes place. Given possible substitution between many potential spouses, 
markets for spousal labor establish equilibrium quasi-wages for spousal labor 
for men and women, the quasi-wage being one material component of the value 
of spousal labor.  
 In a monogamous society marriage tends to occur when at the equilibrium 
w 15*f and w 16*m a man demands the amount of spousal labor a woman wants 
to supply and that woman demands the amount of labor supplied by the man. A 
married couple in equilibrium experiences no excess demand for, or supply of, 
spousal labor at the relevant w*'s. For instance, in Figure 3.4, reproduced in 
Figure 10.1, a couple is in equilibrium when its demands for spousal labor are 
D, its supplies of spousal labor are S, and the equilibrium quasi-wages are 
w 17*f1 and w 18*m1. 
 Based on this analysis, we get predictions regarding both labor supply and 
divorce. With respect to labor supply, it was shown in Chapter 3 that given the 
existence of marriage markets (markets for spousal labor), the conventional 
comparison between w and w*--the basis for individual decisions to work--
involves more than what is usually analyzed in the literature on labor supply. 
One component of the value of time w* is the  
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 Fig. 10.1  Income effects on spousal labor 
quasi-wage established in the marriage market. In addition, w* also has a 
material component dependent on marriage-specific and individual factors, and 
a non-material (or psychic) component. The material compensation an 
individual receives for providing spousal labor thus depends on general 
conditions in the market--affecting all individuals somewhat related to the same 
market--and on conditions specific to the couple. For instance, a wife is more 
likely to gain access to her husband's credit cards if the quasi-wage established 
in her marriage market is high, and/or if her husband is attached  
specifically to her, and therefore possibly willing to treat her better materially 
than the prevailing market-established compensation level. 
 The same theory can help us analyze divorce decisions as well. Any excess 
demand and supply of spousal labor at the equilibrium w* levels can be a 
ground for divorce. The benefits of divorce and recontracting into new 
marriages are a better match between what a man and a woman want in terms 
of demand and supply of spousal labor. However, there are costs of divorce as 
well, including costs of search for a new partner, losses from investments in 
match-specific capital, and losses due to indivisibilities in marital assets.3 In 
addition, divorce may involve direct monetary outlays. Given such divorce 
costs, markets for spousal labor are not spot markets. A couple may decide to 
stay married even if there are excess demands or supplies of spousal labor at the 
market w*s.4 
 Divorce costs faced by each partner in a marriage and total divorce costs 
affect both partners' hours of work and the couple's probability of divorce. 
Assume a couple initially in equilibrium at the market level  w 19*f1 and 
w 20*m1, as depicted in Figure 10.1. Given excess demands or supplies of 
spousal labor caused by any exogenous change, husband and wife can either (1) 
let the material component of w* they give each other differ from the market 
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level w 21*f and w 22*m, or (2) find other ways to reduce excess demands or 
supplies for spousal labor. 
 When a couple lets a marriage-specific quasi-wage w* differ from the 
market equilibrium level w 23*f and w 24*m, the mechanism is as follows. A 
wife or husband who demands spousal labor and is faced with positive costs of 
divorce experiences utility from spousal labor beyond the utility that would be 
provided by potential substitutes.5 In other words, this person's demand for this 
particular spouse exceeds his or her demand for spousal labor provided by 
others. With higher demand, the marriage-specific w* rises. In turn, this will 
also raise the costs of divorce to the partner, who will prefer the higher w* 
received from this spouse over the w* available in the market. For instance, if a 
husband is in love with his wife, but this love is not reciprocated, he translates 
his emotional costs of divorce into a w* exceeding market-level. This shifts part 
of the costs of divorce to the wife, who will now find it difficult to obtain as 
much income from spousal labor if she marries somebody else. Individuals who 
supply spousal labor and who find divorce costly get a higher utility from 
working for their present spouse than from working for a potential substitute. 
The larger supply that this person is willing to supply to this particular spouse 
will cause the marriage-specific w* to be lower than the market equilibrium 
w 25*f or w 26*m. (It may be helpful  to think of these divorce costs as the value 
of match-specific capital either to the worker or to the spouse enjoying the 
work.6 Divorce costs thus cause the marriage-specific demands and supplies of 
spousal labor to shift in a way that (a) reduces any excess demand or supply for 
spousal labor, and (b) creates a gap between market equilibrium w 27*f or 
w 28*m and marriage-specific w*.
7 
 If there are limits to fluctuations in marriage-specific w*'s, there is a need to 
reduce the excess demands or supplies of spousal labor by other means such as 
friendly negotiations between the spouses or use of violence and threat of 
violence. 
 Divorce is linked to labor supply, in the sense that the principal way to 
reduce any excess demand or supply of spousal labor is by adjustments in the 
amount of labor supplied outside the home. 
 Higher divorce costs are likely to discourage divorce. They are also likely to 
cause more divergences between the labor supply of a married person and that 
of a comparable single person. In the case of women, who tend to supply more 
spousal labor than men, one expects the difference between the labor supply of 
a married woman and that of a single woman to be larger, the higher the costs 
of divorce.  
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The Effect of Predicted Divorce on Labor Supply 
 Predicted divorce is expected to affect labor supply. A lower likelihood of 
divorce is likely to be associated with more differences between the labor supply 
of married people and that of single people. More specifically,  
 Hypothesis 33 
 The labor supply of married women with a high likelihood of divorce will be 
larger than the labor supply of women with a low likelihood of divorce.  
 The likelihood of divorce may vary across individuals, for instance as a 
result of differences in divorce costs. Furthermore, the likelihood of divorce 
may change over time if divorce becomes more (or less) common. As to men's 
labor supply, married men with a high likelihood of divorce are likely to be 
more similar to unmarried men than married men with a low likelihood of 
divorce. Married men typically work more than unmarried men, but this is less 
likely to be the case with married men with high likelihood of divorce.  
 The effect of costs of divorce and predicted divorce on labor supply 
decisions may vary with other factors related to the decisions to work and to 
marry. One of these factors is spouse's income. 
 Effect of Spouse's Income. Labor supply during marriage and after divorce 
is a function of the value of time at each of these two points in time. Women 
married to higher income husbands are more likely to receive some income 
from their spouse after a divorce (in the form of alimony, child support or a 
property settlement, for instance). They may also have personal characteristics 
that are attractive in marriage markets and it may be relatively easy for these 
women to replace their spousal income lost through divorce by remarrying. 
Consequently, a predicted divorce does not lower their future value of time as 
much as that of similar women married to men earning a lower income. Given 
that labor supply responds to changes in predicted value of time in the future, 
there is less need for such women to go to work prior to the divorce. 
Availability of spousal income after divorce thus lowers the costs of divorce and 
therefore reduces the need for a married woman to supply labor as if she were 
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single. 
In other words, 
 Hypothesis 33.1 
 The effect of predicted divorce on the labor supply of married women will 
be stronger the lower the likelihood of post-divorce spousal income such as 
alimony or child support. 
 However, being married to a high-income husband is no guarantee of post-
divorce spousal income. It could be that the wife is not attractive and expects to 
do poorly in the marriage market, or that she is being abused by her husband. 
In fact, Dechter (1992) has found that relative income losses due to divorce for 
wives with high-income husbands tend to exceed such losses for wives with 
low-income husbands.  This would imply that wives of high-income husbands 
experience higher divorce costs than wives of low-income husbands. 
Combining these two correlates of high-income husbands (more post-divorce 
income and larger income losses), it is not clear whether wives of high-income 
husbands are more or less likely to enter the labor force as a result of a 
predicted divorce. The effect of predicted divorce on the labor supply of married 
women will be stronger for women married to low-income husbands to the 
extent that they do not expect post-divorce settlements.  However, that effect 
will be weaker for women married to low-income husbands to the extent that 
they are likely to experience less of an income loss as a result of divorce. 
 Expected post-divorce spousal income varies positively with husband's 
income and with husband's education, a good proxy for his permanent income. 
Education may also be related to husband's willingness to agree to a fair 
divorce settlement. 
 An alternative interpretation of weaker effects of predicted divorce on the 
labor supply of women married to husbands with higher incomes, is that these 
women have more desirable characteristics which are valued in the marriage 
market relatively to women married to low-income husbands, the idea behind 
Hypothesis 33.2.  
 Women's Characteristics. Another factor which is likely to affect the 
difference in the value of time of a married woman prior to and after divorce is 
the level of market-determined w* relevant to women with certain 
characteristics. Any factor such as race or age which affects market w* is likely 
to also affect actual w* in a marriage, and therefore the potential drop in 
income a woman could experience. Black women tend to have a worse 
marriage market than white women (see Chapter 5), so Hypothesis 33.2 applies 
to them. The hypothesis also applies to women who have passed what most 
people consider as the age of peak productivity in spousal labor. In most 
Divorce and Labor Supply 209 
 
 
 
cultures, that age is associated with youth and fecundity. 
 Hypothesis 33.2 
 The effect of predicted divorce on the labor supply of married women will 
be larger for women in a better marriage market position, such as white 
women in comparison to black women, and women at peak ages in 
comparison to older women. 
 Predicted divorce affects labor supply via its effect on present and future 
compensation for spousal labor. The larger the drop in income a woman 
expects to experience after divorce, the more she is likely to enter the labor 
force prior to divorce. Even though white women's average interval between 
divorce and remarriage is shorter than that for black women, it is still the case 
that divorced white women do not remarry right away and generally are worse 
off after divorce than prior to divorce. Black married women may expect less of 
a drop in income from spousal labor as a result of divorce than white women, 
given  the lower w* they seem to receive while married (judging from 
indicators such as black-white differences in female labor supply level and 
alimony). Consequently, black married women do not expect divorce to affect 
them as much as what white married women expect to experience. Black-white 
differences in the effect of predicted divorce on women's labor supply would be 
particularly pronounced among women with low chances of remarriage, e.g., a 
function of number of children. 
 More generally, Hypothesis 33.2 applies to any factor which affects market 
w*, which includes sex ratio variations.  
 Men's Spousal Productivity. There may also be trade-offs between various 
characteristics of the husband and the material support he gives his wife both 
during and after a divorce, as discussed earlier in Parts Two and Four. For 
instance, a husband who is much older than his wife--let us say Johnny Carson 
and his third wife--may be compensating her generously for this drawback, 
both before and after a divorce. Consequently, such a wife would not rush into 
the labor force if she predicts a divorce. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 33.3 
 The effect of predicted divorce on the labor supply of married women will 
be weaker in the case of women married to men with relatively undesirable 
characteristics, as valued in the marriage market. 
 Children. It is well known that the presence of young children deters 
210 Divorce and Labor Supply 
 
 
 
divorce. Children are likely to be associated with higher marriage-specific 
benefits and therefore higher loss from divorce to both husband and wife. It was 
found by Dechter (1992) that expected economic losses following divorce are 
important deterrents to divorce for couples with dependent children. One may 
therefore want to estimate whether the effect of predicted divorce on labor 
supply of married women varies with husband's income conditional on number 
of young children.  
 There are more factors influencing labor supply and divorce. One factor 
influencing labor supply and divorce which is of particular interest in this study 
is income. 
Income Effects 
 If both husband and wife experience unanticipated increases in their non-
wage income (Vf and Vm in terms of the notation used in Chapter 3) their 
individual demands for normal goods and services, including leisure si, is 
expected to increase. To the extent that we are in the range of hf where spousal 
labor generates disutility, the wife's higher income, Vf, makes her less interested 
in working, including working as a spouse. Similarly, the husband will be less 
interested in working outside and inside the household. At the same time, 
husband's demand for wife's hf increases as a result of his higher income, Vm, 
and wife's demand for husband's spousal labor increases as well. In terms of 
Figure 10.1 the supplies S shift leftwards to S' and the demands D shift 
rightwards to D'. 
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 If it is assumed that the marriage market component of w* is unaffected, 
such income changes affecting an individual couple will cause a disequilibrium 
for that couple in terms of the amount of spousal labor they supply to each other 
and demand from each other. The right-ward shifts in demand for spousal labor 
and left-ward shifts in supply of spousal labor cause excess demands for spousal 
labor at the unchanged market determined w*'s.  
 These excess demands for spousal labor at the market-established quasi-
wages are grounds for divorce. If costs of divorce are nonexistent, the couple 
will separate. The wife will try to find a new husband who at the market quasi-
wage wants to consume the reduced quantity of spousal labor she supplies, 
whereas the husband will look for a new wife wanting to supply him with 
higher spousal labor, and similarly with respect to husband's spousal labor. In 
other words, if costs of divorce are zero for everybody, markets for spousal 
labor are like spot markets. 
 Assuming husband and wife have the same preference for work compared to 
leisure, and assuming there are no divorce costs, there is no reason to expect a 
change in own non-wage income V to cause more of a proportional reduction in 
the wife's labor supply outside the home than in the husband's labor supply. 
 Given that divorce is costly, the excess demands for spousal labor caused by 
increases in unexpected income can be bridged by either (1) increases in the 
material component of w* to bring it above the market level w 29*f1 or w 30*m1, 
for instance, to the levels w 31*f2 or w 32*m2 in Figure 10.1, or (2) negotiations 
or violent ways to cause reductions in excess demand for spousal labor. 
 Income and Labor Supply. If excess demand for spousal labor is obtained 
through increases in w* we expect an increase in the amount of spousal labor 
supplied, and therefore a parallel decrease in the amount of labor supplied 
(outside of marriage). If there are limits to fluctuations in marriage-specific 
w*'s, and excess demands for spousal labor are reduced through negotiations or 
threats, it is also likely that increases in spousal labor supplied will occur. In 
either case, an increase in income is expected to cause decreases in labor 
supplied outside of marriage.  
 As was hypothesized in Chapter 3 under Hypothesis 5, to the extent that 
there existed an initial division of labor whereby the wife was supplying more 
spousal labor than the husband, if a husband and wife who are married to each 
other experience independent and equal increases in income, the wife's labor 
supply is likely to decrease more than the husband's. 
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 It is now shown that the effect of income on husband's and wife's labor 
supply is likely to be more asymmetric the higher the divorce costs, the higher 
the divorce costs of the wife relative to those of the husband, the more the wife's 
income is affected relative to the husband's income, the fewer the substitutes for 
spousal labor, and the more women are willing to substitute between labor and 
spousal labor. 
 Divorce Costs. Hypothesis 5 is based on the assumption that costs of divorce 
are such that the couple experiencing income increases chooses not to divorce. 
If husband and wife opt for divorce, this reflects a situation of zero or low 
divorce costs, which implies that the income effects on their labor supply are 
likely to be the same. Hypothesis 5 is more likely to hold the higher the costs of 
divorce and the less the couple is likely to divorce. It can also be shown that 
asymmetry in husband's and wife's divorce costs is related to asymmetry in 
income effects on labor supply. To demonstrate that, let us consider two 
extreme cases: that where only the wife finds divorce costly, and that where 
only the husband finds divorce costly. 
 If the wife experiences costs of divorce but the husband does not (for 
instance, because she expects to be taking care of their children after divorce, 
which makes her search for a new partner more difficult than his), the wife will 
be willing to let the husband's w*m go up above its market equilibrium level, but 
the husband may not be willing to let the wife's w*f increase above its market 
equilibrium level. Let us assume flexible w*, and excess demand for husband's 
spousal labor disappears. Consequently, even if the original excess demand for 
spousal labor was the same for husband and wife (at the market level quasi-
wages), after internal adjustments in quasi-wage an excess demand will be left 
in the case of the wife's spousal labor but not in the case of the husband's 
spousal labor. Given her costs of divorce, friendly negotiations or threat of 
violence will then bring the wife to increase her spousal labor supply and 
thereby decrease her labor supply more than the husband will. This effect may 
be reinforced by an income effect, as the wife's quasi-wage for spousal labor 
does not rise, while that of the husband does. The wife's real income 
consequently drops in comparison to the husband's real income. 
 Also, it is possible that the wife would reduce her demand for husband's 
spousal labor, which would also increase the asymmetry between an income 
effect on husband's labor supply and wife's labor supply. 
 If the husband finds divorce costly but the wife does not, the wife will not be 
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willing to let the husband's w*m go up above its market equilibrium level 
whereas the husband will be willing to let the wife's w*f increase above its 
market equilibrium level. Consequently, even if the original excess demand for 
spousal labor was the same for husband and wife (at the market level quasi-
wages), after internal adjustments in quasi-wage an excess demand will be left 
in the case of the husband's spousal labor but not in the case of the wife's 
spousal labor, thereby generating a smaller decrease in the wife's labor supply 
than in the husband's. This will be reinforced by real income effects, as the 
wife's real income increases relative to that of the husband.  
 It follows that Hypothesis 5 is more likely to hold when women's divorce 
costs are high compared to men's divorce costs. Divorce costs are expected to be 
higher for women than for men due to (1) women's tendency to retain custody 
over the children, which reduces the likelihood and speed of remarriage 
(Chiswick and Lehrer 1990), and (2) women's tendency to specialize in home 
production, which implies their skills are less valuable after divorce than those 
of men specializing in the labor market. More generally, the larger women's 
relative costs of divorce, the larger the effect of unanticipated income changes 
on women's labor supply. 
 Hypothesis 5.1 
 The lower the likelihood that women will divorce (e.g. due to women's high 
divorce costs), the more an increase in income is likely to reduce the 
participation of married women in the labor force. 
 It is noteworthy to compare Hypotheses 33 and 5.1. Hypothesis 33 deals 
with the impact of divorce costs on the level of women's labor supply, whereas 
Hypothesis 5.1 deals with the way changes in income cause changes in that 
labor supply. 
 Threat or Violence. If the threat of violence or actual violence is used to 
eliminate any excess demand in spousal labor, and it is more likely to be used 
by men, and given positive costs of divorce, an unexpected change in income is 
more likely to cause an increase in spousal labor supplied by women (or 
decrease in spousal labor demanded by women) than a change in men's demand 
or supply of spousal labor. Consequently, an unexpected change in income is 
more likely to affect women's labor supply than men's. 
 Source of Income Change. In deriving Hypothesis 5 we assumed that 
husband and wife experience equal income changes. It follows from the theory 
of marriage presented above that income effects on husband's labor supply will 
be larger (compared to income effects on wife's labor supply), the larger the 
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increases experienced by the husband in comparison to the increases 
experienced by the wife. Looking at it the other way, Hypothesis 5 is more 
likely to hold when women's income increases more than men's.  
 Substitutes for Spousal Labor. This is a factor that Mincer used in order to 
explain what is being predicted in Hypothesis 5. In terms of this theory, the 
poorer the substitutes for spousal labor, the more additional income will be 
translated into increased demand for spousal labor, the larger the excess 
demands for spousal labor, and the more labor supply is likely to decrease as a 
result of an income transfer.9 In other words, 
 Hypothesis 5.2 
 The poorer the substitutes for spousal labor, the more an income effect on 
labor supply is likely to be negative. 
  If wives' spousal labor is harder to replace than husband's, it follows that 
income increases may generate larger excess demands for women's spousal 
labor than for men's, and therefore Hypothesis 5 holds. It follows that 
Hypothesis 5 is less likely to hold in situations where good substitutes for 
spousal labor are easily available or cheap. Note that even if husbands can very 
easily find substitutes for their wives' time, no gender asymmetry is expected if 
divorce is costless. It is only if divorce is costly that the husband's ability to find 
substitutes for his wife's time is likely to affect the wife's labor supply, and 
similarly for husband's labor supply. 
 Substitutability Between Labor and Spousal Labor. A person's ability to 
substitute one job for another--spousal labor for labor--determines the extent to 
which an unexpected income increase is likely to reduce labor supply. The 
elasticity of supply of spousal labor reflects inter alia substitutability between 
the two kinds of labor. The larger the resemblance between tasks involved in 
spousal labor and outside labor, the more elastic the supply of each kind of 
labor. Furthermore, income changes are more likely to cause shifts in the 
supply of spousal labor that has low substitution with other forms of labor than 
of spousal labor that is easily substitutable.10 For example, a nurse is likely to 
find her spousal labor relatively more similar to her work outside the home 
than a computer analyst, and her supply of labor will be more elastic. The more 
elastic S, the more marriages are likely to survive unexpected changes in 
income.  
 Even though occupational segregation by gender has decreased in recent 
years, it remains true that women work in jobs which resemble household work 
more often than men do. Therefore, wife's labor supply is likely to drop more 
than husband's when each experiences an increase in income. This can be seen, 
for instance, by considering the extreme case of a wife with a perfectly elastic 
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supply of hf replacing the supply in panel b of Figure 10.1. When the husband's 
income rises and he demands more of her spousal labor, she can accommodate 
this change costlessly. A trade-off between reduction in labor supplied and 
divorce will not even be at issue. Furthermore, an increase in income is not 
likely to cause as large a left-ward shift in spousal labor supply if the two forms 
of labor are highly substitutable than if the two forms of labor are very 
different, especially if the psychic benefits of spousal labor are less income 
elastic than the psychic benefits of a career outside the home.  
 The higher women's elasticity of substitution between labor and spousal 
labor in comparison to men's, and the less women's spousal labor supply is 
inelastic in comparison to that of men, the more Hypothesis 5 is likely to hold.  
 Income and Divorce. There is an incentive for divorce when an individual 
couple experiences excess demand or supply of male or female spousal labor at 
the relevant w* levels. When husband's and wife's income increase 
independently, a gap is created between spousal labor supplied and spousal 
labor demanded, which in turn generates an incentive for divorce and 
remarriage. Divorce is expected to occur when the benefits of individual 
recontracting into marriages with no excess demand or supply of spousal labor 
exceed the costs of divorce (including direct and opportunity costs of search for 
a new partner). The analysis presented above also leads to predictions 
regarding income effects on divorce.  
   As stated in Hypothesis 9' in Chapter 4, unexpected changes in income 
lead to divorce. If divorce were costless, any such excess demand for spousal 
labor would cause divorce. Given that divorce is costly, the likelihood of 
divorce is a function of both the costs and the benefits of divorce.  
 Costs and Benefits of Divorce. Hypothesis 9' is more likely to hold if 
divorce costs are lower. To the extent that friendly negotiations are happening, 
it does not matter who owns the divorce costs, as has been explained in Becker 
(1981). If threat of violence is used, then the distribution of divorce costs 
matters. The threat of violence is only capable of discouraging divorce if the 
abused partner has costs of divorce.  Hypothesis 9' is also more likely to 
hold when the benefits from divorce are higher. In turn, these benefits depend 
on (1) the amount by which both husband's and wife's demand for spousal labor 
exceeds the quantity supplied at the market quasi-wages (i.e. the size of the 
initial excess demands for spousal labor), (2) the degree to which such excess 
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demands are eliminated through adjustments in match-specific quasi-wage, and 
(3) the degree to which such excess demands are eliminated through 
negotiations or threats of violence.  
 Income Elasticity of Demand for Spousal Labor. Unexpected changes in 
income are more likely to cause divorce if the demands for spousal labor are 
more income-elastic. This follows from the fact that the more income-elastic 
such demands, the more one expects a gap between quantity demanded and 
supplied at the equilibrium quasi-wages. The larger such a gap, the larger the 
possible benefits from divorce and recontracting with a new spouse. 
 Income Elasticity of Supply of Spousal Labor. Hypothesis 9' is more likely 
to hold if the supply of spousal labor responds more to income changes. In such 
case, there will be more of a decrease in spousal labor supplied, and therefore 
more of an excess demand and more likelihood that this excess demand cannot 
be bridged.  
 Rigidity in Quasi-Wage. Hypothesis 9' is more likely to hold if increases in 
marriage-specific quasi-wage are limited by institutional, technical, or legal 
constraints. If quasi-wages cannot be changed much, divorce is more likely to 
result from excess demands for spousal labor. This rigidity is more of a problem 
if supply of spousal labor is inelastic and use of threats is unavailable, and 
increases in demand for spousal labor thereby cause large increases in w*.  
 Implications for Recent Trends in Divorce. This analysis suggests a 
number of new explanations for recent trends in divorce. It is possible that 
changes in the occupational characteristics of working women, following the 
dramatic increase in women's labor force participation in the U.S. since 1965, 
combined with decreased use of violence by husbands against wives, have 
caused increases in divorce. To the extent that married women have entered an 
increasing number of careers involving tasks that are very different from the 
tasks typically performed in spousal labor, their supply of spousal labor has 
become more inelastic. In contrast, in the past a vast majority of married 
women were employed in occupations such as nursing or teaching, which 
resemble aspects of spousal labor, and are therefore likely to be associated with 
an elastic supply of spousal labor. For many women today, possible switches 
between spousal labor and labor have therefore become more costly in terms of 
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career opportunities and satisfaction, than was the case for women in the past. 
What probably has not changed, are the pressures for women to make such 
adjustments following income fluctuations or other fluctuations over the course 
of married life. 
 It follows from this analysis, that as women's supply of spousal labor has 
become less elastic, a given increase in demand for wife's spousal labor due to 
increased male income is therefore likely to cause a large increase in w* for a 
marriage to continue. If there are rigidities in w* and the use of violence is 
limited, larger changes in quasi-wage resulting from given fluctuations in 
income are more likely to cause a divorce than was the case when women's 
supply of spousal labor was more elastic. In the past, high elasticity of 
substitution between the two forms of labor may have implied less of a need for 
adjustment in quasi-wage for the marriage to continue to function, and divorce 
may have been less likely to follow a given exogeneous change experienced by 
a given married couple. Another point following from this analysis, which is of 
a more trivial nature, is that the use of violence within marriage and divorce 
are alternative ways to coping with the effects of fluctuations in income or other 
changes faced by a married couple. 
 Wage is another factor which is likely to affect labor supply and divorce 
simultaneously. 
Wage Effects 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, an individual uncompensated wage (w) increase 
includes (1) an income effect leading people to work less in general, and 
generally also less outside the home, and (2) a positive compensated wage 
effect leading to substitution of outside labor for spousal labor and time for self. 
These two effects can therefore cancel each other. 
 Furthermore, if both partners in a marriage get higher wages, the income 
effects are as discussed above. Substitution effects exacerbate the problem of a 
decrease in the supply of spousal labor, causing a further gap between spousal 
labor demanded and supplied at the equilibrium w*. It follows from the theory 
that both these effects will have a stronger discouraging influence on the labor 
supply of wives than of husbands, if couples stay married.  
 A wage effect on divorce also includes a positive income effect encouraging 
divorce, and a positive compensated wage effect leading to a decrease in the 
supply of spousal labor. In turn, this may lead to divorce.  
 Next we examine a determinant of labor supply and divorce that has not 
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previously been considered in the literature, and carries potentially important 
policy implications.  
Number of People Affected by a Change 
 An additional determinant of the effect of unanticipated income changes on 
labor supply and divorce is the proportion of people in a given society who 
experience such income change. In the discussion above w*, the compensation 
established in the market for spousal labor, was assumed to remain unchanged. 
This is likely to be the case if most individuals participating in a given market 
for spousal labor have demands and supplies that are unaffected by an income 
change.  
 However, the market equilibrium quasi-wage may increase if a considerable 
proportion of the men and women interacting in the same markets for spousal 
labor receive extra income. This is likely to reduce the need for readjustment 
through divorce or changes in labor supply. It follows that 
 
 Hypothesis 5.3 
 A change in income will have a stronger effect on the supply of labor when 
fewer people in a marriage market are experiencing a similar change, and 
 Hypothesis 9'.1 
 A change in income will have a stronger effect on divorce when fewer 
people in a marriage market are experiencing a similar change. 
 This can be illustrated with the help of Figure 10.1. The two markets for 
spousal labor originally have aggregate supplies S and aggregate demands D. 
The equilibrium compensations are then w 33*f1 and w 34*m1. If a substantial 
amount of participants in these markets get unanticipated increases in income, 
and the market demands increase to D' and the market supplies decrease to S', 
the market compensation will increase, possibly to w 35*f2 and w 36*m2. If the 
same graph also represents an individual couple experiencing unanticipated 
income effects and therefore shifts in D and S similar to the shifts occurring in 
the markets, at the new equilibrium w 37*f2 and w 38*m2 this couple will have 
no reason to divorce. In other words, Hypothesis 9' is not likely to hold if all 
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participants in the same marriage markets are experiencing the same income 
changes, and reacting similarly to such changes.   
 If the new equilibrium corresponds to the same level of hf, there will be no 
reason for men and women to adjust their labor supply differently, and 
therefore Hypothesis 5 is not likely to hold. Had this couple been the only one 
to experience unanticipated changes, they would have experienced an excess 
demand for spousal labor, and divorce and adjustment in labor supply may have 
occurred. When many people experience unanticipated increases in income, 
fewer changes will occur in both labor supply and divorce, even in the case 
where divorce costs exist (although aggregation becomes more complicated). 
 Likewise, the effect of any change in individual characteristics affecting 
marriage and labor supply will depend on the extent to which this change is 
limited in scope. The more widespread the change, and the more others 
surrounding the individual react similarly to that individual, the more marriage 
market conditions are likely to move in unison with individual changes, and the 
less one expects changes in individual marriage and labor supply. 
 We are now ready to analyze the effects of a NIT program on labor supply 
and divorce. 
The Effect of a NIT Program 
 The entire discussion so far is relevant to the analysis of the effects of a 
Negative Income Tax program on labor supply and divorce. A Negative Income 
Tax program that transfers income as a function of earnings includes both a 
positive income effect and a negative compensated wage effect. (See Keeley et 
al. 1978, and Keeley 1981.) 
 Participation in NIT was generally unanticipated at the time of marriage, 
and the income effect involved with NIT is therefore expected to have a positive 
impact on divorce. This impact depends on the excess demands for spousal 
labor, rigidity in w*, costs of divorce, etc., as discussed above. For the same 
reason, we also expect a decrease in labor supply, especially in the case of 
wives. 
 The increase in spousal labor resulting from the negative wage effect will 
help the couple in bridging the gap between demanded and supplied spousal 
labor that originated from the income transfer to both wife and husband. 
Following the discussion above, to the extent that the positive income effect 
dominates the negative compensated wage effect, it is predicted that both 
married women and married men will work less after they become eligible for 
NIT, but that married women's labor supply will respond more to eligibility to 
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treatment than married men's labor supply.  
 Furthermore, it follows from this analysis that the larger the percentage of 
NIT beneficiaries in a marriage market, the fewer the expected divorces and the 
less gender asymmetry will be found in NIT's effect on labor supply.  This 
follows from the fact that market determined w*s will rise if a NIT program 
affects a large fraction of the people who would possibly marry each other. 
 As this book goes to press, new research has appeared regarding the 
effective of NIT experiments on divorce (e.g., Cain and Wissoker 1990).  The 
debate regarding the use of experimental approaches vs. non-experimental 
econometric techniques is still unresolved.  The analysis presented here does 
not invalidate the use of experimental data.  It points out to a "small scale bias" 
which needs to be corrected if one wants to generalize conclusions based on a 
small sample of experimental participants. 
 To the extent that marriage markets (markets for spousal labor) are 
segregated by ethnicity or race,11 it follows that when a larger proportion of an 
ethnic group in a particular city participates in a NIT experiment, the smaller 
the expected effect on divorce and the less the expected gender asymmetry in 
labor effects.  
 This could explain why NIT experiments have caused more divorce (e.g., 
Groeneveld, Tuma, and Hannan 1980, Keeley 1987) and discouraged female 
labor supply more (e.g., Rees 1974, Stephenson and McDonald 1979) among 
white participants in an experiment (who typically constitute a minute fraction 
of the white population in a city) than among blacks or Chicanos. The NIT 
experiments in Denver and Seattle were specifically designed to cover primarily 
black areas of Seattle and primarily Chicano areas of Denver. Black and 
Chicano experimental subjects constituted a larger fraction of their respective 
marriage markets than did white experimental subjects in the same cities. Even 
though only a fraction of Denver's Chicanos and of Seattle's blacks participated 
in the experiments, the proportion of blacks and Chicanos participating in the 
experiments could have been sufficiently higher to cause increases in 
equilibrium quasi-wages for spousal labor of a magnitude that would 
discourage both divorce and dramatic changes in labor supply, especially in 
women's labor supply. 
 Interestingly, Keeley (1987) found that for Chicanos NIT treatment only 
had a positive effect on divorce if they were above the breakeven level. It is 
possible that higher income Chicanos intermarry with the non-Chicano 
population (mostly of Denver) to a greater extent than lower income Chicanos, 
and therefore only Chicanos with lower income experienced an increase in 
market w* as a result of the NIT experiment. This would decrease the benefits 
of divorce and recontracting for lower income Chicanos but not for higher 
income Chicanos. 
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 It also follows from the analysis that the divorce response is closely related 
to the labor supply response to income changes such as the advent of NIT. It is 
therefore necessary to estimate labor supply and divorce simultaneously, as is 
done in the empirical work reported below. 
 Empirical Analysis 
 The joint estimation of income effects on labor supply and divorce was 
performed with data from the Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiment 
performed in Denver and Seattle during the period 1970-1978.   
Sample 
 Eleven different experimental programs were tested in the Seattle and 
Denver Income Maintenance Experiments. The programs differed in support 
levels, tax systems, and duration (3, 5, or 20 years).  Support levels ranged 
from $3,800 to $5,600 in 1971 prices and tax rates ranged from .50 to .80.  In 
all programs, the support level varied positively with family size.  About 60 
percent of the sample families were enrolled in one of the 11 NIT programs and 
the remainder served as controls.  When a divorce occurs, both of the former 
spouses are eligible for the NIT plan to which they were originally assigned, 
but the new support level depends on who gets custody of the children. 
 A complex criterion for sample selection was imposed. First, husbands and 
wives with pre-enrollment normalized income greater than $11,000 were 
excluded. The reason for this exclusion is that the Seattle and Denver 
experiments assigned all families with normal income greater than these 
bounds into the control group and, therefore, these families cannot be suitably 
compared with families on financial treatment. Second, we excluded families 
that had pre-enrollment incomes below the breakeven level but greater than 1.3 
times the grant breakeven level.12 Third, families who were assigned to the 20-
year program were also excluded because of the extremely nonrandom 
procedure used to assign these families to treatment (see Robins and Stieger 
1980).  Finally, we deleted individuals for whom data are missing for more 
than 90 days in any half-year in their employment history or in the pre-
experimental years.
13
  More on these experiments and procedures can be found 
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e.g., in Keeley 1981. 
Methodology 
 Two models of the effect of NIT on labor supply are estimated.  The first looks 
simultaneously at labor supply and divorce, whereas the second only looks at 
labor supply. 
 The simultaneous model consists of equations 10.1 and 10.2. 
 
 and 
where 
 pd = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the person divorces. 
 Xp = a vector of pre-experimentally determined           
control variables.  (See Appendix 10.B)  
   Zp = a vector of pre-experimental variables including all variables in Xp and 
in addition variables measuring eligibility to NIT. Eligibility variables 
are parameterizations of the changes in the pre-NIT budget constraints 
caused by the particular NIT program to which the family was 
assigned.  Eligibility variables are described in Appendix 10.C. 
 l  = hours of work (outside the household) in the second experimental year. 
 T  = an eligibility dummy 
  
 Both sets of explanatory variables include all possible indirect measures of 
divorce costs available. Equation 10.1 enables us to predict the probability that 
a person divorces as a result of NIT eligibility.  Equation 10.2 predicts hours of 
work as a function of background variables Xp, exposure to NIT (T), and 
estimated probability of divorce.  
 The probability of divorce is in part a negative function of divorce costs. As 
was seen above, the higher the costs of divorce, the larger the expected 
difference between the wife's reduction in labor supply as a result of T and the 
reduction in husband's labor supply. It is therefore predicted that expected 
probability of divorce will have a stronger positive effect on wife's labor supply 
than on husband's. 
 bZ = p zpd  (10.1) 
 a)Tp-(1 + aTp + ap + bX = l 3d2d1dlp  (10.2) 
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 The effect of eligibility to NIT on labor supply is given by the difference in 
hours with eligibility, denoted as l (T=1) and hours in the absence of eligibility, 
denoted as l (T=0).  This difference is given by: 
 Thus, a1 provides an estimate of the indirect effect of eligibility through its 
effect on marital status, a2 represents the average response of persons who are 
expected to divorce after becoming eligible and a3 is an estimate of average 
response of persons who are expected to remain married after becoming 
eligible. 
 Parameters a2 and a3 are predicted to differ in magnitude and perhaps even 
in direction in the case of women, but not necessarily in the case of men. If 
divorce is predicted to occur, women will probably not shift their supply of 
spousal labor to the right at the expense of l, labor outside the household, and 
a2 could even be positive. In contrast, if divorce is not predicted to occur, 
married women are likely to reduce their labor supply substantially, i.e., a3 is 
predicted to be strongly negative. The higher the costs of divorce and the lower 
the probability of divorce, the larger the discouraging effect of NIT on married 
women's labor supply. 
 The structural model consisting of equations 10.1 and 10.2 is estimated 
using two-stage-least squares (2SLS). This model will be compared to a simple 
non-structural model which has been discussed extensively in Keeley and Wai 
(1980), and Robins, West, and Stieger (1980)14. The simple model can be 
described as  
where c1 is likely to lie between a2 and a3.  This results from the fact that 
married women are predicted to differ in their labor supply response to NIT 
experiments not only depending on whether they actually got divorced during 
the experiment, but also depending on divorce costs and likelihood of getting 
divorced. The negative income effect of a NIT experiment on female labor 
supply will be stronger if women are predicted to stay married (e.g., because of 
high costs of divorce) than if they are observed to be married without 
knowledge about their chances of divorce (a3>c1), and weaker for women 
predicted to get divorced than for women observed as married (a2<c1). If 
information on divorce costs were available, predicted divorce probabilities 
would not be as necessary to obtain good predictions of NIT's effect on labor 
supply. 
 
]1)=(T p - 1[a +                     
1)=(T pa +] 0)=(T p - 1)=(T p[ a = 0)=(T l - 1)=(T l
d3
d2dd1
(10.3) 
 cT + cX = l 1pp  (10.4) 
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 Estimates from that non-structural model applied to the complete sample 
are reduced-form estimates of labor supply response, conditional on initial 
marital status. The non-structural model was also applied to separate samples 
of husbands and wives who do not change marital status during the first two 
years, and husbands and wives who change marital status, i.e., they divorce. 
Because of possible selectivity bias, the average response of those with 
unchanged marital status cannot be interpreted as the response conditional on 
unchanged marital status and there is a similar problem with the results for 
those who change marital status. 
Variables 
 The dependent variable measuring labor supply is annual hours of work 
during the second year of the experiment with zeros for nonworkers. The 
dependent variable measuring marital status is a dichotomous variable that 
takes on the value of one if the person divorced at any time during the first two 
years of the experiment. Labor supply is measured during the second year 
because it is believed that (at least for persons on the 3-year program) 
adjustment to either the start-out or end of the experiment will be at a 
minimum. In addition, most previous estimates of labor supply response have 
used the second year (see Keeley et al. 1978, Robins and West 1980, and 
Robins, West and Stieger 1979). Since labor supply is measured during the 
second year, marital status change is measured as a change occurring any time 
during the first two years. (Persons with changed marital status have been in 
their new marital status for varying periods of time.) 
 The independent variables that were used are described in Appendix Tables 
10.B and 10.C. Mean hours of work for various samples of husbands and wives 
are found in Table 10.1. 
Results 
 Table 10.1 presents results from the simple model which does not take 
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simultaneity into account.  These results confirm our prediction (Hypothesis 5) 
that among couples who remain married, eligibility for treatment results in a 
larger (negative) labor supply response on the part of wives than on the part of 
husbands (a reduction of 172 hours versus a reduction of 144 hours). Similarly, 
using different sample and variable specifications Robins and West (1980) 
found that participation in the experiment reduced hours worked by husbands 
by 129 hours, and by wives by 166 hours. Also consistent with these results is 
the finding reported by Robins, Tuma and Yaeger (1980) that wives eligible for 
treatment in this NIT experiment showed a decrease in the rate of entering 
employment of 30 percent, while such decrease was only 10 percent among 
husbands. 
 These results are consistent with results from other NIT experiments. Labor 
market hours decreased by 30.6 percent for white wives enrolled in the New 
Jersey-Pennsylvania Income Maintenance experiments, whereas the 
corresponding decrease for white husbands was 5.6 percent (Rees, 1974). 
 Another result is that NIT treatment reduces the hours of work of women 
who stay married substantially more than the hours of work of women who 
divorce. Table 10.1 also indicates a substantially larger response for husbands 
who divorce after the start of the experiment (a significant difference according 
to an F-test).  However, all these results should be regarded with skepticism 
because of possible selectivity bias. In order to obtain unbiased estimates of 
response as a function of marital status change, we now turn to the 
simultaneous model specified above. 
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 In Table 10.2 presents estimates of the simultaneous model, which includes 
predicted divorce as one of the explanatory variables. Here the difference 
between the labor supply response of men and women who remained married is 
much larger than was apparent from the reduced-form estimates (170 hours for 
husbands versus 279 hours for wives). The contrast between women predicted 
to stay married and predicted to divorce during the first 2 years of the 
experiment is also much larger than that between women actually staying 
married and divorcing according to Table 10.1. Married women eligible for 
treatment who divorced during the experiment appear to have increased their 
labor supply rather than having reduced it, and the difference in response 
between women who stay married and women who divorced (a3 - a2) is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Women predicted to stay married worked 766 
hours less as a result of the experiment than women predicted to divorce. This 
confirms Hypothesis 5.1. In contrast, the simultaneous model indicates no 
significant differences in labor supply response between men who are predicted 
to divorce and those who are predicted to remain married. (a3 - a2 = -180 
hours). The difference between a reduction of 180 hours for men and a 
reduction of 766 hours for women is large, and to the extent that it is 
statistically significant, this possibly supports Hypothesis 5.2. 
 The results in Table 10.2 also suggest that the effect of divorce per se 
(coefficient a1 in equation 10.3) is to increase hours of work for both husbands 
and wives. The effects, however, are relatively small and statistically 
insignificant. 
 It was thus found that the labor supply response of women depends on 
whether they are predicted to stay married or not, but that predicted divorce 
does not affect the labor supply response of men. That finding confirms the 
theoretical analysis presented here. To the extent that predicted divorce is 
related to divorce costs, it was hypothesized that with higher divorce costs (i.e. 
lower predicted divorce) there would be more of a difference in husbands' and 
wives' labor supply response to a change in income. It was found that if divorce 
is predicted (e.g., because divorce costs are low) men and women respond in 
similar ways to NIT. If it is predicted that divorce does not occur (e.g., because 
of high divorce costs) men and women are found to respond very differently to 
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NIT, namely women expected to remain married reduce their labor supply 
much more than men expected to remain married. 
 From the differences in results between the reduced-form and simultaneous 
models it appears that selectivity bias may be an important factor affecting the 
estimates reported in Table 10.1. This selectivity bias may very well originate 
from the absence of adequate information on divorce costs, which affects both 
divorce probability and labor supply. Two of the factors one would expect to be 
positively related to divorce costs, the number of children aged 4 or less and the 
number of family members, were included as independent variables in both the 
labor supply and the divorce equation. There are, however, many more 
correlates of divorce costs which were not controlled for. 
 Other Evidence 
 The theory presented here can also be applied to other joint estimations of 
labor supply and divorce. Since the empirical work discussed above was 
performed, other studies have also analyzed labor supply and predicted divorce. 
Greene and Quester (1982) and Johnson and Skinner (1986), also found that 
generally married women's labor supply increases when a divorce is 
anticipated, evidence for Hypothesis 33. 
 Greene and Quester (1982) and Johnson and Skinner (1986) also found that 
predicted divorce had more of an impact on the labor supply of white women 
than on that of black women. They offer no satisfactory explanations for such 
finding, which can be interpreted as evidence for Hypothesis 33.2. Black 
married women may expect less of a drop in income from spousal labor as a 
result of divorce than white women, and are therefore less likely to change their 
labor supply when expecting a divorce.  
 Johnson and Skinner (1986) also found that the interaction of husband's 
income and predicted divorce and of husband's education and predicted divorce 
had a negative sign in regression of wives' labor supply. This offers support for 
Hypothesis 33.1, according to which women married to higher income 
husbands are more likely to receive some income from their spouse after a 
divorce, and are therefore less likely to go to work prior to a divorce. The same 
explanation holds for the interaction of husband's education and predicted 
divorce. 
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 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
  This theory of divorce and labor supply is an attempt at joint modelling of 
these two important aspects of behavior. The theoretical part of the paper 
explains some of the reasons why a joint theoretical analysis is important, and 
why estimates from a simultaneous model of labor supply and divorce would 
differ from reduced form estimates of either labor supply or divorce. Some 
hypotheses were derived, mostly regarding income and wage effects, the topic 
of the empirical analysis.  
 This chapter adds to Mincer's theory of why women's labor supply responds 
more to income changes than men's. It was shown that the difference in the 
way married men and women's labor supply respond to income changes 
depends on the chances that a divorce will occur, possibly a function of divorce 
costs. Furthermore the theory presented here can help explain results from 
other simultaneous estimations of labor supply and divorce that have been 
published after most of this chapter was written. The theory presented here thus 
provides a framework that can potentially be more useful than what was shown 
in this paper.    
  Our simultaneous estimation of the effect of eligibility to a Negative 
Income Tax experiment on wives' and husbands' labor supply and on divorce 
has shown that single equation models of labor supply taking marital status as 
given generate a selectivity bias. The existence of such bias is consistent with 
our theory of individual allocation of time from which both labor supply and 
divorce decisions are derived simultaneously. Some of the hypotheses derived 
in the theoretical section were confirmed. 
 We found that income transfers reduced wives' labor supply more than 
husbands', which is consistent with our theory. Although other theories have 
led to the same insight, the advantage of this theory is that the same theory also 
explains why some families divorced and others did not, and that it points out 
to variables such as divorce costs which intervene in the effect of income 
transfers (or other factors) on labor supply. 
  This chapter also carries policy implications. The results reported here 
confirm those of previous studies of Negative Income Tax experiments. As in 
other studies, NIT was found to have a significantly negative effect on labor 
supply of both husbands and wives, much more so for wives than for husbands. 
It was also confirmed that NIT has a positive impact on divorce probability.  
 To a large extent, talks of replacing the welfare system with NIT have 
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stopped as a result of these strong effects on labor supply and divorce. The 
theory presented here suggests that maybe NIT has been shelved away too soon. 
According to this, one reason why NIT levels and tax rates were found to have 
such strong impact at an experimental level is that relatively few people 
participated in these experiments. The theory suggests that under most 
assumptions, the more people are experiencing unexpected changes, the less an 
individual is likely to be affected by such change. This implies that had NIT 
moved out of its experimental stage and become policy, many of the 
undesirable effects on labor supply and divorce would not have occurred. 
 This insight holds for any unexpected change, and not for only NITs. This 
chapter is also relevant to the huge literature on the effects of welfare benefits 
such as AFDC. 
 There is clearly much room for further work in this area. The theory could 
be derived in a more systematic way and made to include more relevant 
variables. It would also be desirable to generalize the theoretical framework by 
developing dynamic models. Likewise, there is plenty of room to improve on 
the empirical work by using better and more recent data sets and better 
methods.  
 Labor supply, divorce and income transfer programs are all areas of great 
policy relevance, and therefore a theory which improves on the state of the arts 
in the analysis of these issues can be very valuable. 
  Notes 
 1.  Most of this chapter was written before models such as Johnson and Skinner 
(1986). The empirical estimations by Michael Keeley presented here were performed 
prior to 1980. 
 2.  In the Gary experiment no such rise in divorce was observed, but then people 
opting for divorce and not receiving custody of their children disqualified from the 
experiment, whereas this was not the case in Denver or Seattle (Wolf 1979). 
 3.  Both the costs of search and the benefits from searching for an appropriate 
mate are likely to be high in comparison to search for other services or forms of 
employment.  The costs of search are also a function of the complexity of the vector of 
personal characteristics relevant to the choice of a mate.  Marriage-specific capital and 
costs of search are also found in Becker's theory of divorce (see Becker 1973, and 
Becker, Landes and Michael 1977).  The latter article emphasizes children as 
particularly specific to a marriage, which is consistent with viewing children as a 
couple's collective good (see Weiss and Willis 1985).  The term "match-specific" capital 
has been used with respect to worker-employer relations, e.g., by Rosen (1985).  The 
terms "match-specific" and "marriage-specific" have all been inspired by the concept of 
job skills specific to a firm developed by Becker (1964). These terms have been used 
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independently in an analysis of divorce by Lehrer (1992). 
 4.  The existence of divorce costs also causes aggregation problems.  Part of 
spousal labor now becomes non-homogeneous, and not fully substitutable.  This implies 
that market equilibria in h
f
 are most influenced by the demands and supplies obtained 
assuming no divorce costs, which applies first of all to the population of marriage 
eligibles who are not currently married.  Aggregate demand and supply will also include 
that part of the demand and supply of married people which is not match-specific.  It 
still remains true that numbers of men and women (the sex ratio) will affect labor 
supply. 
 5.  If a husband finding divorce costly is married to a wife with no divorce costs, 
and we focus on women's spousal labor, the situation can be compared to that of a firm 
who has invested in a worker's firm-specific human capital, without similar investments 
on the worker's part. She may have been paid a higher w* than that available in the 
market for women's spousal labor. The husband gets more utility from his present wife's 
spousal labor than he would from potential substitutes. The husband is consequently 
willing to subsidize his current wife's spousal labor. He will be willing to pay her 
according to the compensation for her spousal labor established by the market plus the 
costs of divorce he saves by staying married. 
 6.  If the wife finds divorce costly, but the husband does not, she may have been 
supplying her spousal labor at a w* lower than the market quasi-wage (prior to the 
unexpected income change). This is like a situation where the worker has acquired firm-
specific capital valued by the worker but not by the firm. This implies that the wife is 
willing to subsidize her own work to her husband. She may have agreed to have her 
compensation for spousal labor lowered, possibly by the entire amount of her divorce 
costs.  
 7.  When both spouses find divorce costly, the difference between market 
equilibrium quasi-wages and actual quasi-wages for spousal labor can be either positive 
or negative. The maximum value of the difference between the two quasi-wages is the 
amount of divorce costs faced by the husband. Its minimum value is minus the amount 
of divorce costs faced by the wife. In comparison to Becker's (1974a, 1981) theory of 
marriage and divorce, the gain from marriage is separated into a producer surplus 
enjoyed by the spouse working in the household and a consumer surplus enjoyed by the 
employer of such spousal labor. Some of those surpluses are general in the sense that 
they could be enjoyed with another spouse, and some are specific in the sense that they 
can only be enjoyed with the current spouse. One of the major insights contributed by 
Becker's theory of marriage and divorce is that if marriage partners can bargain it is the 
total gain from marriage which matters, and not its initial distribution among the 
spouses.  The present analysis leads to the same conclusion as that version of Becker's 
theory which takes account of opportunities for remarriage. It is the sum of the marriage 
- specific consumer and producer surpluses that the decision to divorce, since the spouse 
experiencing fewer or no divorce costs can be "bribed" into staying married. 
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 8.  The distinction between husband's income and wife's income also plays an 
important role in the bargaining theory of marriage developed by Manser and Brown 
(1980). 
 9.  Substitutes for spousal labor are generally imperfect, as is indicated in the 
assumption of a downward sloping demand for such labor.   
 10. This may help explain why it is customary at many workplaces to have women 
do tasks such as serving coffee, which are similar to tasks most women perform as 
spousal labor. It may be easier for women to perform such tasks on the job than for men, 
given past experience in the home. It may also be in the best interest of men as a group 
to encourage such customs in order to make women's supply of spousal labor more 
elastic.  
 11. Intermarriage among the various racial-ethnic groups is generally low in the 
United States. In 1975, for example, only about 2.4 percent of black women had a 
partner of a different race, almost always white (Spanier and Glick 1980). 
 12. Grant breakeven level is the level of income at which NIT grant becomes zero. 
Families in this earning region were erroneously given an experimental tax rate that 
may have exceeded 100 percent. 
 13. Attrition is by far the most important factor causing a reduction in sample 
size. However, during the first two years, the period during which response is measured, 
sample size was reduced by only 15 percent for husbands and 12 percent for wives, due 
to attrition. 
 14. Using OLS to estimate the probability equation does result in heteroscedastic 
errors and a loss in efficiency. Practically the use of probit or logit instead of OLS made 
very little difference in other divorce equations we ran.  For reasons of costs and 
convenience we used OLS and included the squares of many of the variables in Zp in 
order to minimize possible specification bias. See also Olsen (1980) for a comparison of 
linear and nonlinear estimation procedures. 
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 Appendix 10.A   
 How a NIT Functions 
 
 Figure 10.2 shows how an experimental NIT program functions. Gross income 
appears on the horizontal axis and disposable income (i.e., income after taxes and with 
transfer payments) appears on the vertical axis. If gross income is zero, the NIT grant is 
equal to the support level. Without the NIT, a family with gross income A' would have 
disposable income A after paying positive income taxes; with the NIT payments, the 
family would have disposable income A''. The NIT payment has two components: a grant 
and a reimbursement of positive income taxes. At gross income level G', the NIT grant 
has declined to zero, but the family still benefits from the program by receiving 
reimbursement for its positive income taxes. Positive income taxes are reimbursed 
under the NIT program to eliminate taxes other than those imposed by the NIT. 
Between the gross income levels G' and B', the family still benefits from the NIT 
program by receiving partial reimbursement of its positive income taxes. Families with 
incomes above the tax breakeven level, B', do not receive any benefits from the NIT 
program. (For further details on the functioning of NIT programs, see Keeley et el. 
1978.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 10.2. A Negative Income Tax program with positive tax  
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 TABLE 10.3 Variables in the Control Set Xp 
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 TABLE 10.4 Variables in the Control Set 
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 11 
                                                         A Theory 
of Polygamy 
 This chapter could more accurately be called a theory of "polygyny," which 
is Greek for "marriage to many wives." It presents an analysis of polygamy 
which is "economic" in that it considers marriage as a situation of constrained 
choice. In contrast, most anthropological studies of polygyny have used 
"economic" in a more restricted sense. Murdock (1949), who stresses the "basic 
importance of economic factors" in explaining the incidence of polygyny in a 
society, includes in his concept of "economic" labor in agriculture, trades, and 
crafts, preparation of food, and political and religious functions.  While 
Murdock excludes certain domestic activities, Boserup (1974) leaves them all 
out. It is the same restricted concept of "economic" that Goody (1974) has in 
mind when he criticizes Boserup, maintaining that the "reasons behind 
polygyny are sexual and reproductive rather than economic and productive."  
"Economic" as I have defined it invalidates Goody's dichotomy: the economic 
analysis of polygyny treats both its productive and its reproductive aspects. 
 This chapter explains the theoretical propositions regarding polygamy that 
were mentioned in Chapter 4. First, hypotheses are developed at the micro- 
level, with the purpose of explaining who lives in a polygamous household 
within a polygamous society. Second, hypotheses are developed at the macro-
level. The effects of legalizing polygamy are shown, and hypotheses are deri- 
    
                                    
 
 Adapted from "An Economic Analysis of Polygyny: The Case of Maiduguri," 
Current Anthropology 17: 701-707, December, 1976; and "The Economics of 
Polygamy," in Research in Population Economics, Vol. 2, ed. by J. DaVanzo and J. 
Simon, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1980, p. 321-350; and my Ph.D. dissertation. I thank 
T.W. Schultz for giving me the idea for this study, and for his advice. The help of my 
thesis chairman, Gary S. Becker, was very appreciated. The data I owe to the kindness 
of Jean Steckle, Linda Ewanyk, and Ronald Cohen.  The latter, as well as Julie 
DaVanzo, Jack Hirshleifer, Edward Lazear, and others at the University of Chicago and 
the Rand Corporation also contributed helpful advice. 
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ved regarding the likelihood that a society legalizes polygamy. Both types of 
hypotheses are tested. The testable hypotheses which relate male and female 
characteristics to the incidence of polygamy within a polygamous society were 
tested using data collected in the Nigerian city of Maiduguri. The hypotheses 
regarding the likelihood that a society allows polygamy were evaluated based 
on cross-cultural evidence. 
 Theory 
 This theoretical section addresses two questions. First, within the context of 
a polygamous society, who are the individuals more likely to live in a 
polygamous household? Second, which societies are more likely to prohibit 
polygamy? Based on the theoretical framework of Part Two, I derive a number 
of hypotheses regarding these two questions. As the other type of polygamy--
polyandry, multiple husbands--is almost non-existent, the discussion alternates 
between the use of polygamy and polygyny (multiple wives). 
Who Lives in a Polygamous Household? 
 The theory presented in Part Two had been applied to a number of aspects 
of marriage. Chapter 4 offered an analysis leading to many of the hypotheses 
summarized in Table 4.1. The same theory can be applied to derive predictions 
regarding the likelihood that a particular individual lives in a polygynous 
household within a polygynous society. 
 As in the rest of this book, marriage is considered as a framework for 
domestic production and reproduction valued by the members of a society who 
follow rules of optimization. Individuals determine the extent of their 
participation in a polygynous household according to endowed and acquired 
attributes. 
 Male Income and Education. It was hypothesized in Part Two that if 
spousal labor is a normal input, men with more income demand more spousal 
labor. Within the context of a polygamous society a man can obtain more 
spousal labor by marrying more women. Therefore, the likelihood that a 
woman is part of a polygamous household varies directly with husband's 
income and education, an indicator of permanent income. 
   Hypothesis 34   
 Polygyny is a positive function of male income and education. 
 This was based on the following reasoning. The higher a man's income, the 
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more spousal labor he will demand. (Graphically, a higher income shifts the 
demand schedule upwards.) Within the context of a polygamous society a 
higher quantity of spousal labor demanded may translate into a larger number 
of wives. Education increases one's resources, in terms of both income and the 
ingenuity with which time is utilized; thus a man's education may also generate 
an upward shift in his demand for spousal labor, and is likely to increase the 
likelihood of polygamy.  
 Male Age. To the extent that income is not measured well and can not be 
controlled for adequately, a further approximation for income can be found in a 
man's age. If a man is limited in his ability to borrow funds when young, and if 
his income grows over time until it peaks, his demand for spousal labor will 
increase with age until a certain point of maximum productivity.  As polygyny 
is a function of the demand for spousal labor, it follows that 
 Hypothesis 35 
 Polygyny varies over a man's life-cycle; a man is most likely to be 
polygynous when he attains peak productivity.   
 Empirically, Hypothesis 35 implies a curvilinear relationship between 
husband age and polygyny. This can be estimated by specifying a quadratic 
function of number of wives as a function of age. In contrast, other studies have 
posited a positive linear effect of age on polygyny.1 
 Next, let us look at the effects of variations in female attributes on the 
number of wives in the household. Hypotheses relating female attributes to 
likelihood of living in a polygamous household can be derived on two 
theoretical grounds. First, as argued in Chapter 4, whether a woman shares her 
husband or not is an aspect of her compensation for spousal labor, the quasi-
wage w*. The higher her w* the more she is likely to translate that into the 
privilege of monogamy. Second, differences among women are partially 
reflected in their productivity as wives. More productive wives are less likely to 
have to share a husband as they can possibly provide the equivalent of more 
spousal labor (see Grossbard 1976). 
 Female Education. A factor which is possibly related to women's 
productivity in spousal labor, and therefore to the likelihood of polygyny, is 
education. Education is a resource which can possibly affect a wife's 
productivity positively. More educated women are probably more efficient in 
running a household and are capable of providing better education for their 
children. As a result, despite the possible countereffect of complementarity, 
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educated women are expected to have fewer co-wives if they are more 
productive (see Grossbard 1976, 1980). Furthermore, if their market value is 
higher, probably reflecting their higher productivity, their w* is higher and they 
are more likely to express that in the non-monetary benefit of not having to 
share their husband. It is thus predicted that 
 
 Hypothesis 36 
 Female education relates inversely to polygyny.  
 Fecundity. Another factor related to productivity of wives is fecundity. 
Certain women are more fecund, partially as a function of age. The productivity 
of a woman in marriage helps explain the number of co-wives that she will 
have. As explained in Grossbard 1976, women differing in fecundity vary in (1) 
their supply of spousal labor and (2) their demand for marriage (spousal labor). 
There is no reason to expect complementarity between women of varying 
fertility. Therefore, if, given his resources, a man aims for a specific number of 
children, the possibility of polygyny widens the range of substitute routes 
towards that target.  A given number of offspring can be obtained with one 
unusually fertile wife or with a number of wives of lower expected fertility, 
where expected fertility is related to fecundity.  There may exist a timing factor: 
if after a few years it becomes apparent that the first wife is not able to bear the 
desired number of children, the husband may start to look for a second wife. 
 A woman of higher fertility may also use that asset to acquire more 
privileges for herself.  This, in turn, may persuade her to choose a husband with 
fewer wives. Combining these two considerations brings us to another 
hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 36' 
 Women of higher fertility have fewer co-wives. 
 A direct way to test this will be to assess the relationship between completed 
fertility per wife and number of wives.  Alternatively, an element of expected 
fertility, the age of a woman, may be examined and tested to generate another 
hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 36'' 
 Women at an age of peak fecundity have fewer co-wives. 
 Rules on Intermarriage. So far, I have discussed the differential impact of 
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individual male and female characteristics on membership in a polygynous 
household.  Clearly, people live within a culture imposing constraints on their 
individual choices. If this culture effectively prohibits polygyny, men will be 
limited to choosing one wife at a time.  Observers have noticed that, on a 
worldwide scale, cultural background and religion considerably affect the legal 
status of polygyny (see Murdock 1949). 
 The absence of an absolute prohibition on intermarriage implies that all 
men and all women belong to the same markets for spousal labor. Were there 
an acute shortage of men in one ethnic group, some of the women belonging to 
that group would marry men from other groups.  This suggests a sixth 
hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 37 
 Where all coexisting ethnic groups allow polygyny and intermarriage, there 
will be no major effect of ethnic group on the number of wives. 
 Even though most people in Maiduguri usually marry within their own 
group (Steckle and Ewanyk 1973), the Kanuri dominate the Shuwa Arabs 
politically, one result of which is an asymmetric intermarriage rule: Kanuri 
men may marry Shuwa women, but Shuwa men and Kanuri women are not 
allowed to marry (Cohen and Middleton 1970). The ensuing marriage squeeze 
for Shuwa men may lead to a lower degree of polygyny among the Shuwa in 
comparison to the Kanuri. 
 Like all the preceding hypotheses, Hypothesis 37 states a partial effect: 
tribes generally do not differ in polygyny, once other attributes of men and 
women are taken into account.  In groups with more wealth and education, 
however, men may have more wives. 
 Divorce. According to sociological theory, the strength of a marital 
relationship is a direct function of the attraction within the marriage (Levinger 
1965). In terms of an economic theory, fewer returns from marriage increase 
the likelihood of divorce (Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977). To the extent 
that polygyny reduces the gains of marriage between a polygynist and each of 
his wives, in view of the existence of diminishing returns and the selectivity of 
women entering polygynous marriage, it follows that 
 Hypothesis 38  
 Polygyny leads to more divorce. 
 Cohen (1971) derived the same prediction by using "simple logic." 
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Hypothesis 38 is applicable to individual cross-sectional data within a given 
culture. If one expands its applicability to a cross-cultural context, more factors 
could influence the association between divorce and polygamy. If one considers 
women's preference for stable relationships, the existence of polygyny can 
either encourage or discourage divorce. It encourages divorce to the extent that 
women's marriage market is more favorable (see Hypothesis 39) and that 
women know it will be easy to remarry. However, it could discourage divorce if 
women want to translate their higher w* into more stable relationships.  
 Tests for Hypotheses 34 to 38 explaining polygyny and for Hypothesis 39 
regarding the effect of polygyny on divorce are reported in the section 
analyzing data from Maiduguri, Nigeria. Before turning to such empirical 
analysis, let us look at hypotheses analyzing polygamy from a macro 
perspective. 
A Macro Analysis of Polygamy 
 It follows from an economic analysis of marriage markets that women are 
likely to benefit from the legitimation of polygyny. This was shown by Becker 
(1973) and also follows from the theory presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Consider a market for women's spousal labor. A prohibition on polygamy or 
legal imposition of monogamy can be viewed as an interference in the marriage 
market curtailing men's aggregate demand for spousal labor, whatever that 
means within the specific culture. Consequently, assuming the supply of 
spousal labor by women has not changed, the new equilibrium quasi-wage w* 
will be lower than if polygamy is allowed and demand for spousal labor is 
higher. Societies that impose monogamy therefore cause the equilibrium 
market-determined compensation for spousal labor to go down due to reduced 
competition for spousal labor by potential husbands. 
 Hypothesis 39 
 Women are better off when polygyny is permitted (Becker 1973). 
  A higher w* is expected to be translated into advantages for women, as was 
stated in Becker (1973) and Grossbard-Shechtman (1980). However, as 
suggested by Guttentag and Secord (1983), men may be tempted to impose 
more restrictions on women if they stand to gain more from such restrictions. If 
women would get very high benefits according to free marriage market 
conditions, it is likely that men will organize politically to prevent such free 
market conditions from being established. Polygamy is therefore often 
accompanied with men's use of violence to impose compensation levels for 
women--including women's rights--which lie below market equilibrium 
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conditions. We are now ready to derive a number of hypotheses regarding the 
likelihood that a society will impose monogamy. 
 Wherever monogamy is imposed, this causes a loss of consumer surplus and 
producer surplus in the market for women's spousal labor.  The larger the 
benefits from allowing polygamy (polygyny), the more polygyny is likely to 
occur. Such benefits depend on the existence of marriage squeezes. 
 Marriage Squeezes. Let us assume that there is a marriage squeeze for 
women, i.e., the number of women exceeds the number of men. As shown in 
Part Two, this implies that the demand for spousal labor is low compared to 
such demand under conditions of a marriage squeeze for men. That causes the 
w* in an unrestricted market for spousal labor to be lower if there is a marriage 
squeeze for women than if there is a marriage squeeze for men. In a marriage 
squeeze for women, when w* is relatively low, the imposition of monogamy can 
be even more harmful to women's conditions in the market for spousal labor 
than in a marriage squeeze for men. In fact, one can look at a marriage squeeze 
for women as a factor pushing down the demand for spousal labor, while 
legalization of polygamy is a factor pushing the demand for spousal labor up. 
In a marriage squeeze for women, women and society in general benefit more 
from the legalization of polygyny than in a marriage squeeze for men.  
Therefore, 
 Hypothesis 40 
 In a marriage squeeze for women, polygyny is more likely to occur than in a 
marriage squeeze for men. 
This assumes no political interference with market-determined w*s. As shown 
in Grossbard-Shechtman (1980), where equal numbers of men and women 
enter the marriage market, equilibrium under imposed monogamy could 
possibly have been the same as under a system allowing polygyny. When the 
number of women exceeds that of men, women's equilibrium conditions in 
marriage are always higher in polygyny than in monogamy, which is likely to 
benefit women. Society as a whole is likely to be better off as well. By allowing 
polygyny, society enables previously unmarried women to add to the total 
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production in marriage. With more women than men, it is more advantageous 
for society to allow polygynous marriage. In such circumstances polygyny is 
also more likely to be observed. 
 Any factor raising the productivity of spousal labor in marriage will affect 
the demand for spousal labor performed by men and women. With the total 
unrestricted demand for spousal labor being higher, there is more to lose from a 
restriction on that demand taking the form of a prohibition on polygamy. This 
is especially clear in a marriage squeeze for women. Each additional marriage, 
possible only when polygyny is instituted, then yields a larger gain, and society 
as a whole benefits more from the legalization of polygyny. The larger the gain 
from marriage--i.e. the surplus from consuming and producing spousal labor--
the more a society is likely to experience polygyny. In graphical terms, a larger 
gain from marriage is reflected in an upward shift of the derived demand for 
spousal labor or a rightward shift in the supply of spousal labor (see Chapters 3 
and 4). Next, we look at two factors shifting the demand for spousal labor.  
 Children. The surplus(es) generated by marriage depends on 
complementarity between husband and wife, an important component of which 
is complementarity in procreation and childrearing.  
 Hypothesis 41 
 The more children are important, the more a society is likely to experience 
polygyny.   
 Substitutes. The availability of substitutes for spousal labor is another factor 
influencing the demand for spousal labor. The more other services can be 
substituted for women's spousal labor (for instance, in cleaning, food 
preparation, or sexual activities), the larger the demand for women's spousal 
labor. 
 Hypothesis 42 
 The more costly substitutes to women's spousal labor, the more a society is 
likely to experience polygyny.   
 Women's Earnings. The higher women's earnings from work in the labor 
market, the lower the demand for their spousal labor by men and the more their 
own supply of spousal labor shifts to the left. Consequently, 
 Hypothesis 43 
 The lower women's earnings, the more a society is likely to experience 
polygyny.   
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 Diminishing Marginal Productivity. As shown in Grossbard-Shechtman 
(1980) all previous implications can be derived with the simplest conceivable 
assumptions, one of which is constant marginal productivity of wives. This 
assumption implies that men's demand for women's spousal labor does not 
depend on the number of wives. However, there are two main reasons to expect 
decreasing marginal productivity of additional wives. First, conflicts may arise 
among co-wives married to the same man. Second, the constraint of a fixed 
amount of male spousal labor leads to decreasing marginal productivity of 
additional female spousal labor. If there is only one man in the marriage, 
increasing the number of wives increases the supply of wife-time relative to that 
of the fixed factor, husband-time, which leads to diminishing marginal 
productivity. 
 In addition, men's demand for wives is determined by the value of marginal 
productivity, and there may be decreasing marginal utility from the products of 
marriage. Only one man is enjoying the benefits from marrying a number of 
wives, and his capacity to appreciate services such as child services is limited. 
For instance, depending on the target number of children he aims at and on the 
fertility of each wife, the second wife may have little to contribute. 
 If the sex ratio equals one, and all men are equal, monogamy will occur 
even if polygyny is permitted. No man will be able to offer more to a second 
wife than what an identical man offers her if she were his first wife. But, as 
shown in Grossbard-Shechtman (1980), it still follows that allowing for 
polygyny tends to improve the equilibrium position of women in the marriage 
market. The likelihood that a society will impose monogamy depends on the 
degree to which each consecutive wife exhibits diminishing marginal 
productivity in spousal labor. 
 Hypothesis 44 
 The more rapid the decrease in the value of the marginal productivity of 
each additional wife the less polygyny is likely to occur.   
This is also shown in Grossbard-Shechtman (1980). The effect of decreasing 
marginal productivity of wives on the prevalence of polygyny has its equivalent 
in zoology. According to Orians (1969), the larger the difference in mean 
reproductive success of females in monogamous and bigamous matings in 
equivalent environments, the smaller the likelihood that polygyny will evolve.2 
Factors influencing reproductive success under conditions of monogamy and 
polygyny, i.e., the extent of diminishing marginal productivity of female mates 
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are (1) the extent of male parental care, (2) the possibility for successive 
females of a male to be staggered in their breeding so that the periods of 
dependence of their offspring overlap little or not at all, and (3) the nature of 
food resources controlled by males (p. 594). Factor 1 parallels the reasoning for 
diminishing marginal productivity due to fixed husband-time (however, the 
present analysis is not exclusively restricted to productivity in childrearing). 
Factor (3) could be related to fixed physical resources owned by the husband. 
 Male Inequality. The above analysis assumed that all men are 
homogeneous, and all women are homogeneous. If the assumption of 
homogeneity is relaxed, we can derive the following hypotheses. First assume 
that males differ in attributes, while women remain identical. It can be shown 
that 
 Hypothesis 45 
 The more unequal the distribution of productivity-augmenting traits among 
men in a society, the more one is likely to find polygyny.   
 Similar statements are found in Becker's theory of marriage (1974). Some of 
the analyses by biologists are also relevant here. For instance, in his theory of 
mating systems in the animal world Orians has used the expression "equality in 
the quality of the territories of the males of a species" (1969).  
 It is shown in Grossbard-Shechtman (1980) that by prohibiting polygyny, 
the society with more male inequality stands to lose more, since the more 
productive men would all marry twice while only a fraction of the other men 
would marry, so that total additional surplus after polygyny is larger in the 
society with unequal distribution of productivity. The more unequal the 
distribution of productivity in marriage, the more the gain from a second 
marriage by a high-productivity man is likely to exceed the gain from a first 
marriage by a low-productivity man, so that polygyny is more advantageous 
even under more general assumptions concerning the marriage market. 
 Female Inequality. Until now, women were assumed to be identical. 
Relaxing this assumption yields the following  
 Hypothesis 46 
 Because of positive sorting, female inequality in productivity-augmenting 
traits is likely to dampen the positive effect of male inequality on the 
incidence of polygyny.  
 In other words, male inequality has a positive effect on the incidence of 
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polygyny, whereas female inequality is likely to be associated with less 
polygyny and more monogamy. This statement has applications regarding the 
degree of positive sorting that will be observed in a society. 
 Polygamy and Positive Sorting. As pointed out in Becker (1974a), positive 
sorting is a prediction from economic theory that has received ample support 
from empirical evidence, e.g., men marry women of similar income, height, 
and education. Likewise, sociologists have hypothesized that people tend to sort 
each other positively due to the desire to share values and norms.  
 Allowing for polygyny is expected to weaken the tendency for positive 
sorting. Given polygyny, it may be optimal for a very productive man to marry 
two women of low productivity, who would have each married a man with 
traits similar to theirs had monogamy been imposed. Since polygyny and 
positive sorting are two alternative strategies by which husbands can obtain 
more spousal labor, it follows that 
 Hypothesis 46'  
 Societies prohibiting polygyny are expected to have more positive sorting.   
 A demonstration of this hypothesis can be found in Grossbard-Shechtman 
(1980). 
 Later in this chapter, cross-cultural evidence will be brought to bear on 
some of these macro-level hypotheses regarding the effects of polygyny on 
women and the incidence of legal polygyny. But first, I present a test of the first 
micro-level hypotheses based on data from the Nigerian city of Maiduguri.  
 
 Maiduguri, Nigeria 
 
 Maiduguri was selected for a study of polygyny on two fundamental 
grounds. First, approximately at the same time three separate informative 
surveys were carried out in that predominantly Kanuri city. In 1969, Ronald 
Cohen conducted interviews for his study of divorce among the Kanuri (Cohen 
1971). In 1973, Jean Steckle and Linda Ewanyk surveyed the city for their 
study of consumer preferences in grain utilization. That same year Margaret 
Hardiman undertook a household survey requested by city planners. The 
opportunity to use the raw data collected by Cohen and by Steckle and Ewanyk 
and to refer to Hardiman's survey partially compensated for the lack of personal 
fieldwork. Second, polygyny is common in Maiduguri. In the surveys of Cohen 
and Steckle and Ewanyk, the average number of wives exceeds 1.5 (Table 
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11.1). 
 Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria's Northeastern State, also functions as the 
center of the Bornu-Emirate, homeland of the Kanuri people.  Despite a recent 
influx of animist and Christian migrants from the south and the west, the 
majority of the 165,000 inhabitants adhere to Islam.  According to Hardiman's 
survey, Maiduguri is 52 percent Kanuri (a Muslim tribe), while other Muslims-
-Hausa, Fulanyi, and Shuwa Arabs--account for another 25 percent of the 
population. 
 One of the principles of Islam limits the number of wives to four, a 
regulation strictly respected by Muslims and even non-Muslims: none of the 
households surveyed by Steckle and Ewanyk and Cohen had more than four 
wives. 
 According to Cohen (1967,1971), Islam pervades all aspects of Kanuri life. 
Women lead a separate social existence and take no part in public life. They are 
considered inferior and sexually untrustworthy, which results in ideas of 
seclusion and the "code of modesty." Table 11.1 suggests that well over half the 
wives of urban Kanuri men are secluded. A woman's sexual activities, her 
reproductive power, and some stipulated parts of her economic potential are 
transferable to her husband at marriage. The children belong to the father, and 
when divorce occurs they remain with him, unless they are not yet weaned. 
Divorce is extremely widespread and occurs more often than in the United 
States (Cohen 1971). As Table 11.1 shows, 69 percent of all marriages of the 
45 men in Cohen's sample had ended in divorce, and the average duration of a 
marriage (including extant marriages!) was 7.7 years. From a comparison of 
the average numbers of wives and marriages it follows that the latter figure is 
high (5.1 marriages per man), in part as a function of the high divorce rate. 
This partially reflects the simplicity of divorce; it occurs automatically if a 
husband tells his wife "I divorce you" three times. Cohen's total sample 
reported approximately 450 divorces, only 3 percent of which involved recourse 
to the courts. 
 Maiduguri's economy relies on an old tradition of commerce with the East 
(Steckle and Ewanyk report that 33.6 percent of all men were traders and 
businessmen) and on a large sector of public services (12.1 percent were civil 
servants, 7.3 percent Koranic teachers, and 3.4 percent teachers and 
professionals). Only a small proportion of the population owned a grain farm 
(16 percent), and even fewer were farmers and fishermen (5.4 percent). 
 TABLE 11.1 Means and Standard Deviations 
 in Two Sets of Data on Maiduguri, 1973 
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 Table 11.1 notes (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 With so many teachers in the city, it is not surprising that a large segment 
of the population had received some schooling. According to Steckle and 
Ewanyk (1973), two-thirds of the men and one-third of the women had 
undergone formal schooling, most of it Koranic. Although few Koranic schools 
are recognized by the Ministry of Education, the skills they provide--including 
reading and writing ability--make them a worthwhile investment. In 
economists' language, schooling seems to raise individual productivity in terms 
of earning capacity and/or ability to produce goods in the home.  For instance, a 
woman with Koranic education may be more skilled as a hostess or mother 
than a woman who did not go to school. 
 Most families (75 percent) lived in their own homes, usually part of a 
compound. Most compounds did not have a waterstandpipe. Water had to be 
carried, which was done by women, children or paid carriers. 
 Women married very young. By the age of 15 they had most likely been 
married at least once. In contrast, most men did not marry before age 20 
(Cohen 1971). 
 Women were most likely to bear children between the ages of 19 and 25 
(Hardiman 1973, Steckle and Ewanyk 1973). Hardiman (1973: Table 12) 
estimated the average fertility rate for women over 35 to be 3.2. The average 
number of children living in a man's household was reported by Steckle and 
Ewanyk as 2.5; Cohen found the average number born to a man before and 
during a particular marriage to be 2.3. 
 While on the decline, child mortality was very high. Hardiman estimated 
the mortality rate of newborns at 212 per 1,000 live births. Deaths of women at 
childbirth did not appear to be very common, since only 2.3 percent of 265 
urban Kanuri men's marriages ended with the death of the wife (from all 
causes). 
 After age 34 a woman had a high probability of becoming a divorcee or a 
widow. In contrast, men older than 34 were more likely to be married. The 
survival of divorcees and widows depends on relatives, usually children. It 
appears from Hardiman's survey that many urban divorcees did not receive any 
support and died prematurely, especially if they were childless. 
 Limited labor-force participation increases woman's reliance on husband 
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and children. Of the senior wives in the Steckle and Ewanyk sample, 87 
percent were full-time housewives. 
 When testing for the effect of male and female attributes on the number of 
wives in the household, the characteristics of the mate(s) have to be kept 
constant. For example, if a man is indifferent between marrying two average 
women or one gifted one, given their relative wages and productivity, little can 
be inferred about his number of wives by simply comparing his endowments 
with other men's endowments. The following hypothesis is more informative: 
given that a man has one average wife his attributes lead us to predict that he 
will have more than one wife. Consequently, the regressions simultaneously 
include male and female attributes. Table 11.2 presents the results obtained 
with the two data-sets. The method of estimation was Ordinary Least Squares. 
 The positive income effect predicted in Hypothesis 34 is verified in all 
regressions. Regression 1 estimates income through occupation and ownership 
of a waterstandpipe, a grain farm, and a house.  All coefficients are positive 
and significant.3 Regressions 2 and 3 reflect the same effect with occupation as 
the measure of income. Regression 3 also indicates a wealth effect. 
 A positive income effect on polygyny is well documented, as already 
reported by Becker (1974a). Also, Clignet (1975) found that in Yaounde, 
Cameroun, 84 percent of the household heads working as manual laborers in 
the private sector and having three wives or more owned their house in 1972, 
whereas only 76 percent of those with two wives and 57 percent of those with 
one wife did so. In three Nigerian towns, it was found that men with the 
highest incomes had the largest households and more wives, irrespective of 
occupation (Ware 1974). Even in the polyandrous society studied by Majumdar 
(1962), where women can marry more than one man and men can marry more 
than one woman, men of the higher castes had more wives: 40 percent of the 
members of the higher castes were polygynandrous (i.e., a number of brothers 
were jointly polygynous), while a much lower fraction of the lower caste 
husbands had more than one wife. 
 Earnings vary over the lifetime and in the absence of reliable information on 
income, age can serve as a proxy for earnings. Cross-tabulations (Clignet 1970) 
have indicated a positive linear relationship between husband's age and number 
of wives (with a slight downturn at later ages when income may fall because of 
reduced productivity). 
 It was also predicted that education of the husband raises the number of 
wives, which is confirmed by Regression 1. Given the poor quality of the proxy 
for income, however, education may affect the demand for wives through its 
effect on earnings. 
 Similarly, Clignet (1970) has found that men with some primary education 
tended to be more polygynous than illiterates, and those going beyond primary 
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schooling more than men who completed their primary education. However, 
Clignet also found that those who completed primary schooling 
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were less polygynous than those with some primary education. In Clignet's 
opinion, as well as in Goode's (1963), education modifies the traditional values 
of polygyny among the educated population. But Goode also quotes a Liberian 
study (Goode 1963) that found that over one-half of the literate husbands were 
polygynously married. In order to detect an effect of education which is 
separate from an income effect, a partial analysis is necessary. Such analysis is 
offered in this study, but not by Clignet or Goode. It is also desirable to specify 
how education modifies "values," if it does. For instance, it may encourage 
more demand for child quality (in the United States, father's education is 
known to increase child's education), thus discouraging fertility and 
consequently polygyny. 
 It was also hypothesized that at the age of peak productivity a man is likely 
to be married to more wives. In all regressions, older men appear to have more 
wives. Regression 3, which includes variables "age of husband at last marriage" 
and "age of husband at last marriage, square," shows that peak polygyny occurs 
when men are between ages 43 and 46,4 which seems consistent with a lifetime 
earnings profile. 
 Another male attribute included in regression 2 is the husband's age at the 
time of the interview. The number of wives is probably a positive function of 
the length of time since marriage. We expect the number of wives of a man 
who is 70 years old at the time of interview and was 25 at the time of marriage 
to exceed the number of wives married to a man who is 25 at marriage and time 
of interview. The first base for that hypothesis is the health component. If a 
man living in Maiduguri has lived 70 years, he is probably healthier than 
average. That is an endowment leading to more marital output and more wives. 
Secondly, there may be a cohort effect. If there has been some modernization in 
Maiduguri, polygyny may be decreasing over time. This hypothesis is verified: 
the age of husband at the time of the interview is significantly positive in both 
regressions. 
 Table 11.2 also shows the effect of female attributes on the number of wives 
in the household. Regression 1 confirms Hypothesis 36: the more educated the 
senior wife, the smaller the number of co-wives. This suggests that some men 
substitute marriage to one highly educated wife for marriage to a number of 
uneducated wives. Alternatively, this result may be interpreted as evidence of a 
higher quasi-wage w* for educated women. 
 Other studies have also shown evidence for this hypothesis. Simple 
tabulations show that 11 percent of Aboure women who were monogamously 
married had completed some primary studies or more, while the corresponding 
percentages were 8.4 percent and 9.8 percent for senior and junior co-wives. 
Among the Bete, these numbers were respectively 7.6 percent, 3.8 percent and 
3.0 percent (Clignet 1970, Table 16). In the Yoruba sample, 25 percent of the 
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monogamous wives were completely illiterate, as compared to 39 percent and 
47 percent of the women living in households with respectively two or three (or 
more) wives (Yoruba Social Structure 1976). The evidence provided here is 
more convincing, given that it is based on multivariate analysis. 
 The finding of a negative relationship between wife's education and number 
of wives in the household suggests that educated women are more productive in 
spousal labor than uneducated women. If education simply affects women's 
preferences for monogamy, without any productivity gain in spousal labor, it is 
hard to grasp how educated women would have the opportunity to marry more 
monogamously. What they want has to be matched with available 
opportunities. In Chapter 9, one also finds indirect evidence of a positive effect 
of education on women's productivity in spousal labor. Part Six addresses the 
link between education and spousal productivity more directly. 
 Regression 3 shows that young and old women have more co-wives than 
women around an age of peak productivity. As is predicted in Hypothesis 36', 
women at their age of peak productivity have fewer co-wives. That peak age, as 
computed from the regressions, was between 21 to 23 years, which is consistent 
with the description of fertility patterns in Maiduguri.5 
 The negative relation between fertility per wife and polygyny predicted in 
Hypothesis 36'' is confirmed in all regressions.6 In Regression 1 fertility per 
wife is measured as an average for the household. Regression 2 includes the 
number of children born to a particular marriage between one man and one 
woman, while Regression 3 includes this last variable as well as an estimate of 
the fertility of previous wives.  All three estimates of fertility per wife show a 
negative sign. This result does not invalidate the interpretation of age in terms 
of fertility, since a woman's potential as a mother is a function of her age and 
differs from her actual number of children. A problem with the variable 
"average fertility" is the spurious correlation, since the number of wives appears 
on both sides of the equation.  It is worth noticing that the two sets of data give 
similar results despite the difference in the definition of children. 
 The variable "seclusion," reported by Cohen, differentiates between women 
who are secluded and women who are not. Women who agree to marry a 
husband who will seclude them are giving up the right to leave the home except 
on special occasions, thereby reflecting either a lower productivity or a smaller 
demand for satisfaction inside and outside of marriage. The significantly 
positive sign may therefore be another evidence of substitution between more 
women of lower quality and fewer women of higher quality.  Seclusion could 
also be an additional proxy for husband wealth or a factor reflecting more taste 
for marriage on the part of the husband. The positive sign found in Table 11.2 
is consistent with any of these interpretations.7 
 Ethnic-group membership appears to have little effect on the degree of 
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polygyny.  As expected in Hypothesis 37, Regression 1 shows that members of 
most tribes did not have a  number of wives significantly different from  the 
Kanuri. While Hausa are Muslim, the other tribes are mostly animist or 
Christian; compared to the Kanuri they are equally polygynous. One exception, 
however, is that Shuwa Arabs, subject to disfavorable marriage rules imposed 
by the Kanuri, have fewer wives. 
 To conclude this section, I have viewed people as determining their needs 
for marriage in terms of their personal values and resources and the costs 
involved in marriage. I have considered women as suppliers of spousal labor 
and men as demanding these services. Men were expected to marry more wives 
when their income, education, and age led them to demand more spousal labor. 
A productivity and a demand effect on the supply of spousal labor generated the 
prediction of an inverse relationship between polygyny and female education 
and between polygyny and fertility.  Ethnic-group membership was not 
expected to affect polygyny significantly. Finally, it was hypothesized that 
polygyny engenders divorce.  All of these predictions were tested and most of 
them confirmed. 
 The novelty of this study lies not in the discovery of an income effect  on 
polygyny, but in the hypotheses generated by considering housewives as 
producers. The predictions of a life-cycle effect and of minor tribal effect on 
polygyny are also indicative of the fruitfulness of an economic approach. The 
results depend crucially on simultaneous consideration of male and female 
attributes affecting the demand and supply of women's spousal labor. 
Methodologically, regression techniques of Ordinary Least Squares and Probit 
proved as useful in explaining polygyny and divorce as they have been in 
accounting for paradigms of market economics. The low coefficients of 
determination (R2), however, reflect the limitations of an economic analysis. 
More knowledge of the culture and more culturally meaningful data are 
necessary to improve the results. Further studies may also try applying 
regression techniques specifically designed for polychotomous variables such as 
number of wives, a variable that was truncated at 4 in this sample. 
 With respect to Hypothesis 38 relating polygyny to divorce, Cohen (1971) 
has shown a positive relation between divorce and polygyny. Using the method 
of cross-tabulation, he found that polygynous marriages were more likely to end 
in divorce than monogamous unions. Within polygynous families, Cohen 
showed that in families with two wives the probability of divorce of the younger 
wife was relatively high, while in families with three wives the probability of 
divorce of the senior wife was relatively high. Among urban males, Cohen also 
found a partial effect of polygyny on divorce. A dichotomous variable of 
monogamy accounted for a sizeable fraction of the variation in divorces. In  his 
multivariate analysis of the probability that a marriage will end  in  divorce,  
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Cohen  found  an  effect  of  monogamy  in 
 TABLE 11.3  Probit Regressions of "Divorce," Cohen Data, 
 Maiduguri, 1973 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
addition to the effect of fertility of the present union and the effect of the 
secretiveness of the husband towards his wife. 
 Table 11.3 explains the likelihood that a marriage will end in divorce in 
terms of the number of senior wives, attributes of the husband (age, wealth), 
attributes of the wife (age and age square), the duration of marriage, and the 
number of children (the direction of causality in the last two variables is 
ambiguous). While in his multivariate analysis Cohen used a dichotomous 
explanatory variable "monogamy," I used a continuous variable "wives," which 
local custom limits to 4. In addition, a dummy variable "wives = 4" was 
included to capture differences between households with four wives and other 
households. The method used is Probit, a method of estimation especially 
designed to deal with dichotomous dependent variables. 
 Cohen's finding was confirmed: polygyny has a positive effect on divorce. 
Like Cohen, I found a negative effect of fertility.  In addition, Table 11.3 shows 
a significant negative effect of husband's age and wealth on divorce. 
 The next section brings cross-cultural evidence to bear on this theory of 
polygyny. 
 Cross-Cultural Evidence 
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 Findings of previous researchers are one possible source of evidence for the 
theory of polygyny outlined above. Three kinds of evidence can be brought to 
bear on Hypothesis 39, namely that women are better off when polygyny is 
permitted (also see Grossbard 1978a and Chapter 1 here). 
 
 1[a]. Nobody has yet given a complete explanation on why bridewealth is 
paid by husbands in some societies, while elsewhere the bride's family provides 
a dowry. Whenever such general theory will evolve, it will have to incorporate 
polygyny among the explanatory factors. According to anthropologist Goody 
(1973), "dowry is strongly linked with monogamous (and polyandrous), 
marriage." Similarly, sociologist Clignet (1970) writes that "the institution of 
brideprice is more often found in polygynous than in monogamous African 
societies." 
 These findings make sense if bridewealth versus dowry is seen as an 
indication of women's share of marital income. Bride payments can be 
considered as lump sum transfers through which men compete for wives when 
the equilibrium incomes of married women exceed the income they actually 
receive after marriage.8 Conversely, women or their families would pay dowries 
prior to marriage in order to obtain a husband when the income they actually 
receive exceeds the equilibrium income they would get in a free marriage 
market. If the discrepancy between actual and equilibrium share of women in 
marital income were greater the larger their equilibrium incomes (as suggested 
by Becker 1977) "the frequency and magnitude of brideprices would be 
greater...when poly[gyny] is more common." Conversely. when the equilibrium 
share of women in marital income is low, their actual income may be higher, 
especially if inflexible shares derive from the indivisibility of commodities like 
children (Becker 1977). In turn, it was shown above that a prohibition on 
polygyny reduces women's equilibrium conditions in the marriage market. It is 
clear that the presence of polyandry detriments women's bargaining position 
even more, for once men can pool their resources to marry a common wife, the 
demand for wives is even lower than in monogamy, and consequently the 
equilibrium income of married women even less favorable. The concept of a 
marriage market therefore illuminates these observations by Goody and 
Clignet. 
 Economist Bronfenbrenner (1971) has reached a similar conclusion based 
on his analysis of Indian marriage markets. He observed that in India, "while 
monogamy and dowries prevailed, there were certain subcastes, such as the 
laundrymen of Calcutta, in which the master married his labor force. Under 
these circumstances, not only polygamy but brideprices were found" (see also 
Tambiah 1973). He therefore thinks that "the probability of a positive 
brideprice (or negative dowry) will be greater when inter alia the number of 
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wives per husband exceeds unity."9 
 Not only does it seem that the probability of finding bridewealth versus 
dowry varies directly with the presence of polygyny, but evidence also suggests 
that bridewealth payments are higher in more polygynous societies. Comparing 
two Sebei communities in Eastern Uganda, anthropologist Goldschmidt (1974) 
found that the bridewealth was considerably higher in the more polygynous 
community. Goldschmidt also cross-tabulated thirteen separate societies in East 
Africa by polygyny ("over 150 wives/husbands" and "150 wives/husbands and 
under") and brideprice (high and low) and found that only three out of thirteen 
societies were not in the "high polygyny-high brideprice" or "low polygyny-low 
brideprice" categories. 
 
 1[b]. Age at marriage can also indicate benefits from marriage. The more 
one stands to gain, the younger one is likely to enter marriage. Hypothesis 39, 
therefore, leads us to expect that women will marry younger in polygynous 
societies. Since women gain relative to men, a larger sex differential in age at 
marriage should be found where more polygyny occurs. Simple comparisons 
provide evidence for the theory: women marry younger in countries allowing 
for polygyny. For instance, women's average age at marriage is 13 or 14 among 
the Hausa and the Kanuri of Eastern Nigeria, societies with widespread 
polygyny. (Among the Hausa, 36 percent of all men of marriageable age were 
polygynous; see Mair 1953). The Tallensi, another West-African tribe, are 
slightly less polygynous (30 percent of marriageable men had more than one 
wife; see Mair 1953) and their daughters marry somewhat later: here the 
average female age at marriage is 16 and 17. On the whole, women marry 
considerably earlier in polygynous areas like Africa and the Muslim world than 
in monogamous Europe and America. In addition, while in the United States 
the husband is on average two years older than the wife, that difference rises to 
seven years in the Arab world and to ten years in some heavily polygynous 
African societies like the Kanuri.  
 Using data from sixteen districts of Congo, Brass et al. (1968) found a 
simple correlation of .8 between an index of polygyny (number of married 
women per 100 married men) and the difference in mean husband's and wife's 
age at marriage, evidence for a positive correlation between degree of polygyny 
and difference in age at marriage. Moreover, the South African government's 
efforts to limit polygyny (e.g., by imposing taxes on each wife) led to a later 
female age at marriage (Mair 1953). Recently many Muslim countries have 
simultaneously restricted polygyny and age at marriage. One explanation for 
this joint treatment is that, once polygyny is limited, the age at marriage will 
rise anyway, so that the second restriction becomes less costly. 
 
Polygamy 259 
 
 
 
 1[c]. Not only will polygyny encourage women to marry earlier, but it will 
lead a larger proportion of women to marry at all ages. Comparing two ethnic 
groups in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) and its hinterland, Clignet (1970) found 42 
percent unmarried Aboure females as opposed to 30 percent unmarried Bete 
females. Not surprisingly, the Aboure are less polygynous: in Abidjan married 
men were 91 percent monogamous, while that percentage was 81 percent 
among the Bete. Likewise, better marital income opportunities open to women 
lead widows to accept being "inherited" by relatives of their husband, as is 
specified in the institution of "levirate." In South Africa the restrictions on 
polygyny also led widows to "refuse much more often than in the past to be 
'inherited' by relatives of their husband" (Mair 1953), which can be interpreted 
as the result of a smaller differential between married and widowed income. 
The same sixteen districts of the Congo also showed a negative correlation of -
.45 between polygyny and the proportion of married women 15 to 45 years old 
(Brass et al. 1968). 
 
 Hypothesis 40 predicted that polygyny is more likely in a marriage squeeze 
for women. One of the most dramatic demonstrations of such marriage squeeze 
effect on polygyny occurred in Paraguay in the nineteenth century. After a 
major war against neighboring countries, the shortage of marriageable males 
was so drastic (males were only 13 percent of the total population of Paraguay), 
that for a limited period Paraguay overruled the prohibition against polygyny 
(Becker 1974a). Equally convincing is the case of the South Fore, a New 
Guinean tribe, where an increase in the male/female ratio due to the sexual 
selectivity of a neurological disorder led to drastic reductions in the male 
marriage rate and the rate of polygyny (Glasse and Meggitt 1969). Wagner 
(1972) finds a positive relationship between availability ratio (wives per 
marriageable men)10 and polygyny ratio (wives per married men) in a study of 
twenty-three units of settlement among the Daribi of New Guinea. 
 If polygyny may result from a marriage squeeze for women, does it follow 
that a marriage squeeze for males leads to polyandry? While polygyny is very 
widespread, polyandry is extremely rare (perhaps because, as Becker 1974a 
suggests, men like to maximize the likelihood of fathering their own genetic 
products). In both cases of polyandry on which I obtained documentation, the 
sex ratio exceeded one, i.e. there was a marriage squeeze for males. Among the 
Todas of India (Murdock 1949), scarcity of females resulted from female 
infanticide. In 1951, the polyandrists of Jaunsar-Bawar (Himalaya) had 20 
percent more men than women, also related to female infanticide (Majumdar 
1962). These mountaineers also had a custom of declaring certain women as 
witches, whereafter they were often killed, another reason why men 
experienced marriage squeezes.  
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 While marriage squeezes affect the presence of polygyny, they account for a 
small fraction of variations found in actual polygyny rates. In the most 
polygynous area of the world, sub-Saharan Africa, the number of females per 
hundred males varies between 95.9 and 136 for different countries and periods 
(Dorjahn 1959), i.e. many of these polynous societies experienced marriage 
squeezes for women. As pointed out by Dorjahn, the effective sex ratio can be 
affected by sex differences in age at marriage. Earlier I emphasized that 
differences in age at marriage may result from polygyny. But the observed 
correlations may also be interpreted in the opposite direction, and with the 
evidence presented here, there is no way to differentiate between the two 
interpretations. Viewing age at marriage as a determinant of the effective 
degree of marriage squeeze the Muslim governments' restrictions on age at 
marriage may act as a means to reduce polygyny. 
 
 With regard to the positive relation between the importance of children and 
polygyny hypothesized in Hypothesis 41, it can be noted that in continents 
where more children are demanded, polygyny is more prevalent.  
 
 With respect to Hypothesis 42, a broad world overview also shows that the 
continent of highest polygyny, Africa, has limited markets for consumer goods 
and servant services 11 and that household production uses a higher ratio of 
own time to market goods than is the case in monogamous regions like ours. 
Reduced demand for women's spousal labor may be one explanation for the 
decline in polygyny in the Middle East (Daghestani 1953).  
 Smaller markets for consumer goods may also be a cause of restricted job 
opportunities for women outside the home. In monogamous societies, many 
jobs performed by women in the labor market substitute for women's spousal 
labor (for instance, waitresses, seamstresses, salespersons in supermarkets). 
This supports Hypothesis 43. In Africa, women have fewer possibilities to be 
independent, and therefore the gains from marriage (and polygyny) are larger. 
Actual correlations between female labor force participation and polygyny are 
hard to interpret, for the low demand for wives in more monogamous societies 
may force women to enter the labor market. Keeping this in mind, the finding 
that among the more polygynous of two Ivory Coast tribes women participated 
less in the labor force, is not necessarily a proof of this proposition (Clignet 
1970). To Goode (1953), one of the reasons for the "reduction in the proportion 
of the adult population living under concubinage or some form of polygamy" is 
that "the female ...now...has alternative modes of employment."  
 
 Hypothesis 44 related the prevalence of polygyny to marginal returns from 
an additional wife. The possibility of sharply decreasing marginal returns from 
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wives because of frictions between co-wives endangers polygyny to such an 
extent that all polygynous societies have taken active measures to minimize 
these intramarital conflicts. Four types of arrangements are used to reduce 
frictions in polygynous households: (1) separate dwellings for each wife, (2) 
supervisory authority in the hands of the senior wife, (3) customs requiring that 
the husband cohabitates with each wife in regular rotation, and (4) sororal 
polygyny, whereby sisters share a husband. The latter custom was reported in 
70 out of 193 polygynous societies surveyed by Murdock (1949). Methods (1) 
and (4) appear to serve somewhat as substitutes. In 18 out of 21 societies with 
exclusively sororal polygyny, co-wives live in the same house, while in 28 out 
of 55 societies with non-sororal polygyny, wives live in separate dwellings. 
Clignet and Sween (1974) found that one way urban dwellers in Cameroun 
practice polygyny is by having one wife in the city and one in their village of 
origin. Higher residential costs in African cities tend to discourage polygyny, 
because it becomes harder for husbands to keep wives in separate dwellings. 
 In practice, there is evidence of both frictions and widespread cooperation 
among co-wives. For instance, co-wives cooperate in childrearing. Out of a 
sample of 759 co-wives interviewed in the Ivory Coast, only 25.2 percent 
exerted authority on their children separately from their co-wives, while three-
quarters raised children under some form of shared or accepted authority 
(Clignet 1970). 
 
 Reliable cross-cultural data to substantiate Hypotheses 45 and 46, dealing 
with inequality among men and women, is hard to obtain. Hypothesis 46, 
relating positive sorting and polygyny, is not testable in its original form, but its 
corollary, Hypothesis 46', can be tested. Polygyny and positive sorting being 
two alternative strategies by which husbands can obtain more spousal labor, 
societies prohibiting polygyny should have more positive sorting. In Maiduguri, 
I found a simple correlation between married male and female schooling of 
+.37. In contrast, holding age and wage rates constant, the correlation between 
husband's and wife's years of schooling was +.53 and +.56 for American whites 
and blacks respectively (Becker 1974a). The lower correlation in Maiduguri 
may be due in part to a possible choice between polygyny and positive sorting. 
 If there is indeed substitution between positive sorting and polygyny, a 
prohibition of polygyny would benefit educated women, for it will raise the 
demand for their spousal labor as a replacement for the spousal labor than 
could be provided by a larger number of noneducated women. Consequently, 
educated women in Africa and Egypt have often been active in political efforts 
to prohibit polygyny. Also, West African female students (Omari 1960) were 
vocal against polygyny (but favored brideprice), while their male classmates 
favored polygyny (but were hostile to brideprice). However, as expected, 
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uneducated women did not seem opposed to polygyny. While 12 percent of 
educated Yoruba women would not let their husband take a new wife under any 
circumstance, only 0.8 percent of the uneducated women said so (Yoruba Social 
Structure 1976). 
 The evidence presented in this section consisted, for the most part, of cross-
cultural comparisons by level of polygyny and one other variable, ignoring the 
many other factors that could intervene and transform an apparently causal 
relation into a spurious one. Differences in polygyny between Africa and the 
rest of the world, and among selected tribes in Africa, were used repetitively for 
different purposes, and it may very well be that in a more careful cross-cultural 
investigation some of the correlations would disappear.  
 Conclusions 
 A general theoretical approach to the study of polygyny enhances our 
understanding of the reasons for cross-cultural variation in the prevalence of 
polygyny. It also throws some light on the factors related to the incidence of 
polygyny within a particular society. This study is another example of how 
economic theory benefits the study of marriage.  
 This study also shows some of the advantages of interdisciplinary 
cooperation. An economic analysis vitally depends on the thorough cultural 
understanding anthropologists develop through fieldwork.  Without the 
information on Maiduguri generously transmitted by Ronald Cohen and the 
insights on polygyny previously published by other social scientists, this study 
would have been very limited in scope. 
 The economics of polygyny can potentially be useful in leading to a better 
understanding of the mechanisms behind fertility and female labor force 
participation in countries allowing polygyny. The study of polygamy comprises 
an integral part of the study of marriage institutions, a field where theoretically 
grounded research is still the exception. It is hoped that the theory and 
empirical research presented here can contribute to the study of marriage in 
general. 
  Notes 
 1.  Clignet's (1970) is one study in which elders are viewed as the traditionally 
privileged segment entitled to polygyny. He makes no mention of a maximum seniority 
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beyond which a man becomes less polygynous.  
 2.  He finds evidence for his hypotheses on the basis of comparisons between 
different kinds of living creatures, birds in particular. I am indebted to Jack Hirshleifer 
for this reference. 
 3.  However, the effect of each of these three dummy variables on the number of 
wives has an alternative interpretation. First, waterstandpipes and houses may be 
components of the wife's income from spousal labor. This income is principally 
nonpecuniary, for it consists of provision for room, board, convenience, etc. The more 
wives a man has, the more he needs room to provide for them--especially since in 
Maiduguri each wife lives in separate quarters--and the more he is likely to purchase a 
house. Similarly, the more wives, the more profitable to compensate all wives by saving 
them the trouble of fetching water or purchasing it from water-carriers. (This assumes 
increasing returns to scale in waterstandpipe installations.) Owners of grain farms may 
be wealthier, but they also need wives as farm labor in addition to the other needs 
shared by all men. Unfortunately, there is no way to differentiate between the different 
interpretations of these variables. Small simple correlations between possible wealth 
proxies emphasize that problem. The correlations between waterstandpipe on the one 
hand, and grain farm, house ownership, and occupation on the other hand are 
respectively -.07, .15 and .20. The low correlations between house ownership and 
occupation (.11) and waterstandpipe (.15) partially derive from the recent inflow of 
migrants who do not own houses but are wealthy enough to rent comfortable housing. 
 4.  In mathematical terms, a peak is a maximum. Let us call the variable "wives" 
Y and the variable "age of husband" X and abstract from other variables. The regression 
equation can then be written as Y = aX + bX2. The first order condition for a maximum 
or a minimum is that the first derivative of this equation equal zero, i.e.  a + 2bX = 0. 
This implies that X = -a/2b. Based on the coefficients of age and age, squared estimated 
from regression 2 (.25 and -.0029) we calculate the maximum age as 43. 
 5.  To calculate a minimum value, we follow the same procedure described in 
note 4. The values for (woman's) age and age, squared in regression 2 are -.12 and 
.0029. Using the formula X = -a/2b, we obtain a minimum age of 21. 
 6.  For a more extensive empirical discussion of the relationship between 
polygyny and fertility see Grossbard (1986b). 
 7.  However, here too the causality could be inverse: polygyny could facilitate 
seclusion by adding more variety and companionship to the isolated wife's life. From a 
separate table (Table II in Grossbard-Shechtman 1980) it appears that the effect of 
seclusion varies with duration of marriage. In the sample of all marriages, it is 
significantly positive at the 90 percent level, mainly a result of the strongly positive 
relation for marriages of intermediate duration. 
 8.  In many societies, the income a married woman actually receives differs from 
what would be her income based on market-clearing quasi-wages for spousal labor due 
to regulations enforced through law and custom. 
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 9.  Other factors he considers are productive, skilled and/or arduous work 
expected of a wife; few or no legitimate extracurricular substitutes for wives as sexual 
partners; high sex ratio of men to women in the population of nubile age; and 
prospective husband's old age subsistence depending on numerous healthy sons. 
 10. Apparently, practically all marriageable women do get married in this society.  
 11. The question of substitution between wives and servants is particularly 
complex since a society's propensity to rely on servants simultaneously affects a 
woman's productivity in spousal labor and in outside labor. The institutionalization of 
reliance on female servants is in itself an economic question, perhaps related to the 
gains from household specialization among women differing in skills.  
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 PART SIX 
                                                                                  
   Marriage, Productivity,  
 and Earnings 
  The theory of marriage presented in Part Two viewed individuals as 
suppliers of spousal labor, and defined spousal labor as any service benefiting a 
spouse.  Such spousal labor is not simply about washing dishes and taking care 
of the garden, but also about helping a spouse to earn more at work, 
encouraging a wife to live a healthier life, or enabling a husband to find more 
peace of mind. People invest in their spouse's human capital to the extent that 
spousal labor boosts the spouse's earning capacity or other aspects of the 
spouse's productive capacity (including the capacity to produce happiness).  
The chapters in this part of the volume all deal with aspects of spousal help that 
increase a person's human capital. Chapters 12 to 14 deal with spousal help 
aimed at increasing a worker's earning capacity, whereas Chapter 15 focusses 
on the contribution of a spouse to an individual's religious practice.  
 Of the three chapters which deal with the effect of marriage on worker's 
productivity, the first two are principally of a theoretical nature, whereas the 
last one is  mostly an empirical contribution. Of the two theoretical chapters, 
Chapter 12 is a relatively accessible introduction to the analysis of spousal help 
to workers. Chapter 13 deals with one particular valuable quality which can 
enhance individual success at work, in politics, or in marriage, namely one's 
virtue or trustworthiness. This chapter presents a concept of general human 
capital which goes beyond the usual sense of that expression. In labor 
economics, general human capital has been defined as skills which can be 
productive to different employers (Becker 1964). Here the notion is introduced 
that certain skills can be valuable both to employers and to spouses. Thereby, 
skills obtained in marriage could benefit success at work, and skills obtained at 
work could benefit success in marriage. Chapter 13 presents the framework for 
a market model of virtue or loyalty based on the concept of general human 
capital.   
 Chapter 14 is an attempt to test for the determinants of spousal help as 
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reported by the workers, a sample of Israeli managers. Hypotheses were 
generated based on two theoretical approaches: a human capital approach and a 
cultural approach. Results of linear and logit regressions, run separately by 
gender, with education, earnings, age, children, religiosity, and ethnic origin as 
independent variables, revealed that spousal support is better explained for 
women than for men and husbands help more when it is most productive to do 
so. However, both theories contribute to explaining spousal support. 
 The final chapter, Chapter 15, focusses on religiosity as a form of human 
capital, and more specifically, on spouses helping investments in such human 
capital. The chapter presents an empirical study of the relationship between 
wives' religiosity on Jewish husbands' time spent on religious observance. By 
exploring factors affecting the association between spouse's religiosity and 
individual behavior we find possible evidence of a post-marital learning 
process. We also find that the men whose religious observance is strongly 
correlated to wife's religiosity tend to have higher levels of secular education, 
which possibly reflects the effect of education on the process of in-marriage-
learning. 
 All the hypotheses related to marriage and productivity at work found in 
Part Six are numbered sequentially. These hypotheses were labeled K1 through 
K24 in order to separate them from the hypotheses discussed in Parts Two 
through Five. 
 Much more research needs to be done in this area, both at a theoretical and 
an empirical level. A general equilibrium theory of marriage can lead to many 
further hypotheses regarding the effect of marriage on earnings, consumption, 
or other aspects of behavior. Theoretical developments may lead to innovative 
ways of testing for effects of marriage on behavior. Meanwhile, it is also 
important to have more empirical studies relating marriage and spouses' traits 
to individual behavior at work or in the home. More tests of the hypotheses we 
tested in  Chapters 14 and 15 would also be useful, especially if they are based 
on other data sets and statistical techniques.  
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 12 
                                                        
 Investments in Spouse's 
 Productivity at Work 
 Introduction 
 This chapter was written for the first Handbook of Behavioral Economics, 
an attempt to bring economists and other behavioral scientists closer together in 
a variety of research areas. The subject of the contribution of marriage to 
workers' productivity is a good example of how research can benefit from 
communication between economics and sociology. While this chapter deals 
most with wives' contributions to their husband's career, it is also relevant to 
the contribution of husbands to their wife's career. 
  The chapter first reviews both economic and sociological theories that have 
been used to explain marital status differentials in productivity, a possible 
source of marital status differentials in earnings. Then, hypotheses are derived 
regarding the effect of occupational characteristics on expected marital 
differentials in workers' success, hypotheses that were inspired by some of the 
sociological literature on the subject. The chapter also mentions hypotheses that 
fit well within a general equilibrium theory of marriage and labor. Marital 
differentials in earnings are hypothesized to vary with spouse's characteristics, 
divorce probability, and divorce laws. 
 Married people experience economic activities differently than do singles. 
Married men work and earn more than single men, married women work and 
earn less than unmarried women, and people in married households do 
not consume  the same bundles of goods and services purchased by singles.  
 
 
                                                       
 
 Adapted from "Marriage and Productivity: an Interdisciplinary Analysis" in 
Handbook of Behavioral Economics ed. by Ben Gilad and Stanley Kaish. Greenwich, 
Conn.: JAI Press, 1986. I would like to thank Shelly Chandler, Roger Frantz, Ben Gilad, 
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Stanley Kaish, and Ivy Papps for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
 
 In the United States, married men earn between 8 and 30 percent more than 
single men, after other factors are accounted for (see Kenny 1983), whereas 
married women earn some 3 percent less than single women (Becker 1981).  
Similarly, in England, married men earned between 10 and 14 percent more 
than single men, whereas married women earned 3 percent less than single 
women (Greenhalgh 1980). A positive marital differential was also found in 
Sweden by Duncan and Holmlund (1983). 
 The reasons for these differentials have not been studied adequately by 
members of the various disciplines to whom this issue is of interest. While 
offering relatively well-developed empirical estimations of these marital 
differentials, economists explain them using theories of limited scope.  
Sociologists and sociopsychologists bring a wider range of explanations, but 
their approach is generally nonquantitative. The most valuable contributions by 
noneconomists have been made at the micro level--the study of the organization 
(family or firm)--namely by microsociologists (a term coined by Turner 1970) 
and social psychologists. This makes generalization difficult. 
 The underdeveloped state of this area of study derives from the 
fragmentation of the hehavioral sciences. Academic border treaties have 
assigned one part of the problem--production and productivity--principally to 
economics and business and the other--marriage--primarily to other behavioral 
sciences such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Within the present 
incentive structure, academic border crossing rarely pays off. As a result, the 
effect of marital status on productivity has received insufficient scholarly 
attention, and large gains from trade can be reaped  through intellectual cross-
fertilization (See Chapter 1). 
  This chapter discusses some of the relevant sociological and 
sociopsychological literature and compares it to research economists have 
performed in this area. Its emphasis is on developing testable hypotheses and 
suggesting directions for further research. The entire discussion focuses on 
men's benefits from being married, even though it could have been stated in 
terms of husbands' contribution to the earnings of working women. It makes the 
reading somewhat easier to have wives and husbands consistently in one 
position. 
 The chapter first reviews economic theories dealing with marital 
differentials, and then summarizes some of the sociological theories on the 
same subject. The theoretical section concentrates on one particular theory that 
has been mentioned in both the economic and the sociological literature, 
namely, wives' investments in their husbands' careers. This section 
distinguishes different forms such investments can take. The theory of marital 
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differentials in productivity that is presented focuses on occupational 
characteristics.  
 
 Previous Literature 
Economic Theories 
 Economists have explained the observed marital differentials in earnings on 
the basis of five different theories. The most commonly referred to is what can 
be called the specialization theory (see Mincer 1962; Becker 1965). According 
to this theory, men and women specialize in the production of different goods 
and services, as a result of differences in endowments, utility, or both. Because 
of their comparative advantage in household production, married women work 
less and therefore earn less outside the home than do single women, whereas 
the opposite is true for married men. For a man, marriage implies engaging in 
an exchange of earned income for household income. Married men therefore 
specialize in work outside the home more than single men and earn more, even 
during the same number of working hours. Married men are more productive 
because of their richer work experience and their stronger need to maintain 
their earning power in the future (Kenny 1983; Bartlett and Callahan 1984). 
 While this first theory relates earnings differentials to productivity 
differentials, other economists have also presented the "perceived-need" 
hypothesis, wherein employers pay married workers more because such workers 
need to support a family. Pay scales often reflect such policy, especially in 
Europe (Bartlett and Callahan 1984). 
 A third theory mentioned in the economic literature is that of statistical 
discrimination (Siebert and Sloane 1981). According to this theory, employers 
discriminate against single men and married women because of past statistics 
relating average productivity and marital status. 
 Fourth, economists have used the human capital investment theory to 
provide an alternative explanation for observed marital-status differentials in 
productivity and earnings. According to this theory, such differentials originate 
from wives' investments in their husband's human capital (see Benham 1974). 
In a similar vein, Marxist economists have written about domestic labor 
(principally the wife's) as "the care, maintenance and continued socialization of 
human beings" (Himmelweit and Mohun 1977). 
 This last theory is closely related to the first one, for the same activities-- 
such as cooking or nurturing--in which women specialize often lead to 
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improvements in human capital; for instance, through better nutrition and 
physical or mental health. Indirect evidence for such an investment process has 
been found in the effect of wife's schooling on husband's earnings (Benham 
1974), health (Grossman 1976), and religious practice (Grossbard-Shechtman 
and Neuman 1986). Interestingly, the wife's investment theory has not been 
mentioned in much of the economic literature on this subject. 
 
 Finally, economists have theorized that causality does not necessarily 
proceed from marital status to earnings, but rather from earnings to marital 
status. Men earning higher wages are more likely to get married either because 
higher income encourages people to marry (see Becker 1981, Grossbard-
Shechtman 1984) or because the same desirable and unmeasured characteristics 
that lead to higher earnings also increase the probability of a worker being 
married (Kenny 1983). 
Theories by Other Behavioral Scientists 
 Specialization theory also takes a major place among the explanations 
sociologists and psychologists have offered for the observed marital status 
differentials. Sociologists generally call it role specialization (e.g., Parsons 
1942). 
 Social scientists attempting to explain the origin of such specialization are 
divided regarding the relative influence of nature and nurture. Psychologists 
who specialize in the study of gender differences can be found on both sides of 
the controversy (e.g., Maccoby and Jacklyn 1974). Anthropologists and 
sociologists tend to be particularly interested in demonstrating the dominance 
of cultural influences (e.g., Mead 1949), although a few have recently come to 
emphasize biological factors, basing themselves on the work of biologists. 
According to the so-called sociobiologists (e.g., Wilson 1975), biological 
differences in reproduction technology and in the ability to provide for 
dependents determine gender role specialization observed among all species, 
including the human race.1 Most researchers view existing human role 
specialization as the result of both biologically and culturally determined 
gender differences. 
 Sociologists were writing on the wife's contribution to her husband's success 
at work before economists got interested in the subject (e.g., Whyte 1956, 
Moore 1962). Sociologists differentiate between the wife's indirect 
contribution--her specialization in household tasks, which freed her husband 
from such responsibilities--and her direct contribution. 
 To designate the wife's direct assistance to her husband's success at work, 
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sociologist Papanek (1973) coined the term two-person career. The term 
implies that both members of a married couple are actually working, although 
only one of them is officially employed. 
 Sociologists and social psychologists studying wives' contributions to their 
husbands' success at work generally take a micro perspective in the sense that 
they focus on one occupation or one organization, mostly the corporation. Their 
insights often originate from careful observation of workers on the job. In 
contrast, economists writing on this subject have not paid attention to 
occupational differences in wives' contributions to husbands' success. Similarly, 
economists do not study the effect of husbands' occupation on wives' labor 
supply outside the home, a related subject of research.2 
 The following theoretical section starts with an inventory of possible 
investments wives make in their husbands' careers, derived from both the 
economic and the sociological literature. The focus is on direct contributions as 
defined above. 
 
 Theory 
Types of Wives' Contributions to their Husbands' Work Performance 
 The following discussion distinguishes between wives' direct contribution to 
their husbands' work performance by means of (1) assistance in central tasks, 
(2) investment in husbands' human capital, and (3) contributions to husbands' 
peripheral tasks and to the communication of information. 
 According to Weinstock (1963), a job often includes central and peripheral 
task specifications. Central tasks are technical requirements of the occupation 
directly related to performance. Peripheral tasks refer to the "nontechnical, 
institutionally required social aspects of the job." This distinction is helpful 
when discussing the two-person career (see Mortimer, Hall, and Hill 1978), as 
are the concepts of human capital (Becker 1964) and organizational capital 
(Tomer 1986). 
 Contributions to Husbands' Central Tasks. Wives sometimes help their 
husbands by doing the work that could be done by a paid employee. For 
instance, a saleman's wife may promote sales, or a writer's wife may type his 
manuscript. According to Kanter (1977a), the winners of one company's award 
for exceptional salesmanship all had wives without outside jobs who reported 
spending a considerable amount of time helping their husbands with sales 
work. Wives may also aid their husbands' success by acting as "sounding 
boards," thus helping their husbands think through technical work problems, or 
by giving concrete advice that will enhance productivity. The latter form of 
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direct help may be more relevant to more complex, generally professional, 
white-collar occupations. 
 
 Investment in Human Capital. This is the only direct contribution 
economists have related to (e.g., Benham 1974). The sociological literature 
mentions wives' contributions to workers' good nutrition and good physical and 
mental health. Parsons' (1942) mention of wives' expressive role relates to their 
help as a sounding board and mental health counselor. Likewise, Lasch's 
(1977) view of the family as a "haven in a heartless world" centers on the 
stress-relieving functions of the wife. 
 In addition, wives can help develop their husbands' motivation to work and 
organizational capital. The motivation argument restates in part the "marriage-
as-need-for-income" argument also mentioned in the economic literature. Using 
the sociologists' distinction between instrumental (or extrinsic) and intrinsic 
rewards of work, we see that marriage tends to increase the need for work as an 
instrument (means) to acquire goods. This is what economists generally mean 
when presenting this argument. 
 Sociologists also write of marriage as a means of promoting the intrinsic 
motivation to work--what economists call the nonpecuniary benefits of work. 
Turner (1970), for instance, mentions people's need to identify with their job as 
a major intrinsic, nonpecuniary reward of work. If a husband can get his wife to 
identify with his work, his own commitment to the job will rise; so will his 
motivation to work and, consequently, actual productivity. 
 Whereas workers have intrinsic needs for identity and commitment, 
organizations also have an interest in promoting such commitment. If the 
commitment is specific to a firm, it is often called loyalty. Such loyalty can be 
viewed as organizational human capital, a type of human capital that should be 
distinguished from technical human capital in that it enhances productivity 
through better work relations within the organization (see Tomer 1986). 
Loyalty contributes to productivity in two possible ways: by decreasing the 
likelihood that a worker will quit and by increasing his or her work effort. 
 The value of loyalty as insurance against a worker quitting follows from 
conditions of uncertainty and from the relative importance of specific on-the-
job training (see Becker, 1964). The value of loyalty as motivation to work hard 
derives in part from the absence of well-defined property rights. Once a worker 
has been hired in a team situation, his or her individual extra work effort is a 
public good. Therefore, individual workers may have an incentive to be free-
riders (Leibenstein 1982) with respect to their team or to the firm as a whole. 
Loyalty reduces free-riding tendencies by fellow workers or employees and 
therefore increases workers' productivity3. 
 Wives can contribute to their husbands' loyalty in marriage. I am assuming 
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here that the propensity for loyalty is an acquired trait, which needs to be 
learned within an organization. Since it is a general skill, individual firms have 
limited incentive to teach their workers how to be loyal (See Chapter 13). The 
family being such a pervasive organization, it can serve as a teaching ground 
for loyalty. In turn, the institution of marriage reinforces the loyalty elements in 
family relations, and women do so more actively than men (see Grossbard-
Shechtman 1982 and Chapter 9). In other words, marriage can produce loyalty. 
A similar argument has been stated by Marxist economists Himmelweit and 
Mohun (1977) when they consider the family as a producer of a disciplined 
working class. 
 In principle, corporate loyalty and family loyalty can compete with each 
other. One reason corporations frequently move their employees may be to 
subordinate family loyalty to corporate loyalty. Moreover, firms may engage in 
activities aimed at reducing the possible competition between loyalty to the firm 
and loyalty to the family. For instance, Pahl and Pahl (1971) hypothesize that 
the company's sponsorship of social events for their employees increases wives' 
willingness to support their husbands' commitment. 
 Contributions to Husbands' Peripheral Tasks and to the Communication 
of Information.  Workers get involved in activities that do not seem central to 
their job and are often unrelated at first sight. Examples of such activities are 
entertaining and participation at public events. A closer look may reveal, 
however, that such activities often promote a worker's success on the job. Such 
peripheral tasks often serve to communicate valuable information, and here a 
spouse can play an important role. 
 Parties, which can serve as an efficient means of promoting the circulation 
of information within the organization, are often catered by wives. Other 
peripheral activities enable the employee to communicate personal information 
of value to the firm that otherwise is hard to gather. 
 As mentioned earlier, the firm is interested in workers' loyalty in the hope 
that this will increase the worker's motivation to contribute to joint work 
efforts, but information on the basic character of a worker is hard to obtain. The 
wife's behavior often serves as a testimony and a clue to the character of her 
husband. 
 First, a wife makes it possible for her husband to advertise his propensity for 
loyalty by simply remaining married. Men often tend to advertize their family 
loyalty at the workplace. Kanter (1977a) reports that in the large corporation 
she studied, pictures of wives and children adorned men's offices so commonly 
that they seemed almost mandatory. Such photographs may play the role of 
advertizing loyalty to the family, possibly implying a willingness to be loyal to 
the firm as well. 
 Next, husbands working for corporations benefit from their wives' 
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involvement in charitable and community service. Similarly, wives of 
independent businessmen can help generate business by promoting a favorable 
public image via their volunteer work. In this case the wives' activities serve the 
same function as does the funding of a National Geographic TV special by an 
oil company. Companies and managers benefit from advertising goodwill and 
concern for the community, which can generate direct income for the 
independent businessman and promotion for the executive contributing to his 
corporation's sales. 
 
Hypotheses Relating Marital Differentials to Occupational Characteristics 
 Given the types of contributions wives can make to their husbands' success 
at work, it follows that occupations differ in the degree to which they allow for 
potential contributions by wives. The following hypotheses were derived from 
the theoretical considerations discussed in the previous section.  
 Hypothesis K1  
 Marital differentials will be larger in occupations with potentially steeper 
earnings profiles. 
 The more a man can possibly earn on his job, the larger the potential 
differences in earnings, and therefore the larger the potential contribution a 
wife can make by whatever means are available: indirect assistance by allowing 
the husband to specialize at work, as well as direct assistance applicable to the 
work situation. If the husband is an employee, there probably will be more 
pressure on the wife to contribute to her husband's career the higher the career 
"ceiling" and the more steps in the ladder (Tausky and Dubin 1965, Hall 1975, 
Mortimer, Hall, and Hill 1978). 
 The steepness of earnings profiles is partially a function of educational 
level.  Educated workers typically experience steeper increases in earnings over 
the life-cycle than uneducated workers.  It is therefore a corollary of Hypothesis 
K1 that marital differentials in earnings will be larger the more educated the 
workers.  
 This is one reason executives tend to benefit more from being married than 
do workers in general, and therefore why executives are more often married 
than other workers (Whyte 1956). For instance, in 1969, 93.19 percent of the 
male managers earning 15,000 a year or more were married, 72.25 percent to 
women not in the paid labor force. As income and status go up, even fewer of 
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the wives hold paid jobs, and even more of the men are married (Kanter 
1977a). 
 Self-employed men with large potential earnings are also likely to gain large 
benefits from being married. Independent businessmen or farmers with large 
growth potential, for example, may experience higher marital differentials in 
earnings than do people of similar background in career tracks without growth 
potential. Evidence for this hypothesis can be found in a study of resettled farm 
families given land with growth potential in the Columbia Basin project. The 
farmers who were most successful were more likely to have wives who 
conceived of their roles in traditional terms (Strauss 1958). 
 Although these occupational differences in marital differentials have not 
been tested rigorously, their frequent appearance should lead us to consider this 
hypothesis seriously. However, the same findings could possibly be explained 
with the help of additional hypotheses. 
 When careers have a large growth potential, generally only a small 
proportion of aspiring ladder climbers ever achieve the highest echelons. This 
often creates fierce competition and therefore stress, resulting from intensive 
efforts to move up the ladder. Kanter (1977b) calls such careers "absorptive," in 
the sense that they absorb a large fraction of a person's time and energy. The 
career-minded husband and his family experience stress in two ways: pressure 
on the husband's health and pressure on the wife and children, who must put up 
with many irregular and unpredictable demands of the husbands' job (Turner 
1970). This leads us to another hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis K2 
 The more stressful an occupation, the larger the potential marital 
differentials in earnings. 
 The wife of a husband whose occupation generates a high level of stress has 
more potential to contribute to her husband in the sense that there is more need 
for her to accommodate her husband's work demands: this constitutes an 
indirect contribution. There also is more room for direct contributions, such as 
direct assistance in central tasks and assistance in maintaining husband's 
physical and mental health.  Although careers with high growth potential often 
tend to be stressful, the two hypotheses are separable to the extent that job stress 
and adsorptiveness are measurable. Tests can be designed to ascertain how 
stress level influences marital differentials, given a certain pattern of potential 
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growth in earnings. Moreover, in performing such tests one should control for 
additional aspects of a job that are also likely to affect marital differentials. 
 Hypothesis K3 
 Marital differentials are likely to be higher in occupations involving more 
peripheral tasks. 
 As was shown in the previous section, one means by which a wife can 
promote her husband's career is by helping in peripheral tasks such as 
entertainment and community service. The more such tasks are potentially 
relevant to an occupation, the more a wife can contribute. Such tasks are more 
commonly found in high-prestige occupations (Mortimer, Hall, and Hill 1978), 
in occupations involving extensive personal contacts (Weinstock 1963), or in 
occupations highly dependent on the maintenance of a stable clientele (Moore 
1962). Therefore, we expect higher marital differentials among managers than 
among engineers of similar ability, and among owners or managers of firms 
that depend more on their public image because of the type of product they sell. 
 This hypothesis helps explain the apparently high marital differentials 
among corporate managers and independent businessmen. It also explains why 
wives of university presidents (Clodius and Magrath 1984), politicians 
(MacPherson 1975), officers in the military (Goldman 1973), and ministers 
(Taylor and Hartley 1975) can make important contributions to their husbands' 
careers. 
 Hypothesis K4 
 The more complex and potentially substitutable the central tasks of a 
husband's occupation, the larger the potential marital differentials in 
productivity and earnings. 
 Blue collar workers rarely are in a position to delegate any of their central 
tasks to their wives. In contrast, business managers and writers can have their 
wives do secretarial work, clergymen's wives can run the Sunday school, and 
wives of storekeepers can tend the store. Wives assisting in central tasks are not 
necessarily unpaid. Epstein (1971) found in her study of married lawyer teams 
that the wives did much of the paper work contributing to the husband's success 
in court or with clients. 
 Hypothesis K5 
 The more loyalty contributes to workers' productivity--for example, because 
of the profitability of investments in human capital--the larger marital 
differentials in earnings.  
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 As mentioned in the previous section, one of the ways in which wives can 
potentially contribute to their husbands' careers is by increasing the husbands' 
propensity to be loyal to the firm. Moreover, the fact that a man is married 
signals his potential for loyalty. 
 The potential need for workers' loyalty varies by occupation and by 
industrial system. Firms need loyal workers more if they consider investing in 
the workers' firm-specific skills. An industrial system such as Japan sets a 
particularly high value on loyalty to the firm (Clark 1975). It is therefore not 
surprising that employers' discrimination in terms of slower advancement of 
unmarried workers is more common in Japan than in the United States. In 
Japan, marriage also serves as a declaration of the willingness to curb 
individualistic aspirations and to contribute to organizations and to society at 
large (Hendry 1986). 
Other Hypotheses about Marital Differentials in Earnings 
 The degree to which husbands benefit from their wives' contributions is 
expected to vary not only with occupational characteristics, but also with wives' 
personal traits and the terms of marriage. Similarly, husbands' personal traits 
are expected to influence wives' earnings.  
 Spouse's Characteristics.  The larger the potential for marital differentials, 
the more men are likely to marry women who are particularly adept at 
contributing in the areas of most importance to their job. Women can possibly 
invest in their capacity to boost their husband's earnings.  
 Wives' characteristics that are most likely to contribute effectively to the 
tasks discussed earlier are a higher education and time spent in the home. As 
hypothesized by Benham (1975) 
 Hypothesis K6 
 The more educated the wife, the higher the husband's earnings. 
 Benham's finding that the husband's income increases with the wife's 
schooling, even when the husband's own education and years of work are 
controlled, supports this hypothesis. Interestingly, he found that the positive 
contribution of the wife's schooling stops at the point of graduate education, 
possibly because of the substantially higher percentage of women with graduate 
degrees who work outside the home.  
 Similarly, one expects more educated husbands to contribute more to the 
earnings of their wife than uneducated husbands. 
 Time spent in the home could be related to the wife's labor force status.  As 
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a result, it is possible that 
 Hypothesis K7  
 Husband's earnings are positively related to wife's time spent at home. 
  Evidence of the advantage of a nonworking wife from the husband's point of 
view has been offered in a study of male engineers and accountants (Burke and 
Weir 1976). Husbands of working wives reported more job pressures, expressed 
more dissatisfaction with their jobs, marriages, and other aspects of their lives, 
and manifested more symptoms of stress than the husbands of homemakers. 
 Terms of Marriage.  The same husband--with a given occupation 
employing him--and wife--with a given occupation, education, etc.--are likely 
to have different relationships depending on the terms of their marriage.  In 
part, these terms depend on the legal environment.  Under laws making divorce 
easy, most women do not want to invest in their husbands' careers as much as 
they would have invested if there is good protection against divorce. When 
divorce is easy, it may be necessary for husbands to give their wives more direct 
incentives to help them professionally than at times when divorce is difficult. 
Unilateral divorce may be a particularly strong factor discouraging investments 
by wives in their husbands' careers, as wives faced with husbands asking for a 
divorce have very few bargaining tools helping them in retrieving their 
investments in their husbands' careers.  It follows that  
 Hypothesis K8 
 When divorce laws are unilateral, wives will invest less in their husbands' 
careers than when divorce laws are not unilateral (for instance when they 
are based on mutual agreement.) 
 This hypothesis could be tested by following marital differentials in 
husbands' earnings over time across states and comparing these trends with the 
adoption of no-fault divorce laws.  More generally, predicted divorce is 
expected to have a negative effect on spousal investments in workers' 
productivity, and therefore to reduce marital differentials in earnings. 
 Similarly, expectations about traditional roles of men and women in 
marriage will affect the amount of investment by the wife in her husband's 
career. The more women accept traditional marital roles, implying few personal 
returns for their investments, the more they are likely to support their husbands' 
careers. Lopata (1971) found that wives of successful men were more likely to 
accept traditional marital roles. The more prestigious the husband's occupation, 
the more likely the wife was to turn the enjoyment of her husband's success into 
part of her reward (Mortimer, Hall, and Hill 1978). Some women may, in fact, 
be caught in a bind, not happy about the compensation they receive for their 
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contribution and unable to find better opportunities through divorce and 
remarriage. Many corporate wives suffer from marital problems, according to 
Kanter (1977a). It is not clear, however, if women investing more in their 
husband's work have worse marriages than women who invest less in their 
husband's work. 
 The presence of marital status differentials in earnings may affect the 
likelihood of divorce.  
 Hypothesis K9 
 Divorce may be less common and remarriage more rapid when men engage 
in occupations with high marital-status differentials. 
 Divorce may be less common and remarriage more rapid when men engage 
in occupations with high marital differentials. The decisions to marry and 
divorce are likely to affect earnings. Bartlett and Callahan (1984) found that 
men who were divorced or widowed and who had remarried experienced 
particularly rapid growth in wages.4 If marriage really contributes to earnings 
as is claimed here, the upward trend in divorce that has characterized recent 
decades may be one explanation for the downward trend in productivity left 
unexplained by conventional methods of study. In turn, the upward trend in 
divorce may be caused in part by legal changes which have lowered the 
protection wives receive if they invest in their husbands' careers. 
 Summary and Conclusions 
 This chapter looked at possible effects of spouses on the other spouse's 
career. For simplicity, the entire discussion was stated in terms of wife's effect 
on husband's career. In theory, the arguments presented here could also be 
applied to the effect of husbands on their wives' career. As shown in Chapter 
14, there seems to be evidence that husbands help their wives at work.5 It has 
been argued here that marital differentials in earnings are expected to vary with 
occupational characteristics (including growth potential, stress and 
adsorptiveness, amount of peripheral and central tasks involved, and need for 
loyalty), with characteristics of the spouse, and with institutional factors such as 
type of divorce laws. Preliminary evidence based on the sociological literature 
was offered in partial support of these hypotheses. 
 The above-mentioned hypotheses all have corollaries, which are derived 
from the process by which people select marital status, spouses, occupations, 
and employers. Positions with larger marital differentials are more likely to be 
filled by married men, the result of voluntary selection and possibly 
encouragement by the employer.  
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 This theory also has implications for employers' policies. First, they may 
discriminate against unmarried workers. Second, they may select two persons 
to fill a position that tends to be a two-person career. Employers in fact often 
interview wives of prospective employees as well as the applicants themselves 
(Kanter 1977a). Employers may also organize activities that encourage wives to 
contribute to their husbands' careers, such as family recreation. 
 It is hoped that further research will do more to establish the direction of 
causality so that we get a better understanding of the relationship between 
marriage and productivity at work. 
 Notes 
 1.  Economists writing on gender differentiation as it affects labor supply have 
either ignored the nature-nurture controversy or emphasized biological influences (for 
instance Becker 1981). Becker's position on this issue is consistent with his general 
view of social, legal, and political institutions as promoting long-run individual well-
being. According to this view, commonly espoused by economists, social behavior (such 
as nurturing methods) which is not based on real factor prices and endowments, is not 
socially optimal and would therefore disappear over time. This assumes competition in 
the broadest sense and the absence of exploitation of one group by another. 
 2.  A critique of the economic literature on female labor supply along these lines 
can he found in Mortimer, Hall, and Hill (1978). 
 3.  A related discussion of loyalty can be found in Akerloff (1983). 
 4.  This could also possible reflect a causality whereby higher income facilitates 
remarriage.  
 5.  The fact that there are no regular marital differentials in earnings for women 
does not mean that husbands do not help working wives.  
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 13 
                                                         A Market 
Theory of Virtue 
 as General Human Capital 
 In the long run, the public interest depends on private virtue.  
                                               --James A. Wilson 
 Abstract 
 This paper deals with one particular valuable quality which can enhance individual 
success at work, in politics, or in marriage, namely virtue or trustworthiness.  The 
theory derives a demand for virtue by employers, a supply of virtue by workers, and 
integrates demand and supply in a market for seemingly virtuous workers. Special 
attention is devoted to marriage as seemingly virtuous behavior, and more hypotheses 
are derived regarding marital differentials in earnings. Among the major insights of this 
market model of virtue are a new interpretation of the value of age, individual 
investment in virtue, and the value of making virtue general rather than specific. 
 Introduction 
 The public interest depends on private virtue. So do private interests.  Firms 
benefit from virtuous workers to the extent that workers committed to their 
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employer display a smaller tendency to quit and are less likely to destroy their 
firm's equipment. Virtue or loyalty is a means of preventing moral hazard. As 
was pointed out by Arrow (l975), "every commercial transaction has within 
itself an element of trust." Trust, a component of vir- 
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tue, facilitates productivity not only within a firm, but also in transactions of all 
kinds. 
 People and firms will therefore prefer to associate with virtuous, 
trustworthy, people.  But information on other people's virtue is extremely 
difficult to obtain.  This explains in part why firms often rely on costly devices 
to gather such information, such as extensive interviews, polygraphs or 
graphological tests. Another way for firms to get information on a job 
candidate's virtue is to consider their candidates' past behavior in other areas 
which may indicate an underlying tendency for virtue. Such behavior I call 
"seemingly virtuous behavior." Following Becker's (l964) distinction between 
general and specific human capital, it is assumed that seemingly virtuous 
behavior is of a general nature. Virtue displayed in one area of life is valuable 
to another area of life. Any human relation can serve as evidence of virtue 
valuable in the same area of life, or in a different area. Employers may 
investigate whether a person is known as a good worker, a good son or 
daughter, a good husband or wife, a good soldier, a good tenant, or a good 
citizen. Similarly, wives, husbands, or citizens may want to check on the virtue 
credentials of candidates for marriage or for public office.  
 If seemingly virtuous behavior is rewarded, individuals may invest in such 
behavior as a means of increasing their success in the future. Given the general 
nature of virtuous behavior, one obtains markets for seemingly virtuous 
individuals. 
 In the following analysis, I pursue two examples of activities in which 
people engage, at least in part, in order to invest in their virtue capital: 
marriage and military service. 
 Marriage as Seemingly Virtuous Behavior. A candidate's observed family 
behavior often serves as an indication of possible virtue, and therefore plays an 
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important role in hiring and promotion. Employers may investigate marital 
status, duration of marriage, marital fidelity, or number of children.  
Employer's preference for virtue and married men's potentially higher virtue 
relative to unmarried men is one possible explanation for the higher wages 
married workers have been observed to receive, keeping standard wage 
determinants constant.1 Some of the alternative explanations for such marital 
differentials in men's earnings are (1) that married men acquire more human 
capital and (2) that the relation between marital status and earnings is spurious: 
according to the "economics of marriage," men with higher incomes are more 
likely to be married. 
 The "economics of marriage" explanation can also account for the fact that 
marital differentials are generally found for men, and not for women, in view of 
the hypothesis that women earning more are less likely to be married.  That 
marital differentials for men exceed marital differentials for women can also be 
explained using a "seemingly virtuous" explanation: exemplary and stable 
marital behavior is more likely to indicate true virtue in the case of men than in 
the case of women.  This follows from biologically or culturally given 
differences which lead women to benefit from marital stability more than men. 
 Men who stay married despite the basic forces driving them in the opposite 
direction are more likely to be virtuous than women who more often prefer to 
stay married, an argument that was pursued in Chapters 4 and 9. The latter 
chapter documents gender asymmetry in individual preferences for 
commitment in marriage. 
 People have an incentive to advertise their seemingly virtuous family 
behavior.  Accordingly, Kanter (l977a) reports that in a large corporation 
pictures of wives and children adorned men's offices so commonly that they 
seemed almost mandatory. 
 Heroism as Seemingly Virtuous. Firms also appear to value seemingly 
virtuous behavior in the form of service to the community.  Heroism 
demonstrated at war often serves as a wage booster in countries with a recent 
history of war.  For instance, when they leave the army, Israeli officers with a 
heroic war record obtain jobs that are better than jobs offered to people with 
otherwise comparable credentials and experience.  It is expected that even at 
peace time ceteris paribus people who volunteer to more dangerous military 
positions are likely to reap some benefits from it when applying for positions 
for which a tendency for virtue is particularly appreciated. 
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 A piece of Japanese economic history can also reinforce this viewpoint.  An 
often mentioned partial explanation for l9th century Japan's economic 
revolution is the availability of a samurai class who had been trained both as 
warriors and as bureaucrats espousing the Confucian principle of public virtue. 
 These same samurai later became the captains of a modern factory system (see 
for instance, Clark l975, Morishima l982).  Their Confucian ideology stressing 
virtue benefited their own advancement as well as that of Japanese industry. 
 Next, a market model is applied to analyze seemingly virtuous behavior 
such as marriage and heroism. 
 Theory 
 Virtue is conceived of as a form of human capital in which people invest in 
order to increase their future success at work, in marriage, or in other areas 
where virtue may be valuable. I start with analyzing the demand for virtue, and 
then consider the supply and the market where demand and supply are 
juxtaposed. 
The Demand for Virtue 
 Virtue, called V, cannot be observed.  What is observable is behavior v, 
termed "seemingly virtuous behavior."  The observer does not know, however, 
whether v is behavior out of true virtue or faked virtue. It is assumed that v = 
v(V), where the first derivative is assumed to be positive. In other words, based 
on past experience, seemingly virtuous behavior is interpreted as a signal 
reflecting real virtue. I am now analyzing the demand for an individual's 
seemingly virtuous behavior by another party. First, I consider the demand for 
virtue by employers.  
 Demand by Employers. V increases a worker's i productivity, as reflected in 
the production function Qi = f(ti, Ki, Vi), where Q is output by worker i, t time 
worker i spends at work, and K physical capital the individual uses at work.  
The cross-derivatives of Q by t and V and of Q by V and K are positive, i.e. V 
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reinforces the productivity of labor and capital. 
 V's positive effect on productivity may be due to V's discouraging effect on 
the probability to quit, which in turn leads to higher levels of specific training.  
Workers' virtue also reduces shirking and could save the firm monitoring costs. 
The worker is less likely to misuse capital. If one also adds time of other 
workers to the production function, an additional source of shirking lies in the 
absence of well-defined property rights. Once a worker operates with a team his 
individual extra work effort is a public good.  Therefore, individual workers 
have an incentive to shirk and be free-riders (Leibenstein l982) with respect to 
their team or the firm as a whole. Virtue reduces free-riding tendencies by 
employees, and therefore increases workers' productivity.  Virtue in this context 
is similar to loyalty or discipline. The statements above bring some previous 
literature to mind. Marxist economists, for instance, wrote about the value 
employers derive from a well-disciplined work force (Himmelweit and Mohun 
l977, Bowles l985).  Also, Maital and Maital (l984) considered cooperative 
workers as a benefit to firms, and Ouchi (l98l) found that loyalty enhances 
productivity in Japanese firms and Z-organizations in the U.S. 
 A firm's demand for seemingly virtuous behavior v is downward-sloping if 
the marginal productivity of V is diminishing.  The aggregate demand for v by 
employers, the sum of individual demands, will also be downward-sloping. The 
demand for workers who have displayed virtuous behavior v in the past is also 
downward-sloping, as depicted, in Figure 13.1.  Employers will demand more 
seemingly virtuous behavior the larger V's contribution to productivity and the 
more v is associated with V.  
 To the aggregate demand for virtue and virtuous behavior by firms one can 
add the demand by government and the demand by potential spouses. It is 
assumed that the same virtue capital is valuable in all these different spheres of 
life. 
 Demand by Government. Public employers--eventually, the voters--value 
virtuous employees for the same reasons that they are valued by private firms. 
This explains why the entire personal history of politicians running for office 
undergoes thorough examination. Candidates can lose an election as a result of 
the disclosure of an extra-marital affair or an embarrassing military episode. 
 Demand for Virtue in Marriage. Spouses can also be viewed as each other's 
employers. Marriage markets of the kind analyzed by Becker (l974) and in 
Chapters 3 and 4 establish wages for spousal labor in ways similar to these 
observed in more conventional labor markets. It is therefore predicted that 
people displaying seemingly virtuous behavior outside their marriage will 
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receive higher quasi-wages in marriage. Although measurement problems 
make quantitative applications of this theory to the family harder to come by, 
the importance of virtue to families may make this theory even more relevant to 
the family than to the firm or the government (see Maital and Maital l984). 
Even though this theory is relevant to demand for spouses and politicians as 
well as to the demand for workers, for simplicity we will focus on workers. 
 We now look at some of the determinants of the aggregate demand for 
seemingly virtuous workers, i.e. workers who seem to have behaved virtuously 
in the past. Hypotheses are formulated in terms of one possible indicator of 
virtuous behavior: married status. The demand for seemingly virtuous workers, 
such as married workers, depends in part on the demand for (true) virtue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 13.1  Market for virtuous workers 
 
 Determinants of the Demand for V, Actual Virtue. Workers' virtue is more 
likely to be valuable to employers in the following circumstances: 
 More capital-intensive jobs. Capital and labor generally complement each 
other, and worker's productivity is higher when workers use more capital. 
Consequently, the value of virtue and of seemingly virtuous behavior such as a 
reputable marital history are higher in jobs with higher capital intensity. It 
follows that  
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 Hypothesis K10 
 The more a job is capital-intensive, the more one expects marital 
differentials in earnings. 
 Hourly or monthly contract. When type of contract makes shirking more 
likely, virtue is more valuable to the employer. For instance, if workers are paid 
by the hour shirking is more likely than if workers are paid by piece-rate. It 
follows that 
 Hypothesis K11 
 Higher marital differentials in earnings are expected in salaried jobs than 
in piece-rate jobs. 
 Bureaucracy. In large corporations or bureaucracies, where it is easier for a 
worker to act as a free rider at the expense of fellow workers, virtue can be 
more valuable than in small organizations. The more bureaucratic an 
organization the more shirking is potentially beneficial and the harder it is to 
monitor work efforts. It is consequently not surprising that the ultimate 
employers in a democracy, the taxpayers, seem to pay a lot of attention to 
seemingly virtuous behavior when voting for politicians. Voters seem to look 
for leaders capable of transcending self-interested motivations (Hirshleifer 
l987). They often value any superficial indication of such motivation as 
expressed by the apparently virtuous attitudes of politicians towards wife, 
children, and even grandchildren. Heroism in war (and peace) seems to be 
rewarded in politics too. Politicians can generally improve their public image 
by ostentatiously attending church services. 
 In non-democratic regimes aspiring public servants can also reap benefits 
from displaying seemingly virtuous behavior and from openly espousing 
benevolent ideologies. Perhaps even more so than in democracies, as the 
potential losses the public stands to lose from shirking by its "servants" are so 
large.  The traditional Chinese and Japanese tested their bureaucrats for their 
knowledge of Confucian principles. Candidates for leadership in the Catholic 
church and Marxist regimes need (needed) to appear as staunch defendants of 
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the loftier parts of the official doctrines. 
 Given the value of virtue in bureaucracies, it follows that 
 Hypothesis K12 
 The more bureaucratic an organization, the more one expects marital 
differentials in earnings. 
 Longer tenure. Virtue is more valuable in cases where quits are more costly, 
in part a matter of industrial structure. In Japan, for example, expected job 
tenure is higher than in the United States. Consequently, 
 Hypothesis K13 
 Higher marital differentials in earnings are expected in jobs with long 
expected tenure than in jobs with high quit and lay-off rates.  
 Accordingly, marital differentials in earnings are expected to be larger in a 
country like Japan, where workers hold longer tenure at their jobs, than in the 
United States. For instance, while in the United States some doors close to 
unmarried candidates in the corporate and political world, that is even more so 
in Japan, where firms also act as marriage-brokers (Browning l985). 
 Type of task. Virtue is more valuable where a worker is employed in a task 
more amenable to shirking. For example, it is easier to shirk for a worker 
employed in marketing than for a worker producing a physical object (see 
Barzel 1987). We thus obtain the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis K14 
 The more tasks are amenable to shirking, the more the workers performing 
these tasks are expected to experience marital differentials in earnings. 
 Creativity. To the extent that emphasis on loyalty hinders creativity, virtue 
is going to be more in demand in less creative tasks (see Maital and Maital 
1984 on innovation and corporate culture). 
 Hypothesis K15 
 The less tasks are creative, the more the workers performing these tasks are 
expected to experience marital differentials in earnings. 
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 Certain professions are likely to experience marital differentials in earnings 
for a number of reasons related to hypotheses 10 to 15 presented here and to 
many of the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. For instance, 
corporate executives hold capital-intensive positions, corporations tend to be 
bureaucratic institutions, more responsibility and a higher place in the 
corporate ladder opens more opportunities for shirking, earnings profiles of 
executives are steep, and executives can expect long tenure. Accordingly, the 
positive differential between the earnings of married and unmarried men is 
expected to be larger in the case of corporate executives than among other 
workers with similar characteristics. 
 The following are suggestive facts. In 1969, 93.1 percent of the male 
managers earning $l5,000 or more (nearly all managers) were married. That 
percentage rose as salaries increased. Senior executives also seem to be much 
more likely to stay married to the same wife than men in the same age bracket. 
For instance, according to a recent survey of children (between l4 and 22 years 
old) of senior executives in U.S. corporations with sales of $70 million or more, 
only a surprisingly low 8 percent had parents who had ever been separated or 
divorced (Crossen l985). In contrast, the father of an average child in that age 
group who would on the average be forty years old in l980 had approximately a 
30 percent probability of having been divorced (Schoen and Kluegel 1985). An 
alternative interpretation seems unconvincing. In principle, causality could run 
the other way: the high income earned by executives could increase the 
likelihood of marriage and reduce the likelihood of divorce. But men earning 
higher incomes might have a higher tendency to divorce than men with average 
incomes. In particular, Becker, Landes, and Michael (l977) have shown that 
men earning more than would be expected at time of marriage (possibly the 
case of many successful corporation managers) are more likely to get divorced 
than men earning similar incomes in jobs where virtue is less valuable. 
 Other Determinants of the Demand for v, Seemingly Virtuous Behavior. 
The demand for v is also larger the more v is likely to vary positively with V.  
This is more likely the more v is of a general nature.    
 The generality of virtue is an important element of the demand for 
seemingly virtuous behavior.  If a good husband is also a good worker, his 
virtue is of a general nature.  If what makes a soldier or a worker good is of use 
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to others, his virtue is general and not specific to the context in which he 
operated. The more virtue is of a general nature, the more seemingly virtuous 
behavior expressed in one sphere of behavior is applicable to other spheres, and 
the higher the demand for seemingly virtuous behavior. 
 We now turn to an analysis of the supply of workers who have displayed 
seemingly virtuous behavior. 
The Supply of Virtuous Behavior 
 Short Run Supply. At any given time t, an individual can engage in j kinds 
of seemingly virtuous activities.  Each activity vtj produces utility. For example, 
a two-period utility function is presented as 
where xt are market goods. Activity v11 is work in period 1. Other activities 
could be various forms of leisure or work performed for a spouse, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. It is assumed that no activities are joint. The individual vtj's are 
generally positively related to (the stock of) V. The individual maximizes this 
utility function subject to a time constraint 
 and a budget constraint  
where r is a discount rate. 
 In period 1, the first activity v11 is assumed to be the only one generating 
income. The individual knows that his wage in period 2, w2, varies positively 
with the experience the individual accumulates in period 1, including past 
seemingly virtuous behavior. Some activities may be consciously chosen in 
period one in order to advertise one's potential for virtue. In other words, the 
individual might invest in some activities vtj with the purpose of increasing 
future wages, or may engage in more such activity than would otherwise be the 
case. 
 Consider the example of workers. Workers may get married in period 1 and 
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display exemplary devotion to their family, thereby increasing their wage in 
period 2. Likewise, volunteers to the marines or other relatively dangerous 
assignments may have such investment in mind. In that sense, volunteer 
activities generate information as a beneficial side effect. 
 The supply of a seemingly virtuous activity vj is upward sloping if the 
marginal disutility of engaging in such activity vj increases with vj. By 
definition, virtue implies that an individual gives up some personal utility for 
the benefit of others. The disutility of vj can be expressed in terms of the 
foregone utility of another vj producing more utility at the margin (follows from 
the first-order conditions of optimization). The higher the return to vj in terms 
of higher wages in the next period, the more a person is willing to engage in vj 
and to move along his supply curve. The better the substitutes to vj available to 
the individual, the more elastic the supply. 
 More virtuous people, i.e. people with higher stocks of V, will have a supply 
that lies to the right of that of people who are less virtuous. It is also expected 
that for many activities vtj virtuous people will supply a positive number of 
hours at zero wage. The supply of some activities may be more wage elastic 
than that of others, depending on various institutional and technical 
constraints. 
 The individual faking virtue is giving up much less when engaging in a 
given form of vj than the individual who really attempts to serve others' needs. 
Consequently, fakers may supply more of a given type of vj than genuinely 
virtuous people.2 
 The aggregate supply of seemingly virtuous activity is obtained by 
aggregating individual supplies. 
 Long Run Supply. The model above assumed the stock of virtue V as given. 
The model could be expanded to include investment in V. Virtue may be 
learned from experience. In that case the stock of V in period 2 would increase 
when the person engages in seemingly virtuous activities during period l.4 
 Individuals could also invest in their stock of V by consciously altering the 
"internal locus of control," governing their behavior. (If they solely fake virtue 
they are influenced by an "external locus of control" such as the firm that will 
reward them or the concerned father analyzed by Becker in the Rotten Kid 
theorem).5 
 Virtue can be acquired in various ways, using the intellect, feelings, actions, 
or a combination of these.  An analysis of the mechanisms for such acquisition 
is beyond this chapter's scope. Deliberate exposure to virtuous people is one 
possible strategy which involves some learning-by-doing, i.e. virtue is acquired 
through action. 
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 This type of voluntary reinforcement of one's virtuous tendencies is a case of 
deliberate character planning, and relates to the idea of pre-commitment which 
has previously been discussed by economists.  Akerlof and Dickens (1982), for 
instance, report that when given freedom in job selection, workers tend to show 
signs of cognitive dissonance. They tend to ignore information which does not 
suit them. For instance, they build beliefs whereby they perceive their work as 
safer than it actually is. Van Raaij (l984) mentions that people may take ski or 
piano lessons in order to learn to appreciate skiing or music, an example more 
directly related to the learning-by-doing of virtue. Similarly individuals may 
seek the company of virtuous people in marriage, friendship, religious groups, 
or at work. 
 Precommitment to virtuous groups reminds of Thaler and Shefrin's (1981) 
Christmas clubs. People give up some interest earnings in order to commit part 
of their income for use during a particular season. Also, Schelling's (1978) 
discussion of self-management deals with steps people can take to improve 
themselves. Exposed to short run benefits obvious to the doer part of their 
personality (immediate spending) and long run benefits their planner is aware 
of (Christmas shopping), people may decide to join Christmas clubs where they 
receive lower interest on their savings but a guarantee that money will be 
available right before Christmas.  Likewise, people may join Alcoholics 
Anonymous or Weight Watchers or, more relevant here, a group emphasizing 
virtue. 
 Here are some of the factors affecting the supply of workers who have 
engaged in seemingly virtuous behavior in the past: 
 1. The cost of engaging in seemingly virtuous behavior. That cost could be 
low if faking virtue is easy, in part because of little social control. For 
instance, a man can pretend he is a good husband, and nobody may 
check on whether that is true or not. In turn, social controls may be a 
function of size of the community, for example. 
 2. The amount of (true) virtue the person has accumulated in the past, i.e. 
virtue capital. The more V, the less seemingly virtuous behavior is costly. 
The teaching of virtue may be subsidized by government or religious 
organizations. The more such subsidies, the larger the supply of virtuous 
behavior.  
 3. The degree of generality of V, virtue capital. Experience in different areas 
of life can then contribute more to the total stock of V a person has 
accumulated. The more V, the lower the cost of virtuous behavior. 
 All these factors lead to a larger supply of virtuous workers, which will be 
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reflected in a shift to the right in Figure 13.1. 
Markets for Virtuous Behavior 
 A market for seemingly virtuous workers is generated when demand and 
supply are juxtaposed. In period 2, employers have a demand for workers who 
displayed seemingly virtuous behavior in period l. On the horizontal axis in 
Figure 13.1 is the total number of hours of work by workers who displayed 
virtue in period 1. The supply by workers in period 2 is based on actions in 
period 1 and responds to rewards in period 2. 
 This market is defined for a given level of average faking by workers. If 
faking is common, seemingly virtuous behavior is easy to engage in, and the 
market will be flooded with a lot of seemingly virtuous workers. Also, demand 
for seemingly virtuous workers will be low. Consequently, employers end up 
paying little extra for such workers. Likewise, employers will pay little for past 
seemingly virtuous behavior if there is a large supply of workers with such 
experience due to social subsidies for the teaching of virtue. In contrast, where 
virtue is scarce, i.e. the supply of seemingly virtuous behavior is small, 
employers will pay a large bonus for workers who seem to be virtuous. 
 These insights can be applied to the subject of marital differentials in 
earnings, as marital experience is one kind of seemingly virtuous behavior 
which tends to be rewarded by employers. The lower the reward for seemingly 
virtuous workers, the lower marital differentials in earnings. 
 Hypothesis K16 
 Higher marital differentials in earnings are expected in societies where 
faking virtue is uncommon. 
 This implies that if faking virtue becomes less acceptable over time, the 
bonus to virtuous workers would increase. 
 Hypothesis K17 
 The more virtue is a widespread characteristic in a society, the less one 
expects marital differentials in earnings.  
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 This implies that if people become less virtuous over time, the bonus to 
virtuous workers would increase. 
 It is possible for example, as suggested by Phelps (1991), that the aggregate 
supply of seemingly virtuous behavior shifted to the left between l957 and l976. 
Veroff's measure of power motivation in situations where men and women 
interact, the measure used by Phelps that could be interpreted as inversely 
related to virtue, increased during those years. This would imply that the pay-
off to workers exhibiting marital stability would also have increased during 
those years. 
 At the same time, however, the upward trend in divorce that occurred 
during that period, may decrease the demand by employers for workers who 
have exhibited marital stability. When divorce is so common, actual marital 
stability may indicate many things besides qualities of virtue in the worker.  
 One can construct separate markets for different kinds of workers. In the 
market for vj by executives, one expects a high demand for vj, as virtue is very 
important to the employer. The more executives are willing to engage in 
virtuous activities, i.e. the more the supply shifts to the right, the lower the 
actual reward for engaging in vj. Employers clearly benefit from a virtuous 
population. 
 The state benefits from a virtuous population in its capacity of employer. 
Moreover, it is in a nation's best interest to have a virtuous population to the 
extent that this will increase productivity in all activities, private or public. The 
more virtuous the population, the more there will be volunteering and other 
activities furthering the public good (Weisbrod l977, Hirshleifer l987, Maital 
and Maital l984, and Guttman l985). 
 Policy Implication: General Standards for Virtue  
 In a market for (seemingly) virtuous behavior, employers (and others) 
demand such behavior, and workers supply such behavior. The pay-off for 
having exhibited virtuous behavior in the past is a function of factors 
influencing both demand and supply of virtuous behavior.  
 Given virtue's contribution to productivity, it is in a nation's interest to 
promote it. One of the ways states have attempted to raise the amount of virtue 
capital in a population is by playing a direct role in educating and regulating 
the public. 
 This paper suggests a novel way by which a nation can encourage individual 
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investments in virtue: it can emphasize the generality of individual virtuous 
tendencies. By promoting the general acceptance of well-established standards 
of virtue and seemingly virtuous behavior, the state increases the benefits 
individuals can derive from behaving virtuously, and therefore encourages the 
acquisition of virtue.  
 For instance, let us assume a given stock of virtue in the population, with a 
considerable part of that virtue oriented towards specific groups such as 
families, neighborhoods, firms, tribes, or religious groups. If virtue capital 
accumulated from experience with one group lacks generality, i.e. it is specific 
to that group, the potential benefits individuals can reap from acting virtuously 
are limited. Therefore individuals will not be very motivated to learn how to be 
virtuous. 
 More specifically, if a society is divided by race, and virtue exhibited with 
one race in the form of seemingly virtuous behavior is not valued later by an 
employer from the other race, individuals are less likely to learn how to be 
virtuous. Their expected benefits from investing in virtue capital are lowered by 
the existence of racism which lowers the generality of their virtue capital. 
 If the state intervenes and encourages substitution of more universal virtue 
for the virtue existing within groups, individuals can gain more from being 
virtuous; consequently more investment in virtue will occur, the total stock of 
virtue will rise, and average productivity will rise. In other words 
 Hypothesis K18 
 The more general the standards of virtue in a society, the higher average 
worker's productivity. 
 States have played a major role in increasing the generality of virtue. One 
strategy often used towards that goal is for the state to adopt an official religion, 
such as Anglicanism in England, Confucianism in China, or Lutheranism in 
Sweden. National standardization of virtuous tendencies can also be achieved 
through a variety of national symbols and standards such as royalty, presidency, 
or a Constitution. Nationalism is thus valuable as a means of generalizing 
virtue capital.  
 Some of the most dramatic jumps in economic growth observed in the past 
can be used as suggestive evidence for the hypothesis advanced here.  For 
instance, Europe's transformation from separate feudal fiefs into national 
boundaries helped its economic expansion because it reduced the amount of 
internal malevolence (violence) inside a country, as is commonly argued by 
298 General Human Capital 
 
 
 
economic historians. 
 Given the contribution of private virtue to the public interest and the other 
benefits of virtue mentioned above, one may view the emergence of modern 
economic growth in Europe as the result not only of the neutralization of inter-
tribal and other internal malevolence, but also as the result of the inculcation of 
national standards of virtue. The same perspective can also be used to integrate 
the often-noted fact that England and Japan, two of the most noteworthy 
pioneers in modern economic growth, are islands in which a distinctive 
national character had developed more than was the case on the adjacent 
mainland.  This encouraged more individual investments in virtue, and 
consequently more economic growth. As to the United States' economic 
success, it may be in part attributed to the general standards for individual 
virtue promoted by the American Constitution and other institutions central to 
the United States. 
 Nationalism, while promoting general standards of virtue within a nation, 
has a cost if it involves lowering the value of other nations, thereby creating 
potential international conflicts. At the present, when economic growth occurs 
within a global context, societies promoting the more general standards for 
virtue at an international level are likely to create more incentives for their 
workforce to invest in virtue, and thereby giving that society a comparative 
advantage in workers' productivity. The more general standard for virtue 
promoted in the United States in comparison to most other countries may 
explain part of the dominating role the United States is playing in today's 
global economy. 
 Summary 
 Employers appreciate virtue in workers and are therefore willing to pay 
seemingly virtuous workers a bonus and to speed up their promotion. Workers 
are willing to act as if they were virtuous or to actually be virtuous, in part as a 
result of the incentives employers give them. Among the insights the market 
model presented here has generated one can count (l) the value of general 
virtue versus virtue specifically good for a particular group, (2) the idea of 
investment in virtue, (3) a list of the determinants of seemingly virtuous 
behavior, (4) more hypotheses regarding the determinants of marital 
differentials in earnings, and (5) implications for public policy. 
 An implication for public policy that was emphasized is the importance of 
general standards for virtuous behavior as a means of contributing to economic 
growth. 
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 Notes 
 1.  For more on the relation between marriage and productivity at work, see 
Chapter 10. 
 2.  To these hypocrites one can apply the statement by Pope "Hypocrisy is the 
tribute that vice pays to virtue" (citation contributed by Jack Hirshleifer).  
 3.  This is a major justification rabbis have given for the biblical commandments 
that men get married and be nice to their wife during the first year of marriage. Jewish 
law does not impose parallel commandments on women. 
 4.  These kinds of locus of control have been introduced by Rotter (l966). 
Becker's (l976) concerned father displays what I call seemingly virtuous behavior to his 
children. It is not clear if he is truly virtuous when he gives goods to his children, see 
also Phelps (l988). 
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                                                         A Study 
of Spousal Help 
 Among Israeli Managers 
 (with Dafna N. Izraeli and Shoshana Neuman) 
 Abstract 
 This study examines the factors that contribute to a manager's receiving spousal 
support for his/her career. Two theoretical approaches--human capital and cultural 
norms - generate hypotheses tested on a sample of 869 men and women managers in 
Israel. Results of linear and logit regressions, run separately by gender, with education, 
earnings, age, children, religiosity and ethnic origin as independent variables, revealed 
that spousal support is better explained for women than for men, and that husbands help 
more when it is most productive to do so. Cultural norms also contribute to explaining 
spousal support. 
 Introduction 
 
 There is evidence that a person's success at work is based, in part, on 
benefits received from others. The transmission of human capital is more likely 
to take place in marriage than in other nonmarket associations, as there are 
greater incentives to share acquired abilities and for each mate to enhance the 
productivity of the other within the household (Benham 1974).  
Furthermore, the transaction costs within marriage are lower than in other 
settings because of physical proximity and ease of communication. 
 Most theorizing on the subject of spousal help has focussed on the auxiliary 
functions provided by a wife to her husband (See Chapter 12). More recently 
there is growing interest in the husband's contribution to family work, 
including child care and domestic labor (Coverman 1985, Pleck 
 
                                                 
 
Spousal Help 301 
 
 
 
Adapted from "When Do Spouses Support a Career? A Human Capital Analysis of 
Israeli Managers and their Spouses," working paper, 1991. 
1985). A spouse can contribute to his or her mate's effective stock of human 
capital in many ways. Spousal help is of an indirect nature if the spouse enables 
the person to spend more time at work for example, by freeing the worker from 
chores associated with the household and other non-work obligations or by 
providing encouragement and moral support needed to sustain a person at work 
(Moore 1962, Mincer 1962, Becker 1965). Spouses can also provide direct 
assistance such as entertainment of colleagues and  clients, clerical help, and 
access to information through personal contacts and other means. Where the 
expectation of direct spousal assistance is an institutionalized characteristic of 
the work role--as in the case of doctors, (Gerber 1983, Lorber 1984) diplomats 
and the clergy (Railings and Pratto 1984)--we have a "two-person single 
career" (Papanek 1973). In such arrangements women are generally the unpaid 
partners who provide support to their husbands' occupational role. 
 Men's greater access to spousal help is often mentioned as an explanation 
for the substantially higher earnings of married men in comparison to 
unmarried men (Grossbard-Shechtman 1986). According to this view, marriage 
not only provides additional incentives for human capital accumulation, but 
also facilitates such accumulation either through wife's help in financing 
(Kenny 1983) or more direct help. An alternative explanation for the higher 
earnings of married men, however, argues that men who earn more are more 
likely to be married (Adler and Izraeli 1988). 
 Human capital theory has also been used to explain why married women do 
not earn more than their unmarried counterparts. This difference between men 
and women with regard to the benefits of marriage seems to indicate that wives 
help their husbands' careers more than husbands help their wives' careers 
(Hochschild 1989). Such a conclusion is also shared by observers of particular 
workplaces such as the university (Doenias 1988, Hochschild 1989). Observing 
the greater benefits accrued to men from marriage than to women led 
sociologist Jessie Bernard (1972) to distinguish between "his marriage" and 
"her marriage." 
 Most economic and sociological studies have tended to treat spousal help 
primarily as an independent variable with important consequences for 
husbands' earnings and wives' decisions regarding labor market participation 
(Mortimer 1980). Much less is known about spousal help as a dependent 
variable. Until recently, its determinants have hardly been explored, an 
exception being Coverman (1985). 
    This study, a joint enterprise between a sociologist and two economists, 
draws on theoretical contributions from both disciplines. It addresses the 
question - when is a worker more likely to receive spousal assistance? Spousal 
assistance is here defined in both general and subjective terms as what the 
respondent perceives to be assistance. This strategy avoids presumptions about 
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how persons define assistance and the problem of gender asymmetries in the 
significance attributed to specific kinds of assistance. For example, women may 
view husbands' investments in child care as spousal assistance to their careers 
while men may not regard identical behavior on the part of their wives in 
similar terms. Our purpose is to identify the factors that influence spousal help 
and to examine gender differences in the extent of help received. The 
hypotheses are tested on a sample of Israeli managers. 
 Theoretical Framework 
     We analyze the determinants of spousal help within two theoretical 
frameworks: human capital theory and cultural norms, as summarized in Table 
14.1. We start by using human capital theory in order to explain the presence of 
spousal help. Human capital is defined as any skill people have which enhances 
their success or productivity in performing valuable activities. There are two 
ways in which spousal help can contribute to a person's human capital: it can 
enhance (1) performance at work and (2) performance in the home. To the 
extent that a spouse helps a worker's performance at work, this is considered 
direct help. To the extent that a spouse helps a worker's performance at home, 
it is considered indirect help.  
 The actual degree to which a spouse helps a worker's productivity at work is 
determined by the supply of help by the spouse and by the demand for spousal 
help by the worker. The more human capital the spouse possesses, the more 
productive spousal help can be, and the greater the demand for spousal help, 
both direct and indirect. Also, the demand for spousal help will be greater the 
more opportunities there are for the spouse to help both at work and at home. 
For instance, if the worker and spouse have a large household, there are more 
opportunities for the spouse to provide indirect help that will enable the worker 
to devote more time to a career. Any factor that increases the supply of spousal 
help or that increases the demand for spousal help is likely to be associated 
with more actual spousal help. 
 Given overall gender differences in responsibilities towards work and home, 
we expect employed men to benefit more from spousal help than employed 
women to the extent that men tend to spend more hours in paid work than 
women. Therefore, any given spousal investment in a man's career is likely to 
generate more added earnings than a similar investment by a spouse in a 
woman's career. However, from the perspective of work at home, a spouse is 
more likely to benefit a female worker than a male worker given social norms 
that women be more active in the home. Under such conditions, there are more 
ways men can help their wives in home-related tasks than vice-versa, and 
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therefore, from this perspective, female workers are more likely to demand 
spousal help than are male workers. Such gender asymmetry is especially likely 
to occur where young children are involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 It thus appears that from a perspective of potential for direct help, male 
workers are likely to demand more spousal help than female workers. However, 
from a perspective of indirect help, female workers are likely to demand more 
spousal help than male workers. Combining the two perspectives does not 
generate clear predictions regarding gender differences in demand for spousal 
help. From the perspective of supply of spousal help, there are no a-priori 
reasons to expect gender differences. 
  We now look at a number of factors that can influence either the supply of 
spousal help or the demand for spousal help. Most of the hypotheses based on 
Human Capital theory are consequences of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 
12.  Whereas the hypotheses presented so far dealt with marital earnings 
differentials, the hypotheses summarized in the first column of Table 14.1 deal 
with spousal help. 
 First, as mentioned in the corollary to Hypothesis K1, the more educated the 
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worker, the more a spouse can (and, therefore, probably will) contribute to the 
worker's success directly or indirectly (by freeing the worker from household 
tasks). The tasks of more educated managers are also likely to be more complex 
and to offer more opportunities for direct help by a spouse (see Hypothesis K4). 
 It therefore follows that 
 Hypothesis K19 
 The more educated the worker, the more spousal help is expected. 
 Second, as hypothesized in Hypothesis K6, the productivity of spousal help 
is likely to increase with the spouse's education. Education enhances the 
productivity of both direct and indirect help provided by the spouse. Analyses 
based on male workers in the United States (Benham 1974), Iran (Scully 1979), 
Hong Kong (Wong 1986) and Israel (Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman, 
1991) have all shown that the more educated the wife, the more the husband 
earns, which can be interpreted in terms of a human capital investment by the 
wife in her husband's earnings potential. Also, when both spouses are educated, 
communication between spouses seems to be enhanced (as argued in Chapter 
15) which could cause the spouse's contribution to worker's productivity at 
work to increase. 
 It is therefore predicted that 
 Hypothesis K20 
 The more educated the spouse, the more spousal help is expected. 
 Third, relative earnings will have an impact on spousal help. The 
specialization hypothesis (Becker 1965, Mincer 1962) suggests that the more a 
person earns relative to his or her spouse, the more a person will specialize in 
the workplace and consequently the more the other spouse will engage in 
household tasks providing indirect help towards the success of the spouse 
earning more. Therefore, when a person's earnings are significantly greater 
than those of his/her spouse, making the spouse's time less valuable than the 
person in question, the spouse is more likely to assist than when the person 
earns significantly less than his/her spouse. In the case of two spouses working 
outside the home, specialization implies that the worker earning more has a 
higher demand for total time spent by the spouse in indirect help.  This 
hypothesis is related to Hypothesis K7. 
 At the same time, workers earning less and specializing in the home also 
have a demand for spousal help. Due to such workers' large scope of activities 
and high productivity in the home (as in the case of most working mothers) the 
potential productivity of spousal help is higher. This will be translated in 
higher demand for spousal help by workers who are active in the home than by 
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workers who are not very active at home. In sum, 
 Hypothesis K21 
 There is no clear prediction regarding the effect of relative earnings on 
spousal help. 
 Fourth, age of the worker is predicted to affect spousal help. Careers have 
been conceptualized (Hall 1976, Rosenbaum 1984, Schein 1979) as moving 
through sequential stages beginning with rapid advancement, followed by 
increasingly slower advancement and a mid-life plateau and then declining into 
retirement. Spousal assistance is more effective and consequently expected to be 
greatest, at the beginning of a person's career when the opportunities for 
advancement are greatest. Again, this relates to Hypothesis K1. One would also 
expect younger spouses of workers to find it more profitable to invest as they 
may have a lifetime of joint benefits from these investments. 
 The demand for spousal help is also likely to vary with age to the extent that 
younger workers are more active in the home than older workers, mostly due to 
the presence of young children. Furthermore, the more health problems a 
worker has, the more a spouse can potentially help in the home providing 
health care. This is more likely to be the case with older workers, especially if 
one also views the prevention of health problems as an aspect of spousal 
investments in human capital. A combination of all these considerations related 
to age leads us to predict a non-linear relationship between age and spousal 
help, a spouse being more likely to help at the beginning and at the end of the 
life-cycle. This implies that 
 Hypothesis K22 
 The relationship between spousal help and worker's age is U-shaped. The 
predicted effect of age is negative and that of age squared is positive. 
 It also follows that the younger a worker's children, the larger the demand 
for spousal indirect help, and the more spousal help may be reported. This is 
especially likely to be the case with female workers.  
 An alternative theoretical perspective, a normative one, argues that spousal 
help is closely related to one's values and beliefs and these are shaped by the 
culture and role models available in one's significant environment. Social 
norms determine both the kind and the amount of help that one spouse gives to 
another. Hypotheses based on this normative view are summarized in Column 2 
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of Table 14.1. The fact that societal norms generally define the woman's role as 
that of helpmate to her husband leads us to expect that men receive more help 
than do women. This is especially the case when one or both of the partners 
have more traditional attitudes toward gender roles in marriage. For this reason 
we hypothesize that religiosity and ethnic origin, culture rich identities, have an 
impact on spousal help. Among managers who are more religiously orthodox or 
those who originate from more religiously orthodox families, as well as among 
managers originating from the more traditional Moslem countries of the 
Middle-East and North Africa (Eastern origin) and married to spouses of 
Eastern origin, men will receive more and women less spousal help than among 
managers who are non-religious or who originate from Europe or America 
(Western origin). 
 Similarly, older people are likely to be more influenced by traditional 
stereotypes about gender roles so that from the perspective of social norms we 
expect older men to receive more and older women to receive less spousal help. 
 There is research evidence of a relationship between husbands's education 
and egalitarian division of labor in the family (Katz and Peres 1988). More 
educated husbands tend to have more egalitarian attitudes and therefore, we 
expect, would be more supportive of the wives' careers than less educated 
husbands. On the other hand, social norms generally require that women earn 
less than their husbands (for a review see Hertz 1992). When women's earnings 
are equal to or greater than those of their husbands, husbands may be less 
supportive of their careers (Hochschild 1989) than when women comply with 
social norms and remain the proverbial "two steps behind" (Bernard 1974). 
 As can be seen from Table 14.1, the predictions from human capital theory 
and from cultural theory do not always coincide.  Our tests will help us 
distinguish between the two theories. 
 The predictions derived from the different theoretical perspectives were 
tested on data collected from a sample of married male and female Israeli 
managers and their spouses. Women managers in Israel, differ from those in 
the United States and many countries of Europe in that a higher proportion are 
married and have children, and they constitute a small proportion of total 
managers: 15 percent compared to 37 percent in the U.S. (For a review of the 
cross cultural literature on women in management, see Adler and Izraeli 1988, 
Antal and Izraeli in press). Childcare services in Israel are more highly 
developed than in the United States but less so than in France and the 
Scandinavian countries. But the similarities between managers across 
countries, especially between the U.S. and Israel, are greater than the 
differences. In Israel professional training is based on the American model and 
major texts in almost all fields are from the U.S. In all countries women 
managers are concentrated in the lower ranks of the hierarchy and are found 
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more in staff than in line positions. They earn less than men and less than their 
husbands and have primary responsibility for childcare and domestic work. 
 The generalizability of the findings, however, depends less on the 
representativeness of the sample than on the validity of the theoretical model. It 
is likely that the effects of the specific variables that contribute to the extent of 
spousal help that a worker receives will differ somewhat across cultures. 
However, we expect that our results, based on an Israeli sample, will be 
indicative of the direction of effects of similar variables on spousal help in other 
cultures. 
 Methodology 
The Sample 
 The data, part of Izraeli's larger study of family-work relations were 
collected in 1984 from 869 Israeli managers (416 women and 453 men) 
employed in a variety of firms, including industrial, retailing, financial services 
and public services organizations. The sample is unique in that the men and 
women are matched for organization, managerial level and field of managerial 
specialization, allowing for a more valid gender comparison than is usually 
possible. Matching was accomplished by the following process: within each 
firm all the women managers (defined as those responsible for the work of 
others and having significant discretion in carrying out their job) were 
identified and included in the sample. A comparable sample of male managers 
were added. Wherever it was not possible to match for type of job and job level 
or grade, a close approximation was selected. The personnel manager in each 
firm distributed the questionnaires which were then returned anonymously by 
respondents directly to the researcher in self-addressed envelopes. The response 
rate was 58 percent. Only married managers were included in the present 
analysis. Of the original sample 90 percent of the men and 81.3 percent of the 
women were married, approximately 94 percent of each for the first time. 
 Table 14.2 documents some of the characteristics of the subsample of 
married managers we selected. We observe that the women were slightly 
younger and slightly more educated than the men. Fewer of them were 
religious. Only 20 percent of the women compared to almost 30 percent of the 
men described themselves as religiously orthodox or traditional. One third of 
the women and almost half of the men came from homes where their parents 
were religiously orthodox or traditional. The gender gap may be explained in 
terms of expectations that religious and traditional families have regarding the 
role of women in society. For example, religiosity in Israel is an important 
predictor of work attitudes (Hartman 1978). Traditional families do not 
encourage women to select careers such as management where it is difficult to 
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combine work and family life. 
 We also observe a gender gap in ethnic origin 2: 28 percent of the men but 
only 17 percent of the women were of Asian-African origin. The difference, 
here too, reflects not only the more traditional attitudes of Asian and African 
families but also the ethnic difference in educational achievement.  Education is 
an especially important resource for women's access to managerial positions 
(Izraeli 1988). 
 And finally, we observe (Table 14.2), that women contributed significantly 
less to the total household income than did the men (47 percent compared 
to 72 percent). Data on managers' absolute income were not available. This 
gender gap in contribution to  family  income  reflects  both  women's lower 
 TABLE 14.2  Sample Characteristics: Means and Standard Deviations, 
 Israeli Managers, 1987. 
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earnings (Efroni 1988) and the fact that spouses of female managers earn more 
than do the spouses of male managers. In part, this is due to differences in labor 
force participation. For example, in our sample 55 percent of the men but only 
5 percent of the women were married to a spouse who was either unemployed 
or worked part-time. 
 Table 14.2 also presents the means and standard deviations for spousal help. 
Men and women gave almost identical evaluations of spousal help. On a scale 
from 1 to 5, all managers ranked their spouses' help on average at 3.9. Also, 69 
percent of the women and 65 percent of the men claimed that their careers were 
enhanced by spousal assistance. The standard deviations were also similar. 
Significant gender differences, however, are noticeable in type of help received. 
More women than men reported receiving some or much professional advice 
from their spouse (43 percent compared to 18 percent) while more men than 
women reported being helped with social connections (36 percent compared to 
27 percent). Approximately 80 percent of both men and women reported 
receiving some or a great deal of moral support. Very few respondents 
benefitted from direct clerical assistance from their spouses. The time spent in 
child care, domestic work and in family errands by the wives of the men was 
significantly greater than that spent by the husbands of the women in the 
sample: 3.32 (sd=2.0), 2.86 (sd=1.54), and 1.16 (sd=0.80) hours per day 
respectively compared to 1.59 (sd=1.32), 0.79 (sd=0.78), and 1.12 (sd=0.94), 
hours per day respectively.  
 The correlations between types of assistance and perceived spousal support 
(Table 14.3) suggest both similarities and differences in variables men and 
women consider in their respective calculations of spousal support. The 
relationships between moral support, assists with social connections, 
professional advice and spousal support are significant for both but somewhat 
stronger for men. The greatest gender difference, however, is in time spent in 
housework which is associated with perceived spousal support for women but 
not for men. This implies that men tend not to view the daily hours that their 
wives invest in housework as making a contribution to their careers. 
 
 TABLE 14.3  Pearson Correlations between Perceived Spousal 
 Support and Type of Assistance, by Gender 
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The Measures 
 The dependent variable is a general subjective assessment of spousal help. 
The literature suggests that it is the perceived support that an individual 
receives which affects his/her behavior (Mortimer et al. 1978, Orthner and 
Pittman 1986, Pittman and Orthner 1988). Spousal help was measured by a 
direct question which asked the respondent: "all in all, how would you evaluate 
your spouse's contribution to your career?" Response possibilities were ranked 
from 1 to 5, where 5 (the highest level of help) was "contributed a great deal"; 4 
"contributed some- what"; 3 "didn't contribute but didn't disturb"; 2 "disturbed 
somewhat" and 1 (the lowest level) "disturbed a great deal." Spousal help, the 
dependent variable, was treated once as a continuous variable, and Ordinary 
Least Squares regressions were estimated, and once as a dichotomous variable. 
In the latter case, the dependent variable was equal to 1 if the spouse helped, 
and 0 if the spouse did not help. In the latter case regressions were estimated by 
the logit method. 
 It is not obvious which of these two regression methods is more appropriate 
for our purpose of estimating the effects of the explanatory variables on spousal 
help. The linear regression has the advantage of utilizing all levels of possible 
help (1-5) but has also the drawback of treating help levels as a quantitative 
continuous variable with the assumption that the distance between various 
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answers are all equal. This assumption of identical distances affects the size of 
the coefficients but probably not the sign and significance, which are our main 
concern. This is supported by our experiments giving other weights to the five 
possible answers to the question of whether the respondent's spouse helps, 
assuming that the distance between one answer and the next is not necessarily 
the same (for instance, "helps a lot" = 12, "helps" = 10, "does not help and does 
not disturb" = 7, "disturbs" = 2 and "disturbs a lot" = 0). Alternatively, we 
experimented with transforming the dependent variable using two alternative 
types of transformation: the logarithmic one (assuming decreasing distances 
between the 5 values) and the quadratic one (assuming increasing distances 
between the five values). As the results were not very different (in terms of sign 
and significance) we preferred to use the original scale.  
 On the other hand, while the logit regression is free of the assumptions of 
continuity of the dependent variable, it generates a loss of information, as we 
are referring to only two possibilities: helped or did not help. This lack of more 
detailed information could result in insignificant coefficients for some of the 
explanatory variables. The use of both estimation techniques contributes to the 
robustness of the results and the theory. 
 In addition, respondents were asked about specific types of spousal help 
including professional advice, establishing social connections, clerical services, 
moral support, time spent in child care and in domestic work (including family 
errands). These specific types of assistance are not included in the measure of 
the dependent variable but are presented to enrich our understanding of what 
respondents have in mind when they evaluate their spouses' contribution to 
their careers. 
 In both types of regressions the independent variables were: age, years of 
own schooling and of spouse schooling, age of youngest child, the share of 
family income earned by the respondent, religiosity and religiosity of family of 
origin (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person or the family is traditional or 
orthodox), ethnicity of the respondent (a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
respondent was born in Asia or Africa or when the respondent was Israeli-born 
whose father was born in Asia or Africa), and spouse's ethnicity (a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the spouse was born in Asia or Africa). 
 In addition, we included the square value of age, to take into account 
non-linearities in the effect of age on spousal help, as well as the interaction of 
the respondent's education and the spouse's education, to test for possible 
complementarity between the effect of the worker's education and that of the 
spouse. Complementarity would produce a positive interaction term. 
Alternatively, if such interaction term were found to be negative, it might 
indicate that spouse's education substitutes for the worker's education (see 
Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman 1991). 
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 In the linear regressions each coefficient measures a marginal contribution, 
i.e., the extent to which the dependent variable--a ranking of spousal help-
-responds when an explanatory variable changes by one unit. In the logistic 
regressions, the reported coefficients are the coefficients of an equation 
ln(p/(1-p)) = a + bx, where p is the probability that the dichotomous variable 
equals 1 (Becker 1965). 
 Findings 
 Table 14.4 presents the results of linear regressions where spousal help is 
defined as a continuous variable with a range between 1 and 5. Table 14.5 
reports logit regression results. Both tables present results for male and female 
managers separately. The results of both types of regression are similar. The 
linear regression results, however, are statistically more significant. This is 
probably because the use of dichotomous variables in the logit regressions 
results in a loss of information: only two possibilities are considered, compared 
to five in the linear regressions. Most of the following discussion relates to the 
results based on the continuous variables (Table 14.4). 
 The more educated the female manager, the more she benefits from her 
husband's help (Table 14.4).  Each  additional  year of schooling raises the 
 
 TABLE 14.4  Linear Regressions of Spousal Help, by Gender, 
 Israeli Managers, 1987 
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degree of help by 0.2 points. This result supports the prediction derived from 
human capital theory (Hypothesis K19), however only in the case of women. We 
had predicted an education effect for both men and women. 
 Another prediction derived from human capital theory is that workers 
married to more educated spouses would also receive more spousal help 
(Hypothesis K20). Again, the regression (Table 14.4) confirms this prediction 
for women but not for men, the coefficient of women's spouse's schooling being 
positive and significant. The fact that the more educated the husband, the 
greater his contribution to his wife's career is also in keeping with the 
prediction derived from culture theory and social norms. The logistic 
regressions of Table 14.4 show the same sign for own schooling and spouse's 
schooling, but the coefficients are insignificant. Despite the strong correlation 
between husband and wife education (r = .514 for the female sample and r = 
.524 for the male sample) the coefficients for both the women and their spouses' 
education were significant in Table 14.4.  
 When we tested whether own schooling and spouse's schooling are 
complements or substitutes by including the interaction of both schooling levels 
(see Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman 1991), we found that in the regression 
for female managers such interaction term took a negative sign. This can be 
interpreted as indicating that for a female manager her education and her 
husband's education are substitutes: the more educated one of the spouses, the 
smaller the contribution of the other's education to the manager's career. To 
calculate the net effect of both her schooling and spouse's schooling on help 
received by a female manager, we deducted the interaction term multiplied by 
the spouse's schooling from the direct effect of her schooling. Considering that 
both the managers and their spouses had an average of 15 years of schooling, 
the full effect of a year of own schooling on a female manager's spousal help is 
0.026, (0.191 - 0.011 x 15). Likewise, the full effect of a year of spouse's 
schooling is 0.030, (0.195 - 0.011 x 15). 
 The hypothesis based on a human capital perspective which predicted a U-
curve relationship between age and spousal help (Hypothesis K22) was also 
confirmed. This can be seen in the coefficients of age and age squared. Age 
takes on a negative coefficient in the regressions in Tables 14.4 and 14.5. 
However, only in the regressions for female managers (both the linear 
regression in Table 14.4 and the logit regression in Table 14.5) are these 
coefficients statistically significant. We also find that the coefficient of "age 
square" is positive in regressions for female managers in Tables 14.4 and 14.5, 
indicating that the effect of age is not linear. The amount of help a husband 
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gives his wife decreases until she reaches 50 (48 years according to Table 14.4), 
after which it increases. This non-linear pattern is predicted  by the human 
capital theory discussed above. The social norms perspective explains the 
negative sign of age, but not the non-linearity we found. 
 The magnitude of the effects of education and age appear different for men 
and women. To test for the significance of the difference, we ran a pooled 
regression of both male and female managers and included interaction terms 
between gender and all the other explanatory variables. We found that the 
above-mentioned differences between male and female managers were 
statistically significant. 
 Human capital theory did not lead to a clear prediction regarding the effect 
of the worker's relative earnings on spousal help (Hypothesis K21), whereas 
from culture theory we derived a hypothesis that relative earnings and spousal 
help are negatively related. We found an insignificant coefficient for relative 
income in all regressions (Benham 1974). 
 A perspective of human capital investments in the home also led us to 
predict that women with younger children would receive more help from their 
spouses. As can be seen from Tables 14.4 and 14.5 the coefficient of age of the 
youngest child is negative. This confirms our prediction: the younger the child 
the more the female manager benefits from her husband's  
help. Results from our pooled regression showed that taken in absolute value 
the coefficient of "age of youngest child" had a significantly stronger effect for 
female managers than for male managers. Of the predictions derived from the 
culture theory, religiosity contributes to explaining the variation in spousal 
help, but only in the case of men. Men who define 
 
 TABLE 14.5  Logit a Regressions of Spousal Help, by Gender, 
 Israeli Managers, 1987 
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themselves as religiously orthodox or traditional are more likely to benefit from 
spousal help. 
 In contrast to our prediction, however, women who define themselves as 
religious or traditional do not receive less help from their spouses than other 
women. Religiosity is one of the few coefficients which is insignificant in the 
regression for female managers (see Table 14.4). 
 We predicted that the effect of a traditional or religious family would be 
similar to that of a self-evaluation as traditional or religious. To our surprise, 
we found that when both variables are included in a regression of spousal help, 
they have opposite signs. In both Tables 14.4 and 14.5 and for both male and 
female managers we found that respondents who had grown up in religious or 
traditional families reported less spousal help. While this confirms our 
predictions for female workers, this result surprises us for male workers. 
 As predicted, women married to husbands of Eastern origin receive less 
spousal help than do women married to men of Western origin. Contrary to our 
prediction, however, the ethnic origin of the wife did not affect the amount of 
help reportedly received by male managers. We did not predict the higher 
reported level of help received by female managers of Eastern origin. 
 Discussion 
 The major purpose of this study was to identify the factors that influence the 
amount of support or assistance for their careers that managers get from their 
spouses. The effect of variables derived from a human capital perspective, in 
addition to the effects of cultural norms, were examined separately by gender. It 
appears from our findings that about two-thirds of the married Israeli managers 
in our study acknowledged that their spouses helped promote their career. Such 
a finding supports explanations of the observed higher earnings of married 
male workers in terms of human capital theory. If a majority of the married 
men in our sample reported that their spouses contributed to their success at 
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work, then it should not come as a surprise that married men earn more than 
unmarried men. We also found that a majority of the married women in our 
sample reported being helped by their spouses.  
 Our study suggests ways in which such help might attenuate earnings 
differentials between unmarried and married women. The fact that working 
women receive substantial help from their spouses could explain why most 
studies do not find that married women earn less than unmarried women. 
Existing patterns of specialization in the home lead us to expect that the 
married woman who works full-time outside the home is in a disadvantageous 
situation: she typically has time-consuming responsibilities in the home, which 
she has to combine with a full-time paid job. This may be particularly difficult 
for a married woman working as a manager. 
 What this chapter brings out, is that husbands tend to help their employed 
wives when it is most productive to do so. That help can be more productive, 
either because the wife is more educated, or because she spends more time at 
home. For instance, managers with young children receive more spousal help 
than managers with older children. If husbands help more when their wives 
find it most difficult to handle a full-time paid job in terms of possible time 
conflicts, the major source of income variance due to a woman's marital status 
is neutralized, and one expects relatively small differences in earnings between 
married and unmarried working women. 
 The fact that husbands substitute for some of their wives' responsibilities 
also explains why the interaction of wife's and husband's education had a 
negative sign in our regression of spousal help received by female managers. 
We also found that younger women receive more help from their husbands, 
which can be interpreted in three ways: the husband's help may be more 
productive because there are more young children, his help may be more 
productive because she has a longer career ahead of her, or his values may be 
less traditional. This relationship with age was found to be curvilinear; older 
women may have more health problems and need for help.     
 A point generally overlooked in the literature on this subject, is the impact 
of expected returns on investment. In a period of easy divorce and opportunities 
for independent careers, people are less likely to invest in a spouse's career if 
their chances of personally benefiting from this investment are slim (see 
Chapter 12). The willingness of a spouse to invest in a worker's career, 
therefore, depends both on the probability of divorce and on the profitability of 
the investment. For instance, if young age simultaneously increases the 
profitability of spousal investments and the probability of divorce, its net effect 
on spousal help may be insignificant. The longer the marriage, the more it is 
likely to continue, and the more a spouse has reason to invest in the worker's 
earnings potential, even though this potential may have declined over time. We 
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assume, however, that these considerations are not important in Israel where 
the divorce rate is relatively low (approximately 20 percent) and divorce is 
equally as likely during the first five years as after 20 years of marriage.  It 
would follow that more spousal help would be reported in Israel than in a 
country with a higher divorce rate, such as the United States. 
 Few of the variables explaining the degree of spousal help reported by 
female managers also explained the degree of spousal help reported by male 
managers. This is not surprising, given the asymmetry in the division of labor 
typical of most households, including Israeli households. Working men do not 
have the same needs for spousal help as do working women. They do not 
experience time conflicts when their children are young in the same way 
women experience such conflicts. This may explain why none of the hypotheses 
derived from the perspective of investments in productivity of spousal labor are 
corroborated in the regressions we estimated for male managers. 
 We can also speculate why the hypotheses based on an analysis of 
productivity at work did not hold for men. One possible explanation is that our 
dependent variable, spousal help, as a subjective assessment is influenced by 
the respondent's willingness to acknowledge receiving such help. Possibly, for 
men, more than for women, the variance in the dependent variable may be 
explained by factors that affect men's willingness to acknowledge receiving 
career assistance from their spouses. Furthermore, the very notion of the 
supportive wife who achieves vicariously through her husband and is a 
helpmate to him is at the heart of the relationship in a traditional marriage. 
Among less traditional or more modern couples there is likely to be greater 
competition, and demand for equality and reciprocity. 
 In conclusion, this study throws new light on the relationship between 
marriage and success in the workplace. The fact that both men and women 
recognize that their success at work benefits from spousal help, suggests that 
the often found correlations between earnings and marital status are not simply 
the result of a selection process whereby people earning more find it easier to 
get married or stay married. Our evidence shows that there are real transfers of 
time and resources behind the comparative success of married workers. 
 In the case of women managers, the possible benefits from spousal help are 
relatively easy to define. We show that spousal help is most likely to be reported 
where such help is most productive. We hope that this study will encourage 
further explorations of the determinants of spousal help, and of the link 
between such help and differentials in earnings between married and unmarried 
workers. 
 Notes 
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 1.  Empirically, it is difficult to separate the explanation of earnings as a function 
of marital status from the explanation of marital status as a function of earnings (see 
Conlisk 1988). 
 2.  The major ethnic cleavage in Israel among Jews is between those from the 
Moslem dominated cultures of the Middle East and North Africa, locally known as 
Easterners and those from the cultures of Europe, North and South America, locally 
known as Westerners. The former tend to be more religious, less educated and generally 
more traditional. 
 3.  In order to calculate the marginal contribution of an explanatory variable on p, 
we can use the approximation bp(1-p), where b is the coefficient of the logistic 
regression and p the probability estimated through the regression (generally at the mean 
value of all the explanatory variables). 
 4.  We are only reporting the separate regressions for male and female managers, 
for they are easier to read. The results of the pooled regressions are available upon 
request. 
 5.  Similarly, spouse's occupational status (defined according to the Kraus scale 
which takes values from 1 to 10) did not have a significant effect on spousal help, 
neither by itself nor in interaction with schooling (Kraus et al. 1978). However, when 
we ran regressions where the dependent variable was spousal help operationalized as 
professional advice, the husband's occupational status had a positive and significant 
effect on spousal help received by female managers. In contrast, the wife's occupational 
status did not affect the amount of professional advice a husband reported receiving. 
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 Religiosity and Investments 
 in Spousal Productivity 
 (with Shoshana Neuman) 
  Religiosity, defined as a set of personal attributes, skills, and preferences 
inspired or emphasized by religious ideology,1 is expressed in the form of (1) 
religious activities such as church attendance or observance of religious codes 
of behavior, and (2) purchase of religious goods and services. These religious 
activities and goods--hence defined as religion--can be analyzed as either  
consumption or investment. Religiosity is human capital to the extent that 
religion can be considered as an investment. For instance, religion can provide 
peace of mind and, consequently, lead to improved health, which in turn may 
lead to higher labor productivity on the job or in marriage (i.e. in labor and 
spousal labor, as defined in Chapter 3). Furthermore, religion can also be 
viewed as investment to the extent that engaging in religious activities today 
can improve individual satisfaction from such activities in the future.  
 If religion is consumption, religiosity has no impact on future productivity  
at home, outside the home, or in leisure defined as time for self. While 
recognizing the other aspects of religiosity, in this chapter we focus on 
religiosity as a form of human capital, and more specifically, on spouses 
helping investments in such human capital.  
 Spousal labor is similar to labor in many ways. One aspect of such similarity 
is that people can invest in their human capital raising their pro- 
 
                                           
 
 Adapted from "Economic Behavior, Marriage and Religiosity," Journal of 
Behavioral Economics 15 (Spring/Summer 1986): 71-83. We are indebted to Yehuda 
Ben-Meir and Peri Kedem for letting us use the data they collected, to John Conlisk, 
Roger Frantz, Jacques Silber and Adrian Ziderman for helpful comments. Support from 
the Economics Research Institute, Bar-Ilan University, is gratefully acknowledged. 
ductivity both at work (labor productivity) and in marriage (productivity in 
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spousal labor). Some of these human capital investments occur in the process of 
working, in which case we have on-the-job-training at the workplace and in-
marriage-learning in the case of marriage. Individuals learn skills on the job or 
in a marriage through experience and exposure to co-workers or spouses. One 
can possibly invest in religiosity as human capital by learning from a spouse's 
practice of religion. If such investments take place, one expects a positive 
correlation between individual and spouse's religiosity. As others did before us, 
we find that when both spouses have a similar religious orientation the husband 
participates more intensively in religious activities (see Azzi and Ehrenberg 
1975, Long and Settle 1977, Ehrenberg 1977, Neuman 1982, Ulbrich and 
Wallace 1983). While such positive correlation between spouses' religiosity can 
be interpreted in terms of investment in  correlation human capital, it also 
makes sense as the reflection of compatible preferences in consumption. The 
advantage of looking at this question from the perspective of investments in 
spousal productivity is that it helps us derive hypotheses regarding factors 
influencing the positive correlation between husband's and wife's religiosity. 
These hypotheses are then tested using a sample of Israeli Jewish couples.  
 In view of a general lack of adequate measures of religiosity, especially in 
studies of economic behavior, our empirical work is restricted to an estimation 
of the impact of wives' religiosity on Jewish husbands' time spent on religious 
observance. By further exploring the association between spouse's religiosity 
and individual behavior we possibly find evidence of a post-marital learning 
process. We also find that the men whose religious observance is strongly 
correlated to wife's religiosity tend to have higher levels of secular education, 
which possibly reflects the effect of education on the process of in-marriage-
learning. 
 It is by now well established that economic behavior, such as work and 
consumption, is affected by family considerations. Ever since Mincer's (1962) 
pathbreaking work on female labor supply in a family context, wives' labor 
supply, and very often husbands' labor supply as well, has been modeled as a 
family decision. Triggered in part by Becker's (1965) and Lancaster's (1966) 
theory of household allocation of time, economists have been studying an 
increasing range of economic behavior within a household context. The 
perspective taken in this book is a variation on that theme. Instead of families 
jointly allocating their resources, individual decision-making is conceived of as 
constrained by spousal availability and characteristics. A number of existing 
findings can be interpreted either in terms of joint household decision-making 
or individual decision-making taking account of marriage markets. 
 (1) Wives' added worker effect (Mincer 1962) describing an observed 
tendency for married women to enter the labor force when their 
husbands are unemployed.  
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 (2) Some aspects of husbands' labor supply have been shown to vary with 
wives' labor related characteristics such as her wages or potential 
wages (Lundberg 1985). 
 (3) Benham's (1974) finding that husbands of more educated wives earn 
higher wages has in part been interpreted as evidence for wives' 
contribution towards their husband's productivity at work (see Chapter 
12). Likewise, one could potentially interpret large observed positive 
differentials in wages between married and unmarried men as an 
indication of wives' contribution to their husbands' productivity. 
Substantiation for such claims found in the sociological literature and 
alternative interpretations of marital status differentials in earnings are 
discussed in earlier chapters. Marital differentials in men's earnings 
are also expected to be related to individual characteristics of both 
husband and wife, and the type of matching between such 
characteristics. Marital differentials in men's earnings, men's marital 
status, and type of matching are probably jointly determined. The 
economic literature which considers households as given cannot 
incorporate such simultaneity. In contrast, all these variables can be 
incorporated simultaneously on the base of the theoretical framework 
presented in this book, which examines the joint determination of 
selection of wife's and husband's characteristics and wife's labor 
supply.  
 (4) Economic behavior and marriage are also related in the sense that 
factors influencing the marriage market, such as the ratio of male to 
female marriage eligibles, affects female labor supply (see Part Three). 
 (5) Economists working in the household economics tradition have also 
studied spouses' effects on aspects of behavior not considered as 
"economic" in a strict sense. For instance, health economist Grossman 
1976) has found that wives' schooling has a positive impact on 
husband's health.  
 Economists have thus established that spouses' characteristics such as labor 
force participation, wages and education, affect the economic as well as non-
economic behavior of married men and women. One effect on individual 
behavior that has been neglected is the effect of own and spouse's religiosity. 
 The lack of attention economists pay to religiosity as a factor influencing 
economic behavior results in part from a view pervading Western thought 
which separates religious from worldly matters. Such separation is reflected 
even in journals such as The Journal of Political Economy, which has been 
associated with the new household economics for many years. The articles it 
has published which deal with religion have studied religious activities such as 
church attendance or contributions to charities as dependent variables (Azzi 
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and Ehrenberg 1975, Long and Settle 1977, and Ehrenberg 1977). When 
economists study the relation between economic behavior and religion, they 
generally use poor indicators of type and level of religiosity, such as current 
religious affiliation, or Jewish background (e.g., Friedman 1972, Solomon 
1980, Tomes, 1983). Economists have rarely used variables indicating degree 
or nature of religiosity in terms of depth or type of beliefs or level of skills and 
attributes taught or emphasized by a religion. Exceptions are Medoff's (1984) 
study of female relative success at work as a function of religiosity defined as 
percentage of the population in fundamentalist Christian denominations, 
Medoff and Skov's (1992) study relating the same measure of religiosity to 
marriage, divorce, and other demographic variables, Tomes' (1984) research on 
earnings and religion in which an individual was raised, and Lerner and 
Chiswick's (1992) study on religion and divorce. Some sociologists, especially 
those working in the Weberian tradition, have looked more at the content of 
religiosity as it relates to economic behavior but their contributions also have 
serious shortcomings (e.g., Greeley 1963). 
 The following theory analyzes the effect of own religiosity and spouse's 
characteristics, including religiosity, on economic behavior. 
 Theory 
 Within a framework of allocation of time by utility-maximizing individuals, 
labor supply and consumption are a function of time spent by spouse on various 
activities as well as of characteristics of self and spouse. The same explanatory 
factors also affect the amount of time allocated to other dimensions of behavior, 
often called leisure. 
 The following model is in the tradition of previous theories of allocation of 
time such as Becker's (1965). It is different in that it treats individual members 
of a household as separate maximizers. Although spouse's influence on own 
behavior has been analyzed in past economic research, it has been done within 
the theoretical framework of household utility maximization, which assumes 
the existence and composition of a couple as given. In contrast, in the theory of 
labor and marriage presented in this book the decision to marry or to stay 
married is integrated with other choices, such as labor supply or consumption. 
This model also differs from previous theories of allocation of time to religious 
activities (e.g., Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975) in that it considers religiosity as a set 
of attitudes and skills. 
 Assume an individual i can allocate time to two types of activities, work and 
spousal labor.
2
  A utility function is defined directly in terms of inputs:  
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 ), x ,h ,h ,l( U = U ijiiii  (15.1) 
 
 
where i,j = f, m (m = male, f = female, i  j);  l  denotes time allocated to labor; 
  h  is home-time;  and   x  denotes commercial goods. 
 Home-time is defined as any time not spent at work (it includes both spousal 
labor and time for self, in terms of the model presented in Chapter 3). Own 
labor may generate disutility, i.e. the first derivative of U by l is assumed to be 
negative whereas the first derivatives of U by the other inputs are generally 
positive. One of the inputs is time the spouse contributes to the home hj. 
Marriage is viewed as an exchange of spousal labor, defined as an activity an 
individual engages in for his or her spouse's benefit.  In terms of equation 15.1, 
some hi could be conceived of as spousal labor, the rest being pure leisure or 
time for self. (The model defines hj, spouse's home time, purely as labor 
benefiting the spouse). All men and women interested in marriage participate 
in marriage markets, specifically defined as markets for wives' and husbands' 
spousal labor (see Chapter 3). Equilibrium values of the quasi-wage for spousal 
labor, w*, are established in such markets. Individual marriages occur when at 
market w*'s the quantity of spousal labor supplied by one spouse equals that 
quantity demanded by the other spouse. Costs of divorce may keep some 
marriages alive even if there are potentially preferable matches available in the 
market. Individual skills and attributes which increase productivity and the 
utility of both kinds of time enter both the utility function and the following 
budget constraint:3 
 
where w is market wage for labor; w* is market wage for spousal labor; V is 
non-wage income; p is the price vector for commercial goods, A are skills and 
attributes improving productivity at work, and G are skills and attributes 
improving home-time productivity (of both individual i and spouse j). Higher 
levels of A and G affect individual utility not only directly via productivity in l 
and h, but can also modify preferences, thus entering directly into equation 
15.1. 
  By solving 15.1 subject to 15.2 and a time constraint, T = li + hi, one 
obtains supplies of time to work and home-time and demands for goods and 
services. All these individual supplies and demands are functions of the skills 
and attributes affecting productivity at work and in the home and utility from 
the various activities, goods and services. Moreover, due to the interdependence 
of all three functions, spouse's skills and attributes affecting the utility of his 
time at home also have an impact on all allocative decisions. Any personal 
  ,h )G( * w+ x p = V + l )A( w jjjiiiiii  (15.2) 
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attribute influencing own productivity in spousal labor, Gi, or in labor, Ai, or in 
spouse's productivity Gj which could cause a shift in demand or supply of 
spousal labor, will influence the decision to marry and marital choice. Both 
spouses' productivity in spousal labor, Gi, and Gj, are elements by which 
marriage partners select each other. If higher levels of a particular type of G 
shift husband's and wife's demand and supply of spousal labor to the right, 
selection of partners with highly correlated levels of G will be observed. This is 
called homogamy in the sociological literature, and positive sorting in Becker's 
(1974a,1981) theory of marriage. 
 Skills and attributes which increase spousal productivity are generally 
expected to lead to homogamy. First, because they simultaneously increase 
demand and supply of spousal labor. Second, after marriage occurs, an 
individual may become more productive in spousal labor because he or she 
benefits from a spouse's skills. Formally, this implies that in utility function 
15.1 Gj enters as an independent term, not only as an influence on hj's 
productivity. Spouse j could also have a direct impact on i's activity levels and 
on i's productivity (see Chapter 12). 
 Any productivity-enhancing trait of a spouse, such as education, health, or 
religiosity, can be related to an individual's performance at work or in 
consumption due to a sorting mechanism or via a post-marriage effect, whereby 
spouse's j attributes Gj influence individual i's productivity (in-marriage-
learning) or behavior. 
 It is desirable to differentiate between selectivity in marriage and active 
contributions by spouses, in view of the many potential implications involved. 
For instance, if wives with given attributes actively encourage their husband's 
careers, that would add to the benefits men derive from marriage. Marriage 
would be viewed more in terms of an investment than as consumption, as it is 
generally viewed by economists. 
 In an attempt to disentangle selectivity from direct contributions by spouses, 
one can take account of marital duration and changes in individual behavior 
over time. This has been attempted by Kenny (1983) in the case of the 
association between marital status and earnings. As mentioned by Kenny 
(1983), this is no proof of the existence of investments in marriage. 
 
Religiosity  
 The economics of human resources principally emphasizes two kinds of 
human capital A and G: education and investment in health. (As pointed out by 
Grossman (1976), investments in health and education are interrelated). 
 People's mental attitudes can also influence utility and productivity at work 
and in the home, as has been pointed out by behavioral scientists and 
economists such as Leibenstein (1981). Religiosity as defined here is part of 
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these mental attitudes and can also be viewed as a component of human capital 
A and G. For instance, belief in the puritan ethic can drive somebody to be a 
good worker on the job or at home. Consequently, own and spouse's religiosity 
could shift supplies of labor and demand for goods. 
 Moreover, one expects interactions between various types of skills 
individuals acquire, such as skills obtained through education, health and 
religiosity. For instance, religiosity and health could reinforce each other (a 
healthy soul in a healthy body), and education could weaken religiosity if 
values acquired through education stand in contradiction with religious tenets. 
The effect of a particular element of human capital on a particular activity or 
good need not necessarily be positive. The sign and impact of religiosity will 
depend on the values embodied in a religion (for instance, whether it 
encourages work effort), individual characteristics, and possible interaction 
effects between those two. 
 Religiosity is expected to influence work and consumption. It certainly is 
expected to influence time individuals spend "in the home," in the general 
sense of time not spent at work. In particular, people with more religious 
attitudes will generally spend more time on religious activities, a component of 
h. The time intensity involved with the implementation of a particular brand of 
religiosity may vary widely. For instance, Jewish religiosity, which we will 
study in the empirical section, implies many time-consuming activities, 
especially from men. 
 Next, this perspective is used to derive a number of predictions regarding 
the relationship between spouse's religiosity and individual time devoted to 
religious activities. This human capital perspective is valuable as a basis for 
interpreting the empirical results regarding the effect of wife's religiosity on 
husband's religious activities which are presented in the next section. The 
following empirical analysis attempts to separate between these two kinds of 
causality in the case of the well-known positive association between a husband's 
and a wife's religiosity. This positive association between a husband's and a 
wife's religiosity, which has been observed in the literature, could possibly 
result from the two kinds of causality mentioned above. First, there may exist a 
tendency for positive sorting, i.e., homogamy. Religious partners may select 
each other to avoid potential conflicts over values or to increase the household's 
productivity in the production of services of a religious nature, including 
intergenerational (utility) transfers from grown-up children pursuing their 
parents' lifestyle. Such an approach is consistent with that of Ulbrich and 
Wallace (1983) who regard a situation where both spouses are of the same 
denomination "as enhancing the consumption benefits (joint consumption) or 
reducing the costs (marital discord)." Similarly, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) 
argue that "The social value of religious activity is probably higher for families 
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in which both spouses are of the same religion." 
 Alternatively, a person could influence his or her spouse's level of religiosity 
through a process of investment in the partner, i.e. in-marriage-learning. Such 
investment could be direct through formal or informal religious teachings, or 
indirect in the form of encouragement, making time available for religious 
practice, or exposure to a role-model. This alternative explanation would 
reinforce the hypothesis that wives can influence their husband's productivity in 
the labor market and in health production. 
 We now look at religious activity, spouse's religiosity, marital duration and 
(secular) education. 
 Religiosity and Marital Duration. As mentioned above, if changes in 
individual behavior occur during the duration of a marriage, this could possibly 
mean that investments occur in marriage (although this is no proof). We 
consider religious activities as a component of hi and religiosity of i and j as 
components of Gi and Gj. If there are no direct effects of Gj on hi, but solely a 
selectivity effect, then at time 0, when the marriage starts 
where the selection of Gj reflects selectivity by homogamy.  Similarly, at a later 
time T in the course of the marriage 
The effect of Gj on hio is not expected to differ from its effects on hiT.  But, if Gj 
has a direct effect on hi it is predicted to grow over time with marital duration.  
Consequently, under such a scenario the effect of Gj on hiT would be larger than 
that on hio.  
 In light of this discussion, and the gender differentiation inherent in 
Judaism, the following hypothesis will be tested.4 
 Hypothesis K23  
 The husband's religious activities are likely to be positively related to 
marital duration and wife's religiosity. 
 If this hypothesis is confirmed that could possibly mean that the longer a 
marriage survives, i.e., the larger T, the more Gj, spouse's religiosity, has an 
opportunity to influence hiT, observed religious activities at time T. This would 
be evidence of a direct investment by spouses in their partner's skills and 
preferences. Alternatively, confirmation of the hypothesis could also reflect the 
longer duration of marriage between partners who selected each other for their 
 ),G ,G( 0h = 0h jiii  (15.3) 
 ).G ,G( h = h jiiTiT  (15.4) 
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similar characteristics. 
 Religiosity and Education. Another potential way to check whether spouse's 
G has a direct effect on individual behavior is to consider interactions between 
different types of G, in particular, education and religiosity. From a perspective 
of religiosity as human capital, it is expected that (1) own secular education 
could weaken own religiosity if it develops an alternative set of secular values, 
and (2) education of both spouses can enhance communication between spouses 
and consequently facilitate any direct spousal influence and in-marriage-
learning. Effects (1) and (2) go in opposite directions. Effect (2) relates to the 
interaction between the two spouses' education and one spouse's religiosity, and 
is more likely to occur at high levels of both spouses' education, if 
communication on ideological matters requires a certain level of intellectual 
sophistication. If that is the case, 
  Hypothesis K24 
 The relation between husband's observance and wife's religiosity is 
expected to be strongest amongst educated people. 
 Given effects (1) and (2), the relation posited in Hypothesis K24 may not be 
linear. 
 Data Analysis 
 The data for the present study were obtained from an unpublished survey of 
some 700 Jewish workers in Israel carried out by "Israel-Public Opinion 
Research Ltd." in June 1968. Respondents answered a battery of questions 
related to various areas of every day life, with an emphasis on religious 
activities. Information was also obtained regarding the socio-economic 
background of respondents, including age, number of children, schooling, 
family income, continent of birth and period of immigration. 
 For reasons mentioned above, we restricted our sample to men. In addition, 
we selected men defining themselves as either secular or traditional in order to 
increase the potential range of wive's influence on husband's religiosity. 
 The dependent variable is "time allocated to religious activity."  This was 
measured by summing the estimated number of yearly hours devoted by 
respondents to each of a series of religious activities (see Neuman 1982, 1986). 
Means and variances are given in Table 15.1. 
 The independent variables include a dummy for wife being defined as 
religious (as opposed to secular or traditional), dummies concerning length of 
residence in Israel, and continent of origin. 
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 Two independent variables are of particular interest to this study: duration 
of marriage and schooling. Duration of marriage and age were  
 
 TABLE 15.1 Israeli Men's Religious Practices, 
 Means and Variances, 1968 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strongly correlated so we could not include them both simultaneously.5  
Information on schooling was available only for the husband, but from other 
studies we know that wife's and husband's schooling are strong correlated (see 
Becker, 1981, for instance). The lack of information on spouse's education 
makes it even more likely that at higher levels of education the positive 
interaction between education and spouse's religiosity will tend to dominate the 
negative correlation between own education and own religiosity as reflected in 
the selection of a religious spouse. The more educated the husband, the more it 
is likely that the wife has the minimum level of education required for value 
communication, the basis of an in-marriage-learning effect. 
 Table 15.2 presents regressions of husband's religious practice. From 
column 1 it can be seen that when the wife is defined as religious the husband 
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spends significantly more hours practicing Judaism. The next three columns 
explore this relationship between wife's and husband's religiosity in an attempt 
to test Hypotheses K23 and K24. 
 Columns 2 and 3 illustrate how a wife's religiosity possibly affects her 
husband's hours of practice as a function of the duration of marriage. 
Regression 2 shows that the entire effect of wife's religiosity depends on the  
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 TABLE 15.2  Regressions of Israeli Men's Religious Practices, 1968 (N=357) 
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Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; * Significant at the 95% level; ** Significant at the 90% level. 
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duration of marriage: an interaction term of wife's religiosity and duration of marriage is highly 
significant, leaving wife's religiosity as a separate term without any explanatory power. The coefficient 
of duration of marriage is significantly positive, reflecting mainly the influence of age on religiosity.
6
 
 Regression 3 tells us more about the relationship between wife's and husband's religiosity and 
duration of marriage. Here we constructed three categories of marital duration. It can be seen that if a 
couple is married ten years or less the wife's religiosity is not significantly related to husband's religious 
practice.  If the couple has been married for between eleven and twenty years a religious wife adds close 
to 80 annual hours to the husband's religious practice, the coefficient being statistically significant. (This 
is a large amount considering that the sample's average annual hours of religious practice stands at 121.) 
 Even more impressive is the addition of 214 annual hours of practice if the wife is religious and the 
couple has been married over twenty years. This effect is considerably stronger than the separate effect 
of age. The findings in regressions 2 and 3 possibly confirm Hypothesis K23. It does not necessarily 
prove that the investment-encouragement explanation is more applicable then the selectivity hypothesis, 
however, for reasons discussed above. 
 The results presented in regression 4 strengthen the in-marriage-learning explanation. Here we 
separate the effect of wife's religiosity by husband's (secular) education. It is found that the men whose 
religious observance is strongly correlated to marriage to a religious wife all belong to the more 
educated group with thirteen years of schooling or more. It is also possible that it is the wife who did the 
in-marriage-learning, and that her definition as "religious" results from being married to an observant 
Jew. 
 This finding stands out in light of the generally negative effect of own schooling on husband's 
religiosity. In all regressions the coefficient of schooling is strongly negative. As pointed out by Neuman 
(1982) this can be the consequence of higher time costs since education and income are positively 
correlated and we did not have any information on income. Moreover, the negative coefficient of 
schooling could reflect secular-scientific views of the world which may conflict with a religious outlook. 
 However, it can be seen from regression 4 that men married to a religious wife and having over 13 
years of schooling spent more time practicing Jewish commandments than people with four years of 
schooling. 
 The presence of a religious wife thus overrides the negative impact of schooling. A possible 
explanation for this may be the readier means of communication between educated spouses--assuming 
the wife's education is strongly correlated to the husband's, as is usually the case--thus enabling 
influence on a spouse's religious practice. 
 Due to limited sample size, it was not practicable to create further interaction terms, taking account 
simultaneously of wife's religiosity, duration of marriage and husband's years of schooling.  
 Conclusions 
 This paper first addresses in general terms the relationship between individual behavior (including 
economic behavior), marriage, and religiosity.  Traditional economics insufficiently explores the 
possible impact of marriage and marriage markets on individual behavior. Such deficiency results in 
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part from ignoring processes of in-marriage-learning, the equivalent of On-the-Job-Training at the 
workplace. Another weakness of traditional economics lies in the insufficient attention it pays to 
attitudinal variables such as religiosity. This paper focuses on identifying possible evidence of in-
marriage-learning of religiosity. 
 An analysis of Israeli Jewish couples indicates that spouses may teach each other some religiosity 
during marriage. There seems to be a long run process of religiosity formation, whereby a spouse trains 
or encourages a partner with limited initial skills, and more so, the more educated the couple. More 
research is necessary in order to disentangle this investment in human capital explanation presented here 
from an alternative explanation based on associative matching. 
 The significance of these results extends beyond the scope of religious studies, as similar processes 
on in-marriage-learning could teach spouses a variety of skills and attitudes, including ones that are 
more directly relevant to economic behavior.   
 Notes 
 1.  This view of religiosity corresponds partially to Tomes' (1985) concept of 
religiosity as religious capital (see also Iannaccone 1990). 
 2.  This model is simpler than the model presented in Chapter 3, in which a 
person chooses between three uses of time: work l, work in the home h, and time for 
self s, where work in the home benefits a spouse.  Here hi and si are aggregated. 
 3.  Such skills and attributes are assumed to be at least in part of a "general" 
nature, which is why they can raise a person's wage or marital compensation (see 
Chapter 13). 
   4.  Jewish men are commanded to observe many more time-consuming laws, such 
as prayer in the synagogue, phylacteries, etc. than are Jewish women. 
 5.  This strong correlation is due to the classification of age at marriage into a 
small number of categories and the concentration of most respondents into the category 
of age at marriage in the early twenties. 
 6.  Neuman (1982, 1986) discusses the effect of age on religious practice both at 
a theoretical and empirical level. 
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 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 It is not up to you to complete the work yet you are not free  
 to desist from it. 
                      --Ethics of the Fathers, Talmud 
 
 This book has presented the major insights I have gained from eighteen 
years of research on marriage. As suggested from the subtitle, the major 
emphasis has been theoretical, although a number of chapters have also 
presented empirical results. An attempt was made to add to the existing 
literature on marriage by presenting: 
 1. New ways of organizing existing hypotheses, including connections 
between previously unrelated hypotheses. For instance, previously 
developed hypotheses regarding the effect of marriage squeezes on the 
likelihood of marriage inside a group (in-marriage) were connected to 
other marriage squeeze hypotheses and to other hypotheses regarding in-
marriage (see Chapters 3 and 8). 
 2. New hypotheses, such as the hypotheses regarding the effect of marriage 
squeezes on the participation of married women in the labor force. Some 
new hypotheses are extensions of existing hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between two variables. For instance, it has been 
hypothesized in the past that unexpected changes in income are 
positively related to the likelihood of divorce. New hypotheses were 
presented here regarding third variables which are expected to intervene 
in the relationship between the first two variables (see Chapters 3 and 
Conclusion 335 
 
 
 
10). Many of the new hypotheses that were presented regarded the 
predicted relationship between three variables, a type of hypothesis rarely 
found in the existing literature on marriage. 
 3. A few tests of the hypotheses, especially of some of the new hypotheses. 
 In addressing a subject matter as broad and multi-faceted as marriage, an 
attempt was made to take a multi-cultural perspective. Applications were 
presented in the context of a modern industrialized nation such as the 
contemporary U.S., nations in transition such as the U.S. in 1930 and Israel in 
the 1970s, and freshly industrializing nations such as Guatemala or Nigeria in 
the 1970s. While the perspective was broad in one sense, it was narrow in the 
sense conveyed in the title of this book. The reliance on economics found in 
this book was expressed as follows: 
 1. Focus on aspects of behavior such as labor supply, earnings and 
productivity, which are commonly considered legitimate applications of 
economics. 
 2. Use of demand and supply analysis. Many chapters are based on the 
concept of markets for spousal labor, as explained in Chapter 3. 
 3. Use of general equilibrium theory, which combines the analysis of 
markets for spousal labor and for labor in general. 
 4. Use of wage and income as explanatory variable (Chapters 3 to 11) or 
dependent variable (Part VI). 
 There are many ways in which the work presented here is incomplete and 
could benefit from further research. Here are some directions for future 
research: 
 1. More empirical tests of previously tested hypotheses, using better data 
and statistical techniques. 
 2. Tests of previously untested hypotheses. 
 3. More emphasis on policy-relevant issues. For instance, more could be 
said on the impact on income-maintenance programs and the welfare 
system, starting with some of the analysis found in Chapter 10.  
 4. Development of more legal implications. Some legal scholars have 
already become interested in this line of work (for instance, Ellman 
(1989) in his recent work on alimony). At the present time, more 
connections could easily been drawn to issues of legal concern such as 
divorce laws, spousal support, marriage contracts, and rights of 
cohabitating couples. Further cooperation between lawyers and scholars 
adopting the approach presented here could be very fruitful. 
 5. Refinements and extensions of the theory. 
 If this book will inspire at least a few capable people to expand their 
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research agenda in some of these directions, I will have the satisfaction of 
knowing that I did not waste my time.  
 I will feel equally happy if this book helps some individuals in reaching 
their goals with respect to marriage, labor or divorce. The analysis presented 
here can clarify the choices and constraints faced by individuals, and thereby 
help them make wiser decisions in their personal life. Informal counseling 
seems to have become a by-product of the classes in which I teach about this 
material. In one particular instance, a student who had become heavily involved 
in my work (in part, because he had gone to graduate school in economics at 
the University of Chicago...) credited my course for saving his third marriage. I 
hope that in the future, my work will help others save their second or first 
marriages as well, perhaps in part by helping them think rationally about their 
decision to marry and the circumstances surrounding that decision. Of course, I 
realize that the book is far from being written in the style of a self-help book, 
and that very few will delve deep enough in the abstract analyses to make 
connections to their personal life. Maybe one day I will write another book, 
which will make it easier for readers to reach such practical insights. 
 Finally, I allow myself to hope that some of the ideas presented here will 
also help policymakers. If this book can contribute in any way to the 
improvement of laws and administrative procedures related to marriage, labor 
and divorce, I will feel very honored.  
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